OPINION

PAUL L. MALONEY, District Judge.

This is a social security action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (Commissioner) denying Plaintiff's claim for supplemental security income (SSI) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative record, and provides that if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, it shall be conclusive. The Commissioner has found that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The scope of judicial review in a social security case is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in making her decision and whether there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting that decision. See Brainard v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court may not conduct a de novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. See Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). It is the Commissioner who is charged with finding the facts relevant to an application for disability benefits, and her findings are conclusive provided they are supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Cohen v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir. 1993). In determining the substantiality of the evidence, the Court must consider the evidence on the record as a whole and take into account whatever evidence in the record fairly detracts from its weight. See Richardson v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 735 F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1984). The substantial evidence standard presupposes the existence of a zone within which the decision maker can properly rule either way, without judicial interference. See Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). This standard affords to the administrative decision maker considerable latitude, and indicates that a decision supported by substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because the evidence would have supported a contrary decision. See Bogle, 998 F.2d at 347; Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Plaintiff was thirty-eight years of age on the date of the ALJ's decision. (PageID.43, 167.) She completed high school and has worked in the past as a cashier/checker, sale attendant, and as a sorter. (PageID.122, 287.) Plaintiff has previously applied for benefits in 2007, 2010, and 2012, which all resulted in unfavorable decisions. Plaintiff sought review of the 2012 decision in federal court and, on March 31, 2015, Magistrate Judge Green affirmed the decision of the Commissioner. See Ryan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:13-cv-1380 (W.D. Mich. Marc. 31, 2015) (ECF No. 13).

While her federal case was pending, Plaintiff also filed a new application for SSI on December 24, 2013, alleging that she had been disabled since August 13, 2012, due to bipolar disorder, depression, back pain, leg pain, migraines, shaking, and diabetes.1 (PageID.167, 259-263.) This application was denied upon initial review on February 28, 2014, after which time Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ. (PageID.183-189.) On February 24, 2015, Plaintiff appeared with her counsel before ALJ Stanley Chin for an administrative hearing at which time both Plaintiff and a vocational expert (VE) testified. (PageID.102-126.) On April 8, 2015, the ALJ issued his written decision, concluding that Plaintiff was not disabled. (PageID.43-65.) On March 21, 2016, the Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's decision, making it the Commissioner's final decision in the matter. (PageID.39-38.) Plaintiff subsequently initiated this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

ALJ'S DECISION

The social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential process for evaluating disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a-f).2 If the Commissioner can make a dispositive finding at any point in the review, no further finding is required. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). The regulations also provide that if a claimant suffers from a nonexertional impairment as well as an exertional impairment, both are considered in determining the claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC). See 20 C.F.R. § 416.945.

Plaintiff has the burden of proving the existence and severity of limitations caused by her impairments and that she is precluded from performing past relevant work through step four. Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003). At step five, it is the Commissioner's burden "to identify a significant number of jobs in the economy that accommodate the claimant's residual functional capacity (determined at step four) and vocational profile." Id.

ALJ Chin determined Plaintiff's claim failed at step five. At step one the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 24, 2013, her application date. (PageID.48.) At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of: (1) migraine headaches; (2) obesity; (3) cervical and lumbar spine disorders; (4) bipolar disorder; (5) schizoaffective disorder; (6) anxiety disorder; and (7) personality disorder. (PageID.49.) At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled the requirements of the Listing of Impairments found in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. (PageID.49-52.) At step four, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the RFC based on all the impairments to perform:

(PageID.52.) Continuing with the fourth step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was unable to perform any of her past relevant work. (PageID.58.) At the fifth step, the ALJ questioned the VE to determine whether a significant number of jobs exist in the economy that Plaintiff could perform given her limitations. See Richardson, 735 F.2d at 964. The VE testified that Plaintiff could perform work in the following representative jobs: addresser (25,819 national positions), table worker (13,738 national positions) and surveillance system monitor (17,284 national positions). (PageID.122-124.) Based on this record, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was capable of making a successful adjustment to work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. (PageID.59.)

Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled from December 24, 2013, through April 8, 2015, the date of decision. (PageID.60.)

DISCUSSION

On July 6, 2016, the Court entered a notice directing the filing of briefs in this matter. Among other things, the notice stated that Plaintiff's initial brief "must contain a Statement of Errors, setting forth in a separately numbered section, each specific error of fact or law upon which Plaintiiff seeks reversal or remand. Failure to identify an issue in the Statement of Errors constitutes a waiver of that issue." (PageID.962.) Plaintiff's initial brief provides only a vague and generic statement of errors. (PageID.970.) The Court must therefore frame the issues for review and gleans the following claims from Plaintiff's brief:

The Court will discuss those issues below.3

I. Treating Physician Rule.

Plaintiff's brief provides lengthy excerpts from a total of six different medical opinions from three different treating physicians. Dr. Nancy Devine, M.D., provided two opinions contained in a mental RFC questionnaire, one dated April 25, 2011, and the other dated April 27, 2012. (PageID.744-748, 775-779.) Dr. Devine's sole obligation regarding these questionnaires was to fill in a blank, circle an answer, check a box, or provide a short answer. Both opinions state Plaintiff was limited to an extent greater than as recognized by the ALJ. Specifically, the form discussed Plaintiff's capability to perform unskilled, semiskilled, and skilled work, as well as her ability to do particular types of jobs. In all these areas, the doctor found Plaintiff had substantial limitations. Furthermore, both opinions indicate that, were she to work, Plaintiff could be expected to be absent from work several times a month. (Id.) On September 2, 2011, Dr. Devine also completed a short checkbox opinion indicating that Plaintiff was unable to work. (PageID.780.) On April 10, 2014, and November 5, 2014, Dr. Andreas Sidiropoulos completed mental RFC questionnaires that were similar to those completed by Dr. Devine. Like Dr. Devine, Dr. Sidiropoulos also indicated Plaintiff's impairments led to restrictions greater than those accounted for in the ALJ's RFC determination. (PageID.708-713, 810-818.) Finally, on September 24, 2014, Dr. Ronel Santos completed a questionnaire entitled "Headaches Medical Source Statement." While this statement differed in substance from those completed by Dr. Devine and Dr. Sidiropoulos, it was similar in form in that the doctor's obligation was only to fill in a blank, circle an answer, check a box, or provide a short answer. Dr. Santos indicated that Plaintiff suffered from headaches of multiple types and of moderate intensity, seven days a week. Each headache lasted between twelve and twenty-four hours. He indicated Plaintiff would need to take unscheduled breaks, possibly five days a week, each for several hours. In total, Plaintiff would likely be off task for twenty-five percent or more of a workday, and would miss work more than four days a month. (PageID.823-826.) The ALJ provided the following discussion of these opinions.

(PageID.56-57.) Plaintiff contends the ALJ's discussion of these opinions was in error.

By way of background the treating physician doctrine recognizes that medical professionals who have a long history of caring for a claimant and her maladies generally possess significant insight into her medical condition. See Barker v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 1994). An ALJ must, therefore, give controlling weight to the opinion of a treating source if: (1) the opinion is "well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques" and (2) the opinion "is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record." Gayheart v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 375-76 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527).

Such deference is appropriate, however, only where the particular opinion "is based upon sufficient medical data." Miller v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 1991 WL 229979 at *2 (6th Cir., Nov. 7, 1991) (citing Shavers v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 839 F.2d 232, 235 n.1 (6th Cir. 1987)). The ALJ may reject the opinion of a treating physician where such is unsupported by the medical record, merely states a conclusion, or is contradicted by substantial medical evidence. See Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528; Miller, 1991 WL 229979 at *2 (citing Shavers, 839 F.2d at 235 n.1); Cutlip v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286-87 (6th Cir. 1994).

If an ALJ accords less than controlling weight to a treating source's opinion, the ALJ must "give good reasons" for doing so. Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 376. Such reasons must be "supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source's medical opinion and the reasons for that weight." This requirement "ensures that the ALJ applies the treating physician rule and permits meaningful review of the ALJ's application of the rule." Id. (quoting Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004)). Simply stating that the physician's opinions "are not well-supported by any objective findings and are inconsistent with other credible evidence" is, without more, too "ambiguous" to permit meaningful review of the ALJ's assessment. Id. at 376-77.

At this point it is important to recognize what Plaintiff is, and is not, alleging. Notably, even after the most indulgent reading, Plaintiff does not argue the ALJ failed to provide good reasons for assigning less than controlling weight to the opinions of these three physicians.4 In other words, Plaintiff does not claim the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of the physicians. Instead, Plaintiff merely lists the doctors' various opinions, and then cherry picks record evidence (some of which are beyond the scope of this Court's review5) that she claims supports the opinions. Plaintiff's burden on appeal is much higher than citing evidence on which the ALJ could have found a greater level of restriction. She must show that the ALJ's factual finding is not supported by substantial evidence. "[T]he Commissioner's decision cannot be overturned if substantial evidence, or even a preponderance of the evidence, supports the claimant's position, so long as substantial evidence also supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ." See Jones, 336 F.3d at 477. As all Plaintiff has done is point to evidence from which the ALJ could have reached a different decision, her claim must fail. This is because Plaintiff's alleged errors essentially ask this Court to re-weigh the evidence with respect to the medical opinions without demonstrating, or even claiming, that the ALJ's treatment of these opinions is not supported by substantial evidence. In short, Plaintiff is asking this Court to perform a de novo review of the record. It is beyond the scope of this Court's review to perform such a review. See Brainard, 889 F.2d at 681.

2. SSR 96-5p.

Plaintiff closes her argument regarding the three physicians by contending that if the ALJ had questions regarding these physicians' opinions (as evidenced by the fact that they were not assigned controlling weight) the ALJ had a duty, pursuant to SSR 96-5p, to recontact those physicians for clarification. In Ferguson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 628 F.3d 269 (6th Cir. 2010), the Sixth Circuit held that there were "two conditions that must both be met to trigger the duty to recontact: `the evidence does not support a treating source's opinion . . . and the adjudicator cannot ascertain the basis of the opinion from the record.'" Id. at 273 (quoting SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *6 (July 2, 1996)). An unsupported opinion alone does not trigger the duty to re-contact. Id.

The duty is not triggered where, as here, the ALJ did not reject the physician's opinions because they were unclear; instead, he rejected the opinions because they were unsupported, conclusory, or concerned previously adjudicated periods. (PageID.56-57.) "`[A]n ALJ is required to re-contact a treating physician only when the information received is inadequate to reach a determination on claimant's disability status, not where, as here, the ALJ rejects the limitations recommended by that physician." Ferguson, 628 F.3d at 274 (quoting Poe v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. App'x 149, 156 n.3 (6th Cir. 2009)). Again, Plaintiff does not disagree or allege any error with regard to the reasons provided by the ALJ for assigning less than controlling weight to these opinions. Moreover, the former regulations which had "recogniz[ed] a duty to recontact in cases where the evidence from the treating physician [was] inadequate to determine disability and contain[ed] a conflict or ambiguity requiring clarification," Id. at 273 (citing 20 CFR. §§ 404.1512(e), 416.912(e)), were revised effective March 26, 2012, well before the ALJ's decision in this case. The revised regulations are found at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520b(c)(1), 416.920b(c)(1) and clarify that the Commissioner has "discretion, not a duty, to re-contact a medical source." Jones v. Colvin, No. 2:12-cv-3605, 2014 WL 1046003, at *11 (N.D. Ala. March 14, 2014). Accordingly, the ALJ did not violate SSR 96-5p. This claim of error is denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and therefore will be AFFIRMED.

A separate judgment shall issue.