ORDER AND REASONS

IVAN L.R. LEMELLE, Senior District Judge.

Before the Court is a motion to remand filed by Plaintiffs Yu-Wen Chiu and Chih-Yang Hu. Rec. Doc. 3. Defendant Charles Edward Lincoln, III has not filed an opposition.1 For the reasons discussed below,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion to remand (Rec. Doc. 3) is GRANTED and the above-captioned matter is REMANDED to the First City Court of the City of New Orleans.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Third-Party Defendant Kurt Traub's motion to dismiss (Rec. Doc. 7) is DISMISSED AS MOOT.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's motion to consolidate (Rec. Doc. 11) is DISMISSED AS MOOT.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This is the second time that this case has been removed from state court. The facts and procedural history are thoroughly discussed in the Order and Reasons issued when the case was first remanded. See Chiu v. Lincoln (Chiu I), No. 17-12275, Rec. Doc. 28 (E.D. La. May 29, 2018). To summarize, Plaintiffs Yu-Wen Chiu and Chih-Yang Hu filed suit to evict Defendant Charles Edward Lincoln, III from a property in New Orleans in November 2017. See Chiu I, No. 17-12275, Rec. Doc. 1-1. That same month, Defendant removed the case on the basis of its relationship to a pending bankruptcy matter. See Chiu I, No. 17-12275, Rec. Doc. 1. In May 2018, the Court remanded the case because it was not sufficiently related to the bankruptcy proceeding to support removal. See Chiu I, No. 17-12275, Rec. Doc. 28.

In June 2018, Defendant again removed the case, this time pursuant to the civil rights removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1443. See Rec. Doc. 1. Defendant argues that Louisiana's eviction procedures violate his civil rights, as guaranteed by various federal civil rights statutes, namely 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 12131. See id. at 2-3; see also id. at 9. Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand, arguing that Defendant's second attempt to remove the case represented an impermissible attempt to seek review of the Court's first remand order, and failed to meet the requirements of civil rights removal. See Rec. Doc. 3.

LAW AND ANALYSIS

"[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). "The removing party bears the burden of showing that federal jurisdiction exists and that removal was proper. Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002). "Any ambiguities are construed against removal because the removal statute should be strictly construed in favor of remand." Id.; see also Gasch v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 491 F.3d 278, 282 (5th Cir. 2007) ("As the effect of removal is to deprive the state court of an action properly before it, removal raises significant federalism concerns. The removal statute is therefore to be strictly construed, and any doubt about the propriety of removal must be resolved in favor of remand.").

A defendant must act promptly to exercise his right to remove. If a case filed in state court is removable, a "defendant's time to remove is triggered by simultaneous service of the summons and complaint, or receipt of the complaint, through service or otherwise, after and apart from service of the summons, but not by mere receipt of the complaint unattended by any formal service." Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1999). "[I]f the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable," a defendant's time to remove begins upon "receipt. . ., through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable." 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). In either case, once the clock begins, a defendant has thirty days to remove. See id. § 1446(b)(1), (b)(3). A defendant "los[es] the right to remove the case upon the expiration of that thirty-day period."2 Johnson v. Heublein Inc., 227 F.3d 236, 241 (5th Cir. 2000).

This thirty-day period continues to run even after a defendant files a notice of removal. See Energy Catering Servs., Inc. v. Burrow, 911 F.Supp. 221, 222-23 (E.D. La. 1995) (denying motion to amend notice of removal because amendment would have added new basis for jurisdiction "beyond the thirty day limit for removal of cases"); Cormier v. Chef Morrison Contractors, LLC, 85 F.Supp.3d 880, 884 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (same); see also 14C Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3733 (4th ed. 2018) (After "the expiration of the 30-day period for removal," "defendants may amend the notice [of removal] only to set out more specifically the grounds for removal that already have been stated in the original notice.").

As discussed above, this case began as a suit for eviction in the First City Court of the City of New Orleans in November 2017. See Chiu v. Lincoln (Chiu I), No. 17-12275, Rec. Doc. 1-1 at 2 (E.D. La. Nov. 13, 2017). Defendant removed the case and maintained that this Court had subject matter jurisdiction because the eviction proceeding was related to a matter pending before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.3 See Chiu I, No. 17-12275, Rec. Doc. 1 at 3. Defendant never filed an opposition to Plaintiffs' first motion to remand, see Chiu I, No. 17-12275, Rec. Doc. 9, but did file various other motions. Defendant addressed the jurisdictional basis for removal in some of these motions and argued that it depended on the connection between the eviction proceeding and his bankruptcy matter.4 In a prior Order and Reasons issued on May 29, 2018, the Court granted Plaintiffs' first motion to remand.5 See Chiu I, No. 17-12275, Rec. Doc. 28 (E.D. La. May 29, 2018).

On June 28, 2018, Defendant removed the underlying eviction proceeding for the second time. See Rec. Doc. 1. This time, Defendant seeks to proceed in federal court under the civil rights removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1443.6 See id. at 1. Defendant argues that the First City Court of the City of New Orleans and the Louisiana Rule for Possession of Premises, see La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 4731, violate Defendant's rights guaranteed by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 12131. See id. at 2-3; see also id. at 9. Defendant's second notice of removal is defective and remand is again necessary.

I. Timeliness

Defendant's second attempt to remove is untimely because it was filed more than thirty days after Plaintiffs initiated the eviction proceeding in the First City Court of the City of New Orleans.7 See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1); Johnson, 227 F.3d at 241. As Defendant alludes to in his notice of removal, see Rec. Doc. 1 at 7-8, a new thirty day clock begins when a defendant learns that a previously unremovable case has become removable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). But Defendant does not explain what, if anything, has changed about the underlying eviction proceeding since it was initially filed in November 2017. The record similarly contains no such explanation.

In the second notice of removal, Defendant argues that civil rights removal is appropriate because the "statutory scheme" of the First City Court of the City of New Orleans, as well as "all customs, practices, and policies implementing the same," violate his civil rights. See Rec. Doc. 1 at 1-2. But these infirmities, which do not appear specific to Plaintiffs' eviction proceeding against Defendant, would have been apparent to Defendant when he first attempted removal in November 2017. Moreover, even if these concerns were not immediately apparent in November 2017, Defendant offers no explanation of when or how the eviction proceeding changed to prompt Defendant's civil rights concerns. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) ("[I]f the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable. (emphasis added)). Defendant has not carried his burden of demonstrating that removal is timely, therefore remand is necessary. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446(b), 1447(c); Schexnayder v. Entergy Louisiana, Inc., 394 F.3d 280, 283-85 (5th Cir. 2004).

II. Civil Rights Removal

Even if Defendant's second attempt to remove was timely, Defendant has not met the requirements for civil rights removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1443. The civil rights removal statute states that:

Id. Section 1443(2) is not applicable here because it "confers a privilege of removal only upon federal officers or agents and those authorized to act with or for them in affirmatively executing duties under any federal law providing for equal civil rights." City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 824 (1966). Defendant is neither a federal officer, nor is he authorized to act for one.

Removal is similarly inappropriate under § 1443(1). "[A] removal petition under 28 U.S.C. [§] 1443(1) must satisfy a twopronged test." Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213, 219 (1975). "First, it must appear that the right allegedly denied the removal petitioner arises under a federal law `providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality.'" Id. (quoting Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 792 (1966)). "Second, it must appear, in accordance with the provisions of [§] 1443(1), that the removal petitioner is denied or cannot enforce the specified federal rights in the courts of the State." Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). "This provision normally requires that the `denial be manifest in a formal expression of state law,' such as a state legislative or constitutional provision, `rather than a denial first made manifest in the trial of the case.'" Id. (quoting Rachel, 384 U.S. at 799, 803). "`[T]he vindication of the defendant's federal rights is left to the state courts except in the rare situations where it can be clearly predicted by reason of the operation of a pervasive and explicit state or federal law that those rights will inevitably be denied by the very act of bringing the defendant to trial in the state court.'" Id. (quoting Peacock, 384 U.S. at 828).

As discussed previously, Defendant argues that the First City Court of the City of New Orleans and the Louisiana Rule for Possession of Premises, see La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 4731, violate Defendant's rights guaranteed by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 12131. See id. at 2-3; see also id. at 9. Sections 1981 and 1982 satisfy the first prong of the test for civil rights removal. See Peacock, 384 U.S. at 825; Sunflower Cty. Colored Baptist Ass'n v. Trs. Of Indianola Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 369 F.2d 795, 796-97 (5th Cir. 1966); Louisiana v. London, 335 F.Supp. 585, 588 (E.D. La. 1971). Section 12131, which is part of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) does not "provid[e] for specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality." See Rachel, 384 U.S. at 792. The "guarantees" of the ADA "are phrased in terms of" equality between those with and without disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Therefore, section 12131 does not satisfy the first prong of the test for civil rights removal. See Rachel, 384 U.S. at 792.

Though sections 1981 and 1982 can support civil rights removal, they do not in this case because Defendant has not shown an inability to "enforce the specified federal rights in" the First City Court for the City of New Orleans. See Johnson, 421 U.S. at 219. Defendant makes various allegations about the legality and constitutionality of eviction proceedings in the First City Court for the City of New Orleans, none of which support civil rights removal.8 Defendant does not allege that the text of the statutes governing eviction in Louisiana draws racial distinctions, as would satisfy the requirements of § 1443(1). See Rachel, 384 U.S. at 800 ("A state statute authorizing the denial" of rights of equality "affords an ample basis for . . . a prediction" that the removing defendant would forfeit his rights in state court.). Instead, Defendant argues that

Rec. Doc. 1 at 2. This argument reveals that Defendant's true concern is a denial of due process rights, independent of any racial discrimination.9 But "broad contentions under . . . the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot support a valid claim for removal under [§] 1443, because the guarantees of th[at] clause[] are phrased in terms of general application available to all persons or citizens, rather than in the specific language of racial equality that [§] 1443 demands." Rachel, 384 U.S. at 792. Because the Court cannot "clearly predict" that Louisiana's eviction proceedings will deny Defendant the rights of racial equality guaranteed by §§ 1981 and 1982, there is no basis for civil rights removal per § 1443(1).10 See Peacock, 384 U.S. at 826-35. Because Defendant has not met his burden of establishing eligibility for removal, Defendant's case must be remanded.

"[N]o evidentiary hearing is required if the section 1443 grounds purportedly justifying removal are patently invalid from the face of the removal petition." News-Texan, Inc. v. City of Garland, 814 F.2d 216, 218 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Smith v. Winter, 717 F.2d 191, 199 (5th Cir. 1983) (same); Varney v. Georgia, 446 F.2d 1368 (5th Cir. 1971). Defendant's second notice of removal is patently invalid because it is untimely and plainly fails to satisfy the requirements for civil rights removal. Therefore, Defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

Because removal is improper, Third-Party Defendant Kurt Traub's motion to dismiss (Rec. Doc. 7) and Defendant's motion to consolidate (Rec. Doc. 11) are moot.