MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, Jr., Magistrate Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the defendants' Motions to Dismiss, rec.doc.nos. 12 and 27. These motions are opposed.

The pro se plaintiff, a prisoner currently confined at the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, filed this proceeding seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law.1 As amended, the plaintiff's Complaint names as defendants Secretary James M. LeBlanc, Warden Steve Rader (of Dixon Correctional Institute, Jackson, Louisiana), Sheryl M. Ranatza (Chairman of the Louisiana Parole Board), and Louisiana parole officers Patricia Murphy and Vernester J. Canty.2 The gist of the plaintiff's Complaint is that the defendants have wrongly applied La. R.S. 15:571.5 to his 1998 Louisiana criminal conviction so as to make his subsequent good-time release in connection with that conviction subject to supervisory conditions "as if on parole". As a result, when he became eligible for a good-time release in July, 2011, he was compelled to sign a document imposing supervisory conditions upon his release. Thereafter, he was re-arrested in connection with an unrelated offense in June, 2012 (and apparently again in January, 2013), and the Parole Board placed a "hold" on his record because the re-arrest signaled a possible violation of those conditions. According to the plaintiff, this "hold" allegedly caused him to remain confined until September, 2012, and caused him to lose employment opportunities, to lose an impounded motor vehicle, and to suffer other personal complications. In addition, the plaintiff complains that although he was re-released in September, 2012, the release was again made subject to the "same illegal parole restriction[s]." He prays for monetary damages and for injunctive relief, compelling the defendants "to release the plaintiff from any supervision and illegal custody."

In their Motion to Dismiss filed on January 28, 2013, rec.doc.no. 27, the defendants seek dismissal, on jurisdictional grounds pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of the plaintiff's claim for monetary damages asserted against them in their official capacities.3 In this regard, the defendants are correct that § 1983 does not provide a federal forum for a litigant who seeks the recovery of monetary damages against either a state or its officials acting in their official capacities because these officials are not seen to be "persons" under § 1983. Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Specifically, in Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991), the United States Supreme Court addressed the distinction between official capacity and individual capacity lawsuits and made clear that a suit against a state official in his official capacity for monetary damages is treated as a suit against the state and is therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 25. Accordingly, the plaintiff's claim for monetary damages asserted against the defendants in their official capacities is subject to dismissal. In contrast, the plaintiff's claim for monetary damages asserted against the defendants in their individual capacities remains viable because a claim against a state official in his individual capacity, seeking to impose liability for actions taken by the official under color of state law, is not treated as a suit against the state. Id. at 29. In addition, the plaintiff's claim for prospective injunctive relief asserted against the defendants in their official capacities is not prohibited under the Eleventh Amendment because such a claim is also not treated as a claim against the state. Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, supra, at 71. See also 15 Am. Jur. 2d Civil Rights § 101.

Turning next to the plaintiff's claims over which the Court has subject matter jurisdiction, the defendants assert, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that the plaintiff's Complaint is subject to dismissal for failure "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and more recently, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court clarified the standard of pleading that a plaintiff must meet in order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Specifically, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level". Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, supra, at 555. "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, supra, at 678, quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, supra. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. It follows that, "where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not `show[n]' — `that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679. "Where a Complaint pleads facts that are `merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it `stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'" Id. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court "must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the Complaint." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Further, "[a] document filed pro se is `to be liberally construed' . . . and `a pro se Complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Id. (citation omitted). Notwithstanding, the court need not accept "a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation," Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), or "naked assertions [of unlawful conduct] devoid of further factual enhancement." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, supra, at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Applying the foregoing standard to the plaintiff's allegations, this Court initially determines whether the plaintiff's claims may properly be pursued in a regular civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or whether he must first bring his claims in a habeas corpus proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This determination is made by focusing on the scope of relief actually sought by the plaintiff. Serio v. Members of the Louisiana State Board of Pardons, 821 F.2d 1112, 1117 (5th Cir. 1987). In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), the United States Supreme Court held that a challenge by a prisoner to the fact or duration of his confinement and seeking an immediate or earlier release from that confinement must be pursued through a habeas corpus proceeding rather than in an ordinary civil rights action. Id. at 489. This rule has been applied in the context of challenges by inmates to supervisory conditions placed on their good-time releases and to claimants seeking to mount challenges to such conditions and/or to subsequent revocations of their releases based upon violations of such conditions. See Rome v. Morales, 68 F.3d 471 (5th Cir. 1995) (affirming the dismissal of a Texas inmate's challenge to the conditions placed upon his good-time release and to the subsequent revocation of that release because "[t]he sole remedy for challenges to the fact or length of incarceration is a habeas corpus proceeding"). See also Edge v. Stalder, 240 F.3d 1074 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 918 (2001) (recognizing that habeas corpus is the "exclusive remedy" available to a Louisiana inmate seeking to challenge the as-if-on-parole requirements of La. R.S. 15:571.5); Berry v. LeBlanc, 2011 WL 4732799 (M.D. La. Sept. 7, 2011) (dismissing as frivolous an inmate's § 1983 claim regarding conditions placed upon his good-time release); Boston v. Anderson, 2010 WL 1251646 (W.D. La. Feb. 11, 2010) (interpreting an inmate's claim regarding the revocation of his good-time release, which revocation resulted from the violation of the conditions placed on his release, as partly a habeas corpus application subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust state court remedies and partly a § 1983 claim not ripe for review because of the need to first seek habeas corpus relief).

In the instant case, the plaintiff contends that the State of Louisiana has violated his constitutional rights through the application of La. R.S. 15:571.5 to his confinement, which statute (1) provides that a good-time release shall be "as if . . . on parole", (2) authorizes the imposition of conditions upon such good-time release, and (3) authorizes the revocation of such release upon the violation of one or more of the referenced conditions. The plaintiff complains that his good-time release was wrongly made conditional upon such onerous supervisory conditions, that the statutory requirement that a good-time release be "as if on parole" is unconstitutional, and that the effect of this statute is essentially to extend the length of his sentence by placing him in a form of supervised confinement, pursuant to which the State of Louisiana subjects him to continued supervision and monitoring instead of providing him with an unconditional release from prison upon the expiration of his diminished sentence. The effect of the plaintiff's claim, however, is to seek a release from such supervised confinement and/or a diminution of his period of future supervised confinement.4 Thus, a review of the record leads the Court to conclude that the plaintiff's claim is one challenging the fact or duration of his confinement which must be pursued through habeas corpus channels. Accordingly, his Complaint, brought as a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is subject to dismissal for this reason.5

In addition to the foregoing, the plaintiff also seeks monetary relief for the alleged wrongful conduct of the defendants in subjecting him to the alleged wrongful supervisory conditions. This claim, however, is barred by the doctrine set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Pursuant to Heck, a prisoner's claim seeking monetary damages under § 1983 is not cognizable whenever "a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence." Id. at 487. Before such a claim may be entertained, the prisoner must show that his sentence has been overturned or called into question in a separate proceeding, e.g., in a habeas corpus proceeding. Id. In the present case, a resolution of the plaintiff's claim in his favor, i.e., a determination that he is entitled to an award of monetary damages based upon his alleged wrongful supervised confinement "as if on parole", would necessarily imply that such supervised confinement should be curtailed. Since he has failed to allege or even suggest that this confinement has been invalidated or called into question by a court in a separate proceeding, the plaintiff's claim falls within the holding of Heck v. Humphrey. Accordingly, his cause of action under § 1983 for monetary damages attributable to the alleged unconstitutional supervised confinement has not yet accrued. Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Dismissal of the § 1983 action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) is appropriate, post-Heck, because the plaintiff's action has been shown to be legally frivolous"). See also Stephenson v. Reno, 28 F.3d 26 (5th Cir. 1994); Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 1997). It is therefore appropriate that the plaintiff's § 1983 claim be dismissed, with prejudice to re-assertion until the conditions set forth in Heck v. Humphrey are satisfied. See Arvie v. Broussard, 42 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 1994).6

Finally, The plaintiff also seeks to invoke the supplemental jurisdiction of this Court over claims arising under state law. A district court, however, may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if the court has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. In the instant case, having concluded that the plaintiff's federal claims should be dismissed, the Court recommends that supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state law claims be declined.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction relative to the plaintiff's state law claims and that the defendants' Motion to Dismiss, rec.doc.no. 27, be granted, dismissing the plaintiff's claim for monetary damages against the defendants in their official capacities and dismissing the plaintiff's remaining claims, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted until the conditions set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, supra, are met. It is further recommended that the defendants' Motion to Dismiss, rec.doc.no. 12, be denied as moot.