GUIDRY, J.
The defendant, Jabari Smith, was charged by an amended bill of information with one count of possession with intent to distribute a Schedule I controlled dangerous substance (heroin), a violation of La. R.S. 40:966(A) (count I), and one count of possession of a Schedule IV controlled dangerous substance (alprazolam), a violation of La. R.S. 40:969(C) (count II).
A habitual offender bill of information was filed by the State, alleging the defendant's status as a fourth-felony habitual offender. Following a hearing, the defendant was adjudicated a fourth-felony habitual offender.
Slidell Police Department Sergeant Dennis Bush testified that on two separate occasions, he worked with a confidential informant to determine whether heroin was being distributed from a trailer located at 37705 A Nuevo Street in Slidell, Louisiana. In each instance, Sergeant Bush conducted a "controlled buy," giving the informant $50.00. The informant then drove to the suspected trailer, entered therein, and, a few minutes later, exited the trailer and met with Sergeant Bush, where he turned over a small bag of heroin in powder form. Sergeant Bush testified that as a result of these two controlled drug buys, on October 24, 2014, he participated, along with other local law enforcement officers, in the execution of a search warrant at the Nuevo Street trailer. Upon their arrival, Sergeant Bush observed the defendant seated on the front porch and the defendant was then detained. Sergeant Bush testified that after securing the trailer and the occupants therein, he spoke with Candice York, who advised him in which room the defendant and his girlfriend, Trenell Howard, slept.
St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Detective Brandon Stephens, who likewise participated in the execution of the search warrant, testified that once the trailer was secure, he searched the room where Trenell Howard was located. He testified that Howard was found on a mattress in a small room, which was not much larger than a walk-in closet. Against the wall, "in the little space of floor that was left, that was not covered by the mattress [was] a bag of sandwich, plastic sandwich bags, a box of sandwich bags, [and] a digital scale. And towards the end of the room, kind of off to the left, [he] located a bag of heroin inside a black tennis shoe."
Detective Jason Prieto of the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office testified that during the execution of the search warrant, he searched the other bedroom inside the trailer, which belonged to Candice York. Detective Prieto testified that during his search, he found a bag of what appeared to be crushed Xanax bars. However, Detective Prieto specifically testified that he did not locate any heroin, plastic bags, or digital scales inside York's bedroom. Detective Prieto testified that upon his arrival to the trailer, the defendant, whom he was advised by another officer lived at the trailer, was seated on the front porch. Detective Prieto further stated that he never saw the defendant inside the residence, nor did he see the defendant actually possessing heroin.
Candice York testified that she, her boyfriend, and her son resided in the trailer's second bedroom. York confirmed that the defendant resided in the other remaining bedroom, and that his girlfriend, Trenell Howard, visited often but "technically" was not a resident. York testified that the black tennis shoe found in the defendant's bedroom during the execution of the search warrant was a size eight and one-half, and that it did not belong to her boyfriend, who wore a size nine and one-half.
In his first assignment of error, the defendant contends that insufficient evidence was produced at trial to support his conviction of possession of heroin. Specifically, he claims that "[t]he State, in its attempt to prove [his] guilt, asked the jury to disregard the fact that someone else could have been in possession of the heroin, and/or [he] did not know it was in the trailer." Further, the defendant asserts that "[a]nother important factor that was not eliminated was that the [confidential informant] could have been lying all along [. . . and] easily could [have] hidden the drugs in his car and lied about where he [received] the heroin." He concludes, averring that "[t]his conviction boils down to only a supposition that [he] was guilty of possessing the heroin. The two people who put him inside the trailer had a lot to gain by saying the heroin was his. Aside from their self-serving evidence, no conclusive proof exists that casts any suspicion on [him]." Accordingly, the defendant contends his conviction was improper.
The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is whether or not, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could conclude that the State proved the essential elements of the crime, and the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of that crime, beyond a reasonable doubt.
When a conviction is based on both direct and circumstantial evidence, the reviewing court must resolve any conflict in the direct evidence by viewing that evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. When the direct evidence is thus viewed, the facts established by the direct evidence and the facts reasonably inferred from the circumstantial evidence must be sufficient for a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of every essential element of the crime.
As applicable here, it is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled dangerous substance as classified in Schedule I.
It is well settled that the mere presence in an area where drugs are located or the mere association with one possessing drugs does not constitute constructive possession.
Herein, the defendant does not dispute the amount of heroin seized or that the substances seized were, in fact, heroin. Alternatively, in sum, he argues the State produced insufficient evidence demonstrating his actual or constructive possession of heroin. However, testimony at trial revealed that the confidential informant, on two separate occasions, purchased small quantities of heroin from an individual inside the trailer; that heroin, plastic bags, and a digital scale were found inside the defendant's room; and that the largest amount of cocaine, a 2.6 gram rock, was found inside a shoe located in the defendant's bedroom.
A thorough review of the record indicates that any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence presented in this case in the light most favorable to the State, could find that the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, all of the elements of possession of heroin, and the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the crime. Specifically, the record supports that heroin was not found in Candice York's bedroom, that the defendant was found at the trailer where the heroin was seized, that the heroin was found inside his bedroom, that he had access to the area where the heroin was located, and that his girlfriend, Trenell Howard, was found to be in, and later convicted of, possession of heroin.
Despite the defendant's attempts to discredit them, the verdict rendered in this case indicates the jury credited the testimony of the police officers against him. The trier of fact may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. Moreover, when there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency.
Moreover, the verdict rendered in this case further indicates the jury rejected the defendant's sole hypothesis of innocence, which is that another individual, either the confidential informant or a different resident inside the trailer, solely possessed the heroin at issue. When a case involves circumstantial evidence and the jury reasonably rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the defense, that hypothesis falls, and the defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis which raises a reasonable doubt.
Further, in reviewing the evidence, we cannot say that the jury's determination was irrational under the facts and circumstances presented to them.
In his second assignment of error, the defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial after Detective Prieto testified that he was advised by Detective Bush that the bedroom "all the way to the right" was shared between the defendant and his girlfriend, Trenell Howard. The defendant avers that "[Detective] Prieto said he knew that [the defendant] occupied the second bedroom because this was what the C.I. told [Detective] Bush. Either [Detective] Bush or another officer told him that [Trenell] Howard was with [the defendant] and they occupied the second bedroom. This is the same information that resulted in the first [mistrial] because the informant was not called to testify." The defendant contends that these alleged hearsay statements were prejudicial and "not harmless," and, as such, the trial court erred in not granting his motion for mistrial.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 775 provides, in pertinent part, that a mistrial shall be ordered, and in a jury case the jury dismissed, when prejudicial conduct in or outside the courtroom makes it impossible for the defendant to obtain a fair trial, or when authorized by Article 770 or 771. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 771(2) provides:
A mistrial under the provisions of La. C. Cr. P. art. 771 is at the discretion of the trial court and should be granted only where the prejudicial remarks of the witness make it impossible for the defendant to obtain a fair trial.
During the direct examination of Detective Prieto, the following exchange occurred without objection:
Later, during the defense's cross-examination of Detective Prieto, the following exchange took place:
Despite the defendant's claim of a mistrial, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that any error in the admission of hearsay evidence is "cured" when an individual with personal knowledge provides testimony which corroborates the hearsay.
Herein, Candice York, an individual with personal knowledge of the fact that the defendant resided at the trailer, provided corroborating and curing testimony of Detective Prieto's assertion. Additionally, the record does not support the defendant's argument that the alleged hearsay evidence relayed to Detective Prieto actually originated with the confidential informant, as Detective Prieto testified that he learned during the execution of the search warrant that Candice York was cooperating with the investigation and provided information concerning the trailer, its occupants, and the living arrangements therein. Furthermore, Detective Prieto testified that he was not certain which officer, whether Detective Bush or not, told him that the defendant resided at the trailer. Here, as a result of the denial of the mistrial, the defendant suffered no prejudice, as the exact same information came from a witness who previously testified at trial and, moreover, was subject to cross-examination. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for mistrial, and, as such, this assignment of error lacks merit.
