NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

OPINION

CLAYTON, Judge.

This is an appeal from the trial court's denial of a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV). Based upon the following, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The Appellant, Raymond Rhodes, was found guilty of Possession of a Handgun by a Convicted Felon and sentenced to nine years. The charge stemmed from evidence that was obtained on August 24, 2011, in Jefferson County, Kentucky. On that date, Louisville Metro Police Detective Mickey King (Det. King) had received a complaint about someone selling cocaine from 607 Compton Street in Louisville. Det. King and his partner began surveillance of the residence and, after approximately one hour, observed Rhodes let himself into the residence with a key. Rhodes arrived at the location in a Cadillac and remained at the residence for approximately five to ten minutes.

Det. King testified that he and his partner observed Rhodes return to his vehicle, drive to a house on Algonquin Street and then return to the Compton residence. The detectives observed Rhodes using his key to both lock and unlock the door at the Compton residence.

Upon Rhodes' return to the Compton residence, the detectives stopped him as he exited his vehicle. Det. King's partner performed a cursory pat-down on Rhodes and Det. King advised him that LMPD had received a complaint regarding the trafficking of drugs from the Compton residence. Rhodes gave Det. King his consent to search his vehicle. Det. King did not find any contraband in the vehicle. Det. King then asked Rhodes for consent to search the Compton residence. Rhodes informed him that it was not his residence but belonged to Michelle Bradley, the mother of his son. Rhodes then phoned Bradley and Det. King obtained consent to search from her on the phone. Rhodes also gave a written consent to search.

During the search, Det. King found a pink handled, non-operational.22 caliber Raven model in the master bedroom closet and a .40 caliber HiPoint model with a trigger lock under the bed in the master bedroom. Det. King testified that Rhodes had told him that the weapons were in the house prior to the search. The detectives also found a prescription bottle in the Compton residence with Rhodes' name on it; however, the address on the bottle was the same as the one on his license. Rhodes also surrendered his key ring on which was found a key to the Cadillac, a key to the trigger lock on the HiPoint and a key to the Compton residence.

Det. King and Special Agent Bradley Leveritt interviewed Rhodes. Agent Leveritt testified that Rhodes admitted to him that he had a trigger lock key for the HiPoint. Rhodes was arrested and charged with Possession of a Handgun by a Convicted Felon.

At trial, Raymond Rhodes, Jr. (Rhodes' son) and Jimmy Martin (Rhodes' friend) testified on his behalf. While Raymond testified that Rhodes was rarely at the Compton residence and that the HiPoint belonged to his mother, Martin testified that he had purchased the HiPoint in Indiana, that Rhodes was with him but did not actually witness the purchase, and that Rhodes was at Compton frequently visiting his "wife and family."

During the trial there was an issue regarding whether or not there was a key rack in the kitchen of the Compton residence and whether the HiPoint key was kept on the rack. Det. King testified that he did not see a key rack, while Raymond testified that it was hanging by the door.

Prior to trial, Rhodes made a motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the search, which the trial court denied. The first trial against Rhodes ended in a mistrial and, in the second, he was found guilty of Convicted Felon in Possession of a Handgun and Persistent Felony Offender II. He then brought this appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing a Motion JNOV, an appellate court must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 892 S.W.2d 558, 563 (Ky. 1994). An abuse of discretion occurs when it was clearly unreasonable for the jury to find the defendant guilty. Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991).

In reviewing the trial court's denial of a motion for suppression of evidence, an appellate court must review the facts to determine whether they were supported by substantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Banks, 68 S.W.3d 347, 349 (Ky. 2001). Issues of law are reviewed de novo.

DISCUSSION

During trial, Rhodes first contends that evidence relied upon to secure the consent to search the residence was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. He argues that the detectives had no specific information beyond a general accusation and that his original stop by the detectives was in violation of his rights. Pursuant to the holding in Piercy v. Commonwealth, 303 S.W.3d 492, 497 (Ky. 2010), a police officer may approach an individual and ask questions without violating the Fourth Amendment. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), provides, however, that an officer must have reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is either about to occur or occurring for a stop. Det. King testified that he and his partner were acting on a tip provided by an informant, that Rhodes had exited his vehicle prior to the stop, that Rhodes consented to a search of his vehicle, and that the search of his person was only a pat-down for weapons. We agree with the trial court that this was not in violation of Rhodes' Fourth Amendment rights.

As for the search of the Compton residence, Martin testified that Rhodes was often at the Compton residence visiting, but that he did not live there. A county clerk testified that Rhodes' driver's license address was not Compton, but was on Weaver Street. Det. King and his partner obtained consent to search the premises from Bradley over the phone. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Rhodes' motion to suppress the evidence. Rhodes next argues that the evidence of possession of the firearm was insufficient to support his conviction. There was evidence presented at trial that the key ring belonging to Rhodes had both a key to the Compton residence and a key to the trigger lock of the HiPoint. Det. King also testified that Rhodes had told him that the weapon was located inside the residence. Finally, Rhodes' friend, Jimmy Martin, testified that he had purchased the HiPoint in Indiana in 2009. He further stated that Rhodes was with him when he purchased it and that the weapon was at the Compton residence. Rhodes also stipulated that he was a convicted felon.

Benham at p. 187.

This standard is also applicable for judgments of acquittal. Given the evidence presented at trial set forth above, we hold there was sufficient evidence to support Rhodes' conviction. We also hold that the trial court did not err in denying Rhodes' motion for a directed verdict.

The remaining issues before us are whether the trial court erred in reinstating the indictment following the mistrial and the denial by the trial court of a second motion for mistrial at the second trial. During the first trial, the parties had agreed to not present any evidence identifying Rhodes as the focus of a narcotics investigation. After Det. King mentioned this in his testimony, the trial court granted a mistrial. The trial court asked the parties to brief the issue of whether jeopardy had attached and subsequently ordered a new trial.

Under Stamps v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 868, 869 (Ky. 1983), the Kentucky Supreme Court held that "[t]he general rule, in both federal cases and cases in this jurisdiction, is that a defendant's motion for mistrial removes any double jeopardy bar to retrial." Rhodes, however, contends that there should not have been a retrial because the Commonwealth had acted in bad faith. Bad faith by the Commonwealth is an exception to the rule set forth in Stamps. See Commonwealth v. Deloney, 20 S.W.3d 471 (Ky. 2000). The trial court, however, disagreed and denied the motion to dismiss and for a mistrial. Given the fact that it was a witness for the Commonwealth who presented testimony the Commonwealth had agreed not to enter, rather than behavior on the part of the Commonwealth itself, we agree with the trial court that there was no bad faith on the part of the Commonwealth. Thus, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

ALL CONCUR.