ORDER OF CONTINUANCE AND EXCLUDABLE DELAY

INDIRA TALWANI, District Judge.

Upon consideration of the parties' joint motion seeking an order of continuance and excludable delay, the Court finds as follows:

1. The parties have been engaged in preliminary discussions regarding the possible resolution of this matter (which was initiated by a criminal complaint in United States v. David Cecchetelli, 19-MJ-2570-MBB), which might result in a plea agreement and obviate the need for an indictment, and the requested continuance of the time in which an indictment or information must be filed will permit defense counsel to adequately confer with the defendant and allow the parties to further discuss and finalize the terms of any agreement, before the government is required to seek an indictment or information. Such an agreement, in conjunction with a pre-indictment plea, may work to the defendant's benefit.

3. Accordingly, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance, and excluding the time period from January 31, 2020 through and including March 2, 2020 from the speedy trial clock, outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A), and Sections 5(b)(7)(B) and 5(c)(1)(A) of the Plan for Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases for the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts (effective December 2008).

Accordingly, the Court hereby grants the parties' joint motion and ORDERS that, pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A), and Sections 5(b)(7)(B) and 5(c)(1)(A) of the Plan for Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases, (1) the date on which an indictment or information must be filed is continued to March 2, 2020; and (2) the period from January 31, 2020 through and including March 2, 2020 is excluded from the speedy trial clock and from the time within which an indictment or information must be filed.