ORDER

(Mot. to Seal — ECF No. 129)

PEGGY A. LEEN, Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before the court on Plaintiffs' Motion to Seal (ECF No. 129). This Motion is referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and LR IB 1-3 of the Local Rules of Practice.

As a general matter, there is a strong presumption of access to judicial records. Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006). "In keeping with the strong public policy favoring access to court records, most judicial records may be sealed only if the court finds `compelling reasons'." Oliner v. Kontrabecki, 745 F.3d 1024, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass'n, 605 F.3d 665, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2010)). However, public "access to judicial records is not absolute." Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178. The Ninth Circuit has held that the strong presumption of access to judicial records "applies fully to dispositive pleadings, including motions for summary judgment and related attachments." Id. at 1179. Thus, a movant must show "compelling reasons" to seal judicial records attached to a dispositive motion. Id. (citing Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1136 (9th Cir. 2003)). In general, compelling reasons exist when court records might become a vehicle for improper purposes, "such as to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, commit libel, or release trade secrets." In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland in Oregon, 661 F.3d 417, 429 (9th Cir. 2011).

The Ninth Circuit has made it clear that the sealing of entire documents is improper when any confidential information can be redacted while leaving meaningful information available to the public. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1137. To the extent that a sealing order is permitted, it must be narrowly tailored. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., Riverside Cnty., 464 U.S. 501, 512 (1984). The Supreme Court has instructed that a sealing order should be "limited to information that was actually sensitive," that is only the parts of the material necessary to protect the compelling interest. Id. Thus, even where a court determines that disclosure of information may result in particularized harm, and the private interest in protecting the material outweighs the public interest in disclosure, a court must still consider whether redacting confidential portions of the material will leave meaningful information available to the public. In re Roman Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 661 F.3d at 425 (citing Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136-37).

Plaintiffs' Motion (ECF No. 129) seeks leave to file under seal their motion for summary judgment and the related exhibits. See Pl.'s Sealed Mot. Summ. J. (ECF No. 130) (attaching Appendix of Exhibits (ECF No. 130-1)).1 The Protective Order (ECF No. 59) entered in this case governing confidentiality obligates Plaintiffs to seek leave to file the confidential documents under seal. Plaintiffs state that the motion and exhibits involve highly confidential proprietary information, financial records, intellectual property, and trade secrets. Pursuant to the protective order, Plaintiffs seek leave to preserve the confidentiality of such information and will publicly file a redacted copy of the motion for summary judgment.

Having reviewed and considered the matter in accordance with the Ninth Circuit's directives set forth in Kamakana and its progeny, the court finds that the parties have met their burden of establishing compelling reasons for the unredacted motion for summary judgment and the related exhibits to remain under seal. Plaintiffs narrowly tailored the sealing requests to the extent possible by agreeing to file a redacted version of the summary judgment motion on the public docket.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED: