JUDE G. GRAVOIS, Judge.
Defendant, Michael J. Heine, has appealed his habitual offender adjudication as a second felony offender. For the reasons that follow, we vacate defendant's adjudication and enhanced sentences and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
On May 14, 2010, the Jefferson Parish District Attorney filed a bill of information charging defendant with simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling in violation of La. R.S. 14:62.2 (count one), and illegal possession of stolen things valued at over $500.00 in violation of La. R.S. 14:69 (count two). Defendant initially pled not guilty to these charges, but on June 17, 2010 withdrew his not guilty pleas and pled guilty to the charges. He was thereafter sentenced to a term of ten years imprisonment at hard labor on each count, to run concurrently, with the first year of the sentence on count one to be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
After sentence was imposed, the State filed a habitual offender bill of information alleging that defendant was a second felony offender, having previously pled guilty to a violation of La. R.S. 14:62 on May 13, 2010. Defendant stipulated to the habitual offender bill, his original sentences were vacated, and he was sentenced as a second felony offender to a term of ten years imprisonment at hard labor on each count, to run concurrently. The first year of the sentence on count one was ordered to be served without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. Defendant was also ordered to pay $27,500.00 in restitution to the victim.
Defendant subsequently obtained this out-of-time appeal.
The pertinent facts of the offenses, as detailed in the bill of information, are that on or between November 26, 2009 and November 28, 2009, defendant committed simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling (count one); and on or about April 9, 2010, defendant intentionally possessed, procured, received, or concealed jewelry valued at over $500.00, which had been the subject of a robbery or theft, under circumstances which indicated that defendant knew or had good reason to believe was the subject of one of these offenses (count two).
In defendant's counseled assignment of error, he argues that the use of his
In a similar case, State v. London, 09-398 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/24/09), 28 So.3d 1150, where the defendant stipulated to a habitual offender bill of information that alleged that his predicate conviction was obtained after the commission of the underlying offense, this Court vacated the enhanced sentence and remanded the matter. In that case, the defendant's underlying offense was committed on March 12, 2001, but he was not convicted of the underlying offense until September 26, 2007. The defendant then stipulated to a habitual offender bill of information which alleged he had been convicted of the predicate offense on November 29, 2001. Id. at 1152. Because the predicate conviction occurred after the commission of the underlying offense but prior to the conviction on the underlying offense, this Court found the defendant's stipulation to be an error patent, vacated the stipulation, and remanded for resentencing. Id., 28 So.3d at 1153. In reaching this conclusion, this Court relied on the Louisiana Supreme Court's holding that La. R.S. 15:529.1 requires "for sentence enhancement purposes, the subsequent felony must be committed after the predicate conviction or convictions." Id., 28 So.3d at 1152 (quoting State v. Johnson, 03-2993 (La.10/19/04), 884 So.2d 568, 578).
Further, our plain reading of La. R.S. 15:529.1 supports this holding. At the time of defendant's underlying offenses,
The record before us indicates that defendant stipulated to a habitual offender bill of information in which the State alleged that defendant committed the underlying offenses before he was convicted of the predicate offense. Thus, in accordance with the foregoing, we find that defendant's adjudication (via stipulation) as a second felony offender was improper. We therefore vacate defendant's habitual offender adjudication and enhanced sentences and remand the matter to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We further note that double jeopardy principles are inapplicable to sentence enhancement proceedings. See State v. Balser, 96-443 (La.App. 5 Cir. 11/14/96), 694 So.2d 351, 354. Therefore, the State may retry defendant on the habitual offender bill if it is able to cure the noted defect. Id. If the State if unable to cure the noted defect, then defendant must be resentenced on the underlying convictions, as those sentences were vacated by the trial court when it imposed the habitual offender sentences on defendant.
Defendant submits a pro se assignment of error in which he raises several arguments relating to his habitual offender adjudication. In light of our conclusion that defendant's habitual offender adjudication was defective and requires vacation and remand, defendant's pro se assignment of error is thus moot.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's habitual offender adjudication and enhanced sentences are hereby vacated. This matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.