TAURO, District Judge.
Plaintiffs Robert Sullivan ("Mr. Sullivan") and Mary Sullivan ("Mrs. Sullivan") bring this suit against Starwood Hotels and Resorts Worldwide, Inc. ("Starwood") for negligence and loss of consortium. Mr. Sullivan claims that while vacationing in China, he fell over a hazardous object in the parking garage of a hotel operated and controlled by Starwood. Starwood moves for dismissal on two grounds: (1) forum non conveniens, and (2) failure to join indispensable parties. For the reasons set forth below, Starwood's Motion to Dismiss [# 7] is DENIED.
Mr. and Mrs. Sullivan are residents of Byfield, Massachusetts. Starwood is a corporation organized under the laws of Maryland and registered to transact business in Massachusetts. Mr. and Mrs. Sullivan allege that Starwood owns, operates, and controls the Westin Beijing at Chaoyang Hotel ("Hotel") and its parking garage, located in Beijing, China.
Starwood moves for dismissal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Starwood argues that China is an adequate alternative forum and that convenience and judicial efficiency favor litigating this case in China.
"The decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens is generally committed to the district court's discretion."
Courts generally deem alternative forums adequate "if the defendant demonstrates that the alternative forum addresses the types of claims that the plaintiff has brought and that the defendant is amendable to service of process there."
Starwood has not met its burden of demonstrating that China is an adequate forum to hear Plaintiffs' claims. Starwood merely provides a printout of a website purporting to be the Civil Code of China.
Starwood, however, has not offered an affidavit of a person familiar with Chinese law, or any proof whatsoever, to verify its reading of this website. Nor has Starwood offered any proof of (1) the availability of a comparable cause of action in China for Mrs. Sullivan's loss of consortium claim, (2) the accessibility of Chinese courts to American plaintiffs, or (3) whether the statute of limitations in China bars Plaintiffs' claims.
Without more information, this court cannot determine whether China provides an adequate alternative forum for Plaintiffs' claims. Because Starwood has not met its burden to provide competent evidence, its motion is denied.
Even if Starwood had demonstrated that China is an adequate forum, Starwood would still not be entitled to the relief it seeks because the balance of private and public interest factors favors retaining the case in Massachusetts.
The relevant private interest factors include:
Starwood has not demonstrated that the private interest factors strongly favor a Chinese forum. The majority of key witnesses appear to be located in Massachusetts. Plaintiffs have named several eyewitnesses who saw Mr. Sullivan's fall and who are located in Massachusetts. These witnesses include themselves, Dennis DeCosta, and Daniel Tao. Plaintiffs also claim that the physicians at the Lahey Clinic that provided long-term treatment for Mr. Sullivan's injuries are located in Massachusetts. In contrast, Starwood has not provided the names of any witnesses that it intends to call who are located in China.
Starwood argues that the doctors who initially treated Mr. Sullivan's injuries are located in China. Plaintiffs, however, have obtained certified and translated copies of Mr. Sullivan's Chinese medical records. Starwood further argues that a viewing of the garage is only possible in China. Yet, jury views are not always warranted and Starwood has not demonstrated that a jury view of the garage is necessary or appropriate in this case.
Finally, the court must consider the practical burdens imposed on the parties. Mr. Sullivan is a sixty-nine-year-old Massachusetts resident who claims to be permanently disabled on account of his fall. Starwood is a United States corporation that regularly litigates in United States courts. On balance, Plaintiffs face greater
The relevant public interest factors include:
Starwood has not demonstrated that the public interest factors strongly favor a Chinese forum. First, Starwood has not provided any data as to the congestion of Chinese courts. Without this information, the court is unable to compare the relative congestion of the forums.
Second, Starwood has not demonstrated that China has a greater interest in this dispute than the United States in general, or Massachusetts in particular. This is a dispute between two Massachusetts residents and a United States corporation. Massachusetts has a strong interest in providing relief to its residents. And, the United States has a strong interest in resolving disputes between its citizens.
Third, neither party has briefed, and this court need not decide at this juncture, whether Chinese or Massachusetts law applies. Even if Chinese law applies, the application of foreign law is not dispositive
Finally, it would not be unfair to impose jury duty on United States citizens and Massachusetts residents. The United States and Massachusetts have sufficient connections to this dispute as two United States citizens and Massachusetts residents claim injuries at the hands of a United States corporation.
In sum, Starwood has not demonstrated (1) that China is an adequate forum for Plaintiffs' claims, and (2) that convenience and judicial efficiency strongly favor a Chinese forum. For these reasons, Starwood's motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens is denied.
Starwood also moves for dismissal under Rule 19 for failure to join indispensable
Rule 19 involves a two-part analysis. First, the court must determine whether the absent parties are "required" under Rule 19(a).
Rule 19(a)(1) provides the following definition of a "required" party:
Starwood has not demonstrated that the absent parties are "required" under Rule 19(a). First, this court can afford complete relief between the existing parties without the absent parties' presence under Rule 19(a)(1)(A). In particular, this court can order Starwood to pay Plaintiffs damages for their injuries if Starwood is found liable for negligence and loss of consortium.
Second, Starwood has not demonstrated that the absent parties' interests will be impaired under Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(i). None of the absent parties have claimed an interest in this case. And, Starwood has not presented any arguments or evidence as to how the absent parties' interests will be impaired if this case is resolved in their absence.
Starwood's primary argument is that the absent parties are "required" under Rule 19(a) because they are potential joint tortfeasors and indemnitors. Yet, joint tortfeasors and indemnitors are generally not required parties.
Even if Starwood had demonstrated that the absent parties are "required," Starwood has not demonstrated that the absent parties are "indispensable" under Rule 19(b).
Rule 19(b) provides that if a party is "required" but cannot be joined, "the court must determine whether, in equity and good conscience, the action should proceed among the existing parties or should be dismissed." The court must consider four factors, including: (1) "the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person's absence might prejudice that person or the existing parties;" (2) "the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or avoided...;" (3) "whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence would be adequate;" and (4) "whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder."
As to the first and second factors, the only prejudice that Starwood claims is the inconvenience of having to file a separate action for contribution or indemnity against the absent parties in China. The inconvenience of two suits is not sufficient to render the absent parties "indispensable" in this suit.
As to the third factor, this court can award Plaintiffs adequate relief without joinder of the absent parties, including damages if Starwood is found liable. As to the fourth factor, and as discussed in more detail above, Starwood has not established
For the above-stated reasons, Starwood's Motion to Dismiss [# 7] is DENIED.
AN ORDER HAS ISSUED.
This court hereby orders that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [# 7] is DENIED for the reasons set forth in the accompanying memorandum.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
