RICHARD G. STEARNS, District Judge.
Plaintiffs Dynell and Anabel Latson invested in a three-family residential property in Dorchester, Massachusetts, in March of 2006. The investment was made possible by two mortgage loans extended by defendant Plaza Home Mortgage, Inc. (Plaza), totaling $525,000.
"The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing provides `that neither party shall do anything that will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract . . . .'" Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assocs., 411 Mass. 451, 471 (1991) (internal citations omitted). "The scope of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is shaped in each context by the nature of the contractual relationship." T.W. Nickerson, Inc. v. Fleet Nat. Bank, 456 Mass. 562, 573 (2010), citing Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 443 Mass. 367, 385 (2005). "The covenant may not, however, be invoked to create rights and duties not otherwise provided for in the existing contractual relationship, as the purpose of the covenant is to guarantee that the parties remain faithful to the intended and agreed expectations of the parties in their performance." Uno Rests., Inc. v. Boston Kenmore Realty Corp., 441 Mass. 376, 385 (2004).
Here, the purpose of the contract was the creation of a lender-borrower relationship between the parties. The "fruit" of the contract from the Latsons' perspective was the cash money required to purchase the investment property. The Latsons would now read into the contract a provision imposing an obligation on Plaza not to loan them money to make an investment that over time proved unwise. Not only would this proposed provision defeat the very purpose of the contract (contrary to the covenant), it would impose on the lender a duty that the law does not recognize.
The Latsons have alleged no other facts that would support a finding that Plaza breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. Wayman, 34 Mass.App.Ct. 20, 25 (1993) ("In context [of the implied covenant], the duty of good faith would require that the bank be honest in its dealings with Ann as guarantor and that it not purposefully injure her right to obtain the benefits of the contract. . . . [But here] no evidence was offered of . . . any misrepresentation or dishonest act on Shawmut's part or any design to deprive Ann of the benefits of her contract."). Although the interest rates Plaza offered the Latsons (and to which the Latsons agreed) were high, they were not hidden or misrepresented, nor did Plaza do anything to frustrate the Latsons' opportunity to investigate and become familiar with the terms of the loans. Cf. Spritz v. Lishner, 355 Mass. 162, 164 (1969) (one who signs a contract will be held to its terms whether or not he or she reads it or claims to not have understood its provisions); Cormier v. Cent. Massachusetts Chapter of Nat'l Safety Council, 416 Mass. 286, 289, 290 n.2 (1993) (a party to a contract is assumed to have read (and understood) its terms).
"To prevail on a Chapter 93A claim, the plaintiff `must prove that a person who is engaged in trade or business committed an unfair or deceptive trade practice and that the [plaintiff] suffered a loss of money or property as a result.'" Morris v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 775 F.Supp.2d 255, 259 (D. Mass. 2011), citing Brandon Assocs., LLC v. FailSafe Air Safety Sys. Corp., 384 F.Supp.2d 442, 446 (D. Mass. 2005).
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to dismiss is
SO ORDERED.