RAY KENT, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration (Commissioner) which denied her claim for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplement security income (SSI).
Plaintiff alleged a disability onset date of March 30, 2013. PageID.213. Plaintiff identified her disabling conditions as: rheumatoid arthritis; osteoarthritis; anxiety; and severe depression. PageID.217. Prior to applying for DIB and SSI, plaintiff completed the 12th Grade, with past employment as a school lunch assistant, substitute teacher, day care teacher, residential care aide, and machine operator. PageID.56, 218. An administrative law judge (ALJ) reviewed plaintiff's claim de novo and entered a written decision denying benefits on August 5, 2015. PageID.45-57. This decision, which was later approved by the Appeals Council, has become the final decision of the Commissioner and is now before the Court for review.
This Court's review of the Commissioner's decision is typically focused on determining whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); McKnight v. Sullivan, 927 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1990). "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Cutlip v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994). A determination of substantiality of the evidence must be based upon the record taken as a whole. Young v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 925 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1990).
The scope of this review is limited to an examination of the record only. This Court does not review the evidence de novo, make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Brainard v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). The fact that the record also contains evidence which would have supported a different conclusion does not undermine the Commissioner's decision so long as there is substantial support for that decision in the record. Willbanks v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988). Even if the reviewing court would resolve the dispute differently, the Commissioner's decision must stand if it is supported by substantial evidence. Young, 925 F.2d at 147.
A claimant must prove that he suffers from a disability in order to be entitled to benefits. A disability is established by showing that the claimant cannot engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505 and 416.905; Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990). In applying the above standard, the Commissioner has developed a five-step analysis:
Heston v. Commissioner of Social Security, 245 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
The claimant bears the burden of proving the existence and severity of limitations caused by her impairments and the fact that she is precluded from performing her past relevant work through step four. Jones v. Commissioner of Social Security, 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003). However, at step five of the inquiry, "the burden shifts to the Commissioner to identify a significant number of jobs in the economy that accommodate the claimant's residual functional capacity (determined at step four) and vocational profile." Id. If it is determined that a claimant is or is not disabled at any point in the evaluation process, further review is not necessary. Mullis v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 991, 993 (6th Cir. 1988).
"The federal court's standard of review for SSI cases mirrors the standard applied in social security disability cases." D'Angelo v. Commissioner of Social Security, 475 F.Supp.2d 716, 719 (W.D. Mich. 2007). "The proper inquiry in an application for SSI benefits is whether the plaintiff was disabled on or after her application date." Casey v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiff's claim failed at the fifth step of the evaluation. At the first step, ALJ Condon found that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of March 30, 2013. PageID.47.
At the second step, the ALJ found that plaintiff had severe impairments of: osteoarthritis; degenerative joint disease of both knees, status-post left knee arthropathy; rheumatoid arthritis; and obesity. PageID.48. At the third step, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled the requirements of the Listing of Impairments in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. PageID.49.
The ALJ decided at the fourth step that:
PageID.49. The ALJ also found that plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work. PageID.56.
At the fifth step, the ALJ determined that plaintiff could perform a significant number of unskilled jobs at the light exertional level in the national economy. PageID.56-57. Specifically, the ALJ found that plaintiff could perform the requirements of light and unskilled occupations such as sorter (220,000 jobs in the national economy), hand packager (114,000 jobs in the national economy), and router (161,000 jobs in the national economy). PageID.57. Accordingly, the ALJ determined that plaintiff has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from March 30, 2013 (the alleged onset date) through August 5, 2015 (the date of the decision). PageID.57.
Plaintiff set forth two issues on appeal:
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not properly evaluate NP Bowers' April 3, 2015 physical RFC questionnaire as required under Social Security Ruling (SSR) 06-03p.
PageID.55.
NP Bowers was not an acceptable medical source under the regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.913(a) and 416.1513(a) ("[w]e need evidence from acceptable medical sources to establish whether you have a medically determinable impairment[]"; such sources include licensed physicians, licensed or certified psychologists, licensed optometrists, licensed podiatrists and qualified speech-language pathologists). However, in SSR 06-03p, the Commissioner acknowledged that with the growth of managed health care in recent years, nurse practitioners have increasingly assumed a greater percentage of treatment and evaluation functions previously handled primarily by physicians and psychologists. See SSR 06-03p (Aug. 9, 2006). SSR 06-03p recognized that opinions from other medical sources, such as nurse practitioners, "are important and should be evaluated on key issues such as impairment severity and functional effects, along with other relevant evidence in the file." Id.
The question here is whether the ALJ properly evaluated NP Bowers' opinion. There is no requirement that the ALJ give reasons for the weight assigned to a nurse practitioner. The requirement that the Commissioner give "good reasons" for the weight given to an opinion applies only to "treating sources" (i.e., a physician, psychologist or other acceptable medical source who has provided medical treatment or evaluation). See Smith v. Commissioner of Social Security, 482 F.3d 873, 876 (6th Cir. 2007) ("[b]efore determining whether the ALJ violated Wilson by failing to properly consider a medical source, we must first classify that source as a `treating source'").
Engebrecht v. Commissioner of Social Security, 572 Fed. Appx. 392, 397-98 (6th Cir. 2014).
Here, the ALJ's evaluation of NP Bowers' opinion did not go into great detail regarding why NP Bowers' opinion was not consistent with the medical record. However, the Court concludes that it was sufficient because the ALJ had set forth a rather extensive review of plaintiff's medical history (PageID.50-55), which support his finding that NP Bowers' "extreme limitations . . . are not well supported by the medical record." Accordingly, this claim of error will be denied.
The ALJ contends that ALJ failed to meet his burden at Step Five, because the ALJ "made an erroneous Step Five determination that is unsupported by the substantial weight of the evidence." In turn, this error was caused by the ALJ's erroneous finding at step four that plaintiff had the RFC to perform a reduced range of light work. As discussed, supra, plaintiff bears the burden of proving the existence and severity of limitations caused by her impairments and the fact that she is precluded from performing her past relevant work through step four. Jones, 336 F.3d at 474. The Sixth Circuit has rejected plaintiff's apparent argument, i.e., that the ALJ failed to meet his burden because he made an incorrect RFC determination at step five:
Her v. Commissioner of Social Security, 203 F.3d 388, 392 (6th Cir. 1999).
It appears that plaintiff's actual argument is that the ALJ's RFC assessment "falls short of including the entirety of Plaintiff's documented limitations." Plaintiff's Brief at PageID.597. RFC is a medical assessment of what an individual can do in a work setting in spite of functional limitations and environmental restrictions imposed by all of his medically determinable impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545 and 416.945. It is defined as "the maximum degree to which the individual retains the capacity for sustained performance of the physicalmental requirements of jobs." 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, § 200.00(c).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred because contrary to SSR 02-1p, the ALJ did not consider plaintiff's morbid obesity in combination with her other impairments. Plaintiff contends that "[her] obesity obviously causes a significant limitation in standing/walking" and that "[t]his is not reflected in the RFC as the ALJ found the [p]laintiff can stand/walk 6 of 8 hours in a typical workday." Plaintiff's Brief at PageID.597-98.
SSR 02-1p provides in pertinent part:
SSR 02-1p, 2002 WL 34686281 (Sept. 12, 2002).
While SSR 02-1p provides guidance for the ALJ's in evaluating a claimant's obesity, it does not create a separate procedure requiring the Commissioner to consider obesity in every case.
Bledsoe v. Barnhart, 165 Fed.Appx. 408, 411-12 (6th Cir. 2006).
Here, the ALJ considered plaintiff's obesity in formulating her RFC. The ALJ found that plaintiff had a severe impairment of obesity and addressed this condition throughout his review of the medical record. In this regard, the ALJ cited a rheumatological assessment in November 2014, in which "all joints in the lower extremities were assessed as normal" and "[t]here was no tenderness, swelling, effusion, or limitation of motion of the shoulders, elbows, hips, knees or ankles." PageID.53. The ALJ noted that in January 2015, plaintiff expressed an interest in bariatric surgery, had recently lost 40 pounds and reported doing great with exercise and weight loss, while at the same time discussing ongoing joint pain and stiffness, and exhibiting a limping gait. PageID.53. The ALJ expressly addressed plaintiff's obesity as follows:
PageID.53.
In summary, the ALJ considered plaintiff's obesity in developing the RFC and made accommodations for this condition including: that in an eight-hour work day, plaintiff can sit, stand or walk all for at least six hours; that plaintiff requires the option to change position every 30 to 45 minutes for three to five minutes; and that she never climbs ladders, ropes or scaffolds. PageID.49. Accordingly, plaintiff's claim of error will be denied.
The ALJ's determination is supported by substantial evidence. The Commissioner's decision will be
