STEPHANIE DAWKINS DAVIS, Magistrate Judge.
On November 9, 2016, plaintiff filed the instant suit seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's unfavorable decision disallowing benefits. (Dkt. 1). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.1(b)(3), this matter was referred to the undersigned for the purpose of reviewing the Commissioner's decision denying plaintiff's claim disability benefits. (Dkt. 2). This matter is before the Court on cross-motions for summary judgment. (Dkt. 11, 13). Plaintiff also filed a reply in support of her motion. (Dkt. 14).
Plaintiff filed the instant claim for supplemental security income on October 23, 2013, alleging that she became disabled on April 1, 1998. (Tr. 13). The claims were initially disapproved by the Commissioner on February 25, 2014. Id. Plaintiff requested a hearing and on July 28, 2015, plaintiff appeared with counsel before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Martha M. Gasparovich, who considered the case de novo. (Tr. 31-63). In a decision dated September 9, 2015, the ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 10-27). Plaintiff requested a review of this decision and on September 9, 2016, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when, after the review of additional exhibits,
For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned
Plaintiff was born in 1976 and was 37 years old on the date the disability application was filed. (Tr. 25). Plaintiff has no past relevant work. Id. The ALJ applied the five-step disability analysis to plaintiff's claim and found at step one that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the application date. (Tr. 15). At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff's history of psuedotumor cerebri, status-post thoracotomy, status-post acute respiratory failure, asthmatic bronchitis, diabetes mellitus, type II, osteoarthritis — bilateral knees, morbid obesity, bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder, and history of opiate dependence were "severe" within the meaning of the second sequential step. (Tr. 15). At step three, the ALJ found no evidence that plaintiff's combination of impairments met or equaled one of the listings in the regulations. (Tr. 15-16). At step four, the ALJ found that plaintiff had no past relevant work. (Tr. 25). The ALJ concluded that plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform a limited range of light work as follows:
(Tr. 18). At step five, the ALJ denied plaintiff benefits because plaintiff could perform a significant number of jobs available in the national economy. (Tr. 26-27).
In enacting the social security system, Congress created a two-tiered system in which the administrative agency handles claims, and the judiciary merely reviews the agency determination for exceeding statutory authority or for being arbitrary and capricious. Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990). The administrative process itself is multifaceted in that a state agency makes an initial determination that can be appealed first to the agency itself, then to an ALJ, and finally to the Appeals Council. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137 (1987). If relief is not found during this administrative review process, the claimant may file an action in federal district court. Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 537 (6th Cir.1986).
This Court has original jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final administrative decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review under this statute is limited in that the court "must affirm the Commissioner's conclusions absent a determination that the Commissioner has failed to apply the correct legal standard or has made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record." Longworth v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005); Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997). In deciding whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision, "we do not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence, or decide questions of credibility." Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007); Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). "It is of course for the ALJ, and not the reviewing court, to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, including that of the claimant." Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 247 (6th Cir. 2007); Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 475 (6th Cir. 2003) (an "ALJ is not required to accept a claimant's subjective complaints and may . . . consider the credibility of a claimant when making a determination of disability."); Cruse v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 502 F.3d 532, 542 (6th Cir. 2007) (the "ALJ's credibility determinations about the claimant are to be given great weight, particularly since the ALJ is charged with observing the claimant's demeanor and credibility.") (quotation marks omitted); Walters, 127 F.3d at 531 ("Discounting credibility to a certain degree is appropriate where an ALJ finds contradictions among medical reports, claimant's testimony, and other evidence."). "However, the ALJ is not free to make credibility determinations based solely upon an `intangible or intuitive notion about an individual's credibility.'" Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247, quoting Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, *4.
If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Therefore, this Court may not reverse the Commissioner's decision merely because it disagrees or because "there exists in the record substantial evidence to support a different conclusion." McClanahan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 830, 833 (6th Cir. 2006); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc). Substantial evidence is "more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241; Jones, 336 F.3d at 475. "The substantial evidence standard presupposes that there is a `zone of choice' within which the Commissioner may proceed without interference from the courts." Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted), citing, Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545.
The scope of this Court's review is limited to an examination of the record only. Bass, 499 F.3d at 512-13; Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 357 (6th Cir. 2001). When reviewing the Commissioner's factual findings for substantial evidence, a reviewing court must consider the evidence in the record as a whole, including that evidence which might subtract from its weight. Wyatt v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 974 F.2d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992). "Both the court of appeals and the district court may look to any evidence in the record, regardless of whether it has been cited by the Appeals Council." Heston v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 535 (6th Cir. 2001). There is no requirement, however, that either the ALJ or the reviewing court must discuss every piece of evidence in the administrative record. Kornecky v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 167 Fed.Appx. 496, 508 (6th Cir. 2006) ("[a]n ALJ can consider all the evidence without directly addressing in his written decision every piece of evidence submitted by a party.") (internal citation marks omitted); see also Van Der Maas v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 198 Fed.Appx. 521, 526 (6th Cir. 2006).
The "[c]laimant bears the burden of proving his entitlement to benefits." Boyes v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 46 F.3d 510, 512 (6th Cir. 1994); accord, Bartyzel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 74 Fed.Appx. 515, 524 (6th Cir. 2003). There are several benefits programs under the Act, including the Disability Insurance Benefits Program (DIB) of Title II (42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq.) and the Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI) of Title XVI (42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq.). Title II benefits are available to qualifying wage earners who become disabled prior to the expiration of their insured status; Title XVI benefits are available to poverty stricken adults and children who become disabled. F. Bloch, Federal Disability Law and Practice § 1.1 (1984). While the two programs have different eligibility requirements, "DIB and SSI are available only for those who have a `disability.'" Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007). "Disability" means:
42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A) (DIB); 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a) (SSI).
The Commissioner's regulations provide that disability is to be determined through the application of a five-step sequential analysis:
Carpenter v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2008 WL 4793424 (E.D. Mich. 2008), citing, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Heston, 245 F.3d at 534. "If the Commissioner makes a dispositive finding at any point in the five-step process, the review terminates." Colvin, 475 F.3d at 730.
"Through step four, the claimant bears the burden of proving the existence and severity of limitations caused by her impairments and the fact that she is precluded from performing her past relevant work." Jones, 336 F.3d at 474, cited with approval in Cruse, 502 F.3d at 540. If the analysis reaches the fifth step without a finding that the claimant is not disabled, the burden transfers to the Commissioner. Combs v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640, 643 (6th Cir. 2006). At the fifth step, the Commissioner is required to show that "other jobs in significant numbers exist in the national economy that [claimant] could perform given [his] RFC and considering relevant vocational factors." Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241; 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(v) and (g).
If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the decision must be affirmed even if the court would have decided the matter differently and even where substantial evidence supports the opposite conclusion. McClanahan, 474 F.3d at 833; Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545. In other words, where substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision, it must be upheld.
Plaintiff's first claim of error is the ALJ's assignment of "significant weight" to the February 2014, opinion of non-examining psychologist Dr. Czarniecki who did not have the records from 2015 and never examined plaintiff. According to plaintiff, it is unreasonable to assign this report any weight at all in the light of subsequent medical records. At the point in time that Dr. Czarniecki opined, plaintiff acknowledges that the only mental health records available were the report of Dr. Bray who found a minor impairment and the report of Dr. Youssef, who found a severe impairment. Plaintiff objects to Dr. Czarnecki's statement, which the ALJ apparently accepted, that there was no treatment. Yet, the record includes treating records starting in May 2015, which plaintiff contends square almost completely with the assessment of Dr. Youssef both in terms of diagnosis and severity of impairment. Plaintiff also points out that all three examining and/or treating mental health professionals giving their assessments as of February 2014 and May 2015 show a major depressive disorder and "the three assessments on functional capacity are 45-50, 45 and 50." (Dkt. 11, p. 6). According to plaintiff, Dr. Czarnecki's opinion for anything after February 2014, should be given no weight. And, plaintiff argues that in light of the opinions rendered in February, 2014 and May 2015, by professionals who actually saw plaintiff, there is no evidence that she is not disabled.
Plaintiff also observes that the ALJ seems to acknowledge (Tr. 24-25) that Dr. Bray's opinion is outweighed by the treating records, but asserts that the ALJ does not give the same scrutiny to the opinions of Dr. Czarnecki. Plaintiff believes that this is also not correct because Dr. Bray's opinion is substantial evidence for the year 2012, which is prior to the filing date (apparently for an unmentioned prior application). Plaintiff asserts that "[i]t stands for nothing after that except a reasonable adjudicator could compare it with the DDS records of 2014." (Dkt. 11, p. 7). However, according to plaintiff, a reasonable adjudicator must now look at records from both 2014 and 2015 and the only opinions given are those of disability.
In response, the Commissioner maintains that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's evaluation of Dr. Czarnecki's opinion. The Commissioner points out that opinions by State agency consultants may be given weight based on their supportability and consistency with the record as a whole. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(e); Social Security Ruling 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *2 (July 2, 1996). Additionally, an ALJ may rely on a State agency consultant's opinion where the ALJ makes clear that she considered whether the opinion was consistent with the subsequent medical records. See Blakely v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 409 (6th Cir. 2009).
In February 2014, Dr. Czarnecki reviewed the evidence and opined that plaintiff's personality disorder and substance abuse disorders were severe impairments. (Tr. 68). Dr. Czarnecki opined that plaintiff retained the mental capacity to perform the following: initiate, sustain, and complete simple tasks; tolerate and respond adequately to brief, superficial, and routine low stress social demands; and tolerate routine work related stress. (Tr. 74). He opined that plaintiff was moderately limited in sustaining complicated and detailed workrelated activity and in dealing with complex social interaction. Id. According to the Commissioner, the ALJ considered this opinion and assessed it with significant weight because it was supported by the overall record. (Tr. 25). For example, in August 2012, plaintiff visited Dr. Bray for a consultative psychological examination. (Tr. 366-69). Dr. Bray opined that plaintiff had no difficulty with the following: comprehending and carrying out simple directions; performing repetitive routine simple tasks; getting along appropriately with supervisors; creating and maintaining good working relationships; and getting along appropriately with the public. (Tr. 368). Additionally, in February 2014, plaintiff visited psychiatrist Ibrahim Youssef, M.D., for a consultative examination. (Tr. 422-425). On examination, plaintiff's stream of mental activity was normal and she was attentive to sensorium and mental capacity related test questions involving orientation, memory, and information. (Tr. 424-425). Further, on psychiatric evaluation with treatment provider Team Mental Health in May 2015, plaintiff was fully oriented, with unremarkable cognition, fair insight and judgment. (Tr. 436). Plaintiff denied suicidal or homicidal ideation and reported living with supportive family members who aided her in medication and treatment compliance. Id. Moreover, despite plaintiff's allegations of disabling mental impairments, she took care of two children and reported being able to go to the bank, Dollar Store, restaurant, dentist, movie theatre, grocery store, mall, doctor's office, and post office. (Tr. 155, 451). Based on the foregoing, the Commissioner maintains that plaintiff's argument that Dr. Czarnecki's assessment should not be given weight "for anything after February, [sic] 2014" is unavailing, where it is supported by evidence post-dating the opinion. Furthermore, the Commissioner points out that plaintiff's contention that "a reasonable adjudicator must now look at records from both 2014 and 2015" ignores the fact that the ALJ expressly considered and discussed the record evidence throughout 2014 and 2015. (Tr. 20-22).
Next, the Commissioner asserts that because there is no other medical opinion or assessment of mental functional limitations by a treating source, the ALJ was entitled to rely on Dr. Czarnecki's assessment. See Kimbrough v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2010 WL 3862710, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 2010) ("As the ALJ noted in his decision, `[a]s for the opinion evidence, there are no treating source opinions.' Under the circumstances, the ALJ properly relied on the opinions of the state agency examiners.") (citations omitted), aff'd, 2010 WL 3842159 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2010); Toins v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2014 WL 6389582, at *15 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 14, 2014) (upholding ALJ's RFC finding where "plaintiff [failed to point to] record evidence that any of her treating physicians made . . . findings as related to [p]laintiff's functional limitations," and "plaintiff has not provided an explanation as to how the ALJ erred in considering the non-treating source's opinion absent any other treating-source opinion"). Thus, according to the Commissioner, the ALJ supportably found that Dr. Czarnecki's February 2014 opinion was consistent with the record evidence, which showed that, despite some evidence of mental limitations from her severe impairments, plaintiff retained the capacity for a range of simple, unskilled work.
In the view of the undersigned, the Commissioner has the better position. It has been established that, under certain circumstances, opinions from reviewing State agency physicians "may be entitled to greater weight than the opinions of treating or examining sources." SSR 96-6p; 1996 WL 374180, at *3; Brooks v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 531 Fed. Appx. 636, 642 (6th Cir. 2013) ("[O]pinions from State agency medical and psychological consultants . . . may be entitled to greater weight than the opinions of treating or examining sources.") (quoting SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *3); Benson v. Colvin, 2014 WL 3919577, at *9 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 11, 2014) ("[I]t is not a per se error to give more weight to the opinion of a non-examining physician than that given to an examining or treating physician's opinion."). Indeed, the opinions of state agency medical and psychological consultants may be entitled to significant weight where they are supported by record evidence. Lee v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 529 Fed. Appx. 706, 713 (6th Cir. 2013); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e)(2)(i), 416.927(e)(2)(i)). Furthermore, the ALJ can reasonably credit the opinion of a reviewing medical source, despite the fact that the source did not have access to the entire record, where the conclusion that the claimant retained the capacity to work was supported by the totality of the medical and vocational evidence in the record. Glasgow v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 690 Fed. Appx. 385, 387 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing McGrew v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 343 Fed. Appx. 26, 32 (6th Cir. 2009) (concluding that an ALJ may rely on a state agency physician's opinion that is not based on all of the medical evidence in the record if the ALJ takes into account any evidence that the physician did not consider)). As the Commissioner points out, the ALJ expressly considered and discussed the record evidence throughout 2014 and 2015, including Dr. Youssef's assessment and plaintiff's therapy records with Team Mental Health. (Tr. 20-22). Significantly, no acceptable medical source imposed mental limitations on plaintiff greater than those found by the ALJ and Dr. Czarnecki.
Additionally, the mere fact that plaintiff suffers from a particular condition or carries a certain diagnosis does not equate to disability or a particular RFC. Rather, the residual functional capacity circumscribes "the claimant's residual abilities or what the claimant can do, not what maladies a claimant suffers fromthought the maladies will certainly inform the ALJ's conclusion about the claimant's abilities." Howard v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 240 (6th Cir. 2002). There is no question that the ALJ found plaintiff to have "severe" mental impairments, however, "[a] claimant's severe impairment may or may not affect his or her functional capacity to work. One does not necessarily establish the other." Yang v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2004 WL 1765480, at *5 (E.D. Mich. July 14, 2004). "The regulations recognized that individuals who have the same severe impairment may have different [residual functional capacities] depending on their other impairments, pain, and other symptoms." Griffeth v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 217 Fed. Appx. 425, 429 (6th Cir. 2007). Thus, the mere existence of any severe condition from which plaintiff may have suffered does not necessarily establish any functional limitation or disability. Plaintiff has not offered any evidence suggesting that she is more limited or restricted than the ALJ found in his RFC. The undersigned finds that, reading the ALJ's decision as a whole, the ALJ reasonably considered and discussed the record evidence, and reviewed and weighed the medical opinions of the examining and consulting physicians concerning plaintiff's mental limitations, and plaintiff's claim of error in this regard should be denied.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in discounting plaintiff's lower GAF scores, more particularly those from 2014 and 2015. Specifically, plaintiff challenges the ALJ's rationale, which was that plaintiff had only moderate limitations (Tr. 25), rather than the greater limitations that the scores suggested. According to plaintiff, the evaluators who assessed those scores, both treating and examining, all concluded that the limitations were beyond moderate and up to serious. Plaintiff acknowledges that the ALJ has the discretion to reject these GAF scores, but only if that rejection is supported by substantial evidence. As the 6th Circuit stated in Miller v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 811 F.3d 825, 836 (6th Cir. 2016): "A GAF score of 41-50 `reflects the assessor's opinion that the subject has serious symptoms or serious impairment of social or occupational functioning.' Keeton v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 583 F. App'x 515, 520 n.2 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Kornecky v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 167 F. App'x 496, 511(6th Cir. 2006))." The Court had previously stated that Keeton stands for the rule that the courts look to "consistency among low GAF scores to determine that an ALJ minimized the severity of a claimant's symptoms and failed to provide good reasons for assigning limited weight to a treating doctor's opinion." Miller, 811 F.3d at 836. Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ's selective reading of the medical and testimonial evidence is not supported by the record read as a whole, and that her rationale for the GAF scores being given "only some weight," fails the test set out by the Sixth Circuit in Miller. Plaintiff supports this argument as follows:
(Dkt. 11, p. 8). According to plaintiff, based upon the totality of the record, all the mental health professionals seeing her after 2012 agree that plaintiff's level of functioning is inconsistent with the ability to maintain work. Plaintiff also contends that there is no basis to determine what the ALJ meant by "some weight" as it relates to the GAF scores, because it is so vague that the result is the same as no weight at all.
In response, the Commissioner argues that a GAF score does not reflect a clinician's opinion of functional capacity, and, therefore, an ALJ is not required to consider it when determining a claimant's ability to work. Shorkey v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2014 WL 5361995, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 12, 2014) (citing Howard v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 241 (6th Cir. 2002), aff'd, 2014 WL 5362069 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 21, 2014)). The Commissioner further asserts that the ALJ was not required to accord weight to, much less articulate her reasons for rejecting a GAF score. Robertson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2015 WL 9948818, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2015) (citing Kornecky v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2006 WL 305648, *13 (6th Cir. February 9, 2006)), aff'd, 2016 WL 366778 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2016). The Commissioner also points out that despite having no obligation to do so, the ALJ considered the GAF scores of record, ranging from 45 to 66, and appropriately gave them only some weight because the record supports no more than moderate limitations. (Tr. 25). Notably, as the ALJ found (Tr. 25), GAF scores indicating serious limitations are inconsistent with plaintiff's lack of mental health treatment until May 2015 and her ability to perform various activities of daily living, including taking care of her daughter and son, being independent with personal care, engaging in housecleaning, and shopping. (Tr. 155, 445, 451). Although plaintiff contends that "there is nothing [in the record] suggesting the independence on the level found by the ALJ," (P. Br. 8), in May 2015, plaintiff was specifically found to be independent in several activities of daily living, including: eating, dressing, using the toilet, bathing, grooming, transferring, mobility in the community, taking medicine, and ambulation. (Tr. 445). According to the Commissioner, plaintiff has failed to show any error in the ALJ's consideration of the GAF scores or discussion of the record evidence.
The undersigned agrees with the arguments posited by the Commissioner. As observed in footnote 3, supra, GAF scores do not constitute medical opinions. As explained in Benton v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2017 WL 6333862, at *8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2017), while the Court must generally defer to the medical opinions expressed by a claimant's care providers, see King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 973 (6th Cir. 1984), the ALJ is not required "to put stock in a GAF score in the first place." Kornecky v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 167 Fed. Appx. 496, 511 (6th Cir. Feb. 9, 2006) (citing Howard v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 241 (6th Cir. 2002)). Indeed, a "GAF score does not reflect a clinician's opinion of functional capacity, and, therefore, an ALJ is not required to consider it when determining a claimant's ability to work." Shorkey v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2014 WL 5361995, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 12, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, 2014 WL 5362069 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 21, 2014) (citing Howard v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 241 (6th Cir. 2002) (ALJ is not required to consider GAF score in assessing residual functional capacity)). In addition, under the regulations in effect at the time of the ALJ's decision, the majority of GAF scores were issued by nonacceptable medical sources, to whom deference is not required. See e.g., Roulette v. Colvin, 2015 WL 3951947, at *10 (E.D. Tenn. June 29, 2015) ("Not only do these GAF scores not constitute treating physician opinions, the majority of GAF scores were assessed by non-acceptable medical sources.") (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a); 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2) (applicable to claims filed before March 27, 2017)). Thus, the Court is not presented with a situation such as that found in Keeton, where the Sixth Circuit relied on the existence of consistency among low GAF scores to support a determination that an ALJ minimized the severity of a claimant's symptoms and failed to provide good reasons for assigning limited weight to a treating doctor's opinion. See Keeton v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 583 Fed. Appx. 515, 529-30, 530 n.6 (6th Cir. 2014). For these reasons, the undersigned finds no reversible error as to the ALJ's assessment of the GAF scores in this case.
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned
The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and Recommendation, but are required to file any objections within 14 days of service, as provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) and Local Rule 72.1(d). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections that raise some issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all the objections a party might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(d)(2), any objections must be served on this Magistrate Judge.
Any objections must be labeled as "Objection No. 1," "Objection No. 2," etc. Any objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than 14 days after service of an objection, the opposing party may file a concise response proportionate to the objections in length and complexity. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2), Local Rule 72.1(d). The response must specifically address each issue raised in the objections, in the same order, and labeled as "Response to Objection No. 1," "Response to Objection No. 2," etc. If the Court determines that any objections are without merit, it may rule without awaiting the response.
