PER CURIAM.
The dispute before us concerns which of three insurance companies must shoulder responsibility for payment of plaintiff Muhamed Besic's first-party no-fault insurance benefits. In a summary disposition ruling, the circuit court imposed liability for all of Besic's first-party benefits on defendant Clearwater Insurance Company, which issued plaintiff a bobtail insurance policy. Clearwater appeals as of right, and we affirm.
In January 2007, Besic, a Michigan resident, sustained personal injuries in a motor vehicle accident in Ohio. At the time of the accident, Besic was driving a tractortrailer rig, hauling freight from Illinois to New York. Besic owned the tractor, registered and licensed the vehicle in Michigan, and leased it to MGR Express, Inc., pursuant to a "Contractor Operating Agreement" (COA). The COA identified Besic Express, a corporation solely owned by Besic, as the contractor and owner of the truck; however, Besic testified at his deposition that he owned the truck personally. The COA contemplated that during the term of the lease, MGR would "assume all responsibility and pay for all liability insurance" for the truck "while [Besic] is operating under the terms of this Agreement," and that Besic "has and reserves the right to contract independently for Workers' Compensation coverage, bobtail,[
MGR bought liability insurance for the truck from defendant Lincoln General Insurance Company. Besic purchased bobtail insurance coverage from Clearwater. Defendant Citizens Insurance Company of the Midwest insured Besic's household vehicles.
In November 2007, Besic sued Citizens in the Wayne Circuit Court, seeking payment of first-party no-fault benefits related to the injuries he sustained in the Ohio accident. Besic subsequently amended his complaint to add Clearwater and Lincoln as defendants. In February 2008, Clearwater filed cross-claims against Citizens and Lincoln, requesting "reimbursement or recoupment ... for the entire amounts of monies paid" by Clearwater and asserting that Citizens and Lincoln shared "a higher order of priority to pay Michigan no-fault benefits." The cross-claims also sought reformation of the Lincoln policy if the court determined that it "does not include an express provision for Michigan no-fault coverage. . . ."
All parties filed motions for summary disposition. At a September 2008 hearing, the circuit court expressed on the record its finding that the
In October 2008, the court entered an order granting summary disposition to Citizens and Lincoln, denying Clearwater summary disposition, and granting Besic summary disposition with respect to Clearwater only. Besic settled his claim against Clearwater,
Clearwater challenges the circuit court's summary disposition rulings, which we review de novo. Walsh v. Taylor, 263 Mich.App. 618, 621, 689 N.W.2d 506 (2004). The circuit court did not specify under which subrule of MCR 2.116(C) it found summary disposition appropriate, but a review of the record reflects that the court considered documentation beyond the pleadings and thus made its summary disposition rulings under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Subrule (C)(10) tests a claim's factual support. "In reviewing a motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court considers the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, and other relevant documentary evidence of record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists to warrant a trial." Walsh, 263 Mich.App. at 621, 689 N.W.2d 506.
Clearwater initially submits that its bobtail insurance policy plainly offered only limited coverage that did not apply when Besic had an accident while under dispatch, the situation in this case. Clearwater emphasizes that the bobtail policy endorsement with respect to Michigan personal injury protection (PIP) coverage
When reviewing an insurance policy dispute, an appellate court looks "`to the language of the insurance policy and interpret[s] the terms therein in accordance with Michigan's well-established principles of contract construction.'" Citizens Ins. Co. v. Pro-Seal Serv. Group, Inc., 477 Mich. 75, 82, 730 N.W.2d 682 (2007), quoting Henderson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 460 Mich. 348, 353-354, 596 N.W.2d 190 (1999).
In deciding whether an insured is entitled to insurance benefits, we employ a two-part analysis. Heniser v. Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co., 449 Mich. 155, 172, 534 N.W.2d 502 (1995). "First, we determine if the policy provides coverage to the insured." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). "An insurer is free to define or limit the scope of coverage as long as the policy language fairly leads to only one reasonable interpretation and is not in contravention of public policy." Id. at 161, 534 N.W.2d 502. If the policy does supply coverage, "we then ascertain whether that coverage is negated by an exclusion. It is the insured's burden to establish that his claim falls within the terms of the policy." Id. at 172, 534 N.W.2d 502 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Clearwater policy contains a "Certificate of Non-Trucking Automobile Liability Insurance," which states in relevant part, "No coverage is afforded when the described vehicle(s) is (are): 1. Under motor carrier direction, control, or dispatch." The policy also incorporates an endorsement entitled "Michigan Truckers—Insurance for Non-Trucking Use," which reads:
As discussed in greater detail in part IV of this opinion, the lessee of Besic's truck, MGR, did not buy "Michigan Personal Injury and Property Protection" coverage for Besic's truck. In light of the plain and unambiguous language of the Clearwater "Michigan Truckers—Insurance for Non-Trucking Use" endorsement, the Clearwater policy thus affords coverage. Clearwater essentially concedes this conclusion in its brief:
We reject Clearwater's contention that because the policy language in general excludes coverage while the truck is under dispatch, the endorsement should be similarly construed. "[E]ndorsements often are issued to specifically grant certain coverage or remove the effect of particular exclusions. Thus, such an endorsement will supersede the terms of the exclusion in question." 4 Holmes, Appleman on Insurance (2d ed), § 20.1, p 156. "When a conflict arises between the terms of an endorsement and the form provisions of an insurance contract, the terms of the endorsement prevail." Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Vector Constr. Co., 185 Mich.App. 369, 380, 460 N.W.2d 329 (1990). "[E]ndorsements by their very nature are designed to trump general policy provisions, and where a conflict exists between provisions in the main policy and the endorsement, the endorsement prevails." Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schmidt, 307 F.Supp.2d 674, 677 (W.D.Pa., 2004). The Clearwater endorsement unambiguously extends no-fault coverage under the existing circumstances because Michigan nofault PIP coverage was otherwise unavailable under MGR's Lincoln policy.
Moreover, the Clearwater bobtail policy also included an endorsement for Michigan PIP benefits. An endorsement entitled "Michigan Personal Injury Protection" sets forth in pertinent part the following:
In straightforward fashion, the terms of the Clearwater PIP endorsement apply to the basic facts of Besic's January 2007 accident in Ohio.
We conclude that on the issue of liability for Besic's PIP benefits, the circuit court properly (1) denied Clearwater summary disposition, (2) granted Besic summary disposition with respect to Clearwater, and (3) granted summary disposition to Citizens and Lincoln, pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) and in accord with the reasoning set forth in the rest of this opinion.
Clearwater next maintains that even if the Lincoln policy MGR purchased to cover Besic's truck does not "on its face" extend PIP coverage, this Court should imply PIP coverage under the Lincoln policy because Michigan law mandates that all insurance companies doing business in Michigan include PIP benefits in all automobile insurance policies. According to Clearwater, the Lincoln policy contemplates no-fault coverage in a policy section detailing "out of state coverage extensions." Clearwater alternatively urges that, if this Court interprets the Lincoln policy language as inapplicable to the present circumstances, we should reform Lincoln's policy to offer Besic Michigan no-fault PIP benefits.
Clearwater relies on the following italicized policy language, found in the "Truckers Coverage Form, Liability Coverage" section of the Lincoln policy, in support of its position that the Lincoln policy covered Besic's no-fault PIP expenses:
The emphasized language does not apply in this case because at the time of the accident Besic undisputedly was using the covered "auto" in Ohio, a state that does not have a no-fault liability scheme. Most likely, this section of the Lincoln policy enabled the coverage to comply with laws such as MCL 500.3163(1), which contains the following relevant language:
If Besic had been an Ohio resident injured in a Michigan crash, MCL 500.3163(1) and the "out-of-state-coverage extensions" would have compelled Lincoln to supply first-party no-fault PIP coverage. However, neither the statute nor the Lincoln policy language applies when a Michigan resident suffers a vehicle-related injury in Ohio.
Clearwater lastly avers that pursuant to MCL 500.3114, Citizens, the insurer of Besic's personal vehicles, shares responsibility to pay Besic's no-fault PIP benefits. In Clearwater's view, Citizens stands within the same order of priority as Clearwater, and thus Clearwater should receive a pro rata reimbursement for the first-party no-fault benefits it has paid Besic.
"To determine the priority of insurers liable for [no-fault PIP] benefits, the claimant must look to [MCL 500.3114]." Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 187 Mich.App. 617, 619, 468 N.W.2d 317 (1991). The pertinent subsections of MCL 500.3114 instruct as follows:
MCL 500.3101(1) states, in relevant part:
In Celina Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lake States Ins. Co., 452 Mich. 84, 89, 549 N.W.2d 834 (1996), the Supreme Court held that
The Supreme Court explained that
In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Sentry Ins., 91 Mich.App. 109, 114-115, 283 N.W.2d 661 (1979), this Court set forth the same rationale later adopted in Celina:
Besic owned the truck and worked as a self-employed independent contractor for MGR. Consistently with the Michigan Supreme Court's analysis in Celina, 452 Mich. at 89, 549 N.W.2d 834, the priority language in MCL 500.3114(3) extends to the self-employment situation of Besic. With respect to the additional language comprising MCL 500.3114(3), Besic suffered "accidental bodily injury while an occupant of a motor vehicle owned or registered by [his] employer," given that MRG had leased Besic's truck. MCL 500.3101(2)(h) (including in its definition of "owner" "[a] person renting a motor vehicle or having the use thereof, under a lease or otherwise, for a period that is greater than 30 days"). Because MCL 500.3114(3) applies to the undisputed facts of this case, it dictates that Besic "shall receive personal protection insurance benefits to which [he] is entitled from the insurer of the furnished vehicle." In light of the fact that only Clearwater extended PIP benefits to the truck involved in Besic's accident, it has first priority to pay Besic's first-party benefits.
Clearwater suggests that Smith v. Continental Western Ins. Co., 169 F.Supp.2d 687 (E.D.Mich., 2001), compels a different result. In Smith, the plaintiff owned a tractor registered in Indiana, and he sustained personal injuries in a Michigan accident. Id. at 689. The plaintiff sought PIP benefits and sued the insurers for (1) the company "with whom Plaintiff had a long-term lease to haul; (2) the short-term lessor for whom Plaintiff hauled on the day of the accident; and (3) the company" that provided bobtail coverage for the tractor. Id. The federal district court ruled that although Michigan's no-fault act applied, none of the defendants bore responsibility for paying no-fault benefits because the plaintiff's personal insurer occupied a higher priority. Id. at 692, 695. In reaching its decision, the district court expressly and repeatedly disclaimed any consideration of MCL 500.3114(3), the controlling insurer priority provision here. Id. at 694 n. 3, 695. Therefore, Smith is readily distinguishable from the instant case.
Affirmed. Costs to Citizens and Lincoln as the prevailing parties. MCR 7.219(A).