JOHN H. RICH, III, Magistrate Judge.
The defendant moves to amend my recommended decision in this Social Security benefits appeal, contending that the recommended decision "contains a material misstatement of fact." Defendant's Motion to Amend ("Motion") (Docket No. 17). The motion, if granted, would reverse my recommended decision by eliminating its factual predicate. The plaintiff has not responded to the motion. For the reasons that follow, I deny the motion.
The defendant challenges the following two sentences in footnote 2 of the recommended decision:
Report and Recommended Decision (Docket No. 16) at 4 n.2.
The defendant contends that the state-agency psychologist, David Houston, Ph.D., did in fact reject Patricia Kolosowski, Ph.D.'s IQ scores. Motion at 1. This argument is based on the following entry in Dr. Houston's report of his review of the plaintiff's medical records:
Record at 342.
All of the entry set forth above is merely repeated from Dr. Kolosowski's report. Id. at 471-74. It cannot reasonably be read as a statement of Dr. Houston's opinion that the plaintiff's IQ scores as found by Dr. Kolosowski were invalid. Indeed, Dr. Kolosowski added to the "rule out mental retardation" entry the words "additional testing or information might be needed." Id. at 474. Thus, she did not diagnose mental retardation, but she also did not rule it out finally. This medical information does not compel the conclusion that the Kolosowski IQ scores are "invalid," nor does it demonstrate that Dr. Houston "rejected" those IQ scores.
The defendant asserts that Dr. Houston "declined to check the box on his report indicating a `valid' IQ score of 60 through 70 that would implicate Listing 12.05C (R. 334)." Motion at 2. That characterization reads too much into the fact that Dr. Houston made no marks whatsoever on the page of the defendant's standard Psychiatric Review Technique form that deals with mental retardation. Record at 334. The most likely reason for Dr. Houston's failure to write (or check) anything on that page is that Dr. Kolosowski indicated that she could not determine whether the plaintiff suffered from mental retardation, so Dr. Houston felt that he also was without sufficient information to draw that conclusion.
The defendant also points, Motion at 1, to Dr. Houston's statement that the "Claimant's test results are underestimates due to inconsistent effort. CE [Dr. Kolosowski] reported that her abilities are higher than the test results. Borderline intellectual functioning present." Record at 346. Again, this is a recitation of Dr. Kolosowski's findings, not necessarily a rejection of the IQ scores achieved by the plaintiff. If Dr. Houston rejected those scores as invalid, he did not say so, nor did he provide any statement that necessarily implies such a rejection. The defendant does not even suggest that the administrative law judge did so.
The Seventh Circuit addressed a similar situation in Ribaudo v. Barnhart, 458 F.3d 580 (7
Id. at 583 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). That is what happened in the administrative law judge's opinion in this case. Compare Burns v. Astrue, No. 1:10-CV-42, 2012 WL 966166, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 21, 2012) (where administrative law judge did not mention Listing 12.05, but did explicitly consider elements involved in determining whether plaintiff met or equaled that Listing, no need for remand).
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to amend, which in reality is a motion to reverse the recommended decision,