LEONIE M. BRINKEMA, District Judge.
Collins Kusi Sakyi, ("Sakyi"), proceeding
After a nine-month investigation, involving several cooperating co-conspirators, Collins Kusi Sakyi ("Sakyi") was arrested on August 22, 2006, on charges of conspiracy to import heroin from Ghana and to distribute that heroin in the Eastern District of Virginia. The investigation began when two individuals were arrested at Washington Dulles International Airport on November 1, 2005, for attempting to import heroin into the United States from Ghana. These arrestees, as well as others who were arrested and eventually prosecuted, identified Sakyi as their leader. After months of investigation, Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") arranged for a cooperating individual to purchase 100 grams of heroin from Sakyi in Oxon Hill, Maryland. After ICE agents identified a Comfort Inn near the spot set for the drug sale, they proceeded to a motel room rented by Sakyi and co-conspirator Akua Gyamfuah ("Gyamfuah"). Agents knocked on the hotel room door and, after several minutes, Gyamfuah opened it. Gyamfuah, who was alone in the room, consented to the agents searching the room. During the search, agents found in a microwave two black pellets which they identified as devices commonly used to transport heroin. They also recovered 1.1 kilograms of cocaine, 95 grams of crack cocaine, and one half kilogram of heroin. Stmt. of Facts ¶ 13 [Dict. No. 79]. After being read her
On September 21, 2006, a federal grand jury returned a four-count indictment against Sakyi and Gyamfuah, charging them with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846 and other substantive drug offenses. The United States filed a criminal information pursuant to 21 U.S.0 § 851 as to Sakyi on September 27, 2006. A 15-count superseding indictment was returned against Sakyi and Gyamfuah on October 26, 2006, which added a continuing criminal enterprise charge, as well as additional counts for possession and distribution of heroin, aiding and abetting flight to avoid prosecution, and obstruction of justice, respectively in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and (c), 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(1), and 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (b)(1). A 16-count second superseding indictment was returned on November 8, 2006, adding an additional charge of conspiracy to cause flight to avoid prosecution, as well as adding Jeffrey Okyere, Rose Starks, and Orrin Jones as additional defendants. Gyamfuah pleaded guilty on December 8, 2006, under a plea agreement in which she agreed to cooperate. Sakyi initially pleaded not guilty to all 16 counts and requested a jury trial.
Attorney Paul Vangellow ("Vangellow"), Sakyi's court-appointed lawyer, filed several pretrial motions, including motions for discovery, to suppress, for a bill of particulars, and to dismiss the indictment on the ground that it was tainted by information Sakyi provided while under an informal immunity agreement.
On December 27, 2006, Sakyi attempted to plead guilty. At the plea hearing, Chris Amolsch, an attorney who had been retained by Sakyi's family and who had represented Sakyi during plea negotiations with the government, appeared in court. Because Sakyi indicated at the hearing that he wanted Vangellow to remain his counsel, Amolsch's request for an Order of Substitution was denied, and Vangellow remained counsel of record. To give Vangellow sufficient time to discuss the plea agreement with Sakyi, the hearing was briefly halted. The plea hearing resumed; however, when the plea colloquy turned to the Statement of Facts, which accompanied the plea agreement and which Sakyi had signed, he voiced several objections. Given those objections, the Court did not accept the plea.
Two days later, on December 29, 2006, a second plea hearing was held, during which Sakyi pleaded guilty under a revised plea agreement to Counts 1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, and 16 of the second superseding indictment. The remaining counts were dismissed.
During the Rule 11 colloquy on December 29, Sakyi stated, under an affirmation to tell the truth, that he fully understood the revised plea agreement, that the agreement constituted the complete understanding that he had reached with the government, and that he had no "side deals" or other promises from the government. Plea Tr. Dec. 29, 2006, at 14. He affirmed that he was not pleading guilty as a result of any force or pressures
Sakyi was sentenced on March 23, 2007, to concurrent sentences of 320 months incarceration for Counts 1, 10, 11, and 12; 120 months incarceration for Counts 13 and 15; and 60 months incarceration for Count 16, followed by 10-year periods of supervised release for Counts 1, 10, 11, and 12, and three-year periods of supervised release for Counts 13, 15, and 16.
Sakyi did not file a direct appeal but timely filed his first § 2255 motion on April 1, 2008. In that motion, he raised 49 claims involving three specific issues: ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Paul Vangellow; prosecutorial misconduct; and errors by the Court. The United States filed a response, which included affidavits from Vangellow and the case agent, and Sakyi filed a reply. Sakyi also filed a motion to supplement his initial § 2255 motion with additional claims. That motion was denied,
On December 24, 2009, all claims in Sakyi's first § 2255 motion were dismissed with prejudice except for the claim that after being instructed to file a notice of appeal, trial counsel failed to do so.
Sakyi appealed that decision. The Fourth Circuit found that, given the district court's decision to allow Sakyi an opportunity to take a direct appeal, the Court should have vacated the judgment and then reimposed it to restart the 14-day period in which to notice an appeal.
On remand, the judgment was vacated and reinstated, and appellate counsel was appointed. Sakyi timely noticed his appeal, in which he argued that the district court committed error when it denied his suppression motion, enhanced his sentence by imposing a leadership role, and failed to adjust his criminal history when it reentered the judgment. Sakyi also argued that the government breached the plea agreement by using information he had provided under an immunity agreement to enhance his sentence. He did not raise in his appeal any claim that the indictment was tainted by the government's use of his immunized statement.
On August 14, 2012, the Fourth Circuit rejected all of these arguments in an unpublished opinion.
To succeed in his § 2255 motion, Sakyi has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that his sentence or conviction was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, that the Court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or that the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum or is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). An evidentiary hearing in a § 2255 proceeding must be held if the movant alleges facts which, if true, would entitle him to relief.
As the Court previously found in addressing Sakyi's first Motion to Vacate, all of the issues he raises in this motion fall into three categories: ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, and errors by the Court.
To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Sakyi must meet the "highly deferential" two-prong test established in
As to his claims of being dissatisfied with Vangellow's representation, those claims conflict with Sakyi's affirmance under oath during both plea colloquies that he was fully satisfied with how Vangellow had represented him. Plea Tr. Dec. 29, 2006, at 14; Plea Tr. Dec. 27, 2006, at 57. Absent extraordinary circumstances, "allegations in a § 2255 motion that directly contradict the petitioner's sworn statements during a properly conducted Rule 11 colloquy are always palpably incredible and patently frivolous or false."
Sakyi claims that Vangellow did not investigate his case adequately by failing to visit the Comfort Inn, to interview hotel staff, and to obtain a hotel surveillance tape. This claim is without merit as the record shows that Vangellow did in fact secure the motel video tape and thoroughly investigated the case, including obtaining police reports. Vangellow Aff.
Plea Tr. Dec. 27, 2006, at 57;
Sakyi claims that Vangellow was ineffective in his efforts to suppress evidence from the search of the Comfort Inn hotel room that occurred shortly before Sakyi's arrest. Specifically, he argues that Vangellow should have called the hotel clerk (Claim 2) and co-defendant Gyamfuah (Claim 3) to testify at the suppression hearing. As a matter of procedure, any complaints about Sakyi's suppression motion were waived during his plea colloquies:
Plea Tr. Dec. 27, 2006, at 63-64.
Plea Tr. Dec. 29, 2006, at 20.
Vangellow filed a motion to suppress the drugs and other evidence obtained through the search of the Comfort Inn room and an evidentiary hearing was held on that motion. Ultimately, the motion was denied. That defense counsel's motion was unsuccessful does not, in and of itself, constitute ineffective assistance.
Sakyi asserts that both Gyamfuah and the hotel clerk working the night of his arrest would have provided favorable testimony, which he does not specify. Moreover, in their affidavits, both Vangellow and case agent Rodriguez affirmed that by the time of the suppression hearing, Gyamfuah was cooperating with the government and would not have provided testimony favorable to Sakyi. Vangellow Aff. ¶ 8; Rodriguez Aff.
Although Vangellow did not call the hotel clerk on duty the night Sakyi was arrested, he did call the hotel manager, who testified that he did not know what was on the security tape from the evening in question. Sakyi's focus on the security tape and the hotel clerk's testimony involves pure speculation.
Finally, in Claim 4, Sakyi alleges that Vangellow failed to file a motion for a rehearing after his Motion to Suppress was denied. Sakyi does not describe any new evidence that Vangellow could have offered at such a rehearing other than repeating his claim that Gyamfuah and the hotel clerk should have been called. None of these claims has merit and therefore they will be dismissed.
Sakyi alleges that Vangellow was ineffective in failing to win a dismissal of the original indictment on the ground that it was tainted by alleged immunized information Sakyi had revealed to the government during post-arrest debriefings. The record shows that Vangellow initially filed a Motion to Dismiss. The government responded with an extensive opposition, explaining the parameters of Sakyi's debriefing and also outlining the evidence it had already obtained from cooperating witnesses before Sakyi was arrested. In his affidavit, Vangellow explained that he determined that the government had not based its charges on any immunized information and that it had separate, corroborated evidence for each charge, and on that basis he withdrew the motion. Vangellow Aff. ¶ 12.
The record establishes that the evidence against Sakyi was developed through the government's debriefing cooperating witnesses well before Sakyi was arrested and from the evidence seized from the Comfort Inn. Sakyi has tendered no evidence to contradict Vangellow's assertion. As such, the Court fmds that Vangellow's conclusion that the indictment was not based on immunized statements from Sakyi was reasonable, and the decision not to pursue a dismissal of the indictment was fully justified. Lastly, it is significant that when a similar taint issue was raised on appeal, the Fourth Circuit found no misconduct by the government.
Despite unambiguously affirming during his plea colloquies that he was fully satisfied with Vangellow's representation, Sakyi makes multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with his guilty pleas and also suggests that his pleas were involuntary. In Claim 6, he alleges that Vangellow failed to inform him that an earlier plea offer would be withdrawn on a certain date. As Vangellow explained in his affidavit, early in the case he had obtained a favorable plea agreement based on Sakyi's proffered cooperation, but it "became less favorable over time as Sakyi refused fully to cooperate with the United States and obstructed justice." Vangellow Aff. ¶ 11. Vangellow also avers that both he and the prosecutor "advised Sakyi repeatedly about plea offer acceptance deadlines."
In Claim 7, Sakyi alleges that counsel never told him he could take a conditional plea under which he could reserve his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. He goes on to argue that "during my plea hearing I thought I had already lost my right to file for appeal on my suppression. ... Counsel never told me that suppression appeal was still valid and it will be only invalid after the plea. First time that I heard I was giving [sic] my right to appeal the suppression was when the Court asked me during my plea hearing." Mot. to Vacate 4 (Aug. 21, 2013) [Dkt. No. 253].
On this record, there is no evidence of any error by counsel because there is no evidence in the record that government counsel would have offered Sakyi a conditional plea. Moreover, Sakyi waived this issue by not raising it on appeal. Lastly, his claim that he did not realize that he was giving up his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion until his final plea is contradicted by the record. On December 27, 2006, when Sakyi first tried to plead guilty, he was clearly advised by the Court that a result of his plea would be losing the right to appeal the ruling on his suppression motion.
Plea Tr. Dec. 27, 2006, at 63-64. Sakyi had two more days to think about that implication of pleading guilty; however, he never raised any objection to that result.
On Friday, December 29, during his second plea colloquy, Sakyi was again asked whether he understood he was giving up the right to appeal that decision:
Plea Tr. Dec. 29, 2006, at 20.
Even if Sakyi was initially under a misunderstanding about his ability to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress when he first came before the Court, he was on clear notice when he entered his final pleas on December 29, 2006, and cannot now claim that his counsel was ineffective in how he handled that issue. Therefore, this claim will be dismissed.
In Claim 10, Sakyi contends that Vangellow was ineffective in failing to file a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas after Sakyi asked him to do so. Sakyi contends that he wanted to withdraw his guilty pleas at his sentencing hearing but that Vangellow told him he was being "stupid" and to simply apologize when asked if he had anything to say. Mot. to Vacate 6 [Dkt. No. 253]. In response to this claim, Vangellow avers that he does not recall any request by Sakyi to move to withdraw his guilty pleas. Vangellow Aff. ¶ 21. The record shows that no motion to withdraw the guilty pleas was ever filed. Moreover, as of February 15, 2007, only a few weeks before his sentencing hearing, Sakyi wrote a letter fully admitting his guilt, including his involvement in efforts to cause a witness to flee the United States.
At the March 23, 2007, sentencing hearing, Sakyi's tone was quite different from that in his letter. He complained about the accuracy of the Presentence Report.
A defendant does not possess an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea.
All of the claims alleging that Vangellow coerced Sakyi into pleading guilty are "palpably incredible" given that Sakyi admitted during both plea colloquies that he was fully satisfied with counsel's representation, that he had gone over both the original and amended plea agreements and Statement of Facts in detail with counsel, that he understood them, and that his pleas were completely voluntary. See Plea Tr. Dec. 29, 2006, at 6-14, 21-22; Plea Tr. Dec. 27, 2006, at 14-17, 64. It is well established that these statements are binding absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
For example, in Claim 11, Sakyi alleges that Vangellow dictated how he should answer the Court's questions during the plea colloquy depending on how counsel turned his pen: "[I]f he turn [sic] the pen the long way I should answer yes and if he turn [sic] the pen the other way I should answer no to the judge's question, making my plea involuntary." Mot. to Vacate 6 [Dkt. No. 253]. The transcripts for both plea colloquies defeat this claim. Those transcripts show that Sakyi was hardly an automaton in the plea colloquies, during which he interjected numerous comments.
In Claim 13, Sakyi appears to complain about Vangellow refusing to approach the prosecutor to see if Sakyi could plead to some counts and go to trial on others; in essence arguing that he was dissatisfied with the plea bargain to which he had finally agreed. Vangellow avers that he "advised Sakyi that he could plead in part and go to trial in part, but that the United States would withdraw it's [sic] offer of a cooperation plea and a possible sentence reduction if Sakyi made this decision[.]" Vangellow Aff. ¶ 16. Such a request would hardly have been advantageous to Sakyi. Given that a major advantage to the government in offering a plea bargain to a defendant is the ability to avoid the time and expense of a trial, if a defendant only agrees to plead to a few counts and insists on going to trial on the rest, the government usually rejects such an offer. Given the government's insistence on Sakyi pleading to multiple counts, it is highly unlikely that such a request would have been accepted, and there is no reason to believe that Sakyi's ultimate sentence would have been any lower if he had gone to trial on some counts. Therefore, this claim will be dismissed.
In Claim 15, Sakyi complains about the four-level increase to his base offense level for having a leadership role. Specifically, he argues that Vangellow was ineffective in advising him to accept the term in the final plea agreement that allowed both sides to argue whether that increase should apply. Sakyi claims that he "only agree[d] for the Court to decide the 4 points enhancement because of my counsel." Mot. to Vacate 8 [Dkt. No. 253]. This is a meritless claim because, regardless of what guideline factors the parties agree to in a plea agreement, the Court retains the power to determine the applicable guideline factors, unless the plea is made under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C), which is a type of plea rarely accepted by the Court because it contains binding provisions. In fact, Vangellow protected Sakyi in the final plea agreement by avoiding a stipulation on the issue, which could have foreclosed Sakyi's opposing the enhancement.
Sakyi claims that Vangellow was ineffective by failing to move to dismiss Count 13, which charged him with aiding and abetting Fred Asante's flight from prosecution in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 3146(a)(1). Specifically, he argues that Count 13 did not allege a crime and that Vangellow should have moved to dismiss it. This claim has no merit as all elements of the offense were properly alleged.
Sakyi also argues that this count was based upon information he provided while he was immunized; however, the record, including Vangellow's affidavit, clearly shows that this count was based on information from independent sources other than Sakyi. Vangellow Aff. ¶ 12. Indeed, Sakyi admitted during his plea colloquy and in the previously discussed letter of February 17, 2007, that he helped Asante flee the United States,
Sakyi complains that Vangellow failed to tell him that statements by co-defendants Jeffrey Okyere, Gyamfuah, Daniel Gyamfi, and Gifty Boakye could be suppressed: "Counsel never talk trial strategy with me about any suppression of these statement[s]. ..." Mot. to Vacate 9 [Mt. No. 253]. This claim contradicts Sakyi's acknowledgment during his final plea colloquy that Vangellow had discussed the evidence with him:
Plea Tr. Dec. 29, 2006, at 14.
To the extent Sakyi mentions Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), he has not described how statements by these witnesses would even constitute Rule 404(b) evidence. In fact, Okyere, Gyamfuah, Gyamfi, and Boakye were all co-conspirators of Sakyi.
Sakyi complains that Vangellow failed to assert his speedy trial rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1); however, Sakyi waived his speedy trial rights when he pleaded guilty. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). The issue, then, is whether Vangellow was ineffective in counseling Sakyi to plead guilty, rather than moving for a dismissal of the second superseding indictment on Speedy Trial Act grounds.
Sakyi's guilty plea on December 29, 2006, occurred 99 days after the first indictment was returned against him on September 21, 2006. Although the Speedy Trial Act normally requires that a trial be held within 70 days of a defendant's first appearance in court, the Act excludes from that time period any days from the filing of a pretrial motion until the hearing on, or disposition of, such motion. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D);
Sakyi alleges that Vangellow was ineffective for failing to investigate the prior drug charge that formed the basis for the § 851 information. The charge at issue was a 1997 conviction for possession of five or more grams of crack cocaine with intent to distribute.
In his reply in support of his first Motion to Vacate, Sakyi went into great detail about that conviction, describing how he was a passenger in a car driven by Lemont Gunn on the George Washington Parkway.
Lastly, Sakyi unambiguously admitted to being guilty of the prior drug offense and to understanding the impact it would have on his sentence.
Sakyi asserts multiple claims of prosecutorial misconduct which, because he pleaded guilty, are only relevant to the extent that they may have impacted the knowing or voluntary nature of his guilty plea.
Sakyi alleges that prosecutors "breached [the] plea agreement by using information the defendant gave" to support the portion of the Statement of Facts supporting Count 13. This claim essentially repeats Sakyi's previous allegation that the government improperly used information he provided under an immunity agreement to support obtaining the indictments. As discussed above, there is no evidence in the record to support this claim and the Fourth Circuit has rejected this claim, which will be dismissed.
Sakyi alleges that the government violated the requirements of
Sakyi claims that the prosecutor told him he would not file a § 851 information but then did so after plea negotiations broke down. That claim does not establish prosecutorial misconduct. Prosecutors are allowed to threaten and charge defendants with harsher offenses and expose them to more severe punishment if they refuse to accept plea offers.
This claim is barely comprehensible. Sakyi appears to be arguing that early in the case his family retained Bernard Grimm to represent him, yet he also mentions Vangellow being his attorney at the same time. He does not allege that he wanted Grimm to be his counsel and his conduct on December 27, 2006, when he rejected the services of another attorney, Christopher Amolsch, ostensibly hired by his family, and asked that Vangellow remain his counsel undermines any argument that the government interfered with his desire to have Grimm represent him. It is also significant that this issue was not raised in Sakyi's much longer first Motion to Vacate. For all these reasons, this claim will be dismissed.
As with the previous claim, this claim is barely comprehensible. Sakyi appears to be complaining that the prosecutor approached him in the lobby of the courthouse (obviously before Sakyi had been charged) and asked him who he was and whether he had hired a lawyer for Fred Asante and Gifty Boakye, who had been arrested. He further alleges that the prosecutor asked the lawyer representing Asante and Boakye who was paying his fees and, according to Sakyi, the lawyer showed Sakyi's business check to the prosecutor. Nothing in this claim makes out a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. Sakyi does not allege that he was under arrest when approached by the prosecutor and does not allege that he was represented by counsel at the time. He does not even describe what, if any, prejudice resulted from this interaction. Therefore, this claim is meritless and will be dismissed.
Sakyi alleges that after he told the government that he was innocent of his prior drug charge, which was cited in the § 851 information as the basis for increasing the mandatory minimum sentence, the prosecutor should have investigated that prior conviction. This claim essentially repeats Sakyi's previous claim that Vangellow provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to investigate that conviction further. As already explained, Sakyi was properly convicted of possession of five grams of crack with intent to distribute, and his conviction was upheld on appeal. Moreover, Sakyi unambiguously admitted to being guilty of the prior drug offense and to understanding the impact it would have on his sentence. See Plea Tr. Dec. 29, 2006, at 10.
Sakyi complains that the government coerced him into pleading guilty by promising that if he accepted a proposed plea agreement, charges against Rose Starks, the mother of his child, would be dropped. Sakyi admits that after he refused to accept that plea agreement, the government included Starks in the second superseding indictment. He then told the prosecutor that he would accept a plea agreement if the government dropped the charges against Starks but the prosecutor said it was too late. Sakyi further alleges that the prosecutor stated that "if [Sakyi] will accept the guilty plea deal he will not seek jail time for Ms. Rose Starks. So [Sakyi] told Mr. Amolsch and the prosecutor that [he] will take the plea." Mot. to Vacate 13 [Dkt. No. 253]. In neither of the two written plea agreements is there any mention of such an agreement. Instead, during both plea colloquies Sakyi denied that he had any side deals or understandings outside of the written plea agreements.
Six of the nine alleged errors by the Court relate to sentencing decisions. Specifically, Sakyi objects to the offense level having been increased two levels for obstruction of justice (Claim 1) and by four levels for being a leader of more than five persons (Claim 2). He also objects to his criminal history being increased by three levels for two driving-while-suspended charges, which he alleges were not disclosed to him (Claim 5), and by a two-point increase because of the recency of his conviction (Claim 7). In addition, Sakyi claims that the Court erred by sentencing him to ten years' supervised release (Claim 4) and by saying that the § 851 charged in the information would have no effect on his sentence (Claim 6).
Barring extraordinary circumstances, an error in the application of the Sentencing Guidelines cannot be raised in a § 2255 proceeding.
Claim 4 appears to address supervised release issues. To the extent Sakyi is arguing that the ten-year period of supervised release imposed on Counts 1, 10, and 11 should have been five years, he is wrong. As a result of the § 851 information being filed, not only were the statutory minimum terms of imprisonment doubled from ten years to twenty years for Counts 1, 10, and 11, but so were the maximum periods of supervised release increased from five years to ten years, and Sakyi was clearly on notice of the lengthened period of supervised release during both plea colloquies.
In Claim 6, Sakyi alleges that the Court erred by saying that the § 851 information had no effect on his sentence. In both plea colloquies the Court explained the effect that the § 851 information would have on the
For all these reasons, Claims 1, 2, and 4 through 7 will be dismissed.
Sakyi alleges that the Court erred in not allowing him to withdraw his guilty pleas. As discussed above, there is no record of Sakyi explicitly making such a motion, and his argument that his counsel was ineffective in failing to file such a motion demonstrates that no such motion was ever presented to the Court.
To the extent Sakyi is trying to argue that the Court should have assumed he wanted to withdraw his guilty pleas from the nature of his complaints about the Presentence Report, the Court raised that issue but immediately stated that, under the
Citing to
Sakyi's conviction became final on February 19, 2013, when his petition for
Even if
In his last claim, Sakyi argues that the Court did not give him and Vangellow enough time to go over the case before his plea. To the contrary, the record reflects that after the Court refused to accept Sakyi's plea on Wednesday, December 27, 2006, no date was set for a second plea hearing, although the Court stated that it could schedule one during the following week. Instead, the parties, not the Court, scheduled the second plea hearing two days later, for Friday, December 29, 2006. Before allowing Sakyi to plead guilty on December 29, 2006, he was again placed under an affirmation to tell the truth, and fully questioned about whether he had taken enough time to consider the plea agreement:
Plea Tr. Dec. 29, 2006, at 6.
As this colloquy clearly establishes, Sakyi admitted having had sufficient time to consider pleading guilty. Lastly, as to each count to which he pleaded guilty, he was asked whether he claimed in any respect that he was innocent, and he answered "no" as to each count. Plea Tr. Dec. 29, 2006, at 45-48. Therefore, this claim is meritless and will be dismissed.
Because the record established in connection with both his first and second Motions to Vacate demonstrates that none of Sakyi's claims has merit, there is no need for an evidentiary hearing and this Motion to Vacate will be dismissed by an Order to be issued with this Memorandum Opinion.
Plea Tr. Dec. 29, 2006, at 20-21;
Plea Tr. Dec. 29, 2006, at 10-11.
Plea Tr. Dec. 29, 2006, at 10.
Plea Tr. Dec. 27, 2006, at 17.
Plea Tr. Dec. 29, 2006, at 14.
