GORTON, United States District Judge.
This cases involves a land dispute between Samuel Bourne ("Bourne" or "plaintiff"), the Town of East Bridgewater, Massachusetts ("the Town") and the Chairman of its Planning Board, Roy E. Gardner (collectively, "defendants"). Bourne generally alleges that defendants violated his constitutional right to due process and that their actions prevented him from acquiring the subject parcel of land, in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Pending before the Court are defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's claims, or, alternatively, to transfer the case to state court and plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint. For the reasons that follow, defendant's motion to dismiss will be allowed and plaintiff's motion to amend will be denied.
On March 17, 2016, Bourne acquired title to a parcel of land known as "Lot 31" in East Bridgewater, Massachusetts. He recorded the deed on April 1, 2016 with the Plymouth County Registry of Deeds ("the Registry of Deeds").
On June 30, 2016, Roy Gardner ("Gardner"), the Chairman of the Planning Board for the Town of East Bridgewater wrote Bourne a letter in which he notified Bourne that the acquisition of Lot 31 violated several local zoning ordinances. The following day, Gardner's letter was recorded with the Registry of Deeds.
Meanwhile, Bourne also filed suit against Gardner and the Town in this Court in November, 2016. Although the factual allegations are nearly identical, here Bourne alleges three causes of action: 1) "
In December, 2016, defendants moved to dismiss this case or, in the alternative, to transfer plaintiff's claims for resolution in the state court case. While that motion was pending plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint, seeking to add Dorothy L. Simpson ("Simpson"), a secretarial clerk who works for the Town under Gardner, as a defendant and two causes of action: conspiracy against Gardner and Simpson and intentional interference with contractual relations against all defendants. This memorandum addresses both pending motions.
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain "sufficient factual matter" to state a claim for relief that is actionable as a matter of law and "plausible on its face."
When rendering that determination, a court may not look beyond the facts alleged in the complaint, documents incorporated by reference therein and facts susceptible to judicial notice.
The Court has broad discretion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) to allow the plaintiff to amend his pleadings and "should freely give leave when justice so requires."
The "prior pending action" doctrine provides that, to ensure judicial efficiency and avoid inconsistent judgments,
An examination of the pleadings in the public record establishes that the "prior pending action" doctrine bars plaintiff's claims against Gardner and the Town in this action.
Plaintiff's claims against defendants in this case and the state court case concern a letter sent (and later recorded at the Registry of Deeds) by Gardner which has allegedly clouded plaintiff's title to Lot 31. The witnesses and documents at issue in both cases, the parties and the claimed damages are all the same.
Moreover, the result of the state court litigation will be binding on this court.
Finally, the fact that plaintiff could have amended his complaint in state court to add the causes of action raised here,
Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint will be allowed and the claims will be dismissed without prejudice.
Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint to add Simpson and two causes of action because he "discovered" new evidence. Defendants respond that such evidence was information they provided as part of discovery in the pending state court case and, in any event, the proposed amendments would be futile because the new claims are subject to dismissal.
First, the addition of Simpson as a defendant does not save plaintiff's original three claims, which are repeated in his proposed amended complaint, from application of the prior pending action doctrine.
In Count IV of his proposed amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that the individual defendants (Gardner and Simpson) conspired against him, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
In the context of § 1985(3) claims, to be entitled to qualified immunity, Gardner and Simpson must not have known, or could not have predicted, that the statute would preclude them corresponding with each other about the subject letter.
Here, the fact that Gardner and Simpson work as part of the same agency establishes that they are entitled to qualified immunity because it is unlikely that government officials within a single agency could conspire with each other for the purpose a of § 1985(3) claim.
Moreover, the statute requires that the conspiracy be based upon "class-based animus,"
Thus, Count IV of the proposed amended complaint is subject to dismissal.
In Count V of the proposed amended complaint, plaintiff claims that Gardner, Simpson and the Town intentionally interfered with his "contractual relations". With respect to the claims asserted against Gardner and Simpson, defendants contend that plaintiff has not alleged any improper conduct on their part. The Court agrees.
To state a claim for intentional interference with contractual relations, plaintiff must allege facts that show that Garnder and Simpson acted "for an improper purpose or by improper means."
With respect to plaintiff's claim against the Town, the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, M.G.L. c. 258, § 10(c), expressly bars such claims.
Accordingly, Count V is also subject to dismissal. Plaintiff's proposed amendment would thus be futile.
In accordance with the foregoing,