ELLEN S. CARMODY, Magistrate Judge.
This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff's claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. The parties have agreed to proceed in this Court for all further proceedings, including an order of final judgment. Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative record and provides that if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence it shall be conclusive. The Commissioner has found that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner's decision is
The Court's jurisdiction is confined to a review of the Commissioner's decision and of the record made in the administrative hearing process. See Willbanks v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988). The scope of judicial review in a social security case is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in making her decision and whether there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting that decision. See Brainard v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court may not conduct a de novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. See Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). It is the Commissioner who is charged with finding the facts relevant to an application for disability benefits, and her findings are conclusive provided they are supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Cohen v. Secretary of Department of Health and Human Services, 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992). It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir. 1993). In determining the substantiality of the evidence, the Court must consider the evidence on the record as a whole and take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. See Richardson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 735 F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1984). As has been widely recognized, the substantial evidence standard presupposes the existence of a zone within which the decision maker can properly rule either way, without judicial interference. See Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986). This standard affords to the administrative decision maker considerable latitude, and indicates that a decision supported by substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because the evidence would have supported a contrary decision. See Bogle, 998 F.2d at 347; Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545.
Plaintiff was 33 years of age on his alleged disability onset date. (PageID.200). He successfully completed high school and worked previously as a semi-truck driver. (PageID.53). Plaintiff applied for benefits on June 17, 2014, alleging that he had been disabled since April 3, 2011, due to ankylosing spondylitis, fibromyalgia, Scheuermann's disease, myositosis,
On November 2, 2016, Plaintiff appeared before ALJ Sarah Zimmerman with testimony being offered by Plaintiff and a vocational expert. (PageID.65-103). In a written decision dated May 31, 2017, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. (PageID.39-55). The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's determination, rendering it the Commissioner's final decision in the matter. (PageID.25-29). Plaintiff subsequently initiated this appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the ALJ's decision.
Plaintiff's insured status expired on December 31, 2016. (PageID.42). Accordingly, to be eligible for Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, Plaintiff must establish that he became disabled prior to the expiration of his insured status. See 42 U.S.C. § 423; Moon v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1175, 1182 (6th Cir. 1990).
The social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential process for evaluating disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f).
The burden of establishing the right to benefits rests squarely on Plaintiff's shoulders, and she can satisfy her burden by demonstrating that her impairments are so severe that she is unable to perform her previous work, and cannot, considering her age, education, and work experience, perform any other substantial gainful employment existing in significant numbers in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528. While the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step five, Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through step four of the procedure, the point at which her residual functioning capacity (RFC) is determined. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987); Walters v. Commissioner of Social Security, 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffered from: (1) obesity; (2) kyphosis/Scheuermann's disease; (3) degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine; (4) osteoarthritis of the left shoulder status post reconstruction; and (5) carpal tunnel syndrome of the left upper extremity status post release, severe impairments that whether considered alone or in combination with other impairments, failed to satisfy the requirements of any impairment identified in the Listing of Impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (PageID.42-45).
With respect to Plaintiff's residual functional capacity, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform sedentary work subject to the following limitations: (1) he cannot lift/carry more than 10 pounds at one time and can occasionally lift/carry items such as docket files, ledgers, and small tools; (2) during an 8-hour workday, he can sit for 6 hours and stand/walk for 4 hours; (3) he should be able to change position every 30 minutes for 5 minutes while remaining on task; (4) he can frequently climb ramps and stairs, but can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; (5) he can frequently balance, occasionally stoop and kneel, but can never crouch or crawl; (6) he can never be exposed to hazardous heights, dangerous machinery, or excessive vibration. (PageID.45).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant work at which point the burden of proof shifted to the Commissioner to establish by substantial evidence that a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy which Plaintiff could perform, his limitations notwithstanding. See Richardson, 735 F.2d at 964. While the ALJ is not required to question a vocational expert on this issue, "a finding supported by substantial evidence that a claimant has the vocational qualifications to perform
The vocational expert reported that there existed approximately 138,000 jobs nationally which an individual with Plaintiff's RFC could perform, such limitations notwithstanding. (PageID.94-100). This represents a significant number of jobs. See, e.g., Taskila v. Commissioner of Social Security, 819 F.3d 902, 905 (6th Cir. 2016) ("[s]ix thousand jobs in the United States fits comfortably within what this court and others have deemed `significant'"). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to disability benefits.
In addition to Plaintiff's testimony at the administrative hearing, the administrative record contained copies of Plaintiff's medical treatment records. The ALJ described this evidence as follows:
(PageID.46-49).
On September 27, 2016, Dr. Nathan Sailor completed a report describing Plaintiff's physical ability to perform work-related activities. (PageID.711-16). As detailed below, the doctor concluded that Plaintiff experienced greater physical limitations than the ALJ recognized. The ALJ, however, afforded "little weight" to Dr. Sailor's opinions. (PageID.51). Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to relief on the ground that the ALJ failed to articulate good reasons for discounting Dr. Sailor's opinions.
The treating physician doctrine recognizes that medical professionals who have a long history of caring for a claimant and his maladies generally possess significant insight into her medical condition. See Barker v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 1994). An ALJ must, therefore, give controlling weight to the opinion of a treating source if: (1) the opinion is "well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques" and (2) the opinion "is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record." Gayheart v. Commissioner of Social Security, 710 F.3d 365, 375-76 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527).
Such deference is appropriate, however, only where the particular opinion "is based upon sufficient medical data." Miller v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 1991 WL 229979 at *2 (6th Cir., Nov. 7, 1991) (citing Shavers v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 232, 235 n.1 (6th Cir. 1987)). The ALJ may reject the opinion of a treating physician where such is unsupported by the medical record, merely states a conclusion, or is contradicted by substantial medical evidence. See Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528; Miller v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 1991 WL 229979 at *2 (6th Cir., Nov. 7, 1991) (citing Shavers v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 839 F.2d 232, 235 n.1 (6th Cir. 1987)); Cutlip v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 25 F.3d 284, 286-87 (6th Cir. 1994).
If an ALJ accords less than controlling weight to a treating source's opinion, the ALJ must "give good reasons" for doing so. Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 376. Such reasons must be "supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source's medical opinion and the reasons for that weight." This requirement "ensures that the ALJ applies the treating physician rule and permits meaningful review of the ALJ's application of the rule." Ibid. (quoting Wilson v. Commissioner of Social Security, 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004)). Simply stating that the physician's opinions "are not well-supported by any objective findings and are inconsistent with other credible evidence" is, without more, too "ambiguous" to permit meaningful review of the ALJ's assessment. Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 376-77.
If the ALJ affords less than controlling weight to a treating physician's opinion, the ALJ must still determine the weight to be afforded such. Id. at 376. In doing so, the ALJ must consider the following factors: (1) length of the treatment relationship and frequency of the examination, (2) nature and extent of the treatment relationship, (3) supportability of the opinion, (4) consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, (5) the specialization of the treating source, and (6) other relevant factors. Ibid. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527). While the ALJ is not required to explicitly discuss each of these factors, the record must nevertheless reflect that the ALJ considered those factors relevant to his assessment. See, e.g., Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007); Undheim v. Barnhart, 214 Fed. Appx. 448, 450 (5th Cir., Jan. 19, 2007).
According to Dr. Sailor, Plaintiff experiences the following functional limitations: (1) during an 8-hour workday, Plaintiff can sit for 3 hours, stand for 3 hours, and walk for 2 hours; (2) Plaintiff can "never" perform overhead reaching activities and otherwise can only use his upper extremities occasionally to perform work activities; (3) Plaintiff can walk only 100-200 yards without using a cane or other assistive device; and (4) Plaintiff would be absent from work "more than three days a month" due to his impairments. (PageID.711-16).
In support of his decision to discount Dr. Sailor's opinion, the ALJ concluded as follows:
(PageID.51).
Dr. Sailor first examined Plaintiff in September 2015. (PageID.680-83). Nevertheless, the doctor asserted that the limitations he identified were in effect as of 2011. As the ALJ correctly noted, however, the doctor offered no basis for opining as to limitations Plaintiff allegedly experienced four years before he even examined him. As the ALJ also observed, the results of Dr. Sailor's few examinations of Plaintiff revealed findings inconsistent with his subsequent opinion. (PageID.680-96). Rather, the doctor reported that Plaintiff's symptoms were relieved by over the counter medication and physical therapy. (PageID.680, 684). These two justifications alone are sufficient to discount Dr. Sailor's opinion. As the ALJ further observed, however, the other medical evidence of record does not support Dr. Sailor's opinion, as the discussion above reveals. Accordingly, this argument is rejected.
A claimant's RFC represents the "most [a claimant] can still do despite [his] limitations." Sullivan v. Commissioner of Social Security, 595 Fed. Appx. 502, 505 (6th Cir., Dec. 12, 2014); see also, Social Security Ruling 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184 at *1 (Social Security Administration, July 2, 1996) (a claimant's RFC represents her ability to perform "work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis," defined as "8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule"). As noted above, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff retained the ability to perform a limited range of sedentary work. Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to relief because the ALJ's RFC assessment is "hallucinatory" and "detached from reality." (ECF No. 11 at PageID.947-48).
In support of his argument, Plaintiff argues that he suffers from severe impairments and has identified isolated portions of the medical record which arguably support his contention that he is more limited that the ALJ concluded. First, there is no dispute that Plaintiff suffers from severe impairments. The ALJ recognized such and limited Plaintiff to a range of sedentary work. Second, it is almost always the case that the record contains evidence supporting alternative findings and conclusions. As noted above, however, the fact that the evidence would support a different result is not a sufficient ground to obtain relief. Instead, the question is whether the ALJ's decision regarding Plaintiff's RFC is supported by substantial evidence. As the ALJ's discussion of the evidence reveals, such is the case. Accordingly, this argument is rejected.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to comply with Social Security Ruling 02-1p, Titles II and XVI: Evaluation of Obesity, 2000 WL 628049 (S.S.R., Sept. 12, 2002). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to adequately consider his obesity and the effect of such on his RFC.
As the Sixth Circuit has held, Social Security Ruling 02-1p "does not mandate a particular mode of analysis, but merely directs an ALJ to consider the claimant's obesity, in combination with other impairments, at all stages of the sequential evaluation." Nejat v. Commissioner of Social Security, 359 Fed. Appx. 574, 577 (6th Cir., Dec. 22, 2009); see also, Bledsoe v. Barnhart, 165 Fed. Appx. 408, 412 (6th Cir., Jan. 31, 2006) ("[i]t is a mischaracterization to suggest that Social Security Ruling 02-01p offers any particular procedural mode of analysis for obese disability claimants"). The ALJ recognized that Plaintiff's obesity constituted a severe impairment and examined the entire record in assessing Plaintiff's residual functional capacity. The evidence of record does not support the argument that Plaintiff's obesity, either alone or in combination with her other impairments, impairs him to an extent greater than that recognized by the ALJ. Accordingly, this argument is rejected.
For the reasons articulated herein, the Court concludes that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner's decision is
