JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
¶ 1 In 2013, the General Assembly adopted the "Erroneous homestead exemptions" section of the Property Tax Code (Code) (35 ILCS 200/1-1 et seq. (West 2014)), setting out procedures for the Cook County Assessor's Office, once it has discovered that a property owner has been erroneously granted a homestead exemption, to recoup unpaid taxes and 10% annual interest and impose 50% penalties and liens. See Pub. Act 98-93, § 5 (eff. July 16, 2013) (adding 35 ILCS 200/9-275). A homestead is a property taxpayer's primary residence and the legislature has granted limited homestead exemptions from taxation to certain groups, such as military veterans, senior citizens, and long term occupants. See 35 ILCS 200/9-275(a) (West 2014). The main question presented by Evergreen Park property owner Barbara R. Mulry is whether the statute adopted in 2013 encompasses tax years 2010, 2011, and 2012. Mulry contends the statute has been applied retroactively in violation of the contract clause and due process guarantee of the state and federal constitutions and that an administrative hearing officer's decision in favor of tax assessment and 10% interest is primarily based on computer records admitted into evidence without adequate foundation.
¶ 2 In 2014, the Cook County Assessor's Office notified taxpayer Mulry that she was not eligible to take homestead exemptions for tax years 2010, 2011, and 2012 for 9135 South Springfield Avenue, Evergreen
¶ 3 At the hearing, Mulry objected to the admission into evidence of computer printouts showing that she received a homestead exemption for two different Illinois properties for the three tax years at issue. After a brief continuance, the Assistant State's Attorney called Joseph Accardi, an employee of the Cook County Assessor's Office, to testify. Accardi testified that during the course of his investigation into Mulry's exemptions, he printed records from the assessor's database, that the printed records proffered in the courtroom were kept in the normal course of business at the Assessor's Office, and that he had accessed them from the assessor's computer system by logging in as an individual and then entering the PIN numbers for both properties. Mulry objected to the sufficiency of this foundation, but the hearing officer overruled the objection. Accardi then testified that the documents showed exemptions had been taken for both properties for the three tax years at issue. Mulry waived cross-examination. The assistant State's attorney moved to admit the documents into evidence, and, over Mulry's objection, the hearing officer admitted these documents, as well as others.
¶ 4 Mulry testified that she and her husband, Timothy P. Mulry, have owned and resided for more than 30 years at 9139 South Springfield Avenue, Evergreen Park, Illinois, 60805-1459, which is next door to the property now at issue. Mulry inherited the subject property, 9135 South Springfield Avenue, from her widowed uncle, James Leo Brogan, who passed away on September 23, 2001. She has never resided in her uncle's former house and has rented it out more or less continuously since her inheritance. Until she received the Assessor's notice in 2014, she was unaware her uncle had a general homestead exemption in effect for his property. Since her inheritance, she has not looked at any tax bills and has merely signed checks that her husband has prepared to pay the tax bills. Her husband has also prepared checks to pay the taxes on their residence. Mulry tendered into evidence documents substantiating her uncle's death and her inheritance of the property title.
¶ 5 The assistant State's Attorney then argued the proceedings established that Mulry took simultaneous exemptions for the two properties and that the law entitled her to an exemption only for her primary residence. Mulry's attorney countered that the erroneous homeowner's exemption statute was being improperly applied. The hearing officer rejected Mulry's statutory argument, found that the preponderance of the evidence was in favor of the State of Illinois, and ruled that Mulry owed $4188.60.
¶ 6 Mulry sought review in the circuit court of Cook County, and when those proceedings also concluded in the State's favor, she sought this further review in the appellate court.
¶ 7 When a party appeals from the circuit court's decision on a complaint for administrative review, we review the decision of the administrative agency rather than the decision of the circuit court. White v. Retirement Board of Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 2014 IL App
¶ 8 Mulry first argues that the hearing officer's decision is erroneous because it gives impermissible retroactive application to the statute. She contends that the claimed tax arrears for tax years 2010 through 2012 are all prior to section 9-275's effective date of July 16, 2013 (Pub. Act 98-93, § 5 (eff. July 16, 2013)), and there is no language in the statute indicating the General Assembly intended for the law to apply to conduct occurring before its enactment. Mulry contends her interpretation is supported by the fact that the Assessor's Office did not implement procedures for conducting section 9-275 hearings until February 26, 2014. The State's Attorney responds that Mulry misunderstands the significance of a statute's effective date and that, under the analysis set forth in numerous Illinois cases, it is permissible for the legislation to be applied as it was written.
¶ 9 Mulry's argument is one of statutory interpretation, which is a question of law we address de novo. White, 2014 IL App (1st) 132315, ¶ 23, 385 Ill.Dec. 92, 18 N.E.3d 92; Branson v. Department of Revenue, 168 Ill.2d 247, 254, 213 Ill.Dec. 615, 659 N.E.2d 961, 965 (1995). The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature. People ex rel. Madigan v. Lincoln, Ltd., 383 Ill.App.3d 198, 205, 322 Ill.Dec. 56, 890 N.E.2d 975, 980 (2008). The language of a statute is the most reliable indication of the legislature's objectives in enacting the law. Lincoln, 383 Ill.App.3d at 205, 322 Ill.Dec. 56, 890 N.E.2d at 980-81. The language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning, all provisions of an enactment are to be viewed as whole, and words and phrases are to be construed in light of relevant provisions of the statute rather than in isolation. Lincoln, 383 Ill.App.3d at 205, 322 Ill.Dec. 56, 890 N.E.2d at 980-81. In addition, whenever possible, every word, clause, and sentence is to be given reasonable meaning and shall not be treated as superfluous or rendered void. Lincoln, 383 Ill.App.3d at 205, 322 Ill.Dec. 56, 890 N.E.2d at 980-81.
¶ 10 In our opinion, Mulry misconstrues the significance of a statute's effective date, which is simply the date that legislation takes effect or, in other words, becomes governing law. A statute's effective date is not enough to tell us about the General Assembly's intended temporal reach of this enactment. The "`traditional rule'" is that statutes do not apply retroactively unless the legislators have expressly stated this temporal reach. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector, 196 Ill.2d 27, 37, 255 Ill.Dec. 482, 749 N.E.2d 964, 971 (2001) (quoting Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 237, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 131 L.Ed.2d 328 (1995)). A statute that has retroactive impact is one that "`would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or imposes new duties with respect to transactions already completed.'" Commonwealth Edison, 196 Ill.2d at 38, 255 Ill.Dec. 482, 749 N.E.2d at 971 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994)). The presumption against statutory retroactivity is based on concerns for unfairly affecting property and contract rights. Commonwealth Edison, 196 Ill.2d at 37-38, 255 Ill.Dec. 482, 749 N.E.2d at 971. Accordingly, courts require the legislature to clearly
¶ 11 In order to apply Landgraf and to adhere to the principles of sound interpretation, we must consider all the relevant language of the statute, rather than merely the date the legislation became effective, as Mulry argues. The statute as a whole created specific procedures through which the chief county assessment officer may recover an unlawfully received tax benefit. Paragraph (a) defines certain terms used in the statute. 35 ILCS 200/9-275(a) (West 2014). Paragraph (b) details the information the chief county assessment officer must include in each assessment notice sent in a general assessment year and indicates that a property owner will not be penalized if, within 60 days after receiving the notice, he or she notifies the officer of the receipt of a homestead exemption in error in a previous assessment year and pays the principal amount of back taxes. 35 ILCS 200/9-275(b) (West 2014). The next five paragraphs of the statute — paragraphs (c), (c-5), (d), (e), and (f) — describe how the chief county assessment officer is to proceed upon realizing that "one or more erroneous homestead exemptions was applied to the property," indicate that the taxpayer may request a hearing of the allegations, set out procedural rules for the taxpayer's request and the hearing, and provide for appeals consistent with the Administrative Review Law. 35 ILCS 200/9-275(c), (c-5), (d), (e), (f) (West 2014). The next five paragraphs — paragraphs (g), (h), (i), (j), and (k) — concern other circumstances not relevant here, such as the impact of clerical errors and how a lien affects the legal rights of bona fide purchasers, mortgagees, and other third parties. 35 ILCS 200/9-275(g)-(k) (West 2014). The concluding paragraph, (l), sets out the terms of an amnesty period. 35 ILCS 200/9-275(l) (West 2014).
¶ 12 In this instance, the General Assembly clearly directed the Cook County Assessor to proceed as far back as three years against taxpayers who received an erroneous homestead exemption. Specifically, paragraph (c) of section 9-275 provides that the Assessor may cause a lien to be recorded against property when the property owner received one or two erroneous homestead exemptions "during any of the 3 collection years immediately prior to the current collection year." 35 ILCS 200/9-275(c) (West 2014). Paragraph (f) specifies that if the taxpayer received one or two erroneous exemptions, "during any of the 3 collection years immediately prior to the current collection year," the principal amount of unpaid taxes and 10% interest per annum are to be charged to that taxpayer. 35 ILCS 200/9-275(f) (West 2014). In this case of statutory interpretation, we adhere to the principle that if the General Assembly had intended for the statute to apply only to erroneous homestead exemptions "which occur after the
¶ 13 Nevertheless, we do not find that the statute operates retrospectively, as Mulry argues. As pointed out in Commonwealth Edison: "`A statute does not operate "retrospectively" merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute's enactment [citation] or upsets expectations based in prior law. Rather, the court must ask whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment.'" Commonwealth Edison, 196 Ill.2d at 39, 255 Ill.Dec. 482, 749 N.E.2d at 971-72 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269-70, 114 S.Ct. 1483). A law that operates retroactively is a law that reaches back in time and either penalizes conduct that was permissible at the time or changes a penalty. Mohammad, 2013 IL App (1st) 122151, ¶ 14, 373 Ill.Dec. 90, 993 N.E.2d 90; Hayashi, 2014 IL 116023, ¶ 23, 388 Ill.Dec. 878, 25 N.E.3d 570 (a law that operates retroactively is a law that would "`impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed'" (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483)).
¶ 14 Section 9-275's application to Mulry is not retrospective. It does not upset Mulry's expectations based on prior law or attach new consequences to prior conduct because, even under prior law, she was not entitled to take simultaneous homestead exemptions on two different
¶ 15 Mulry contends only in passing, in the "Summary of Argument" section of her opening appellate brief that our interpretation of the statute would "conflict with section 4 of the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70)(4) [(West 2000)]." We disagree. Section 4 of the Statute on Statutes "controls by default only where the legislature has not clearly defined the temporal reach of a statute." Hayashi, 2014 IL 116023, ¶ 24, 388 Ill.Dec. 878, 25 N.E.3d 570 (citing Caveney v. Bower, 207 Ill.2d 82, 92-93, 797 N.E.2d 596, 601-02, 278 Ill.Dec. 1 (2003)); Doe A. v. Diocese of Dallas, 234 Ill.2d 393, 406, 334 Ill.Dec. 649, 917 N.E.2d 475, 483 (2009) (section 4 of the Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2006)) operates as a default standard only where the legislature has not clearly specified the temporal reach of a statute). If the legislature has clearly expressed the temporal reach of legislation, section 4 is irrelevant. Hayashi, 2014 IL 116023, ¶ 24, 388 Ill.Dec. 878, 25 N.E.3d 570; Doe A., 234 Ill.2d at 406, 334 Ill.Dec. 649, 917 N.E.2d at 483 (section 4 "is inapplicable to situations where the legislature has clearly indicated the temporal reach of a statutory amendment"). Section 4 is not applicable in this instance where the legislature has clearly defined the temporal reach of its statute.
¶ 16 Even if we assume for the sake of argument that the statute is retroactive, Mulry's arguments do not persuade us to reverse the hearing officer's decision.
¶ 17 Mulry also contends that holding her liable in 2014 for back taxes dating to 2010 is so harsh and oppressive that it violates the due process clauses of the Illinois and federal constitutions. In order to determine whether retroactive application is "so harsh and oppressive as to transgress the constitutional limitation," courts consider such factors as (1) the legislative purpose for enacting the law, (2) the length of period of the retroactivity, (3) whether the taxpayer reasonably and detrimentally relied on the prior law, and (4) whether the taxpayer had adequate notice of the change in the law. Commonwealth Edison, 196 Ill.2d at 43, 255 Ill.Dec. 482, 749 N.E.2d at 974. Mulry argues only the second factor and contends the length of retroactivity is too long. We do not consider the three year period to be harsh and oppressive, given that it is shorter than the time period found in comparable provisions of the Property Tax Code, such as the 20-year statute of limitations the State has to collect delinquent real estate taxes and the 20 years a Cook County taxpayer has to request a refund of their overpayment of property taxes See 35 ILCS 200/20190(a) (West 2014) ("actions for the collection of any delinquent general tax, or the enforcement or foreclosure of the tax lien shall be commenced within 20 years after the tax became delinquent, and not thereafter"); 35 ILCS 200/20-175(a-1) (West 2014) ("A claim for refund shall not be allowed unless a petition is filed within 20 years from the date the right to a refund arose."). In those two examples, either the tax collector or the tax payer is given 20 years to correct the State's tax receipts. The General Assembly's decision to allow the assessor to go back three years to rectify erroneous exemptions from property taxation is consistent with these other corrective measures. The three-year period at issue is not so long that it is harsh and oppressive. Therefore, even if the statute were retrospective, which it is not, it would not implicate Mulry's contractual or substantive due process under the state and federal constitutions.
¶ 18 We next address Mulry's contention that there was insufficient foundation to warrant the admission of the Assessor's computer records into evidence. Mulry contends that without the computer records, there is no competent evidence that she received a homestead exemption on the subject property for tax years 2010, 2011, and 2012, nor was there competent proof that she violated the cited statute. Consequently, she concludes, the agency's
¶ 19 When a review of the legal effect of a given set of facts involves a mixed question of law and fact, our standard of review is one of clear error. White, 2014 IL App (1st) 132315, ¶ 23, 385 Ill.Dec. 92, 18 N.E.3d 92. "`Clearly erroneous' is said to rest somewhere between the `manifest weight of the evidence' and de novo, requiring us to afford some deference to the agency's experience and expertise. [Citations.] Under the clearly erroneous standard, we must accept the administrative agency's findings unless we are firmly convinced that the agency made a mistake.'" Express Valet, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 373 Ill.App.3d 838, 847, 311 Ill.Dec. 951, 869 N.E.2d 964, 973 (2007) (quoting Randolph Street Gallery v. Zehnder, 315 Ill.App.3d 1060, 1064, 248 Ill.Dec. 780, 735 N.E.2d 100, 104 (2000)).
¶ 20 In support of her argument that the printouts from the Assessor's database are inadmissible, Mulry cites cases that are over 25 years old that question the trustworthiness of computers. Mulry relies on King, which addressed the evidentiary rules that Mississippi used in the late 1960's. King v. State ex rel. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 222 So.2d 393 (Miss. 1969). The Supreme Court of Mississippi contrasted "conventional bookkeeping methods" and the "shop book rule" with "business records stored on electronic computing equipment." King, 222 So.2d at 397. Nevertheless, even in 1969, the Mississippi court determined local evidentiary rules should evolve with "the realities of current business methods" and that the court would "adapt the rule formerly applied to conventional books so as to accommodate the changes involved in electronic data processing." King, 222 So.2d at 398. The Mississippi court went on to state that jurisdiction's standard for determining the admissibility of computer printouts. King, 222 So.2d at 398. The southern court's standard was subsequently discussed by the Illinois Supreme Court in Grand Liquor Co., a 1977 decision that introduced the concept of the "computer printout" and characterized a government auditor's "personal computations" and "nonautomated recordkeeping" as the "conventional" method in use at the time. Grand Liquor Co. v. Department of Revenue, 67 Ill.2d 195, 198-99, 10 Ill.Dec. 472, 367 N.E.2d 1238, 1240 (1977). The Illinois court applied the same evidentiary standard as the Mississippi court and ultimately found that an insufficient foundation for computer printouts was laid in the 1972 administrative hearing it was reviewing. Grand Liquor Co., 67 Ill.2d at 202, 10 Ill.Dec. 472, 367 N.E.2d at 1242.
¶ 21 These cases simply determined that a long-standing exception to the hearsay rule, which has been made for regular entries made in the course of business, could be applied to what was then a new form of recordkeeping. Given the courts' need to explain how computerized accounting records were created and maintained at the time, we do not consider the analysis persuasive and applicable to proceedings that took place when computer recordkeeping and printouts were ubiquitous and routine. The rule of evidence that was in effect when this case developed did not express a preference for any particular form of recordkeeping. The foundation necessary to admit a record into evidence is only that the proponent establish that the record was (1) made in the regular course of business and (2) made at or near the time of the transaction, event, or occurrence. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC v. Szpara, 2015 IL App (2d) 140331, ¶ 42 n.5,
¶ 22 Here, Accardi's testimony clearly satisfied the two foundational requirements. Accardi said he investigated Mulry's tax exemptions for 2010, 2011, and 2012, in part by "pull[ing] documents" from the "records that * * * [were] kept in the normal course of business at the Assessor's office." Accardi elaborated, stating that he was "familiar with the [Mulry] case" and that he printed out the proferred documents himself from the Assessor's AS400 system. Accardi also more specifically identified the printouts and their contents:
¶ 23 Thus, the testimony established that the printout was from records that were made in the regular course of the Assessor's business, at or near the time that Mulry's tax liability was calculated in 2010, 2011, and 2012.
¶ 24 Furthermore, our review of the hearing transcript and exhibits leads us to conclude that the hearing officer did receive sufficient competent evidence that established Mulry was liable for erroneous homestead exemptions because she had been simultaneously receiving a homestead exemption for the 2010, 2011, and 2012 tax years for two properties located in Cook County. Mulry testified that she has been the owner and resident of one of the properties, 9135 South Springfield Avenue, for at least 30 years and that in 2001 she inherited her uncle's property, 9139 South Springfield Avenue, and still owns it. Mulry further testified that tenants have occupied the inherited property more or less continuously since she acquired it. She was specifically asked whether there were tenants during the three tax years at issue, and her answer established that the inherited property had not been her primary residence. Accardi testified regarding the records kept by the Assessor's office and further testified that Mulry received a homestead exemption on both of the properties dating back to at least 2010. In addition to the witness testimony, the exhibits tendered to the hearing officer included printouts from the Assessor's database showing application of a homestead exemption to both properties. The exhibit marked as "People's Exhibit D1" was a printout indicating Mulry was the taxpayer for PIN 24-02-302-022-000, which is the PIN associated with the uncle's former property, 9135 South Springfield Avenue and that "HO" was applied for tax years 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012, but not tax year 2013. The exhibit marked "People's
¶ 25 On the basis of the witness testimony and documentary evidence, the hearing officer found at the conclusion of the hearing that Mulry erroneously received a homestead exemption on the inherited property, making her liable for repayment in the amount of $4188.60. The evidence was competent and its manifest weight supports the hearing officer's findings and order of liability.
¶ 26 Mulry remarks that the statute supports only the enforcement of a lien and not the finding of monetary liability. Mulry's remark is not sufficiently developed to warrant review. Kaminski v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n, 20 Ill.App.3d 416, 421, 314 N.E.2d 290, 294 (1974) (finding appellants failed to pursue issue on appeal).
¶ 27 For these reasons, we affirm the final administrative decision indicating that Mulry is liable for the homestead exemptions erroneously granted for tax years 2010, 2011, and 2012 for the 9135 South Springfield Avenue property.
¶ 28 Affirmed.
Presiding Justice Ellis and Justice Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.
