MAARTEN VERMAAT, Magistrate Judge.
This is a civil rights action brought by state prisoner Julius C. ClarkWillis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ClarkWillis claims that Defendant Steve Adamson denied him a religious diet in violation of his First Amendment rights.
The pleadings and subsequent filings in this case present a confusing picture of events. After thoroughly reviewing the Complaint (ECF No. 1) and the summary judgment briefs (ECF Nos. 29 and 36), the undersigned interprets the facts as follows.
In early 2017, ClarkWillis began studying the Islamic faith and the Holy Quran while he was incarcerated in the Ionia Correctional Facility (ICF). He alleges that his religion requires him to eat a halal diet, which means that he cannot eat pork or "pork by-products" and can only eat other meats if they were properly prepared.
On March 1, 2017, ClarkWillis requested to have his religious preference changed to Al-Islam and to take the religious diet test. On April 14, 2017, ClarkWillis signed the religious meal participation agreement and took the religious diet test. The religious test involved an interview with Chaplain Cheney. On April 26, 2017, while ClarkWillis was waiting for a decision on his diet request, he was transferred from ICF to the Marquette Branch Prison (MBP). Defendant Adamson was not involved in the decision to transfer ClarkWillis to MBP. ClarkWillis states that ICF is the only level 5 facility that provides a Muslim halal diet and that MBP does not accommodate such a diet.
On May 2, 2017, ClarkWillis received a memorandum informing him that Defendant Adamson had denied his request for the religious diet. The memorandum noted that "while it is difficult to discern sincerity based on external indicators, it was decided not to transfer [ClarkWillis] to a facility where [his] requested religious diet could be accommodated." (ECF No. 1, PageID.4.)
ClarkWillis claims that the denial of the religious diet violated his federal rights and sues Defendant Adamson in his official capacity.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Kocak v. Comty. Health Partners of Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 466, 468 (6th Cir. 2005). The standard for determining whether summary judgment is appropriate is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. McGowan, 421 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)). The court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and admissions on file, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Adkins, 400 F.3d 293, 296 (6th Cir. 2005).
ClarkWillis claims that the denial of the religious diet violated his First Amendment rights. The First Amendment guarantees that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ." U.S. Const. amend. I. While "lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights," inmates retain the First Amendment protection to freely exercise their religion. O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (citations omitted). To establish a violation, ClarkWillis must show that: (1) the belief or practice he seeks to protect is religious within his own "scheme of things," (2) that his belief is sincerely held, and (3) that the defendant's behavior infringes upon this practice or belief. Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220, 1224-25 (6th Cir. 1987); Flagner v. Wilkinson, 241 F.3d 475, 481 (6th Cir. 2001).
Prison officials may impinge on a prisoner's constitutional right to exercise First Amendment religious beliefs if their actions are "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Flagner, 241 F.3d at 483 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). To determine whether a prison official's actions are reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest, the Court must assess the official's actions by reference to the following factors:
Flagner, 241 F.3d at 484 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91).
Failure to satisfy the first factor renders the regulation or action infirm, without regard to the remaining three factors. Flagner, 241 F.3d at 484 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90) ("a regulation cannot be sustained where the logical connection between the regulation and the asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational"). If the first factor is satisfied, the remaining three factors are considered and balanced together; however, they are "not necessarily weighed evenly," but instead represent "guidelines" by which the court can assess whether the policy or action at issue is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. Flagner, 241 F.3d at 484 (citations omitted). It should further be noted that the Turner standard is "not a `least restrictive alternative' test" requiring prison officials "to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant's constitutional complaint" Id. Instead, the issue is simply whether the policy or action at issue is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. Id. "However, `if an inmate claimant can point to an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests, a court may consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard.'" Id. at 484 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 91.)
Although Defendant Adamson's position is not entirely clear, he appears to challenge whether ClarkWillis's belief is sincerely held and whether the denial infringed upon ClarkWillis's religious beliefs. Defendant Adamson also asserts that there was a reasonable basis for his decision to deny ClarkWillis's request. In his affidavit, Defendant Adamson states:
(ECF No. 29-2, PageID.299.)
ClarkWillis counters by arguing that his religious beliefs are sincerely held based on his affidavit (ECF No. 36-12) and handout entitled "Islam at a Glance" (ECF No. 36-3). ClarkWillis further states that the vegetarian tray did not meet his religious dietary needs because (1) there are several items on the vegetarian substitute tray that are made with haram (unlawful) by-products, (2) the vegetarian tray is made in the same kitchen where the haram foods are made, and (3) the vegetarian tray is not available for breakfast. Thus, whether he ate from the regular food tray or the vegetarian food tray, the diet would still violate his religious beliefs.
In the opinion of the undersigned, there is a question of fact as to whether ClarkWillis's beliefs are sincerely held and whether the denial infringed on ClarkWillis's religious beliefs. In addition, the undersigned cannot conclude that Defendant Adamson's denial was "reasonable" in light of the Turner factors because of the lack of evidence relating to Chaplain Cheney's interview with ClarkWillis and ClarkWillis's assertion that the vegetarian diet violated his religion beliefs.
Finally, Defendant Adamson states that ClarkWillis continued to purchase non-halal foods at the prison store, such as buffalo wing blue cheese chips, whole enchilada party mix, jalapeno cheese spread, and meat-flavored ramen noodles.
The facts in Swansbrough are distinguishable from the facts in this case. Here, ClarkWillis states that he only purchased the non-halal food items so he could trade the items with other prisons. Thus, in the opinion of the undersigned, a question of fact exists as to whether ClarkWillis was actually consuming the non-halal food items or trading the food with other inmates as he suggests.
For the reasons stated above, the undersigned finds that Defendant Adamson has not established that there exists a valid, rational connection between his action and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify such. Accordingly, a genuine issue of fact exists.
Defendant Adamson also asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Government officials, performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Dietrich v. Burrows, 167 F.3d 1007, 1012 (6th Cir. 1999); Turner v. Scott, 119 F.3d 425, 429 (6th Cir. 1997); Noble v. Schmitt, 87 F.3d 157, 160 (6th Cir. 1996); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). An "objective reasonableness" test is used to determine whether the official could reasonably have believed his conduct was lawful. Dietrich, 167 F.3d at 1012; Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).
"Qualified immunity balances two important interests-the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). In making a qualified immunity determination, the court must decide whether the facts as alleged or shown make out a constitutional violation or whether the right that was allegedly violated was a clearly established right at the time of the alleged misconduct. Id. at 232. If the court can conclude that either no constitutional violation occurred or that the right was not clearly established, qualified immunity is warranted. Id. The court may consider either approach without regard to sequence. Id.
Here, Defendant Adamson states that it is not clearly established that a prisoner has a right to halal meat entrees. But ClarkWillis is not claiming to have a right to halal meat.
Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the Court deny Defendant Adamson's motion for summary judgment.
NOTICE TO PARTIES: Objections to this Report and Recommendation must be served on opposing parties and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen (14) days of receipt of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). Failure to file timely objections constitutes a waiver of any further right to appeal. United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981); See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
