PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right the circuit court's judgment awarding plaintiff attorney fees pursuant to MCL 500.3148(1) and taxable costs pursuant to MCR 2.625(A)(1). We affirm. This appeal has been decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Dolphus Tinnin was struck by a car as he crossed a street. At the time, Tinnin was 57 years old and resided with his mother. Tinnin was treated for bone fractures in his right leg and a possible closed head injury. A neuropsychological evaluation found that Tinnin suffered from mild mental retardation and borderline intelligence and that he had suffered a mild closed head injury in the accident. For approximately two and one-half years after the accident, defendant reimbursed Tinnin for the cost of attendant care services, which were primarily provided by Tinnin's mother, and for other medical expenses. Later, defendant discontinued Tinnin's benefits after obtaining the results of two independent medical evaluations (IME). Defendant denied Tinnin's claims for physical medicine and rehabilitation (PM & R) treatment on the basis of an IME performed by Dr. Nathan Gross, who opined that Tinnin did not require ongoing physical therapy, but that it would have been reasonable for Tinnin to continue to see a PM & R specialist to monitor his condition on an "as needed" basis. At trial, defendant's claims adjuster agreed that the discontinuation of Tinnin's PM & R benefits was improper in light of Dr. Gross's testimony that such treatment would have been reasonable on an "as needed" basis. Defendant denied Tinnin's claims for attendant care services on the basis of an IME performed by Dr. Manfred Greiffenstein, who believed that Tinnin's need for supervision resulted from Tinnin's pre-existing borderline intelligence and not from injuries suffered in the accident.
Tinnin filed suit seven months after the accident,
The jury determined that plaintiff was entitled to payment of Dolphus' PM & R bills, and awarded her $1,235. The jury also determined that those benefits were overdue as defined by MCL 500.3142(2), and awarded plaintiff $218.95 in no-fault interest. The jury declined to award plaintiff any benefits for attendant care.
The trial court granted plaintiff's motion for no-fault attorney fees under MCL 500.3148(1), concluding that defendant's failure to pay the PM & R expenses was unreasonable. Plaintiff sought $57,690 in attorney fees, and $9,651.67 in taxable costs. Defendant argued that plaintiff's request for attorney fees was excessive in light of the verdict, and that in excess of $7,000 of the taxable costs plaintiff sought related to her unsuccessful claim for attendant care and should not be granted. The trial court granted plaintiff the full amount of attorney fees and costs requested.
A trial court's award of attorney fees under MCL 500.3148(1) presents a mixed question of law and fact. Ross v. Auto Club Group, 481 Mich. 1, 7, 748 N.W.2d 552 (2008). "What constitutes reasonableness is a question of law, but whether the defendant's denial of benefits is reasonable under the particular facts of the case is a question of fact." Id. We review questions of law de novo, and review a trial court's findings of fact for clear error. Id. "A decision is clearly erroneous where, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Kitchen v. Kitchen, 465 Mich. 654, 661-662, 641 N.W.2d 245 (2002). We review a trial court's award of attorney fees and costs for an abuse of discretion. Moore v. Secura Ins., 482 Mich. 507, 516, 759 N.W.2d 833 (2008). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes." Id.
The no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., was intended to provide insured persons who have sustained injuries in automobile accidents with assured, adequate, and prompt compensation for certain economic losses. Shavers v. Attorney General, 402 Mich. 554, 578-579, 267 N.W.2d 72 (1978). To ensure prompt payments to the insured, the act includes a provision for attorney fees. McKelvie v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 203 Mich.App. 331, 335, 512 N.W.2d 74 (1994). MCL 500.3148(1) provides:
In Moore, our Supreme Court explained the statutory prerequisites that must be met before attorney fees may be awarded under MCL 500.3148(1):
An insurer's refusal to pay benefits or delay in making payment creates a rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness, and the insurer bears the burden of justifying the refusal or delay. McKelvie, 203 Mich.App. at 335, 512 N.W.2d 74. "The insurer can meet this burden by showing that the refusal or delay is the product of a legitimate question of statutory construction, constitutional law, or factual uncertainty," Ross, 481 Mich. at 11, 748 N.W.2d 552, including bona fide questions whether a particular medical procedure is reasonably necessary. McCarthy v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 208 Mich.App. 97, 104-105, 527 N.W.2d 524 (1994).
On appeal, defendant argues that it did not act unreasonably by denying plaintiff's entire claim because a bona fide factual dispute existed regarding causation and the amount of benefits owed to plaintiff, if any. We disagree.
"[A]n insurer's initial refusal to pay no-fault benefits can be deemed reasonable even if it is later determined that the insurer was required to pay those benefits." Moore, 482 Mich. at 526, 759 N.W.2d 833. But, if it is determined that an insurer is not liable for no-fault benefits, they cannot be overdue, and the insurer's initial refusal or delay of payments cannot be deemed unreasonable. Id. In the instant case, the trial court found that defendant's denial of benefits was unreasonable only with respect to the $1,235 related to Dolphus' PM & R treatment and did not opine about the reasonableness of defendant's denial of plaintiff's claim for attendant care services. Defendant denied plaintiff reimbursement of the PM & R costs solely on the basis of Dr. Gross's report. While our Supreme Court has held that an insurer may reasonably rely on the medical opinion of its physicians and the IMEs the physicians perform, id. at 522, 759 N.W.2d 833, defendant simply failed to clarify the results provided in Dr. Gross's report. Dr. Gross's report did not specifically address whether it was reasonable for Dolphus to continue to obtain PM & R treatment on an "as needed" basis, but Dr. Gross testified in his deposition that he believed it was reasonable for Dolphus to continue to receive PM & R treatment on an "as needed" basis. The claims adjuster agreed that had she been aware of Dr. Gross's opinion regarding PM & R treatment, she would not have denied plaintiff's PM & R claim. The trial court did not clearly err by determining that defendant acted unreasonably in refusing to reimburse plaintiff for Dolphus' PM & R treatment in the amount of $1,235.
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding the full amount of attorney fees and costs plaintiff sought, $57,690 and $9,651.67, respectively. We disagree.
An award of attorney fees under MCL 500.3148(1) must be reasonable. Wood v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 413 Mich. 573, 588, 321 N.W.2d 653 (1982). There is no precise formula for assessing the reasonableness of an attorney fee. In re Temple Marital Trust, 278 Mich.App. 122, 138, 748 N.W.2d 265 (2008). In Wood, our Supreme Court identified the following factors for courts to consider when determining what constitutes a reasonable attorney fee under MCL 500.3148(1): "`(1) the professional standing and experience of the attorney; (2) the skill, time and labor involved; (3) the amount in question and the results achieved; (4) the difficulty of the case; (5) the expenses incurred; and (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.'"
Plaintiff sought to recover attorney fees for 192.30 hours of work at a rate of $300 an hour. The 192.30 hours reflected only the amount of time one attorney expended on plaintiff's case over approximately two and one-half years, and did not include the time of a second attorney who attended and participated in the trial. Plaintiff submitted an affidavit from her principal attorney stating that the attorney had tried several first-party no-fault cases, five of which resulted in an award of attorney fees. The attorney's hourly rate in those cases ranged from $250 to $300. The trial court granted plaintiff her entire request for attorney fees and costs, explaining its decision as follows:
Defendant argues that the bulk of plaintiff's suit revolved around plaintiff's claim for attendant care services totaling over $90,000, which the jury denied completely. Defendant argues that plaintiff's claim for attendant care can be separated from plaintiff's claim for PM & R treatment, and that the award of attorney fees should reflect the amount plaintiff recovered as opposed to how much she sought. Defendant characterizes plaintiff's claim for attendant care benefits as cognitive in nature and links it to Dolphus' alleged closed head injury, whereas defendant characterizes plaintiff's claim for PM & R benefits as primarily physical in nature, apparently linking it to the leg fractures Dolphus suffered in the accident.
The extent of each injury's relationship to plaintiff's claim for PM & R treatment and attendant care services is unclear from the record. The trial court found the PM & R bill to be sufficiently related to the closed head injury and thus considered unrealistic any attempt to separate the time and costs expended in pursuit of the PM & R claim from the time and costs expended in pursuit of the attendant care services. Defendant fails to provide factual support for its attempt to draw clear lines between plaintiff's claims for PM & R and attendant care. The PM & R bill was based solely on Dr. Ilechukwu's treatment of Dolphus. Dr. Ilechukwu is board-certified in PM & R as well as occupational medicine. He diagnosed Dolphus as having suffered a closed head injury in the accident and believed that his lower back pain was related to the accident. Dr. Ilechukwu testified that the brain trauma Dolphus suffered in the accident exacerbated his preexisting cognitive problems and resulted in a deterioration of both his cognitive and physical functioning. Dr. Ilechukwu recommended that Dolphus receive "case management to coordinate his care," home health care, assistance with his chores and transportation, and eight hours of attendant care a day. Dr. Ilechukwu saw Dolphus three more times over the following year and did not change his diagnoses or recommendations with respect to Dolphus' care. On this record we are unable to say that the trial court clearly erred by finding that Dolphus' PM & R treatment was sufficiently related to his closed head injury.
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to apportion the award of attorney fees so that plaintiff was compensated only for the time and effort directly attributable to securing the overdue PM & R benefits. Defendant, however, points to no authority that requires a court to apportion attorney fees "where a defendant has unreasonably refused to pay certain benefits even where
We find Moore distinguishable from the instant case. Unlike in Moore, the trial court found that all of the attorney's time for which plaintiff sought compensation was sufficiently related to securing the overdue benefits compensable under MCL 500.3148(1).
Because the language of MCL 500.3148(1) does not unambiguously require the apportionment defendant advocates, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to apportion plaintiff's award of attorney fees.
Defendant's next argument is based on Wood factor (3), "the amount in question and the results achieved." Defendant argues that the majority of plaintiff's claim concerned attendant care services totaling over $90,000, which the jury denied completely. Defendant stresses that plaintiff's recovery of $1,453.95, which included penalty interest, constituted less than two percent of the amount of damages plaintiff sought overall. While it is within the discretion of the trial court to adjust the award of attorney fees in light of the result achieved, it is not required to do so as long as the ultimate award remains reasonable. See Schellenberg v. Rochester Lodge No. 2225 of the Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 228 Mich.App. 20, 45, 577 N.W.2d 163 (1998). In awarding plaintiff attorney fees, the trial court noted its familiarity with plaintiff's counsel and his experience in the area of no-fault insurance, and found that all the attorney hours for which plaintiff sought compensation related to securing the PM & R claim. The trial court explained that the jury apparently used the testimony of each physician to determine that the PM & R costs were related to the accident. And the trial court indirectly addressed plaintiff's small recovery by explaining that he did not want to deter plaintiffs in general from bringing claims for benefits that are unreasonably withheld by their insurers. In light of the trial court's analysis of the Wood factors on the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding plaintiff attorney fees and thus affirm the award.
Defendant also contests the trial court's award of taxable costs to plaintiff. We review a trial court's decision on a motion for costs under MCR 2.625 for an abuse of discretion. Klinke v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 219 Mich.App. 500, 518, 556 N.W.2d 528 (1996).
MCR 2.625(A)(1) provides:
The trial court awarded plaintiff $9,651.67 in taxable costs, $7,050 of which represented the costs of procuring the expert opinions and testimony of a psychiatrist and a psychologist. Implicit in defendant's challenge to this portion of the costs is again the assumption that Dolphus' closed head injury was the sole basis for plaintiff's claim for attendant care. As discussed above, the trial court did not clearly err when it found that Dolphus' closed head injury sufficiently related to plaintiff's claim for PM & R treatment. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding plaintiff the costs of procuring the expert testimony. See MCR 2.625(B)(2); see also Angott v. Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 270 Mich.App. 465, 488-490, 717 N.W.2d 341 (2006).
We affirm. As the prevailing party, plaintiff may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
