ELLEN S. CARMODY, Magistrate Judge.
This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff's claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative record and provides that if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, it shall be conclusive. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), authorizing United States Magistrate Judges to submit proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition of Social Security appeals, the undersigned recommends that the Commissioner's decision be
The Court's jurisdiction is confined to a review of the Commissioner's decision and of the record made in the administrative hearing process. See Willbanks v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988). The scope of judicial review in a social security case is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in making her decision and whether there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting that decision. See Brainard v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court may not conduct a de novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. See Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). It is the Commissioner who is charged with finding the facts relevant to an application for disability benefits, and her findings are conclusive provided they are supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Cohen v. Secretary of Department of Health and Human Services, 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992). It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir. 1993). In determining the substantiality of the evidence, the Court must consider the evidence on the record as a whole and take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. See Richardson v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 735 F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1984). As has been widely recognized, the substantial evidence standard presupposes the existence of a zone within which the decision maker can properly rule either way, without judicial interference. See Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986). This standard affords to the administrative decision maker considerable latitude, and indicates that a decision supported by substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because the evidence would have supported a contrary decision. See Bogle, 998 F.2d at 347; Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545.
Plaintiff was 50 years of age on her alleged disability onset date. (PageID.285). She successfully completed high school and worked previously as a baker helper, cashier, sales clerk, hand packager, and stock clerk. (PageID.57-58). Plaintiff applied for benefits on March 25, 2015, alleging that she had been disabled since November 7, 2013, due to: (1) post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); (2) neck injury; (3) dyslexia; (4) hearing loss; (5) hip pain; (6) vericose veins; and (7) memory loss. (PageID.285-92, 323).
Plaintiff's applications were denied, after which time she requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (PageID.132-283). Following an administrative hearing, ALJ Sarah Zimmerman, in an opinion dated March 16, 2018, determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. (PageID.45-59, 66-110). The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's determination, rendering it the Commissioner's final decision in the matter. (PageID.31-35). Plaintiff subsequently initiated this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the ALJ's decision.
The social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential process for evaluating disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f).
The burden of establishing the right to benefits rests squarely on Plaintiff's shoulders, and she can satisfy her burden by demonstrating that her impairments are so severe that she is unable to perform her previous work, and cannot, considering her age, education, and work experience, perform any other substantial gainful employment existing in significant numbers in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528. While the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step five of the sequential evaluation process, Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through step four of the procedure, the point at which her residual functioning capacity (RFC) is determined. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987); Walters v. Commissioner of Social Security, 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffers from: (1) degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine; (2) degenerative joint disease of the bilateral hips; (3) migraines; (4) obesity; (5) hearing loss; (6) major depressive disorder; (7) post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); and (8) personality disorder, severe impairments that whether considered alone or in combination with other impairments, failed to satisfy the requirements of any impairment identified in the Listing of Impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (PageID.48-50).
With respect to Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC), the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the ability to perform light work subject to the following limitations: (1) she can lift/carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; (2) during an 8-hour workday, she can stand/walk for sit for 8 hours and stand/walk for 6 hours; (3) she can occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl, but can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; (4) she can hear at moderate noise levels; (5) she can carry out simple instructions; (6) she can occasionally interact with the public; and (7) she can tolerate occasional changes in a routine work setting. (PageID.50).
A vocational expert testified that given this RFC, Plaintiff would still be able to perform her past relevant as a baker helper and hand packager. (PageID.102-05). The vocational expert also testified that there existed more than 500,000 other jobs in the national economy which Plaintiff could perform despite her limitations. (PageID.102-05). Based on this testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled because (1) she was still capable of performing past relevant work and (2) there exists a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy which Plaintiff can perform, her limitations notwithstanding. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits.
In addition to Plaintiff's testimony at the administrative hearing, the administrative record contains copies of medical treatment records and statements by Plaintiff. The ALJ described this evidence as follows:
(PageID.51-55).
On November 16, 2016, Dr. Palamara completed a form regarding Plaintiff's emotional impairments and limitations. (PageID.712-17). The ALJ, however, afforded "little weight" to the doctor's statements. Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to relief on the ground that the ALJ failed to afford "appropriate weight" to Dr. Palamara's opinion.
The treating physician doctrine recognizes that medical professionals who have a long history of caring for a claimant and his maladies generally possess significant insight into her medical condition. See Barker v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 1994). An ALJ must, therefore, give controlling weight to the opinion of a treating source if: (1) the opinion is "well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques" and (2) the opinion "is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case record." Gayheart v. Commissioner of Social Security, 710 F.3d 365, 375-76 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527).
Such deference is appropriate, however, only where the particular opinion "is based upon sufficient medical data." Miller v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 1991 WL 229979 at *2 (6th Cir., Nov. 7, 1991) (citation omitted). The ALJ may reject the opinion of a treating physician where such is unsupported by the medical record, merely states a conclusion, or is contradicted by substantial medical evidence. See Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528; Cutlip v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 25 F.3d 284, 286-87 (6th Cir. 1994).
If an ALJ accords less than controlling weight to a treating source's opinion, the ALJ must "give good reasons" for doing so. Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 376. Such reasons must be "supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source's medical opinion and the reasons for that weight." This requirement "ensures that the ALJ applies the treating physician rule and permits meaningful review of the ALJ's application of the rule." Ibid. (citation omitted). Simply stating that the physician's opinions "are not well-supported by any objective findings and are inconsistent with other credible evidence" is, without more, too "ambiguous" to permit meaningful review of the ALJ's assessment. Id. at 376-77.
If the ALJ affords less than controlling weight to a treating physician's opinion, the ALJ must still determine the weight to be afforded such. Id. at 376. In doing so, the ALJ must consider the following factors: (1) length of the treatment relationship and frequency of the examination, (2) nature and extent of the treatment relationship, (3) supportability of the opinion, (4) consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, (5) the specialization of the treating source, and (6) other relevant factors. Ibid. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527). While the ALJ is not required to explicitly discuss each of these factors, the record must nevertheless reflect that the ALJ considered those factors relevant to his assessment. See, e.g., Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007); Undheim v. Barnhart, 214 Fed. Appx. 448, 450 (5th Cir., Jan. 19, 2007).
Dr. Palamara assessed Plaintiff's abilities in various "aptitudes." With respect to Plaintiff's "mental abilities and aptitudes needed to do unskilled work," the doctor rated Plaintiff's abilities in sixteen separate areas. The doctor reported that Plaintiff possessed "no useful ability to function" in eight areas, was "unable to meet competitive standards" in four areas, was "seriously limited" in two areas, and was "limited but satisfactory" in two areas. (PageID.714).
With respect to Plaintiff's "mental abilities and aptitudes needed to do semiskilled and skilled work," the doctor rated Plaintiff's abilities in four separate areas. The doctor reported that Plaintiff possessed "no useful ability to function" in two areas and was "unable to meet competitive standards" in two areas. (PageID.715). With respect to Plaintiff's "mental abilities and aptitude needed to do particular types of jobs," the doctor rated Plaintiff's abilities in five separate areas. The doctor reported that Plaintiff possessed "no useful ability to function" in one area, was "unable to meet competitive standards" in one area, was "seriously limited" in one area, and was "limited but satisfactory" in one area. (PageID.715). The doctor did not indicate whether Plaintiff could "use public transportation." (PageID.715). The doctor also reported that Plaintiff would be absent from work "more than four days per month." (PageID.716).
In support of her decision to afford little weight to Dr. Palamara's opinion, the ALJ stated:
(PageID.56).
The ALJ's rationale is supported by substantial evidence as Dr. Palamara's contemporaneous treatment notes reveal. (PageID.718-42). The ALJ's decision in this regard must be affirmed for an even more fundamental reason, namely the form that Dr. Palamara completed does not constitute a "medical opinion" to which deference must be accorded. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2); 416.927(a)(2) (a medical opinion is defined as "statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions"); see also, Ashley v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2014 WL 1052357 at *7-8 (W.D. Mich., Mar. 19, 2014). Simply checking a box on a pre-printed form indicating that an individual is, for example, "unable to meet competitive standards" or is "seriously limited" in a particular area fails to indicate what the individual can still do despite their impairments. Accordingly, such does not constitute an opinion to which any deference must be accorded. The same conclusion applies to the doctor's assertion that Plaintiff would be absent from work more than four days per month. Such is not supported by the evidence and, again, does not even constitute a medical opinion to which deference must be accorded. See, e.g., Ellis v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2016 WL 3735776 at *4 (W.D. Mich., July 13, 2016) (a doctor's "predictions of how often Plaintiff would likely miss work was conjecture, not a medical opinion"). Accordingly, this argument is rejected.
On April 27, 2015, Plaintiff's daughter, Melissa Crysler, completed a report regarding Plaintiff's daily activities. (PageID.365-71). The ALJ described Crysler's opinion as well as her reasons for discounting such as follows:
(PageID.56-57).
Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to relief because "having known the Claimant her entire life, she is in the best position to make comments on Claimant's medical and mental conditions and how they affect the Claimant's quality of life." While Crysler undoubtedly has known Plaintiff her entire life, there is no evidence that Crysler is a medical or mental health professional or otherwise possesses training and/or experience which elevate her opinions beyond lay status. The ALJ credited Crysler's statements to the extent they were supported by the medical evidence. The Court discerns no error in the ALJ's treatment of such. See, e.g., Mullins v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2015 WL 3441163 at *13 (E.D. Mich., May 28, 2015) ("the ALJ is not required to give any perceptible weight to lay opinion testimony that does not comport with the medical evidence"). Accordingly, this argument is rejected.
For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned recommends that the Commissioner's decision be
OBJECTIONS to this report and recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within such time waives the right to appeal the District Court's order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
2. An individual who does not have a "severe impairment" will not be found Adisabled" (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c));
3. If an individual is not working and is suffering from a severe impairment which meets the duration requirement and which "meets or equals" a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulations No. 4, a finding of "disabled" will be made without consideration of vocational factors. (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d));
4. If an individual is capable of performing her past relevant work, a finding of "not disabled" must be made (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e));
5. If an individual's impairment is so severe as to preclude the performance of past work, other factors including age, education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity must be considered to determine if other work can be performed (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f)).
