OPINION
ELLEN S. CARMODY, Magistrate Judge.
This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff's claim for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The parties have agreed to proceed in this Court for all further proceedings, including an order of final judgment. (ECF Nos. 10, 14).
Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative record and provides that if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence it shall be conclusive. The Commissioner has found that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner's decision is affirmed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court's jurisdiction is confined to a review of the Commissioner's decision and of the record made in the administrative hearing process. See Willbanks v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988). The scope of judicial review in a social security case is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in making her decision and whether there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting that decision. See Brainard v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court may not conduct a de novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. See Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). It is the Commissioner who is charged with finding the facts relevant to an application for disability benefits, and her findings are conclusive provided they are supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Cohen v. Sec'y of Dep't of Health and Human Services, 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir. 1993). In determining the substantiality of the evidence, the Court must consider the evidence on the record as a whole and take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. See Richardson v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 735 F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1984). As has been widely recognized, the substantial evidence standard presupposes the existence of a zone within which the decision maker can properly rule either way, without judicial interference. See Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). This standard affords to the administrative decision maker considerable latitude, and indicates that a decision supported by substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because the evidence would have supported a contrary decision. See Bogle, 998 F.2d at 347; Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Plaintiff was 47 years of age on his alleged disability onset date. (PageID.215). He successfully completed high school and worked previously as a cook's helper, cashier, waiter, commercial cleaner, and stock clerk. (PageID.46-47). Plaintiff applied for benefits on January 24, 2013, alleging that he had been disabled since November 22, 2011, due to heart disease and a broken left foot. (PageID.215-20, 248). Plaintiff's application was denied, after which time he requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (PageID.122-207). On November 13, 2013, Plaintiff appeared before ALJ Michael Condon with testimony being offered by Plaintiff and a vocational expert. (PageID.54-104). In a written decision dated January 3, 2014, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. (PageID.36-48). The Appeals Council declined to review the ALJ's determination, rendering it the Commissioner's final decision in the matter. (PageID.26-28). Plaintiff subsequently initiated this pro per appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the ALJ's decision.
ANALYSIS OF THE ALJ'S DECISION
The social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential process for evaluating disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f).1 If the Commissioner can make a dispositive finding at any point in the review, no further finding is required. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The regulations also provide that if a claimant suffers from a nonexertional impairment as well as an exertional impairment, both are considered in determining his residual functional capacity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.
The burden of establishing the right to benefits rests squarely on Plaintiff's shoulders, and he can satisfy his burden by demonstrating that his impairments are so severe that he is unable to perform his previous work, and cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, perform any other substantial gainful employment existing in significant numbers in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528. While the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step five, Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through step four of the procedure, the point at which his residual functioning capacity (RFC) is determined. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987); Walters v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997) (ALJ determines RFC at step four, at which point claimant bears the burden of proof).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffers from (1) degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine with a history of laminectomy; (2) asthma/COPD; (3) depressive disorder; and (4) substance addiction disorders (alcohol dependence and cocaine/marijuana abuse), severe impairments that whether considered alone or in combination with other impairments, failed to satisfy the requirements of any impairment identified in the Listing of Impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (PageID.38-41). With respect to Plaintiff's residual functional capacity, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the capacity to perform medium work subject to the following limitations: (1) he can frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl;
(2) he can only occasionally climb stairs, ramps, ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; (3) he cannot use his left lower extremity to operate leg/foot controls; (4) he cannot work with concentrated exposure to respiratory irritants; (5) he is limited to simple, routine tasks involving no more than simple, workrelated decisions; and (6) he cannot maintain more than occasional contact with co-workers, supervisors, or the general public. (PageID.41).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff cannot perform his past relevant work at which point the burden of proof shifted to the Commissioner to establish by substantial evidence that a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy which Plaintiff could perform, his limitations notwithstanding. See Richardson, 735 F.2d at 964. While the ALJ is not required to question a vocational expert on this issue, "a finding supported by substantial evidence that a claimant has the vocational qualifications to perform specific jobs" is needed to meet the burden. O'Banner v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 587 F.2d 321, 323 (6th Cir. 1978) (emphasis added). This standard requires more than mere intuition or conjecture by the ALJ that the claimant can perform specific jobs in the national economy. See Richardson, 735 F.2d at 964. Accordingly, ALJs routinely question vocational experts in an attempt to determine whether there exist a significant number of jobs which a particular claimant can perform, his limitations notwithstanding. Such was the case here, as the ALJ questioned a vocational expert.
The vocational expert testified that there existed approximately 14,080 jobs in the state of Michigan, and approximately 424,000 jobs nationwide, which an individual with Plaintiff's RFC could perform, such limitations notwithstanding. (PageID.93-99). This represents a significant number of jobs. See Born v. Sec'y of Health and Human Services, 923 F.2d 1168, 1174 (6th Cir. 1990); Hall v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 272, 274 (6th Cir. 1988); Martin v. Commissioner of Social Security, 170 Fed. Appx. 369, 374 (6th Cir., Mar. 1, 2006). The ALJ concluded, therefore, that Plaintiff was not entitled to disability benefits.
On August 10, 2015, the Court issued a Notice Regarding Consent and Directing Filing of Briefs. (PageID.531-32). Plaintiff was expressly instructed to submit an initial brief containing a "Statement of Errors, setting forth the specific errors of fact or law upon which Plaintiff seeks reversal or remand." (PageID.531). Despite this clear instruction, Plaintiff has submitted in support of his appeal a one page, handwritten brief in which he simply argues that the decision to deny his application for disability benefits was unfair and unjust. (PageID.536).
Despite failing to articulate any basis for relief, the Court has, in light of Plaintiff's pro per status, thoroughly reviewed the record to determine whether the ALJ's decision in this matter is in any way defective or deficient. This review has revealed nothing which calls into question the ALJ's decision making process, the legal standards he applied, or the substantiality of the evidence in support of his decision. The ALJ's RFC finding is supported by substantial evidence and none of Plaintiff's care providers imposed on Plaintiff's limitations which are inconsistent with such. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated herein, the Court concludes that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Commissioner's decision is affirmed. The Court further finds that appeal of this matter would not be taken in good faith. See Smith v. Commissioner of Social Security, 1999 WL 1336109 at *2 (6th Cir., Dec. 20, 1999); Leal v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2015 WL 731311 at *2 (N.D. Ohio, Feb. 19, 2015); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). A judgment consistent with this opinion will enter.
