STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III, District Judge.
Michigan prisoner Dwaynn Epperson filed a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He was convicted of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.84, and felonious assault, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.82, following a jury trial in the Wayne County Circuit Court. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 6 to 25 years imprisonment and 6 to 15 years imprisonment on those convictions in 2012. In his pro se pleadings, Epperson raises claims concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, the charging decision of the prosecutor, and double jeopardy. For the reasons below, the Court will deny the petition, deny a certificate of appealability and deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
Epperson's convictions arose from an altercation with Jeremiah Fish in Detroit, Michigan on January 16, 2012. The Court adopts the statement of facts set forth by defense counsel on direct appeal to the extent that it is consistent with the record:
Def. App. Brf. 5-8, ECF No. 9-9.
At the close of trial, the jury convicted Epperson of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, and felonious assault. The trial court subsequently sentenced him to concurrent terms of 6 to 25 years imprisonment and 6 to 15 years imprisonment.
Following sentencing, Epperson filed an appeal of right with the Michigan Court of Appeals raising the same claims presented on habeas review. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied relief on those claims and affirmed Epperson's convictions. People v. Epperson, No. 311933, 2014 WL 265520 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2014) (unpublished). Epperson then filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied in a standard order. People v. Epperson, 495 Mich. 1008 (2014).
Epperson filed a federal habeas petition in 2015. Pet., ECF No. 1. He raises claims concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, the charging decision of the prosecutor, and double jeopardy. Id. Respondent contends that the petition should be denied because the double jeopardy claim is barred by procedural default and all of the claims lack merit. Resp., ECF No. 8.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), codified 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq., provides the standard of review for federal habeas cases brought by state prisoners. The AEDPA provides:
28 U.S.C. §2254(d) (1996).
"A state court's decision is `contrary to' . . . clearly established law if it `applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases' or if it `confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent.'" Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002).
"[T]he `unreasonable application' prong of § 2254(d)(1) permits a federal habeas court to `grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of petitioner's case." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413); see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. But "for a federal court to find a state court's application of [Supreme Court] precedent `unreasonable,' the state court's decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court's application must have been `objectively unreasonable.'" Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21(citations omitted); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. "AEDPA thus imposes a `highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,' and `demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333, n. 7 and Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)).
The United States Supreme Court has held that "a state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as `fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court has emphasized "that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. at 102 (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). A habeas court "must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision" of the Supreme Court. Id. Thus, in order to obtain federal habeas relief, a state prisoner must show that the state court's rejection of a claim "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id. at 103; see also White v. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014). Federal judges "are required to afford state courts due respect by overturning their decisions only when there could be no reasonable dispute that they were wrong." Woods v. Donald, 135 S.Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015). A habeas petitioner cannot prevail as long as it is within the "realm of possibility" that fairminded jurists could find the state court decision to be reasonable. Woods v. Etherton 136 S.Ct. 1149, 1152 (2016).
Section 2254(d)(1) limits a federal court's review to a determination of whether the state court's decision comports with clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; see also Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009) (noting that the Supreme Court "has held on numerous occasions that it is not `an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law' for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by this Court") (quoting Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125-26 (2008) (per curiam)); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71-72. Section 2254(d) "does not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been `adjudicated on the merits.'" Harrington, 562 U.S. at 100. Furthermore, it "does not require citation of [Supreme Court] cases-indeed, it does not even require awareness of [Supreme Court] cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them." Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002); see also Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 16.
The requirements of "clearly established law" are to be determined solely by Supreme Court precedent. Thus, "circuit precedent does not constitute `clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,'" and "[i]t therefore cannot form the basis for habeas relief under AEDPA." Parker v. Matthews, 132 S.Ct. 2148, 2155 (2012) (per curiam); see also Lopez v. Smith, 135 S.Ct. 1, 2 (2014) (per curiam). The decisions of lower federal courts may be useful in assessing the reasonableness of the state court's decision. Stewart v. Erwin, 503 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 2007); Dickens v. Jones, 203 F.Supp.2d 354, 359 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
Finally, a state court's factual determinations are presumed correct on federal habeas review. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A petitioner may rebut this presumption with clear and convincing evidence. Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998). Moreover, habeas review is "limited to the record that was before the state court." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).
As an initial matter, Respondent contends that one of Epperson's claims is barred by procedural default. It is well-settled, however, that federal courts on habeas review "are not required to address a procedural-default issue before deciding against the petitioner on the merits." Hudson v. Jones, 351 F.3d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997)). The Supreme Court has explained the rationale behind such a policy: "Judicial economy might counsel giving the [other] question priority, for example, if it were easily resolvable against the habeas petitioner, whereas the procedural-bar issue involved complicated issues of state law." Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 525. Here, the substantive issues are easier to resolve such that the interests of judicial economy are best served by addressing the merits of the habeas claims.
Epperson first asserts that he is entitled to habeas relief because the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to support his felonious assault conviction, particularly that he possessed a dangerous weapon.
The federal due process clause "protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The question on a sufficiency of the evidence claim is "whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The Jackson standard must be applied "with explicit reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law." Brown v. Palmer, 441 F.3d 347, 351 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n. 16).
A federal habeas court views this standard through the framework of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Martin v. Mitchell, 280 F.3d 594, 617 (6th Cir. 2002). Thus, under the AEDPA, challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence must survive "two layers of deference to groups who might view facts differently" than a reviewing court on habeas review — the factfinder at trial and the state court on appellate review — as long as those determinations are reasonable. Brown v. Konteh, 567 F.3d 191, 205 (6th Cir. 2009). "[I]t is the responsibility of the jury — not the court — to decide what conclusions should be drawn from the evidence admitted at trial." Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S.Ct. 2, 4 (2011) (per curiam). "A reviewing court does not re-weigh the evidence or re-determine the credibility of the witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by the trial court." Matthews v. Abramajtys, 319 F.3d 780, 788 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983)). Accordingly, the "mere existence of sufficient evidence to convict . . . defeats a petitioner's claim." Id. at 788-89.
Under Michigan law, the elements of felonious assault are: (1) an assault, (2) with a dangerous weapon, and (3) with the intent to injure or place the victim in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery. People v. Avant, 235 Mich.App. 499, 505 (1999); Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.82. Direct or circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence may constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of an offense.
Applying the foregoing standards, the Michigan Court of Appeals ruled that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to support Epperson's conviction for felonious assault. The court explained in relevant part:
Epperson, 2014 WL 265520 at *1.
The state court's decision is neither contrary to Supreme Court precedent nor an unreasonable application of federal law or the facts. The testimony of the victim, Jeremiah Fish, and the medical evidence, considered in a light favorable to the prosecution, established that Epperson stabbed Fish in the abdomen with a knife or knife-like object during an argument, and that Epperson required surgery to correct the damage. A victim's testimony alone can be constitutionally sufficient to sustain a conviction. See Tucker v. Palmer, 541 F.3d 652, 658-59 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing cases). The victim's testimony and the medical evidence, along with reasonable inferences therefrom, was sufficient to support a finding that Epperson was armed with a dangerous weapon and that he used it to commit the crime.
Epperson challenges the credibility of the victim and the inferences the jury drew from the testimony presented at trial. However, it is the job of the fact-finder at trial, not a federal habeas court, to resolve evidentiary conflicts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Martin v. Mitchell, 280 F.3d 594, 618 (6th Cir. 2002); Walker v. Engle, 703 F.2d 959, 969-70 (6th Cir. 1983) ("A federal habeas corpus court faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume — even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record — that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution."). The jury's verdict, and the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision affirming that verdict, were reasonable. The evidence presented at trial, viewed in a light favorable to the prosecution, established beyond a reasonable doubt that Epperson committed felonious assault. Habeas relief is not warranted on this claim.
Epperson also asserts that he is entitled to habeas relief because the prosecutor abused her discretion by charging him with assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, as well as felonious assault, arising from a single incident.
It is well-settled that a prosecutor has significant discretion in determining what charge to file against an accused provided that probable cause exists to believe that an offense was committed by the accused under the charging statute. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); United States v. Davis, 15 F.3d 526, 529 (6th Cir. 1994). A prosecutor, however, may not undertake a prosecution based upon a vindictive motive, Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363, or based upon race, religion, or some other arbitrary classification. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
In this case, the Michigan Court of Appeals denied relief on this claim concluding that the prosecutor did not abuse her discretion in charging Epperson with two different assault crimes arising from the same incident because both of the charges were supported by the evidence and did not violate double jeopardy principles. Epperson, 2014 WL 265520 at *2.
The state court's decision is neither contrary to Supreme Court precedent nor an unreasonable application of federal law or the facts. The prosecutor had probable cause to believe that Epperson was guilty of assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder and felonious assault based upon the victim's description of the incident and the medical testimony documenting the type and severity of his injury. Moreover, there is no evidence that the prosecutor's charging decision was vindictive or based upon any impermissible factor. Epperson fails to establish that the prosecutor abused her discretion or otherwise violated his constitutional rights. Habeas relief is not warranted on this claim.
Lastly, Epperson asserts that he is entitled to habeas relief because his convictions and sentences for assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder and felonious assault violate double jeopardy principles.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution commands that no "person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. Amend. V. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides three basic protections: "[It] protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense." Shiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229 (1994) (quotations omitted). "These protections stem from the underlying premise that a defendant should not be twice tried or punished for the same offense." Id.
In the context of multiple punishments, however, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit a state from defining one act of conduct to constitute two separate criminal offenses. As the Supreme Court has explained, "[b]ecause the substantive power to prescribe crimes and determine punishments is vested with the legislature . . . the question under the Double Jeopardy Clause whether punishments are `multiple' is essentially one of legislative intent." Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984). Thus, "even if the two statutes proscribe the same conduct, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent the imposition of cumulative punishments if the state legislature clearly intends to impose them." Brimmage v. Sumner, 793 F.2d 1014, 1015 (9th Cir. 1986). When "a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punishments under two statutes, . . . a court's task of statutory construction is at an end and the prosecutor may seek and the trial court or jury may impose cumulative punishment under such statutes in a single trial." Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983). In determining whether a state legislature intended to authorize separate, cumulative punishments under the circumstances presented, a federal court must accept the state court's interpretation of the legislative intent for the imposition of multiple punishments. Id. at 368; Banner v. Davis, 886 F.2d 777, 779-80 (6th Cir. 1989).
The Michigan Court of Appeals denied relief on this claim finding that there was no double jeopardy violation because the two crimes have different elements and the Michigan Supreme Court has determined that convictions for both assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder and felonious assault do not violate constitutional double jeopardy protections. Epperson, 2014 WL 265520 at *2.
The state court's decision is neither contrary to Supreme Court precedent nor an unreasonable application thereof. The Michigan courts have ruled that the state legislature has authorized separate punishments for assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder and felonious assault and that those offenses each contain an element that the other does not such that convictions for both offenses arising from the same incident do not violate double jeopardy. See, e.g, People v. Strickland, 293 Mich.App. 393, 401-02 (2011). This Court is bound by that determination. Thus, Epperson fails to establish a double jeopardy violation; habeas relief is not warranted on this claim.
For the reasons stated, the Court concludes that Epperson is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claims and that his habeas petition must be denied.
Before Epperson may appeal the Court's decision, a certificate of appealability must issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(a); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). A federal district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when denying relief. Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. A certificate of appealability may issue "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
When a court denies a habeas claim on the merits, the substantial showing threshold is met if the petitioner demonstrates that reasonable jurists would find the court's assessment of the constitutional claim debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000). A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating "that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). Having conducted the requisite review, the Court concludes that Epperson fails to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right as to his habeas claims. A certificate of appealability is not warranted. The Court also will deny Epperson leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal as an appeal cannot be taken in good faith. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a).
