SEAN F. COX, District Judge.
In this criminal action, Defendant Gregg Blaney ("Blaney") was charged in a three-count indictment, with one count of conspiracy to commit bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 and two counts of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344.
Blaney pleaded guilty, pursuant to a Rule 11 Plea Agreement, to one count of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344.
This Court held a sentencing hearing on April 17, 2013. Blaney was represented by retained counsel at that sentencing hearing. Thereafter, on April 18, 2013, this Court issued a 29-page Memorandum Opinion (Docket Entry No. 93), setting forth its rulings as to relevant conduct and the amount of loss calculation and other issues. In that Memorandum Opinion, this Court rejected the following argument made by Blaney:
(Id. at Pg ID 969). The conclusion section of that Memorandum Opinion summarized:
This Court imposed a sentence of thirty-seven months. (See 4/30/13 Judgment, Docket Entry No. 96). This Court also imposed a fine of $400,000.00 and ordered that Blaney pay restitution in the amount of $801,634.48. (Id. at Pg ID 981).
Blaney appealed, arguing that this Court erred in determining both the relevant conduct and the amount of loss for sentencing purposes. Blaney's challenges included the following:
United States v. Blaney, 570 F. App'x 536, 537 (6th Cir. 2014). Blaney also argued that this Court did not adequately consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentenced disparities, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected all of Blaney's challenges and affirmed this Court's Judgment. Id.
Specifically, as to Blaney's challenges to the sentencing guidelines, the Sixth Circuit stated:
Id. at 537. The Sixth Circuit also rejected Blaney's remaining challenge:
Id.
Following his appeal, Blaney did not file a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 challenging his conviction or sentence.
Blaney has since been released from prison.
On December 14, 2016, Blaney filed a pro se "Petition To Reduce Restitution." (Docket Entry No. 112). In it, Blaney asks this Court to either reduce the amount of restitution that he must pay or grant a new restitution hearing so that Blaney can present evidence that he believes should have been presented to the Court. Among other things,
Blaney also filed a pro se "Petition To Stay Collection Proceedings" (Docket Entry No. 113), along with his Petition To Reduce Restitution. The Government also opposes this motion. Having reviewed the motions and responses, the Court concludes that oral argument is not necessary as to either motion.
Prior to sentencing Blaney, this Court held a sentencing hearing, wherein Blaney was given a full and fair opportunity to present all of his arguments and evidence concerning the underlying real estate transactions to this Court. Blaney argued before this Court that several of the properties were charged off by the lenders, thereby showing zero balances, and therefore no loss should be attributed to those loans. This Court considered and rejected that argument. This Court's April 30, 2013 Judgment ordered Blaney to pay restitution in the total amount of $801,634.48. That Judgment was affirmed on appeal on June 27, 2014 — some two and a half years ago.
"A district court's power to revisit a sentence once imposed is extremely limited. Once a court sentences a criminal defendant, it generally has jurisdiction to continue hearing related issues only when authorized by statute or rule." United States v. May, 500 F. App'x 458, 460 (6th Cir. 2012).
Blaney's motion does not identify any applicable rule or statute that would allow this Court to grant the relief he requests.
Rather, Blaney directs the Court to Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But that is a rule that applies in civil cases, not criminal cases. See, e.g. United States v. Gibson, 424 F. App'x 461, 464 (6th Cir. 2011) (explaining that Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 is not applicable to criminal proceedings and may not be used to disturb a criminal sentence or conviction.) Moreover, even if Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 applied, Blaney's motion would be untimely. That is because any motion based on newly discovered evidence or fraud must be made no more than a year after the judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).
Blaney's reliance on United States v. Jones is also misplaced. Blaney's opening brief directed the Court to a
Accordingly, the Court