ANTHONY P. PATTI, Magistrate Judge.
The Court should
On April 5, 2016, Eunice Gordon filed the instant lawsuit for surviving spouse benefits under Defendant's pension plan, in which Plaintiff delineates the following causes of action:
Defendant answered the complaint on October 13, 2016, denying any liability and seeking an award of costs, including attorney fees. (DE 8.) The parties have filed cross motions for judgment on the administrative record, and Defendant has filed a timely response. (DEs 17, 19, 20, 22.) Judge Cox has referred these motions to me for a report and recommendation.
The first issue requiring the Court's attention is the parties' dispute over the proper standard of review. Defendant argues that the Court should apply the "deferential arbitrary and capricious" standard of review, while Plaintiff advocates that her claim for "equitable relief" should be assessed under the de novo standard of review. (DE 19 at 11-13.)
Defendant disagrees with the characterization of the complaint as seeking equitable relief. (DE 22 at 15.) Plaintiff's sole cause of action is titled, "violation of ERISA and wrongful denial of full surviving spouse benefits." Also, while some of the underlying paragraphs use terms such as "promises" and "representations," the essence of Plaintiff's claim is an alleged improper denial of "full surviving spouse benefits," namely:
(See DE 1 ¶¶ 22, 23, 27 (emphases added).) Thus, in title and in substance, Count I asserts Plaintiff's entitlement to surviving spouse benefits under the pension plan. (See also DE 1 ¶¶ 19, 20, 24.)
Moreover, as noted above, Count II seeks a "declaratory judgment[,]" although this is a distinct legal remedy from injunctive (or equitable) relief, as it requires a "lesser showing than injunctive relief[.]" 12 Moore's, § 57.07; see also Remedy: Equitable Remedy,
It seems that Plaintiff's sole cause of action is based upon 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B). (DE 1 ¶¶ 7, 24.) "[A] denial of benefits challenged under § 1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan." Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989). Plaintiff acknowledges this. (DE 19 at 11.) "If a plan affords such discretion to an administrator or fiduciary, we review the denial of benefits only to determine if it was `arbitrary and capricious,' . . . and will uphold his decision if it is `rational in light of the plan's provisions,' . . . ." Marks v. Newcourt Credit Grp., Inc., 342 F.3d 444, 456-457 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted).
As each of the parties points out, the plan at issue in this case expressly provides:
(R. at 167 ¶ C (emphases added).) In fact, Plaintiff admits: "since the Plan documents grant discretionary authority to the Plan Fiduciary, it would appear that the Standard of Review is `arbitrary and capricious'." (DE 19 at 12.) Thus, the parties agree that the pension plan at issue in this case provides for the requisite "discretionary authority" and that the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review applies to Plaintiff's statutory ERISA claim. (DE 17 at 21-22.)
The "Pension Agreement between FCA US LLC and the UAW" at issue in this case became effective on January 1, 2014. (R. at 111-237.) In particular, Plaintiff's lawsuit concerns the provisions of the agreement that relate to "surviving spouse benefits," which includes, among other things, terms related to "the regular surviving spouse option," and "widow's/widower's pension benefit." (R. at 135-143; see also DE 17 at 18-20.)
Also relevant to this case is the Pension Plan's "Summary Plan Description 2008." (R. at 239-299.) Like the Pension Agreement, the SPD contains provisions related to "survivor benefits," although it is divided into two options with different nomenclature: (A) "if you die before benefit payments begin," and (B) "if you die after benefit payments begin." (R. at 259-264.)
Raymond O. Gordon, Sr. died on April 13, 2013, at the age of 64. (R. at 11, 33, 57, 69, 76, 98; DE 1 ¶¶ 12-13.) On or about May 16, 2013, Eunice Gordon submitted her husband's death certificate, apparently along with a "certified copy of marriage record," to Benefit Express. (R. at 96-99.) This set in motion the following chain of communication:
The following month, Plaintiff wrote a letter to appeal. (R. at 33-38.) On December 24, 2014, the Benefits Express Determination Review Team denied the request "to receive additional survivor pension." Among other things, this letter explained:
(R. at 53-54, 74-75.) In her dispositive motion, Plaintiff acknowledges that May 1, 2013 is the date on which she became "eligible to commence receiving surviving spousal benefits. . . ." (DE 19 at 13 (citing R. at 31, 107); see also DE 19 at 18.)
Plaintiff retained counsel to appeal the denial of pension benefits. (R. at 55, 67.) On April 24, 2015, the FCA US LLC-UAW Pension Board of Administration provided the following analysis:
(R. at 109-110.)
Under the terms of the "Widow's/Widower's Pension Benefit," Eunice Gordon was eligible to receive "65% of the reduced monthly basic pension that was or would have been payable after age 62 and one month to the retired employee," or, in other words, "65% of the basic pension benefit you would have been eligible to receive at age 62 and one month — reduced to reflect the surviving spouse adjustment factor." (R. at 137 ¶ 9(a)(5), R. at 139 ¶ 9(B)(ii), R. at 260.) As the SPD goes on to explain: "The benefit amount is based on the basic pension rate in effect at the time of your death and is calculated as if you had voluntarily retired on the date of your death and had elected a Surviving Spouse option." (R. at 260.)
Plaintiff contends that she "was in no position to know how the calculations were being made and/or whether she was required to delay the commencement of benefits. . . ." (DE 19 at 14; see also DE 19 at 17.) Stated otherwise, Plaintiff argues that she "had no reason to doubt the representations made to her that she needed to wait one year to receive benefits, or that the amount of $2,306.99 was incorrect." (DE 19 at 18.) Still, the parties now agree that Raymond Gordon was eligible to receive a monthly pension benefit in the amount of $2,306.99 had he retired on April 13, 2013, the date of his death. (DE 17 at 9 ¶ 3, DE 19 at 6 ¶ 1.) Sixty-five (65) percent of $2,306.99 is $1,499.54. As such, the Court should agree with Defendant and conclude that the Board of Administration's April 24, 2015 determination "was neither arbitrary nor capricious." (DE 17 at 22-23.)
As noted above, Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit on April 5, 2016 to recover "full surviving spouse benefits," presumably a monthly benefit of $2,306 instead of $1,499. Her May 18, 2017 motion for summary judgment argues that "Defendant is estopped from denying Plaintiff Gordon monthly benefits in the amount of $2,306.[9]9 based upon the doctrine of equitable estoppel." (DE 19 at 13-18.)
The Court should deny Plaintiff's motion. As discussed above in further detail, Plaintiff's complaint does not present a claim for equitable relief. True, Plaintiff's motion asserts that she relied to her detriment upon misrepresentations contained within Defendant's May 17, 2013 and March 25, 2014 letters (R. at 5-10) and within oral conversations (perhaps including one dated April 1, 2014 (R. at 11)). (DE 19 at 14-19.)
Perhaps more germane to Plaintiff's contractual cause of action is the following instruction from the Supreme Court: "the summary documents, important as they are, provide communication with beneficiaries about the plan, but . . . their statements do not themselves constitute the terms of the plan for purposes of § 502(a)(1)(B)." CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 438 (2011). Also, as to an ERISA contract claim, the Sixth Circuit has stated:
Bloemker v. Laborers' Local 265 Pension Fund, 605 F.3d 436, 444 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff seeks benefits as set forth in Benefit Express's May 17, 2013 and March 25, 2014 letters, the Court should agree with Defendant that "Benefit Express's letters cannot alter the terms of the pension plan." (DE 17 at 23-25.)
Plaintiff's complaint provides a sole cause of action for a violation and declaration of rights under ERISA, which should be reviewed under the deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard. As such, there is no need for the Court to separately address Defendant's argument that Count II should be dismissed. (See DE 17 at 25-26.) The Board of Administration's April 24, 2015 determination was not arbitrary and capricious. Furthermore, Benefit Express's May 17, 2013 and March 25, 2014 letters do not alter the terms of the Pension Plan. If the Court agrees with these conclusions, then it need not separately address Defendant's argument that the Estate of Raymond O'Neil Gordon, Sr. "lacks standing and failed to exhaust administrative remedies." (DE 17 at 26-28.) Accordingly, the Court should
The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and Recommendation, but are required to file any objections within 14 days of service, as provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) and Local Rule 72.1(d). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections that raise some issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all the objections a party might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1273 (6th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(d)(2), any objections must be served on this Magistrate Judge.
Any objections must be labeled as "Objection No. 1," and "Objection No. 2," etc. Any objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than 14 days after service of an objection, the opposing party may file a concise response proportionate to the objections in length and complexity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d). The response must specifically address each issue raised in the objections, in the same order, and labeled as "Response to Objection No. 1," "Response to Objection No. 2," etc. If the Court determines that any objections are without merit, it may rule without awaiting the response.
