SUSIE MORGAN, District Judge.
The Court has pending before it Defendant Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Company's ("Hartford") motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff Christopher Barrilleaux was employed by Defendant Sea Support Ventures, LLC. Barrilleaux contends that, as part of the terms of his employment, he was entitled to long-term disability ("LTD") benefits pursuant to a Policy sponsored by Sea Support and administered by Hartford. The parties agree that ERISA governs the LTD Policy.
The circumstances surrounding Barrilleaux's enrollment (or attempted enrollment) in the LTD Policy are at least obfuscated, if not genuinely disputed. But the facts material to Hartford's motion for summary judgment are straightforward and undisputed. After allegedly incurring a workplace injury, Barrilleaux made a claim to Hartford for LTD benefits under the Policy. Hartford denied that claim in written correspondence dated April 8, 2008.
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party "must come forward with evidence which would `entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.'" Int'l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263-64 (5th Cir. 1991). If the moving party fails to carry this burden, the motion must be denied. If the moving party successfully carries this burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. at 322-23. Once the burden has shifted, the non-moving party must direct the Court's attention to something in the pleadings or other evidence in the record that sets forth specific facts sufficient to establish that a genuine issue of material fact does indeed exist. Id. at 324.
If the dispositive issue is one on which the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, however, the moving party may satisfy its burden by simply pointing out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an essential element of the non-moving party's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The nonmoving party must then respond, either by "calling the Court's attention to supporting evidence already in the record that was overlooked or ignored by the moving party" or by coming forward with additional evidence. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 332-33 & 333 n.3.
"An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action." DIRECTV Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir. 2005). When assessing whether a material factual dispute exists, the Court considers "all of the evidence in the record but refrains from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence." Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2008); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). There is no genuine issue of material fact if, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, no reasonable trier of fact could find for the non-moving party, thus entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v. Amedisys, 298 F.3d 434, 440 (5th Cir. 2002).
Plaintiff seeks to recover from Hartford benefits allegedly due to him under the LTD Policy; his claim is therefore brought pursuant to ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). See McCall v. Burlington N./Santa Fe Co., 237 F.3d 506, 512 (5th Cir. 2000) ("When a beneficiary wants what was supposed to have been distributed under a plan, the appropriate remedy is a claim for denial of benefits under § 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA rather than a fiduciary claim brought pursuant to § 502(a)(3)."). "ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) does not specify a statute of limitations." Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 134 S.Ct. 604, 610 (2013). Therefore, courts generally "`apply the most closely analogous state of limitations under state law.'" See Kennedy v. Elec. Pension Plan, IBEW No. 995, 954 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158 (1983)); see also Heimeshoff, 130 S. Ct. at 609. But the LTD Policy at issue in this case contains a contractual limitations period requiring suit to be filed within "three years after the time written Proof of Loss is required to be furnished."
It is undisputed on this record that Plaintiff filed suit more than four years after denial of benefits, rather than within three years from the time proof of loss was due, as required by the LTD Policy.
In response, Plaintiff has asserted various arguments at different stages of the briefing. Plaintiff first argument is that because the basis for denial of his claim was that he was not enrolled in the Policy, the terms of the Policy cannot bar this lawsuit.
In supplemental briefing, Plaintiff urges the Court to apply Louisiana's ten-year prescriptive period for personal actions, relying on Hall v. National Gypsum Co., 105 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 1997) and Kennedy v. Electricians Pension Plan, IBEW No. 995, 954 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1992).
Plaintiff also apparently argues that the April 8, 2008 denial letter was not a denial of benefits, and therefore his lawsuit is somehow timely. Although a cause of action generally accrues when benefits are denied, a contractual provision that commences the limitations period even before accrual of a cause of action, as the Policy did in this case, is enforceable. See Heimeshoff, 134 S. Ct. at 610-11. Thus, Plaintiff was required under the terms of the Policy to file suit within three years from when proof of loss was due. He has presented no summary judgment evidence or argument that he complied with that requirement. Hartford is therefore entitled to summary judgment.
For the foregoing reasons,