MAX O. COGBURN, JR., District Judge.
Plaintiff applied for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits under title II of the Act in May 2015, alleging disability beginning June 17, 2013. (Tr. 10). Plaintiff's application was denied initially and upon reconsideration.
The court adopts and incorporates the ALJ's factual findings herein as if fully set forth. Such findings are referenced in the substantive discussion which follows.
The only issues on review are whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Even if the undersigned were to find that a preponderance of the evidence weighed against the Commissioner's decision, the Commissioner's decision would have to be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence.
The court has read the transcript of plaintiff's administrative hearing, closely read the decision of the ALJ, and reviewed the relevant exhibits contained in the extensive administrative record. The issue is not whether the court might have reached a different conclusion had it been presented with the same testimony and evidentiary materials, but whether the decision of the administrative law judge is supported by substantial evidence. Here, the court finds that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence, and it will thus be affirmed.
A five-step process, known as "sequential" review, is used by the Commissioner in determining whether a Social Security claimant is disabled. The Commissioner evaluates a disability claim under Title XVI pursuant to the following five-step analysis:
20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(f). The burden of proof and production during the first four steps of the inquiry rests on the claimant.
At step one of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ found that plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity ("SGA") since his alleged onset date of June 17, 2013, 2010 through his date last insured of December 31, 2016. (Tr. 12). At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff has the following severe impairments: paroxysmal SVT s/p AICD implantation; cardiomyopathy; congestive heart failure; ventricular tachycardia; cervical radiculopathy; lumbar radiculopathy; obesity; depression; and anxiety.
Then, before step four, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the RFC to perform sedentary work, with the following limitations: he is limited to occasional climbing of ramps and stairs, ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; he should avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold and heat, dust, odor, fumes, and other pulmonary irritants; he must avoid hazards such as working at unprotected heights or around moving mechanical machinery; and he is limited to performing simple routine tasks and to maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace for two-hour periods during the workday, as well as a work environment with infrequent changes to work routine. (Tr. 14-20).
At step four, the ALJ found that plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work due to his RFC. (Tr. 20). At step five, the ALJ found that jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy that plaintiff can perform, including surveillance system monitor, stuffer, and sorter. (Tr. 20-21). As a result, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. (Tr. 21-22).
The court has closely read plaintiff's memorandum (#11) in support of his motion (#10). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to resolve apparent conflicts between the testimony of the vocational expert ("VE") and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT"), by failing to properly analyze plaintiff's RFC, and by improperly assessing medical opinion evidence. The court will consider each allegation in turn.
First, the court will consider plaintiff's allegation that the ALJ's analysis of the VE's testimony was improper. Plaintiff argues that the job of surveillance system monitor is not unskilled and therefore in conflict with plaintiff's RFC, that the VE misidentified the job of sorter and it conflicts with plaintiff's RFC, and that the ALJ failed to resolve apparent conflicts between the VE's testimony and the DOT.
Here, the court finds no basis for remand. First, plaintiff offers only his own speculation that surveillance system operator is not an unskilled job. In his arguments, plaintiff does not cite to the DOT or another judicially recognized source but instead points to postings on the Transportation Security Administration's website and job descriptions of gaming surveillance officers and gaming investigators on O*Net as proof that surveillance system operator is a skilled occupation. #11 at 10-11. Such speculation cannot overcome the VE's testimony or the DOT, and can hardly be said to create an apparent conflict that would result in remand.
As for the misidentification of sorter, the court agrees with plaintiff that the VE wrongly identified sorter as a sedentary job when it actually involves light work, and notes that defendant concedes this apparent error. However, as outlined below, work remains in significant numbers in the national economy for plaintiff to perform that does not conflict with the DOT, rendering this error by the ALJ and VE harmless since a different result would not have been reached.
As for apparent conflicts between the VE's testimony and the DOT, the jobs suggested by the VE and endorsed by the ALJ appear to require General Educational Development ("GED") Reasoning Levels ranging from 2 to 3. GED levels range from Level 1 (lowest reasoning ability) to Level 6 (highest reasoning ability). Whether there is an apparent conflict between simple, routine, repetitive work and GED Level 3 is far from settled. The Fourth Circuit has yet to provide binding precedent on this issue, and in examining persuasive precedent elsewhere, the court has found that a circuit split exists.
However, only the job of surveillance system monitor is Level 3. Even assuming an apparent conflict exists there, the job of stuffer remains; with 354,810 jobs nationally, it alone is more than sufficient to meet the ALJ's burden.
Next, the court considers plaintiff's allegation that the ALJ improperly analyzed plaintiff's RFC. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to explain her findings on plaintiff's mental and physical capabilities; specifically, plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by failing to consider plaintiff's ability to perform detailed tasks, notwithstanding the opinion of consultative examiner Carla Duszlak, and that she failed to fully explain plaintiff's ability to stay on task for two hour periods. Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to fully consider whether plaintiff could maintain the physical ability to stay on task, alleging that the ALJ failed to make specific findings on the frequency of plaintiff's severe impairments and their effect on plaintiff.
Here, the court has reviewed the ALJ's findings on plaintiff's RFC, and cannot find a basis for remand. (Tr. 13-20). Contrary to plaintiff's assertions, the ALJ did consider Dr. Duszlak's assessment, explained why she assigned it some weight, and agreed with Dr. Duszlak that plaintiff could perform simple routine tasks. (Tr. 15, 18-19). Further, the ALJ explained why Dr. Duszlak's opinion did not merit more weight, explaining that minimal treatment and objective findings contradict other aspects of Dr. Duszlak's opinion, in conjunction with plaintiff's reported activities of daily living. (Tr. 19). And contrary to plaintiff's assertions that the ALJ failed to offer an explanation for plaintiff's ability to stay on task, the ALJ specifically cited Dr. Duszlak's opinion as justification for plaintiff's ability to perform simple tasks, as well as the opinions of State agency physicians who found that plaintiff could sustain concentration at the level needed to perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks. (Tr. 19, 83). As such, the ALJ has sufficiently justified her mental RFC findings with substantial evidence. As for plaintiff's physical RFC, the ALJ discussed evidence of plaintiff's physical condition at length, from the limiting effects of his symptoms to treatment records of heart issues, pain, and obesity to opinion evidence. (Tr. 16-19). Indeed, in her analysis the ALJ actually found it appropriate to limit plaintiff's physical functioning beyond what State agency consultants found. (Tr. 19). As such, the ALJ discussed the evidence of record on plaintiff's RFC thoroughly, allowing this court to conduct meaningful review, and clearly justified her RFC findings with substantial evidence. Thus, the court cannot find a basis for remand exists on this issue.
Finally, the court considers plaintiff's allegation that the ALJ improperly weighed the medical opinion evidence of record. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to give appropriate weight to the opinion of Dr. John H. Edmund. However, weighing evidence and adjusting it to favor one party over the other is not the job of the court at this stage. Indeed, "[i]n reviewing for substantial evidence, we do not undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute our judgment for that of [the ALJ]."
Here, the court finds that the ALJ's explanation of the weight she assigned to Dr. Edmund's opinion is supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ did take note of Dr. Edmund's opinion. (Tr. 19). However, the ALJ also explained that Dr. Edmund's opinion is outdated, in that Dr. Edmund relied on plaintiff's defibrillator regularly discharging; however, that defibrillator error has since been corrected and plaintiff has testified that the defibrillator now only discharges roughly five times per month.
The undersigned has carefully reviewed the decision of the ALJ, the transcript of proceedings, plaintiff's complaint, the cross Motions for Summary Judgment, and accompanying memoranda. Review of the entire record reveals that the decision of the ALJ was supported by substantial evidence.