NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, SR., Judge.

Plaintiff, Lawrence Murphy, appeals a judgment that sustained a peremptory exception of prescription and dismissed his claims against the defendants, United States Maritime Services, Inc., Michael Faulk, and Jose Canseco. For the following reasons, we hereby affirm.

FACTS

On November 5, 2010, Lawrence Murphy filed suit against United States Maritime Services, Inc. ("USMS")1, Michael Faulk, and Barry J. Thibodeaux alleging that defendants engaged in fraud and unjust enrichment in connection with his ownership interest in USMS.2 On January 7, 2011, plaintiff amended his petition by adding Jose Canseco (Michael Faulk's attorney in connection with a 1994 Settlement Agreement) and Gregory Swafford (plaintiffs own attorney in connection with a 1994 Settlement Agreement).

In April 2011, USMS, Michael Faulk, and Jose Canseco filed a peremptory exception of prescription arguing that in November of 1994, plaintiff agreed, in writing, to sell all his interests in USMS for $20,000.00, and that under any legal theory, his claims are now prescribed. Attached to the peremptory exception of prescription, defendants attached Michael Faulk's affidavit as well as a copy of the 1994 settlement agreement between Michael Faulk and plaintiff. Michael Faulk's affidavit states, in pertinent part:

In opposition to the exception, plaintiff argues that defendants have been unjustly enriched based on the alleged sale of his interest in USMS and that the settlement agreement lacks the fundamental elements of consent. Plaintiff further argues that an absolutely null contract does not prescribe.

After a hearing, the trial court granted the peremptory exception of prescription and dismissed USMS, Michael Faulk, and Jose Canseco with prejudice.3 Plaintiff now appeals this final judgment.

DISCUSSION

In reviewing a peremptory exception of prescription, an appellate court will review the entire record to determine whether the trial court's finding of fact was manifestly erroneous. Katz v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2004-1133, p. 2 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2/2/05), 917 So.2d 443, 444. Further, the standard controlling review of a peremptory exception of prescription requires that this court strictly construe the statutes against prescription and in favor of the claim that is said to be extinguished. Id.

Delictual actions generally are subject to a liberative prescription of one year, which commences to run from the day injury or damage is sustained. La. C.C. art. 3492. Prescription begins to run when damage to the plaintiff has manifested itself with sufficient certainty to support accrual of a cause of action. La. C.C. art. 3492; Cameron Parish School Bd. v. ACandS, Inc., 96-0895, p. 6 (La. 1/14/97), 687 So.2d 84, 88. A personal action is subject to a liberative prescription of ten years. Although an action for annulment of an absolutely null contract does not prescribe, an action of annulment of a relatively null contract must be brought within five years from the time the ground for nullity either ceased, as in the case of incapacity or duress, or was discovered, as in the case of error or fraud. La. C.C. art. 2032.

When the face of the petition shows the prescriptive period has already elapsed, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that suspension, interruption, or renunciation of prescription has occurred. Ferguson v. Sugar, 2005-0921, p. 20 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/25/08), 988 So.2d 816, 830. Here, the action appears to be prescribed on its face since: (1) plaintiff alleges in his petition that he founded USMS in 1991 and that the company received a major contract in 1993; (2) plaintiff alleges that USMS was just beginning to realize its potential when he "suffered a debilitating stroke that rendered him mentally incompetent for several years;" and (3) "it was at this time that Michael Faulk as the President of USMS and Barry Thibodeaux as the accountant for USMS began the process of taking the business from Lawrence Murphy, taking advantage of his mental impairment." Because the underlying events occurred in the mid-1990's, and considering that the maximum prescriptive period is ten years for a personal action and/or a contract action, we find that the petition is prescribed on its face. Thus, the burden is on plaintiff to prove the suspension or interruption of the prescriptive period.

Under the judicially created doctrine of contra non valentem, prescription is suspended (1) when there was some legal cause which prevented the courts or their officers from taking cognizance of or acting on the plaintiff's action; (2) when there was some condition coupled with the contract or connected with the proceedings which prevented the creditor from suing or acting; (3) where the debtor himself has done some act effectually to prevent the creditor from availing himself of this cause of action; and (4) where the cause of action is not known or reasonably knowable by the plaintiff, even though his ignorance is not induced by the defendant. Renfroe v. State ex rel. Dept. of Transp. and Development, 2001-1646, p. 9 (La. 2/26/02), 809 So.2d 947, 953. The doctrine of contra non valentem applies only in exceptional circumstances, and must be strictly construed. Id. The doctrine does not exempt the plaintiff if the plaintiff's ignorance is attributable to his own willfulness or neglect. A plaintiff will be deemed to know what he could by reasonable diligence have learned. Id., p. 10, 809 So.2d at 953.

A plaintiff bears the burden of proving one of the foregoing situations applies in order to defeat an exception of prescription on the basis of contra non valentem. Maurice v Prudential Ins. Co., 2002-0993, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/23/02), 831 So.2d 381, 386. The only ground of contra non valentem that could apply under the facts set out in the pleadings in this case is No. 4, "where the cause of action is neither known nor reasonably knowable by the plaintiff even though plaintiffs ignorance is not induced by the defendant." However, the record before us contains no evidence as to why plaintiffs cause of action for fraud and/or unjust enrichment was not known or reasonably known within the relevant prescriptive periods. Thus, we find plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proving that prescription was suspended.

Given the facts and circumstances of the present case, we find no error on the part of the trial court in sustaining the exception of prescription. We hereby affirm the judgment of the trial court.

AFFIRMED.