MEMORANDUM OPINION

M. HANNAH LAUCK, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants BJ's Wholesale Club, Chris Chase, and Brandon Jester's (collectively, "BJ's") joint Motions to Compel Arbitration and Dismiss Proceedings. (ECF Nos. 11, 12.) Plaintiff Dazzmond Hawthorne responded to BJ's Motions. (ECF No. 17.) BJ's did not file a reply, and the time to do so has expired. Accordingly, the motions are ripe for adjudication. The Court dispenses with oral argument because the materials before the Court adequately present the facts and legal contentions necessary to resolve BJ's motions. The Court exercises jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.1

For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant BJ's Motion to Compel Arbitration (ECF No. 11) and BJ's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 12). The Court will dismiss the action without prejudice.

I. Procedural and Factual Background

A. Procedural History

On September 22, 2015, Hawthorne filed a Complaint in this Court. (ECF No. 2.) Hawthorne submitted his Complaint in narrative form, lacking enumerated paragraphs or citations to any law. Hawthorne specifically states that he brings suit against BJ's for "wrongful termination, pain and suffering, defamation of character, and false allegations."2 (Compl. 3.) Liberally construing Hawthorne's pro se Complaint, the Court finds he attempts to state claims for defamation, wrongful termination, and racially discriminatory employment practices, in violation of Title Vil. (See supra note 1.) On January 13, 2015, BJ's filed the instant Motions to Compel Arbitration and Dismiss the Proceedings. (ECF Nos. 11, 12.) BJ's asserts that Hawthorne's claims are subject to an agreement to submit all employment-related claims to binding arbitration.

B. Hawthorne's Work for and Termination from BJ's

On or about December 2, 2013, BJ's hired Hawthorne to work in its tire bay.3 Hawthorne alleges that two coworkers, Shiante Crumbley and Ashley Cooper, informed him in June 2014 that another coworker, Brandon Jester, used vulgar and racially derogatory language to insult him on Facebook. Hawthorne states that he confronted Jester about the comments during Hawthorne's next shift. Hawthorne avers that management then began scheduling Jester to work with Hawthorne more frequently than had occurred in the past. Hawthorne states that he felt as if Jester and BJ's management wanted "something serious to occur" between Hawthorne and Jester. (Compl. 1.) Hawthorne alleges that he brought these concerns to his immediate manager, but was told "to think nothing of it, and just continue to do [his] job." (Id.) Hawthorne states that no other incidents occurred between June and September of 2014.

On or about September 13, 2014, Hawthorne alleges that Crumbley contacted him and told him to "watch [his] back" because she heard Hawthorne "was getting" something when he returned to work. (Id.) During Hawthorne's next shift, on September 20, 2014, Chris Chase, the store manager, placed Hawthorne on suspension, in part for making threatening comments to other employees. Hawthorne avers that Chase refused to state more specific grounds for the suspension because of a "right-to-know" law. (Id.) On September 29, 2014, Hawthorne met with two other BJ's representatives. The two representatives ultimately terminated Hawthorne due to a threat against Jester.

C. The Arbitration Agreement

In April and May of 2013, BJ's adopted the Open Door Solutions program to serve as a four-step dispute resolution system. Steps one, two, and three of the Open Door Solutions program attempt to resolve employment-related disputes internally. Step four of the Open Door Solutions program requires the parties to submit to binding arbitration. At the time of its implementation, BJ's allowed each of its employees to opt out of the Open Door Solutions' Arbitration Agreement (the "Arbitration Agreement"). Since its implementation, BJ's informs all new employees about the Arbitration Agreement and gives them an opportunity to opt out.

The parties agree that Hawthorne signed a "New Hire Acknowledgement and Agreement" (the "Acknowledgement") upon being hired. (New Hire Aclm. Arb. Agreement at 1; Pl.'s Resp. at 1.) The Acknowledgment notes that Hawthorne received and reviewed a copy of BJ's Open Door Solutions program materials. The Acknowledgement further states:

(New Hire Aclm. Arb. Agreement 1.) Article 2 of the Open Door Solutions Rules and Procedures provides that "all employment-related legal disputes, controversies or claims arising out of, or relating to, employment or cessation of employment, whether arising under federal, state[,] or local decisional or statutory law ("Employment-Related Claims"), shall be resolved exclusively by final and binding arbitration." (Loudon Deel. at 8 ("Arb. Rules and Proc."), art. 2, ECF No. 13-1.) Article 2 then lists a number of examples of "Employment-Related Claims," expressly including defamation, wrongful termination, and claims arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (Id.)

The "Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims" further clarifies the Arbitration Agreement in plain language:

(Loudon Deel. at 5 ("Mutual Agreement to Arb." ¶ 1).)

New BJ's employees have an opportunity to opt out of the Arbitration Agreement by completing an opt-out form and returning it to the BJ's Office of Open Door Solutions within 30 days. Neither party contests that Hawthorne did not opt out of the Arbitration Agreement.

II. Analysis

The Court finds that Hawthorne's claims are subject to binding arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")4 because: (I) the Arbitration Agreement pertains to current and former employees; (2) Hawthorne makes no showing of unconscionability;5 and, (3) any breach by BJ's does not render the Arbitration Agreement unenforceable.

A. The Federal Arbitration Act

Congress passed the FAA "`to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements . . . and to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.'" Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89 (2000) (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/ Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (alteration in original)). The FAA provides that a written agreement to arbitrate "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. Section 2 limits the scope of the FAA to written contracts involving commerce. Id. "The effect of th[is] section is to create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act." Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).

Once a court determines that the parties entered into a written agreement to arbitrate the underlying dispute, Section 4 directs courts to compel arbitration if necessary. 9 U.S.C. § 4. The FAA gives district courts no discretion to do otherwise:

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985) (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4); see Hightower v. GARI, Inc., 272 F.3d 239, 241 (4th Cir. 2001); Sydnor v. Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp., 252 F.3d 302, 305 (4th Cir. 2001).

B. BJ's Motion to Compel Arbitration

To compel arbitration under the FAA, BJ's must demonstrate:

Galloway v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 819 F.3d 79, 84 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Rota-Mclarty v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 700 F.3d 690, 696 n.6 (4th Cir. 2012)); accord Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Hinkle Contracting Corp., 497 F. App'x 348, 352 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 500-01 (4th Cir. 2002)).6 Hawthorne does not contest the existence of a dispute between the parties, the relationship of the transaction to interstate or foreign commerce, or his failure, neglect, or refusal to arbitrate the dispute. (Pl.'s Resp. at 1.) Hawthorne disputes only the second element, denying that a valid contract to arbitrate the dispute exists.7 Specifically, he avers that: (1) the Arbitration Agreement pertains only to current employees; (2) the Agreement was unconscionable; and, (3) BJ's breached the Agreement. (Compl. 2.)

Courts evaluate a motion to compel arbitration using the following precepts:

Craddock v. LeClairRyan, P.C., No. 3:16cv11, 2016 WL 1464562, at *3 (E.D. Va. Apr. 12, 2016) (omissions and second alteration in original) (quoting Lorenzo v. Prime Commc'ns., L.P., 806 F.3d 777, 781 (4th Cir. 2015)). Therefore, the Court turns to Virginia contract law to determine the validity of the Arbitration Agreement.

1. The Arbitration Agreement Pertains to Former Employees

Under Virginia law, "[c]ontracts are construed as written, without adding terms that were not included by the parties." TM Delmarva Power, L.L.C. v. NCP of Va., L.L.C., 557 S.E.2d 199, 200 (Va. 2002) (citing Wilson v. Holy field, 313 S.E.2d 396, 398 (Va. 1984)). "Where the terms in a contract are clear and unambiguous the contract is construed according to its plain meaning." Id. (citing Bridgestone/Firestone v. Prince William Square Assocs., 463 S.E.2d 661, 664 (Va. 1995); Ross v. Craw, 343 S.E.2d 312, 316 (Va. 1986)).

Hawthorne avers that the Arbitration Agreement applies only to current employees of BJ's. However, the "Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims" expressly provides that "this Agreement continues after [his] employment at BJ's ends" and applies to any dispute "arising out of or relating to any aspect of [his] job at BJ's." (Mutual Agreement to Arb. ¶ 1.) The plain meaning of these clear and unambiguous terms shows that the Arbitration Agreement applies to employment-related claims of both current and former employees. TM Delmarva, 557 S.E.2d at 200 (citing Bridgestone/Firestone, 463 S.E.2d at 664; Ross, 343 S.E.2d at 316). Hawthorne does not dispute that he worked for BJ's or that the grounds for each of his allegations originate from his previous employment. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Arbitration Agreement applies to each of Hawthorne's allegations.

2. Hawthorne Makes No Showing of Unconscionability

The FAA provides that a written agreement to arbitrate "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. The grounds upon which a party may seek revocation of such an agreement include "fraud, duress, and unconscionability." Sydnor, 252 F.3d at 305 (citing 9 u.s.c. § 2).

Virginia has traditionally defined an unconscionable contract as one that no person in his or her "`senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and [that] no honest and fair [person] would accept on the other.'" Lee v. Fairfax Cty. Sch. Board, 621 F. App'x 761, 762 (4th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (quoting Chaplain v. Chaplain, 682 S.E.2d 108, 113 (Va. App. 2009)). Unconscionability, a narrow doctrine, requires a showing of inequality "so gross as to shock the conscience." Id. (citation omitted); accord Sydnor, 252 F.3d at 305 (applying Virginia law). Unconscionability has both a procedural and a substantive element. Lee, 621 F. App'x at 763 (citing Chaplain, 682 S.E.2d at 114). Procedural unconscionability "necessitates inequity and bad faith in `the accompanying incidents . . ., such as concealments, misrepresentations, undue advantage, oppressions on the part of the one who obtains the benefit, or ignorance, weakness of mind, sickness, old age, incapacity, pecuniary necessities, and the like.'" Id. (omission in original) (quoting Chaplain, 54 S.E.2d at 114). Substantive unconscionability "requires a `gross disparity in the value exchanged.'" Id. (quoting Chaplain, 682 S.E.2d at 113).

This Court concludes that the Arbitration Agreement is neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable. This Court recognizes that Hawthorne was likely required to sign the Acknowledgement along with his other initial employment paperwork. (See New Hire Ackn. Arb. Agreement at 1.) At best, taking Hawthorne's allegations as true, he was not afforded an opportunity to read and understand the arbitration information until later that evening. (Pl.'s Resp. at 1.) However, these facts, in and of themselves, do not constitute procedural unconscionability.

First, courts have found that when plaintiffs maintain an option to refuse to sign the form and to work elsewhere instead, as Hawthorne did here, the plaintiffs faced a contract that was not unconscionable. See Bennett v. Dillard's, Inc., 849 F.Supp.2d 616, 620 (E.D. Va. 2011) (evaluating an arbitration agreement that lacked an opt-out provision but finding that "Dillard's employees had the option to work elsewhere, so the Arbitration Agreement is not a contract of adhesion or otherwise unconscionable."). More importantly, BJ's allowed Hawthorne the opportunity to opt out of the Arbitration Agreement. (Mutual Agreement to Arb. at il 5.) The Arbitration Agreement clearly and unambiguously stated that it did not constitute a condition of employment and that Hawthorne could opt out without any "negative employment action." (Id.) This Court finds no procedural "inequity or bad faith" in BJ's Arbitration Agreement. Lee, 621 F. App'x at 762. Likewise, this Court finds no evidence that Hawthorne was incapacitated or otherwise unable to appreciate the gravity of the Arbitration Agreement and make a deliberate choice regarding his option to opt out of it. Id.

Having reviewed the Arbitration Agreement's rules and procedures, this Court also does not find it to be substantively unconscionable. The Arbitration Agreement allows both parties to participate in the selection process of a neutral arbitrator from the American Arbitration Association. (Arb. Rules and Proc. art. 7.) It provides that the arbitration hearing would be held within 50 miles of Hawthorne's last place of employment, unless the parties agree otherwise. (Id. art. 8.) Hawthorne has the option to be represented by an attorney. (Id. art. 9.) Alternatively, if he chooses to represent himself, BJ's agrees not to have an attorney present during the arbitration hearing. (Id.) The agreement provides for discovery that mirrors that of a court, including initial disclosures, interrogatories, and depositions. (Id. art. 10.) Likewise, the agreement provides for "Hearing Procedure[s]" that resemble judicial procedures, such as those governing witnesses, evidence, and dispositive motions. (Id. art. 11.) BJ's agrees to pay for the costs of arbitration, with the exception that each party is responsible for filing fees, attorney fees, and incidental costs. (Id. art. 15) The agreement empowers the arbitrator to award any relief that Hawthorne could attain in a courtroom, including damages and attorney fees. (Id. art. 16.)

These provisions provide Hawthorne a fair opportunity to present his claim and receive just compensation should he prevail on the merits. Both parties also receive the benefit of a substantially quicker and cheaper forum to resolve their dispute. Accordingly, this Court finds that the value that each party receives from the Arbitration Agreement does not evince such a "gross disparity" as to render the agreement substantively unconscionable. Lee, 621 F. App'x at 763.

3. BJ's "Breach" Does Not Render the Arbitration Agreement Unenforceable

Lastly, Hawthorne argues that, even if a binding agreement to arbitrate his claim exists, BJ's breached the contract by failing to afford Hawthorne an opportunity to use BJ's Open Door Solutions program in the current dispute. This argument lacks relevance to the issue before the Court because it does not attack the validity or enforce ability of the Agreement. Instead, the parties must address the matter during arbitration.

Under the FAA, the Court must first determine whether the Arbitration Agreement is enforceable. See 9 U.S.C. § 2. A written agreement to arbitrate "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. If the Court finds the Arbitration Agreement enforceable, it must compel arbitration of claims within its scope. Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 218 (1985) (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4).

Hawthorne's claim that BJ's breached the Arbitration Agreement does not constitute a ground that exists "at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." Id. To the contrary, a breach of contract claim presupposes a valid contract. See Jackson v. Ocwen Loan Serv., LLC, No. 3:15cv238, 2016 WL 1337263, at *8 (E.D. Va. Mar. 31, 2016) ("To state a claim for breach of contract under Virginia law, a plaintiff must plausibly allege: (1) a legally enforceable obligation of a defendant to a plaintiff; (2) the defendant's violation or breach of the obligation; and, (3) an injury or harm cause by the defendant's breach." (citing Filak v. George, 594 S.E.2d 610, 614 (Va. 2004)).

Hawthorne's final contention thus defeats itself. His claim of breach presupposes a valid agreement to arbitrate. Faced with a valid agreement to arbitrate, this Court must compel arbitration. Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 218 (1985) (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4). This Court would lack discretion to do otherwise. Id. Hawthorne must submit his claim for breach of contract to arbitration.

B. BJ's Motion to Dismiss

"A court may dismiss or stay a suit that is governed by the FAA." Chronister v. Marks & Harrison, P.C., No. 3:11cv688, 2012 WL 966916, at *2 (E.D. Va. Mar. 21, 2012) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 3; Choice Hotels lnt'l, Inc. v. BSR Tropicana Resort, Inc., 252 F.3d 707, 709-10 (4th Cir. 2001)). When a party seeks enforcement of an arbitration agreement in district court, the party sufficiently "invoke[s] the full spectrum of remedies under the FAA, including a stay under [9 U.S.C.] § 3." Choice Hotels, 252 F.3d at 710. However, if a court determines "that all of the issues presented are arbitrable, then it may dismiss the case." Greenville Hosp. Sys. v. Emp. Welfare Ben. Plan for Emps. of Hazelhurst Mgmt. Co., 628 F. App'x 842, 845-46 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing Choice Hotels, 252 F.3d at 709-10). The law remains unsettled as to whether a court should stay or dismiss a case when all claims are subject to arbitration,8 but no question exists that the Court has the discretion to take either option. Choice Hotels, 252 F.3d at 709-10. Here, because the Court found that all of Hawthorne's claims are arbitrable, (see supra note 7; Part II. B. 1 ("[T]he Arbitration Agreement applies to each of Hawthorne's allegations."), it will exercise its discretion to dismiss the case without prejudice.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant BJ's Motion to Compel Arbitration (ECF No. 11), grant BJ's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 12), and dismiss the action without prejudice.

An appropriate order shall issue.