NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

OPINION

CLAYTON, JUDGE.

Naymon and Audrey Chesser appeal from a judgment of the Washington Circuit Court declaring, as a matter of law, that a roadbed which runs through their property is a county road providing a necessary access to the properties of Appellees Everett Hasty, Brenda Hasty, Mark Simms, Leon F. (Sandy) Simms, and Joey Byrd. In so doing, the circuit court relied primarily upon its interpretation of the term "necessary access" as set forth in Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 178.116. Because we believe that the court's interpretation was erroneous, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Facts and Procedural History

This case arose as a response to Appellants' placement of a locked gate across an unmaintained roadway running through what they claim is their property. This gate blocked Appellees from using the roadway to access portions of their properties. The roadway adjoins Highway 1754 in Washington County and runs northward. A portion of this roadway includes a county-maintained road marked with a green sign designating it as "Naymon Chesser Road." The maintenance of this road extends for approximately 200 yards. At that point the maintenance apparently ends and the rest of the roadway appears to be unmaintained. The unmaintained portion of the roadway extends approximately 3,300 feet to a creek and then approximately 2,600 feet eastward. The gate erected by Appellants is located where the maintained portion of the road ends.

Appellees filed suit against Appellants on September 12, 2005, seeking to have the gate removed. Appellees raised a number of basis for relief in their suit, including a claim that they had established an easement by adverse possession over the subject roadway and a claim that that the roadway was excluded from and not part of Appellants' property. Of particular relevance here, Appellees also contended that the entire roadway constituted a county road that had never been closed and was consequently available for use as a public road by Appellees and the public at large. In their answer, Appellants challenged these assertions and requested trial by jury on all issues.

The case was originally scheduled for trial and litigation proceeded for months in this posture. However, on June 5, 2008, the circuit court asked the parties to brief the issue of the legal status of the subject roadway, i.e., whether it was a county road. Appellees contended that the roadway had been made a county road by order of the Washington County Fiscal Court in 1891 and that it remained a county road to the present day. They further contended, citing to KRS 178.116(1)(b), that this roadway provided them with a "necessary access" to their properties and, therefore, could not be discontinued as a county road. In response, Appellants argued that the roadway had been abandoned by operation of KRS 178.116 because it had not been used by the public since they purchased their property in 1976. They further argued that it did not provide "necessary access" to Appellees' properties because Appellees had other means of accessing such. Therefore, possession of the roadway should revert to them under the terms of the statute.

On May 14, 2010, the circuit court entered a judgment determining, as a matter of law, that the subject roadway was a county road, as established by the 1891 order, and that its status as a county road had not been formally discontinued. The record supports these particular findings, and Appellants do not take issue with them on appeal.

In response to Appellants' argument that the roadway had been abandoned and that, as a result, possession of the property reverted to them by operation of KRS 178.116, the circuit court first noted that KRS 178.116(1)(b) "presumes old county roads closed by act of law unless they provide a `necessary access for a private person.'" The court then noted that KRS 178.116(5) defines "necessary access" as "includ[ing] access to any farm, tract of land, or dwelling, or to any portions of such farm, tract of land, or dwelling" but concluded that this definition was unhelpful. The court then turned to Black's Law Dictionary for a definition of "necessary"1 and noted that the term was defined therein in two ways: "It may import absolute physical necessity or inevitability, or it may import that which is only convenient, useful, appropriate, suitable, proper, or conducive to the end sought." The court concluded that by using the phrase "or to any portions of such farm, tract of land, or dwelling" in defining "necessary access" in KRS 178.116(5), the General Assembly implied a requirement of only convenience, usefulness, or appropriateness as opposed to absolute necessity.

The circuit court then determined that since at least two Appellees had alleged that they used the unmaintained roadway to access their farms, they had made a showing of "necessary access" even if their properties were also directly adjoined to Highway 1754. Therefore, pursuant to KRS 178.116, the roadway maintained its status as a county road. Consequently, the circuit court ordered Appellants to remove the gate and to allow Appellees access to the portion of the roadway at issue. Appellants' subsequent motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment was denied. This appeal followed.

Analysis

On appeal, Appellants contend that the circuit court improperly interpreted KRS 178.116 in determining that the subject roadway supplied Appellees with "necessary access" to their properties. Because this raises a question of statutory interpretation, a matter of law, our review is de novo. Wheeler & Clevenger Oil Co., Inc. v. Washburn, 127 S.W.3d 609, 612 (Ky. 2004); Bob Hook Chevrolet Isuzu, Inc. v. Com., Transp. Cabinet, 983 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Ky. 1998). As such, we are not required to give deference to the circuit court's interpretation. Id.; Cinelli v. Ward, 997 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Ky. App. 1998).

For purposes of KRS Chapter 178, county roads are defined, in relevant part, as "public roads which have been formally accepted by the fiscal court of the county as a part of the county road system, or private roads, streets, or highways which have been acquired by the county pursuant to subsection (3) of this section or KRS 178.405 to 178.425." KRS 178.010(1)(b). Any such county road "lawfully established and opened and not lawfully discontinued or vacated shall continue as such, until properly discontinued." KRS 178.020.

Pursuant to KRS 178.070, a fiscal court can affirmatively and formally direct that a county road be discontinued in the manner set forth therein. The parties agree that such has not been done in this case. However, KRS 178.116 provides an alternative mechanism for the informal discontinuance of roads adopted or maintained by the county in instances where a fiscal court has not taken formal action. Specifically, KRS 178.116(1) sets forth how possession of an informally discontinued county road may revert to the prior owners of the land:

By its own terms, then, KRS 178.116 is self-actuating and possession of a formerly maintained county road reverts to the property owner pursuant to KRS 178.116(1) unless one of the conditions listed in subsections (1)(a)-(c) is applicable. No formal action by a fiscal court is necessary. As previously noted, the circuit court herein relied upon KRS 178.116(1)(b) in finding that the disputed roadway provided a "necessary access" for Appellees, thus precluding its discontinuance and reversion.

As the parties recognize, resolution of this appeal requires us to resolve the meaning of the term "necessary access," with an emphasis on the word "necessary." KRS 178.116(5) provides that "`necessary access' shall be construed to include access to any farm, tract of land, or dwelling, or to any portions of such farm, tract of land, or dwelling." We agree with the circuit court that this language is far from clear and confuses the issue more than aids it. Consequently, we are forced to rely upon well-established rules of statutory interpretation in considering this matter.

"When analyzing a statute, we must interpret statutory language with regard to its common and approved usage." AK Steel Corp. v. Com., 87 S.W.3d 15, 17 (Ky. App. 2002); see also KRS 446.080(4). The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (New College Edition 1981) defines "necessary" as "[n]eeded for the continuing existence or functioning of something; essential; indispensable." See Muse v. Banks, 2011 WL 831970 (Ky. App. 2011) (2010-CA-000101-MR and 2010-CA-000150-MR). In contrast, the definition of "necessary" urged by Appellees (and adopted by the circuit court) would essentially allow for any access — no matter how much it was actually needed. We cannot agree with this interpretation because we fail to see how such equates to "necessary" as that term is commonly understood. Access is not "necessary" merely because it is preferable or more convenient to a party. We further note that subsection (5) does not directly define "necessary access." Instead, we believe that it merely specifies that certain types of property are entitled to access where appropriate, i.e., farms, tracts of land, dwellings, or parts of such.

Moreover, interpreting KRS 178.116(1) and (5) in the broad manner suggested by the circuit court and Appellees would effectively render much of those provisions superfluous. Were we to conclude that the legislature meant to define "necessary access" as "any access," obviously there would be no need to further describe what is encompassed within the purview of the meaning of "any." In interpreting a statutory provision, we must assume that the General Assembly intended the provision to be effective in its entirety and for each part to have significance and effect. George v. Scent, 346 S.W.2d 784, 789 (Ky. 1961). Furthermore, we must construe a statute so that no part of its provisions is rendered meaningless and ineffectual. Hardin County Fiscal Court v. Hardin County Bd. of Health, 899 S.W.2d 859, 861-862 (Ky. App. 1995). The General Assembly intentionally — and undoubtedly with a specific purpose — included the term "necessary" several times within KRS 178.116. We are compelled to accord meaning to the term and to construe the statute in such a manner as to render it effective in its entirety. George, 346 S.W.2d at 789. Thus, we decline to accept the interpretation of KRS 178.116 given by Appellees and the circuit court, which would vitiate the plain meaning of the statute and would ignore the commonly understood meaning of the word "necessary" as it is defined above, i.e., needed, essential, or indispensable.3

Given our determination, reversal and remand is required. The record contains little to no testimony from the parties as to the issues of necessary access, discontinued use, and maintenance, although we note that Appellees do not argue that the disputed roadway was the only or even the best access to their property. Moreover, in the event that it is established that the subject roadway is not a county road, the parties have also raised alternative arguments below concerning ownership and adverse possession of the property that require further development. These issues all involve factual questions that generally require resolution at trial in the absence of agreement by the parties or undisputed evidence. Consequently, further proceedings are required.

Conclusion

In summary, the circuit court's decision is reversed and remanded because the court erroneously interpreted the meaning of "necessary access" as that term is set forth in KRS 178.116.

ALL CONCUR.