NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

OPINION

CLAYTON, Judge.

Jamie E. Smith Townsend appeals from the August 23, 2013, order of the Crittenden Circuit Court which held Townsend in contempt of court and sentenced her to 180 days of detention. Because we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.

Townsend and Jerrald Jones are the biological parents of one minor child, W.R.J., born in 1999. In 2001, Townsend filed a petition to establish paternity, as well as child support and medical support for W.R.J. As a result, the court entered an order of paternity and an order of support which required Jones to pay $216.67 per month to Townsend.

In April of 2003, Townsend moved the court to find Jones in contempt of the child support order for being $1,083.35 in arrears. As a result, Jones was found in contempt and sentenced to 90 days in jail, conditionally discharged for two years on the condition that he pay an additional $25.00 per month towards his arrearage. In October of 2003, Townsend filed another contempt motion in which she requested that Jones' conditional discharge be revoked for failure to pay his child support. On October 28, 2003, following a hearing, the court revoked Jones' probated time and sentenced him to 180 days in jail. However, the trial court gave Jones three weeks to obtain employment until his sentence would begin. A review was scheduled for November 18, 2003, for which Jones failed to appear. A bench warrant was issued and executed, and Jones was incarcerated for 96 days, with the remaining 84 days on Jones' sentence conditionally discharged for two years. A new motion for contempt was filed in 2008, and Jones was again found in contempt and sentenced to 180 days, conditionally discharged on the condition that he pay an additional $25.00 per month toward his arrears.

In 2009, Townsend, through the Crittenden County Child Support office, waived an arrearage of $8,972.22. However, a new motion for contempt was filed on February 1, 2013. Unable to obtain service on Jones, the child support office decided to pursue flagrant non-support charges against Jones. In June of 2013, the child support office received a call from W.R.J.'s maternal grandmother, Pamila Munoz. Munoz stated that she had been W.R.J.'s legal guardian since June of 2004, and that she had only ever received $67.00 in support money from Townsend. She further claimed that she was unaware that Townsend had been receiving child support from Jones. As a result of the information brought forth by Munoz, a hearing was held and it was determined that Townsend was at risk of being held in contempt. She was appointed an attorney and a show cause hearing was set.

At the show cause hearing, Munoz testified that W.R.J. had been living with her in Illinois since 2001 or 2002 and that she became his legal guardian in 2004. She further testified that she began receiving SSI money for W.R.J. in 2005 and that he has a medical card from the state of Illinois, as well as private health insurance provided by Munoz. Munoz admitted that Townsend had custody of W.R.J. during all summers except one, and Munoz provided money from the SSI payments to Townsend during that time. Jones testified that he had limited contact with Townsend; that he was unaware of W.R.J. and Townsend's location and living arrangements; and that he was unaware that Munoz had guardianship of W.R.J. Townsend testified that she used the support money to care for W.R.J. during the summer and to travel to and from Illinois. She further testified that she did not give money to Munoz for W.R.J.'s support. Brenda Croft, of the Crittenden child support office, testified that Townsend had contacted the office at least twenty times in five years and requested that the office aggressively pursue enforcement of the 2001 child support order. It was further revealed that Jones had paid $12,813.98 to Townsend since June of 2004.

Following the show cause hearing, Townsend was found to be in contempt of court and was sentenced to 180 days in jail. This appeal followed.

Contempt falls into two categories, civil and criminal, which are distinguishable not by the punishment but by the purpose for imposing the punishment. A.W. v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 4, 10 (Ky. 2005). Refusal to abide by a court's order is an act of civil contempt. Newsome v. Commonwealth, 35 S.W.3d 836, 839 (Ky.App. 2001). In contrast, an act which exhibits disrespect for the court's procedures; has obstructed the administration of justice; or has brought the court into disrepute, is an act of criminal conduct. A.W. v. Commonwealth, supra. Criminal contempt further includes those acts that obstruct the court's process, degrade its authority, or contaminate its purity. Id. When a court seeks to coerce or compel a course of action, the appropriate sanction is civil contempt. Id. However, when a court seeks to punish conduct that has already occurred or to vindicate its authority, the appropriate sanction is criminal contempt. Id.; Miller v. Vettiner, 481 S.W.2d 32, 35 (Ky. 1972). In addition, criminal contempt can be either direct or indirect.

Commonwealth v. Burge, 947 S.W.2d 805, 808 (Ky. 1996) (citations omitted).

A court has nearly unlimited discretion in its exercise of contempt powers. Meyers v. Petrie, 233 S.W.3d 212, 215 (Ky. App. 2007). Therefore, we will not disturb a court's finding of contempt absent an abuse of that discretion. "The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial [court's] decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles." Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)).

Townsend argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it held her in contempt, because Jones' child support order had never been modified and remained in effect. We disagree. There was overwhelming evidence, including testimony from Townsend herself, that Townsend continuously harassed both the trial court and the county attorney's office to enforce an order that was produced under false pretense. The trial court found that Townsend knowingly misled the court and misused its resources to wrongfully collect money from Jones. This finding was adequately supported by the evidence. Thus, the finding of contempt is neither arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, nor unsupported by sound legal principles. Any argument that Townsend's contemptuous behavior should be negated by Jones' failure to abide by an improperly obtained order is impertinent, at best. Accordingly, we hold that Townsend has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion when it entered its order of contempt.

For the foregoing reasons, the August 23, 2013, order of the Crittenden Circuit Court is affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.