SUSIE MORGAN, District Judge.
Before the Court are Plaintiff Christelle Nunnery's
On January 8, 2014, Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. Two months later, on March 7, 2014, Plaintiff applied for disabled widow's benefits, alleging a disability onset date of May 31, 2013. She alleged she was disabled based on her arthritis, back pain, obesity, Type II diabetes, and depression. Plaintiff was fifty years old when she claimed disability and fifty-one years old at the time of the final administrative decision. Plaintiff attended college for two years and has past work experience as a Licensed Practical Nurse ("LPN"), scheduler, private nurse, and sitter.
Defendant denied Plaintiff's application for disability benefits on May 28, 2014. Plaintiff then sought an administrative hearing, which Defendant conducted on January 12, 2015 before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). One month later, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not been disabled since May 31, 2013. While the ALJ's decision acknowledged Plaintiff is affected by back pain, obesity, diabetes, and degenerative joint disease of the right shoulder, the ALJ determined these conditions do not constitute an impairment or combination of impairments that meet or medically equal a listed impairment under the pertinent regulations. The ALJ found Plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light work activity as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.157(b) and can perform her past relevant work as an LPN, scheduler, and private nurse. Plaintiff then asked the Appeals Council ("AC") to review the ALJ's conclusion that she is not disabled. On July 18, 2016, the AC denied Plaintiff's request. Plaintiff then timely filed this civil action.
Plaintiff's appeal was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge. On appeal, Plaintiff raised three issues: (1) whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion that plaintiff's depression is not severe; (2) whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's credibility determination; and (3) whether the ALJ erred when she accorded great weight to the state-agency single decision maker ("SDM"). Both parties moved for summary judgment. After considering the law, record, and pleadings, the magistrate found each of the ALJ's determinations were supported by substantial evidence and recommended this Court grant Defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Appellate review of the Commissioner's denial of disability benefits is limited to determining whether "(1) the decision is supported by substantial evidence and (2) proper legal standards were used to evaluate the evidence."
To be considered disabled and eligible for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, an applicant must show she is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months."
Courts weigh four elements of proof to determine whether there is substantial evidence of disability: (1) objective medical facts; (2) diagnoses and opinions of treating and examining physicians; (3) claimant's subjective evidence of pain and disability; and (4) claimant's age, education, and work history.
After Defendant initially denied Plaintiff's applications on May 28, 2014, Plaintiff sought an administrative hearing before an ALJ. On February 12, 2015, the ALJ found (1) Plaintiff does not have an impairment or a combination of impairments that meets or medically equals a listed impairment under the regulations, (2) Plaintiff retains the RFC to perform light work activity as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), and (3) Plaintiff can perform her past relevant work as an LPN/Scheduler and a private nurse/sitter.
Upon review of the ALJ's determination, the magistrate concluded there is substantial objective medical evidence supporting the ALJ's findings in the form of exams with normal findings, physicians' opinions, and plaintiff's ability to work part time.
In determining whether Plaintiff has a severe mental impairment, the ALJ correctly analyzed Plaintiff's case using the framework detailed in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.150a(d)(1) and 416.920a(d)(1). Using this framework, the ALJ determined Plaintiff has no limitations in activities of daily living; no limitations is social functioning; mild limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace; and no episodes of decompensation.
The ALJ based her findings on hospital records, mental status examinations, consultative psychological examinations, and review by state agency medical consultants. For example, records from Ochsner Foundation Hospital from June 2010 through March 2012 show normal mental findings, including intact memory, a euthymic mood, goaldirected and logical thought processes, and no auditory hallucinations, compulsions, delusions, homicidal thoughts, illusions, obsessions, phobias, suicidal thoughts, violence, or visual hallucinations. Similarly, mental status examinations at Jefferson Parish Human Services Authority in June and July 2014 revealed Plaintiff has a euthymic mood, normal thought process, good intellect, good insight, good judgment, and intact memory, and Plaintiff reported that her mood was improved and that she slept well at night. A consultative psychological examination performed by Carlos Reinoso, Ph.D., in May 2014, revealed Plaintiff's mood and affect were appropriate with no signs of gross mood dysfunction; she had no impaired thought; no problems with attention, impulsivity, or hyperactivity; she maintained good eye contact; she established rapport easily; she put forth adequate effort and motivation; and she demonstrated normal concentration and adequate persistence and pace of response. Finally, Lester Barnett, Ph.D., a state agency medical consultant, also reviewed the available record in May 2014 and concluded that plaintiff does not have a severe mental impairment.
The Court finds the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards.
An SDM is a non-medical professional who assumes primary responsibility for processing a claimant's application for disability, including a claimant's initial disability determination.
In her evaluation of whether Plaintiff has the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b), the ALJ noted:
Plaintiff contends "[a]lthough the ALJ did not explicitly assign weight to the opinion of the SDM, stating that the SDM's opinion was `consistent with the medical evidence of record' shows that the ALJ improperly evaluated the SDM's RFC as evidence in the decisionmaking process."
It does not follow that a mere reference the SDM's opinion indicates the ALJ accorded the opinion "great weight." Plaintiff essentially asks the Court to reweigh the evidence, which this Court cannot do.
Accordingly;