TERRENCE G. BERG, District Judge.
This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Michigan prisoner Kevin Sears ("Petitioner") was convicted of conspiracy to commit first-degree premeditated murder, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.157a, 750.316(a), and solicitation of murder, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.157b(2), following a jury trial in the Macomb County Circuit Court. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment and 12 to 23 years imprisonment in 2014. In his pro se petition, he raises claims concerning the trial court's reference to jurors by their numbers instead of names and the trial court's exclusion of a witness's prior inconsistent statement. For the reasons set forth, the Court denies the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court also denies a certificate of appealability and denies Petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
Petitioner's convictions arise from his participation in a plot to kill his estranged wife before their divorce became final. The Court adopts the following summary of the trial testimony, provided by the prosecutor on direct appeal, to the extent that it is consistent with the record:
On April 9, 2011, Sears text-messaged Wilson-Strat: "We need to talk when you get here." (Tr. 12-5-13, 57). She replied: "Good or bad." (Tr. 12-5-13, 57). He responded: "Not good." (Tr. 12-5-13, 57). Wilson-Strat text-messaged: "What is it." (Tr. 12-5-13, 57). Sears answered: "You know what it is." (Tr. 12-5-13, 58). She text-messaged: Almost there, but I got it covered. I told you yesterday. You don't want me to tell you, though." (Tr. 12-5-13, 58). Wilson-Strat testified that she meant that she had found Sergeant Glass to kill Jessica. (Tr. 12-5-13, 58).
Pet. App. Brf., pp. 1-12.
Following his convictions and sentencing, Petitioner filed an appeal of right with the Michigan Court of Appeals raising several claims, including those raised in his habeas petition. The court denied relief on those claims and affirmed his convictions. People v. Sears, No. 320458, 2015 WL 3757613, *1-4. Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, which was denied in a standard order. People v. Sears, 499 Mich. 856, 873 N.W.2d 318 (2016). Petitioner subsequently challenged his judgment of sentence on state collateral review, but was denied relief. Those proceedings are not germane to this habeas action.
Petitioner thereafter filed his federal habeas petition. He raises the following claims:
I. The trial court violated his due process rights by empaneling a jury referred to only by juror numbers and by failing to give a proper cautionary instruction.
II. He was denied his constitutional right to present a defense, to confront witnesses against him, and to a fair trial when the trial court refused to allow impeachment of Mallorie Wilson-Strat with extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement that she made to Latoyia Brooks.
Respondent has filed an answer to the petition contending that it should be denied because the first claim is barred by procedural default and both claims lack merit.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq., sets forth the standard of review that federal courts must use when considering habeas petitions brought by prisoners challenging their state court convictions. The AEDPA provides in relevant part:
28 U.S.C. §2254(d) (1996).
"A state court's decision is `contrary to' . . . clearly established law if it `applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]' or if it `confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent.'" Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002).
"[T]he `unreasonable application' prong of § 2254(d)(1) permits a federal habeas court to `grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of petitioner's case." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413); see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. However, "[i]n order for a federal court to find a state court's application of [Supreme Court] precedent `unreasonable,' the state court's decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court's application must have been `objectively unreasonable.'" Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21 (citations omitted); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. "AEDPA thus imposes a `highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,' and `demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333, n. 7; Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)).
The United States Supreme Court has held that "a state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as `fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court has emphasized "that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). A habeas court "must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision" of the Supreme Court. Id. Thus, in order to obtain federal habeas relief, a state prisoner must show that the state court's rejection of a claim "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id.; see also White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419 (2014). Federal judges "are required to afford state courts due respect by overturning their decisions only when there could be no reasonable dispute that they were wrong." Woods v. Donald, 135 S.Ct. 1372, 1376 (2015). A habeas petitioner cannot prevail as long as it is within the "realm of possibility" that fairminded jurists could find the state court decision to be reasonable. Woods v. Etherton, 136 S.Ct. 1149, 1152 (2016).
Section 2254(d)(1) limits a federal court's review to a determination of whether the state court's decision comports with clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; see also Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009) (noting that the Supreme Court "has held on numerous occasions that it is not `an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law' for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by this Court") (quoting Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125-26 (2008) (per curiam)); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71-72. Section 2254(d) "does not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been `adjudicated on the merits.'" Harrington, 562 U.S. at 100. Furthermore, it "does not require citation of [Supreme Court] cases-indeed, it does not even require awareness of [Supreme Court] cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them." Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002); see also Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 16.
The requirements of "clearly established law" are to be determined solely by Supreme Court precedent. Thus, federal circuit or district court cases do not constitute clearly established Supreme Court law and cannot provide the basis for federal habeas relief. See Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 48 (2012) (per curiam); see also Lopez v. Smith, 135 S.Ct. 1, 2 (2014) (per curiam). The decisions of lower federal courts, however, may be useful in assessing the reasonableness of a state court's decision. Stewart v. Erwin, 503 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Williams v. Bowersox, 340 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir. 2003)); Dickens v. Jones, 203 F.Supp.2d 354, 359 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
Lastly, a state court's factual determinations are presumed correct on federal habeas review. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A petitioner may rebut this presumption with clear and convincing evidence. Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998). Moreover, habeas review is "limited to the record that was before the state court." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011).
Federal habeas relief may be precluded on a claim that a petitioner has not presented to the state courts in accordance with the state's procedural rules. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 85-87 (1977); Couch v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 94, 96 (6th Cir. 1991). The doctrine of procedural default applies when a petitioner fails to comply with a state procedural rule, the rule is actually relied upon by the state courts, and the procedural rule is "adequate and independent." White v. Mitchell, 431 F.3d 517, 524 (6th Cir. 2006); Howard v. Bouchard, 405 F.3d 459, 477 (6th Cir. 2005); Coleman v. Mitchell, 244 F.3d 533, 539 (6th Cir. 2001). "A procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on either direct or habeas review unless the last state court rendering a judgment in the case `clearly and expressly' states that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar." Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263-64 (1989). The last explained state court ruling is used to make this determination. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-05 (1991).
The Michigan Court of Appeals rendered the last reasoned opinion on this claim. In denying relief, the court relied upon a state procedural bar — Petitioner's failure to object at trial. Sears, 2015 WL 3757613 at *2. The failure to make a contemporaneous objection is a recognized and firmly-established independent and adequate state law ground for refusing to review trial errors. People v. Carines, 460 Mich. 750, 763, 597 N.W.2d 130, 138 (1999); People v. Stanaway, 446 Mich. 643, 687, 521 N.W.2d 557, 579 (1994); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750-51 (1991). Moreover, a state court does not waive a procedural default by looking beyond the default to determine if there are circumstances warranting review on the merits. Paprocki v. Foltz, 869 F.2d 281, 285 (6th Cir. 1989). Plain error review does not constitute a waiver of state procedural default rules. Girts v. Yanai, 501 F.3d 743, 755 (6th Cir. 2007); Hinkle v. Randle, 271 F.3d 239, 244 (6th Cir. 2001); Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 557 (6th Cir. 2000). Nor does a state court fail to sufficiently rely upon a procedural default by ruling on the merits in the alternative. McBee v. Abramajtys, 929 F.2d 264, 267 (6th Cir. 1991). The Michigan Court of Appeals denied relief on this claim based a procedural default — Petitioner's failure to object at trial.
A state prisoner who fails to comply with a state's procedural rules waives the right to federal habeas review absent a showing of cause for noncompliance and actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation, or a showing of a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753; Gravley v. Mills, 87 F.3d 779, 784-85 (6th Cir. 1996). To establish cause, a petitioner must establish that some external impediment frustrated the ability to comply with the state's procedural rule. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). A petitioner must present a substantial reason to excuse the default. Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 223 (1988). Such reasons include interference by officials, attorney error rising to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel, or a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493-94 (1991).
Petitioner neither alleges nor establishes cause to excuse this default. A federal habeas court need not address the issue of prejudice when a petitioner fails to establish cause to excuse a procedural default. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986); Long v. McKeen, 722 F.2d 286, 289 (6th Cir. 1983). Nonetheless, the Court notes that Petitioner cannot establish prejudice (or that he is otherwise entitled to habeas relief on the merits of this claim) because, as explained by the Michigan Court of Appeals in reviewing the claim for plain error, the claim also lacks merit. See Sears, 2015 WL 3757613 at *2.
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that the empaneling of an anonymous jury should be limited to circumstances in which the jury needs reasonable protections, and then only after taking care to minimize any prejudicial effect on the defendant, United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989, 1001 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing cases), neither due process nor the Sixth Amendment require that a juror's identity be disclosed. See United States v. Lawson, 535 F.3d 434, 440-41 (6th Cir. 2008) (rejecting the notion that the Constitution establishes a right to juror identification). The Supreme Court has never held that jurors must be referred to by their names, rather than by their juror numbers. See Cook v. Haas, No. 5:13-CV-12171, 2014 WL 256286, *3 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 2014) (citing Lawson, 535 F.3d at 440, and denying habeas relief on similar claim). Consequently, Petitioner cannot show that the state court's denial of relief is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. See Wright v. Van Patten, 552, U.S. 120, 126 (2008) ("Because our cases give no clear answer to the question presented . . ., it cannot be said that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law.") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Moreover, as explained by the Michigan Court of Appeals, the jurors were not anonymous to the parties. The parties had access to the juror questionnaires and had the opportunity to ask the jurors questions about their backgrounds, attitudes, and potential biases. The trial court's use of juror numbers did not render the jury `anonymous' nor otherwise preclude the parties from conducting an adequate jury voir dire.
Petitioner relatedly asserts that the trial court erred by failing to give a cautionary jury instruction that referring to the jurors by number was a uniform practice and not a reflection of his guilt or dangerousness. In order for habeas relief to be warranted on the basis of incorrect jury instructions, a petitioner must show more than that the instructions are undesirable, erroneous or universally condemned. Rather, taken as a whole, they must be so infirm that they rendered the entire trial fundamentally unfair. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991); Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977). A jury instruction is not to be judged in artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 391 (1999); Grant v. Rivers, 920 F.Supp. 769, 784 (E.D. Mich. 1996). The failure to give an instruction that is supported by the evidence does not automatically justify habeas relief — the failure to instruct must have rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973); Daniels v. Lafler, 501 F.3d 735, 741 (6th Cir. 2007). "An omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law." Henderson, 431 U.S. at 155. State law instructional errors rarely form the basis for federal habeas relief. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72.
There is no clearly established Supreme Court precedent requiring such a cautionary instruction — and the "decision to empanel an anonymous jury `is within the sound discretion of the trial court,'" Lawson, 535 F.3d at 439 (quoting United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989, 1001 (6th Cir. 1999)). There is no indication in the record that the jurors in this case would have believed that the trial court had prejudged the case or found Petitioner to be dangerous based upon the jury voir dire method. See, e.g., Johnson v. Smith, No. 15-CV-10574, 2017 WL 3007065, *12 (E.D. Mich. July 14, 2017) (denying habeas relief on similar claim). To be sure, the trial court instructed the jury that Petitioner was presumed innocent and that their decision should be based upon the evidence presented at trial. Jurors are presumed to follow the court's instructions. See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 799 (2001) (citing Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987)); United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 66 (1984) ("Jurors . . . take an oath to follow the law as charged, and they are expected to follow it."). The lack of a specific cautionary instruction on the court's jury voir dire method did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. Petitioner fails to establish a constitutional violation. This claim lacks merit.
Petitioner also fails to establish that a fundamental miscarriage of justice occurred. The miscarriage of justice exception requires a showing that a constitutional violation probably resulted in the conviction of someone who is actually innocent. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 326-27 (1995). "`[A]ctual innocence' means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency." Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 624 (1998). "To be credible, [a claim of actual innocence] requires a petitioner to support his [or her] allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was not presented at trial." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. Petitioner makes no such showing. This claim is thus barred by procedural default, otherwise lacks merit, and does not warrant habeas relief.
At trial, defendant's trial counsel questioned Wilson-Strat regarding Latoyia Brooks, who was a fellow inmate and food-service coworker of Wilson-Strat. Defendant asked Wilson-Strat if she had discussed the case with Brooks, and Wilson-Strat replied, "Not that I recall." Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel elicited testimony from Brooks that while in the prison shower together, Wilson-Strat told Brooks that she had tried to have her boyfriend's wife murdered. Brooks further testified that Wilson-Strat said she was going to testify against defendant because "she was trying to take him down with her because he didn't love her like she loved him." The trial court excluded Brooks' testimony from trial. On appeal, defendant asserts that the trial court should have permitted defendant to impeach Wilson-Strat with Brooks' testimony.
Sears, 2015 WL 3757613 at *3.
A federal court may only grant habeas relief to a person who is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Alleged trial court errors in the application of state evidentiary law are generally not cognizable as grounds for federal habeas relief. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) ("it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions"); Serra v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 4 F.3d 1348, 1354 (6th Cir. 1993). An error in state procedure or evidentiary law does not rise to the level of federal constitutional claims warranting habeas relief, "unless the error renders the proceeding so fundamentally unfair as to deprive the petitioner of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment." McAdoo v. Elo, 365 F.3d 487, 494 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Estelle, 502 U.S. at 69-70); see also Wynne v. Renico, 606 F.3d 867, 871 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Bey v. Bagley, 500 F.3d 514, 519-20 (6th Cir. 2007)); Bugh v. Mitchell, 329 F.3d 496, 512 (6th Cir. 2003).
The right of an accused to present a defense has long been recognized as a "fundamental element of due process." Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967); see also Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 329-31 (2006); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973). A defendant's right to present a defense is not unlimited, however, and may be subject to "reasonable restrictions." United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998). For example, a defendant "does not have an unfettered right to offer evidence that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence." Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42 (1996) (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988)); see also Holmes, 547 U.S. at 326 (recognizing that "well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury"). State rules excluding evidence from criminal trials "do not abridge an accused's right to present a defense so long as they are not `arbitrary' or `disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.'" Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308 (internal citations omitted). "A defendant's interest in presenting . . . evidence may thus bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process." Id. In such cases, the question is not whether the jury would reach a different result, but whether the defendant was afforded "a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense." Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)); see also Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.
The Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the right to confront the witnesses against him or her. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1973). "Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested. Subject always to the broad discretion of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation, the cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve into the witness's story to test the witness's perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit the witness." Id. at 314. The right of cross-examination, however, is not absolute. Trial judges "retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness's safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." Delaware v. VanArsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986); see also Jordan v. Warden, Lebanon Corr. Inst., 675 F.3d 586, 594 (6th Cir. 2012). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has explained:
United States v. Callahan, 801 F.3d 606, 624 (6th Cir. 2015). The Michigan Court of Appeals denied relief on this claim, explaining in relevant part:
Sears, 2015 WL 3757613 at *2-4.
The state court's denial of relief is neither contrary to Supreme Court precedent nor an unreasonable application of federal law or the facts. First, to the extent that Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony under Michigan law, he merely alleges a violation of state law which does not justify federal habeas relief. State courts are the final arbiters of state law and federal courts will not intervene in such matters. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); Oviedo v. Jago, 809 F.2d 326, 328 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005); Sanford v. Yukins, 288 F.3d 855, 860 (6th Cir. 2002). Habeas relief does not lie for perceived errors of state law. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68.
Second, with regard to federal law, the exclusion of the evidence did not render Petitioner's trial fundamentally unfair, impede his right to present a defense, nor violate his right to confront the witnesses against him. The trial court excluded the prior inconsistent statement testimony as hearsay and found that defense counsel failed to lay a proper foundation for its admission into evidence (as a prior inconsistent statement). This was a reasonable exercise of the state court's discretion in implementing the Michigan Rules of Evidence and did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. Moreover, while the trial court's evidentiary ruling foreclosed one avenue for impeachment of Wilson-Strat, Petitioner nevertheless mounted a meaningful defense and effectively confronted Wilson-Strat at trial. The record reflects that defense counsel challenged WilsonStrat's version of events and her credibility during an extensive cross-examination, see 12/5/13 Trial Tr., pp. 74-167, 12/12/13 Trial Tr. pp. 88-154, presented several defense witnesses, see 12/6/13 Trial Tr., pp. 177-240, 12/12/13 Trial Tr., pp. 22-87, and argued during closing arguments that Wilson-Strat was not worthy of belief and that Petitioner was innocent of the charges. See 12/13/13 Trial Tr., pp. 41, 53-58. Petitioner fails to establish a violation of his constitutional rights.
Lastly, even if the trial court erred in some fashion, such error was harmless. For purposes of federal habeas review, a constitutional error that implicates trial procedures is considered harmless if it did not have a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 117-118 (2007) (confirming that the Brecht standard applies in "virtually all" habeas cases); Ruelas v. Wolfenbarger, 580 F.3d 403, 411 (6th Cir. 2009) (ruling that Brecht is "always the test" in the Sixth Circuit). In this case, Wilson-Strat's testimony, the text messages between the parties, the evidence confirming the break-in at the Sears' home while Jessica was present, and Sergeant Glass's testimony provided significant evidence of Petitioner's guilt. The trial court's ruling did not have a substantial or injurious effect on the jury's verdict. Habeas relief is not warranted on this claim.
For the reasons stated, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claims. Accordingly, the Court
Before Petitioner may appeal the Court's decision, a certificate of appealability must issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(a); FED. R. APP. P. 22(b). A certificate of appealability may issue only if the petitioner makes "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a federal court denies relief on the merits, the substantial showing threshold is met if the petitioner demonstrates that reasonable jurists would find the court's assessment of the constitutional claim debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000). "A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). When a court denies relief on procedural grounds without addressing the merits, a certificate of appealability should issue if it is shown that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petitioner states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right, and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the court was correct in its procedural ruling. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85. Petitioner makes no such showing. Accordingly, the Court
Lastly, the Court
