INDIRA TALWANI, District Judge.
A teacher employed by the Town of Stoughton ("the Town") allegedly sexually assaulted Jane Doe for several years while she was a high school student. Doe brings federal and state law claims against the Town and two school administrators for violating Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and various state laws. Defendants'
The plaintiff, Jane Doe, attended Stoughton High School at the time of the events in question. First Am. Compl. ("Compl.")¶¶ 11, 14, 17-18 [#18]. Defendant Juliette Miller was, at the relevant times, the principal of Stoughton High School.
Doe became involved in the Destination Imagination extracurricular program at Stoughton High School during the 2013-14 school year, when she was a sophomore.
In the fall of 2015, another student informed his teacher that he had observed Norton providing Doe with special treatment.
In September 2017, Doe and Norton ended their relationship and Doe disclosed their relationship to another teacher.
This action followed.
In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must "examine whether the operative complaint states a claim for which relief can be granted, construing the well-pleaded facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting their truth and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor."
As to a number of the issues raised by Defendants, there is now no disagreement between the parties.
First, Defendants challenge Plaintiff's allegation that some or all Defendants are liable for violating various Massachusetts statutes, including the mandatory reporter statute, M.G.L. ch. 119, § 51A, the anti-bullying statute, M.G.L. ch. 71, § 37O, and the statute requiring schools to notify personnel of mandatory reporting obligations, M.G.L. ch. 71, § 37L. Defendants contend that these Massachusetts statutes do not provide for a private right of action.
Next, Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against Rizzi and the Town under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act ("MCRA"), M.G.L. ch. 12 §§ 11H-11I. Def. Mem. 16-18 [#22]. Plaintiff agrees that the complaint does not state a MCRA claim against Rizzi. Opp'n 9 [#27]. And, Plaintiff does not oppose Defendants' argument that the MCRA claim against the Town fails because the MCRA applies only to persons. Defendants' motion to dismiss is therefore ALLOWED as unopposed as to the MCRA claims against Rizzi and the Town.
Third, Defendants challenge the claims that Miller and Rizzi violated the Massachusetts Fair Educational Practices statute, M.G.L. ch. 151C, and that Miller violated Title IX, on the ground that neither chapter 151C nor Title IX provides for a cause of action against individuals.
Finally, Defendants challenged Plaintiff's chapter 151C claim against the Town on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to file a charge of discrimination with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination before filing this action. The statutory framework governing chapter 151C's administrative exhaustion requirement is, as this court has observed, "somewhat tangled."
In light of the foregoing, no claims remain against Defendant Rizzi. The court turns now to the remaining claims against Defendants Miller and the Town.
To succeed on her Title IX claim against the Town, Plaintiff must show that she "was a student, who was subjected to harassment based upon sex . . . [that] was sufficiently severe and pervasive to create an abusive educational environment."
"The actual knowledge requirement imposes a higher standard for Title IX claims than for claims arising under § 1983, where deliberate indifference can follow actual or constructive knowledge."
The complaint in this case alleges that "a classmate of Ms. Doe informed his teacher of his observations of Norton providing Doe with special treatment. The student, along with the teacher, reported that they had observed Ms. Doe parking her vehicle at the nearby school and subsequently getting into Norton's vehicle." Compl. ¶ 21. Plaintiff argues that Miller had actual knowledge of Norton spending excessive time with Doe, giving her special treatment, and leaving school property with Doe in his vehicle. Opp'n 8 [#27]. In Plaintiff's view, "[s]uch conduct between an older male teacher and a minor female student objectively reveals the strong and presumptive likelihood of illegal sexual misconduct, abuse and harassment."
Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Title IX claim against the Town is ALLOWED.
Defendants do not challenge Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against the Town on this motion to dismiss, but do seek dismissal of the § 1983 claim as to Miller.
A supervisor can be liable for a subordinate's actions under § 1983 "if the subordinate's behavior led to a constitutional violation and if `the supervisor's action or inaction was affirmatively linked to that behavior in the sense that it could be characterized as supervisory encouragement, condonation or acquiescence or gross negligence amounting to deliberate indifference.'"
As discussed above, Plaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to charge Miller with actual knowledge of the sexual harassment. She has alleged (albeit in a somewhat conclusory fashion), that from these facts, "Miller should have considered and did consider the information she received to be a credible basis for suspected sexual abuse." Compl. ¶ 21. Although a close call, in light of the allegations of the report to Miller of time spent by Norton and Doe outside of school without others present, that Doe was observed by one or more school employees on multiple occasions alone late at night in a back room with Norton, and that multiple teachers and administrators knew that Norton was providing Doe with passes to spend significant time in his class room, a reasonable jury could conclude that Miller was on constructive notice of a grave risk of harm posed by Norton to Doe.
Defendant further emphasizes that, in any case, after receiving this information Miller did address the risk by conducting an investigation and interviewing both Norton and Plaintiff, both of whom denied having an improper relationship. Def. Mem. 19 [#22].
Plaintiff responds that Miller displayed deliberate indifference because she pursued her investigation with "superficial effort, at best, to get at the truth." Opp'n 10 [#27].
The facts pled in the complaint, construed in the light most favorable to Doe, could give rise to an inference that, having constructive knowledge of a grave risk of harm, Miller failed to take sufficient, easily available measures to address the risk. Defendants' motion to dismiss the section 1983 claim against Miller is therefore DENIED.
Together, sections 11H and 11I of the MCRA provide a private right of action for "[a]ny person whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights secured by the constitution or laws of the commonwealth, has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with," M.G.L. ch. 12 § 11H, "by threats, intimidation or coercion,"
In the context of interfering with a person's rights under the MCRA, a threat "involves the intentional exertion of pressure to make another fearful or apprehensive of injury or harm."
Plaintiff responds that the complaint sufficiently alleges that Miller's investigation involved intimidation and coercion because "the manner in which the so-called investigation was conducted by Miller put [Doe] in fear of telling the truth." Opp. at 10. But, on a motion to dismiss, the court must first distinguish the complaint's factual allegations (which must be accepted as true) from its conclusory legal allegations (which need not be credited).
Instead, the Complaint alleges only that Miller questioned Doe, a minor, without notifying her parent or guardian, that Miller "did not ask Ms. Doe to retrieve her cell phone and never did anything to review the cell phone's content" despite "having credible information that the cell phone was involved in communications between Norton and Ms. Doe," and that Miller "did not ask Ms. Doe if she had been threatened in anyway by Norton" or "assure Ms. Doe that she would not be in trouble with the Town if she revealed she was a victim of sexual abuse." Compl. ¶¶ 22, 24. At most, these allegations suggest that alternative ways to conduct the interview may have elicited more information. They do not support the claim that Miller engaged in "threats, intimidation or coercion" for the purpose of interfering with Doe's civil rights.
In the absence of such factual allegations, Defendants' motion to dismiss the MCRA claim against Miller is ALLOWED.
The Massachusetts Torts Claims Act ("MTCA"), M.G.L. ch. 258, provides for liability of public employers for injuries caused by the negligent acts or omissions of public employees while acting within the scope of official employment. Plaintiff claims that the Town is liable for the negligent acts of employees other than Norton.
Section 10(j) of the MTCA protects a municipality from liability "based on an act or failure to act to prevent or diminish the harmful consequences of a condition or situation, including the violent or tortious conduct of a third person, which is not originally caused by the public employer or any other person acting on behalf of the public employer." M.G.L. ch. 258, § 10(j). The provision establishes "a distinction between the failure to alleviate or respond to a private harm," which is not actionable, "and the action of a public employee in initially creating the injury-causing circumstance," which is actionable.
However, if a municipal employee negligently hired a perpetrator, the municipality "may have `originally caused' the situation and, therefore, it would not be immune from suit pursuant to section 10(j)."
Defendants contend that, to the extent that Plaintiff's MTCA claim is based on alleged negligent training and supervision, the claim must be dismissed because there is no actionable underlying tortious conduct.
However, even where a statute does not provide for a private right of action, where "the interest protected is physical or emotional harm, courts may consider the legislative purpose and the values reflected in the statute to decide that the purpose and values justify adopting a duty that the common law had not previously recognized." Restatement (Third) of Torts ch. 7 § 38(c). As such, to the extent that Town employees violated the mandatory reporting laws or other school safety statutes, those violations may establish liability under the MTCA.
Moreover, Plaintiff's complaint, identifies a number of affirmative acts aside from negligent hiring, training, and supervision, which may have caused injury or placed Plaintiff in a worse position. For example, Plaintiff points to "[t]he establishment of a system which allowed Norton to remove Ms. Doe from the classes she should have been attending," "[t]he provision of afterhours facilities with a secluded room to Norton which facilitated his abuse of Ms. Doe," and the conduct of an inadequate investigation into credible allegations of Norton's misconduct. Opp'n 4-5 [#27].
The court need go no further, as such allegations are sufficient, at this stage, to state a claim under the MTCA. Defendant's motion to dismiss Count I is therefore DENIED.
In light of the foregoing, Defendants'
IT IS SO ORDERED.