ORDER

HENRY T. WINGATE, District Judge.

The Court has before it a Motion to Dismiss [docket no. 14] filed by the Defendants The Vick Group, d/b/a/ 1311 Bar and Grill and Alexander Vickers. The Plaintiff, Seth Thomson, filed this suit against the Defendants for violation of the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq.,1 and for quantum meruit and other state law relief.

The Complaint [docket no.1] in this action was filed by the Plaintiff, Seth Thomson, on June 10, 2014. Plaintiff invokes the federal question jurisdiction of this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331.2 Plaintiff also asserts a quantum meruit claim3 under state law. The Defendant does not specify the procedural standard under which this motion to dismiss is brought [docket no. 14], so this Court will construe the motion as one brought under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6),4 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that the defendants recruited him to come to Vicksburg, Mississippi, to help turn business around for the 1311 Bar & Grill. Plaintiff says he agreed to postpone taking a salary, but claims he was promised by Alexander Vickers that once Vickers received some funds he was expecting from settlement of a lawsuit, Plaintiff's pay would be made retroactive to his beginning work date. Thomson also states he was promised 20% ownership of the business.

Plaintiff moved from Florida and began working in Vicksburg, Mississippi, on July 15, 2013. Plaintiff claims he worked ninety (90) hours per week for twenty weeks without any compensations and finally stopped working on December 1, 2013. Plaintiff is seeking back pay plus an equal amount in liquidated damages; prejudgment interest; costs and reasonable legal fees. He seeks quantum meruit pay for the value of his services. The Defendants, The Vick Group, Inc., doing business as 1311 Bar and Grill and Alexander Vickers, filed their response in opposition and a Counterclaim against the Plaintiff.

FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

In enacting the Fair Labor Standards Act, Congress acknowledged that labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary to the well-being of workers burdens the free flow of interstate commerce. 29 U.S.C.A. § 202.5 Among the provisions of FLSA are laws governing the minimum wage,6 and overtime compensation laws.7 The Act is administered by the Wage and Hour Division of the United States Department of Labor.8

The Plaintiff argues that he was an `employee' as defined by the FLSA. Title 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(e)(1) defines employee, with the exception of certain public employment and agricultural work, as any individual employed by an employer.9 The Complaint states that The Vick Group, Inc. is an employer as defined by the FLSA and that Alexander Vickers, as an officer, director and/or manager of the Vick Group, Inc. is an employer under FLSA. Employer is defined in 29 U.S.C.A.S. § 203(d) as any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee, with the exception of labor organizations.10

STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR A 12(B)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS

For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true all of the well-pled allegations contained in the complaint and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir.1996)(citing McCartney v. First City Bank, 970 F.2d 45, 47 (5th Cir. 1992)). Only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief will survive a motion to dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). See also, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

ANALYSIS

Defendant Alexander Vick

Defendant Alexander Vick argues that he is not a proper defendant here since he is only a shareholder of the 1311 Bar and Grill and not personally liable for the acts or debts of 1311 Bar and Grill. Vick asserts that he was not Plaintiff's employer, but that Plaintiff is employed by 1311 Bar and Grill.

Plaintiff, however, does not allege that Vickers is liable because he is a shareholder of the company. Thomson alleges that Defendant Alexander Vickers, as an officer, director and manager, was personally involved in the management of the Bar and Grill and in supervising Thomson's activities. In Reich v. Circle Investments, Inc. 998 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1993), the Secretary of Labor sought to enjoin Circle C Investments Inc. and an individual "consultant" from violating minimum wage, overtime and other provisions of the FLSA relative to topless dancers, bartenders, waitresses and others who worked in their nightclubs. In that case the Fifth Circuit stated "[t]he FLSA's definition of employer must be liberally construed to effectuate Congress' remedial intent. Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation, 695 F.2d 190, 194 (5th Cir. 1983) (where a corporate officer has been found to have acted" directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee", 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(d), he may be enjoined along with the corporate employer) (citing Donovan v. Hamm's Drive Inn, 661 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1981).

The Court went on to say that the FLSA's definition of employer is broad enough to include a non-owner of the corporation who effectively dominates its administration or otherwise acts, or has the power to act, on behalf of the corporation regarding its employees. Sabine Irrigation, at 194-95; see also Donovan v. Grim Hotel Co., 747 F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir. 1984) (observing that an individual qualifies as an employer if he "independently exercised control over the work situation") cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1124 (1985). In Reich, the Court stated, "[b]ased upon our review of the record, we cannot say that the district court committed error in its determination that Charles Cranford was an employer within the meaning of the FLSA. Reich at 329. This Court, too, cannot say at this point, as a matter of law, that Alexander Vick was not an employer within the meaning of the FLSA.

The Vick Group d/b/a/ 1311 Bar & Grill

The Vick Group, Inc., argues that this case should be dismissed against it for failure to state a claim under FLSA. They argue that the Vick Group is not an enterprise engaged in commerce under 29 U.S.C.A. §203(s)(1)(A)(ii)11 because its annual sales volume did not exceed $500,000.

According to Plaintiff, his claim is not contingent on his employer qualifying as an employer engaged in an enterprise in commerce. Employment may be covered under the Act pursuant to either "individual" or "enterprise" coverage. Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 n.8 (1985). Prior to the introduction of enterprise coverage in 1961, the only individuals covered under the Act were those engaged directly in interstate commerce, or in the production of goods for interstate commerce. The addition of the covered enterprise provision does not narrow the scope of employees who are covered by the FLSA; rather it substantially broadens the scope of the Act to include any employee of an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce, as defined by the Act.

Plaintiff claims he has alleged sufficient facts to show that as manager of the bar, he engages in qualifying activities, such as processing out of state credit card transactions, ordering food and spirits that are manufactured outside the state, speaking by telephone with the out-of-state owner, and other activities. Plaintiff, Seth Thomson concludes that he is an employee covered by the FLSA because he is engaged in interstate commerce or the production of goods for interstate commerce.

CONCLUSION

The Court finds by the foregoing observations that the Plaintiff's Complaint states a claim for relief and, thus, this court must deny Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [docket no.14]. The parties are directed to contact the assigned Magistrate Judge for a schedule of future proceedings.

SO ORDERED.