ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, District Judge.
Before the Court is Plaintiff Selina Goodwin ("Plaintiff")'s appeal seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Defendant Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying disability benefits. The decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
The Court's review of the Commissioner's decision to deny disability benefits is limited to determining if the decision "complies with the relevant legal requirements and is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole." Halverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 922, 929 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ford v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 2008)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance of the evidence, but is `such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would find adequate to support the [Commissioner's] conclusion.'" Grable v. Colvin, 770 F.3d 1196, 1201 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Davis v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 962, 966 (8th Cir. 2001)). In determining whether existing evidence is substantial, the Court takes into account evidence that both supports and detracts from the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") findings. Cline v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted). "If the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence, [the Court] may not reverse even if substantial evidence would support the opposite outcome or [the Court] would have decided differently." Smith v. Colvin, 756 F.3d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Davis, 239 F.3d at 966). The Court does not re-weigh the evidence presented to the ALJ. Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Baldwin v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 549, 555 (8th Cir. 2003)). The Court should "defer heavily to the findings and conclusions of the [Commissioner]." Hurd v. Astrue, 621 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
By way of overview, the ALJ determined the Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: diabetes mellitus type II; major depressive disorder, in remission; a history of conversion disorder with pseudo-seizures; and an anxiety disorder variously described as panic disorder with agoraphobia and post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"). However, the ALJ found that none of Plaintiff's impairments, whether considered alone or in combination, met or medically equaled the criteria of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Pt. 404. Subpt. P, App. 1 ("Listing"). The ALJ also determined that Plaintiff's mental impairments did not cause at least two marked limitations or one marked limitation and repeated episodes of decompensation, and therefore held the Paragraph B criteria were not satisfied. The ALJ determined the Paragraph C criteria were not satisfied. The ALJ found that despite Plaintiff's impairments, Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) with several limitations. Although the ALJ found Plaintiff unable to perform any past relevant work, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. Therefore, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Act from April 5, 2013, through the date of the ALJ's decision.
On appeal, Plaintiff alleges errors related to: (1) whether the ALJ erred in rejecting the marked mental limitations of Dr. Ahmed, in assessing Plaintiff's RFC;
Having carefully reviewed the record before the Court and the parties' submissions on appeal, the Court concludes that substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports the ALJ's decision.
IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is