NOELLE C. COLLINS, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the court on Petitioner's Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Doc. 4). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (Doc. 12). After reviewing the case, the Court has determined that Petitioner is not entitled to relief. As a result, the Court will
In January 2007, Petitioner was charged with one count of first-degree murder for the murder of Ricky Haynes ("Haynes") and two counts of Class C felony stealing for taking two cars belonging to Haynes in St. Francois Circuit Court (Doc. 10-2 at 36-37). On September 21, 2007, the State filed a notice of aggravating factors in support of the death penalty (Id. at 9). On December 7, 2011, Petitioner pleaded guilty to first-degree murder pursuant to a plea agreement with the State (Id. at 29; Doc. 10-1 at 2). At the plea hearing, when asked how many times Petitioner had discussed his case with plea counsel, Petitioner agreed it was well over 40 times and further stated that counsel had spent close to 100 hours with him (Doc. 10-1 at 2). Petitioner also testified that he was satisfied with counsel's assistance, felt he had sufficient time to consult with counsel before pleading guilty, and felt he had been fully informed of all charges and defenses available to him (Id. at 2-3). Petitioner stated he had not been threatened or coerced into pleading guilty and acknowledged the rights he was waiving by doing so (Id. at 3). In exchange for Petitioner's guilty plea, the State withdrew its notice of intent to seek the death penalty and dismissed the two counts of stealing (Id. at 2-3). The Circuit Court accepted Petitioner's plea and sentenced him to life without parole in the Missouri Department of Corrections (Id. 6, 39-40).
On March 1, 2012, Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction relief (Id. at 33, 48-52). On December 4, 2012, with the assistance of counsel, Petitioner filed an amended motion (Id. at 34, 58-74). Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the motion court denied Petitioner's motion on January 8, 2013 (Id. at 34, 75-77). On February 10, 2013, Petitioner appealed the motion court's decision, raising the following ground for relief: the motion court clearly erred in denying Petitioner's post-conviction relief motion in that counsel was ineffective because there was not pretrial determination of whether Petitioner is mentally retarded,
On appeal, Petitioner asserted that, if afforded a hearing, he would provide medical records that establish Petitioner's mental retardation and that he is, therefore, ineligible for the death penalty under state statute. Specifically, before the post-conviction appellate court, Petitioner outlined his medical and school history as follows:
On March 11, 2014, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District affirmed the Circuit Court's denial of the motion (Doc. 10-5). In affirming the motion court's denial, the post-conviction appellate court did not review whether Petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing because the issue was not contained within his Point Relied On as required by Missouri Supreme Court Rule 84.04(d)
On November 20, 2014, Petitioner filed the current Section 2254 Petition in which he raises the following ground for relief: Plea Counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain a pretrial determination of his mental retardation which, if decided in the affirmative, would render him ineligible for the death penalty (Doc. 1 at 3). Petitioner asserts that as a result of this allegedly deficient performance by counsel, his guilty plea is invalid (Id. at 6).
"In the habeas setting, a federal court is bound by the AEDPA to exercise only limited and deferential review of underlying state court decisions." Lomholt v. Iowa, 327 F.3d 748, 751 (8th Cir. 2003). Under this standard, a federal court may not grant relief to a state prisoner unless the state court's adjudication of a claim "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A state court decision is contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent if "the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the] Court on a question of law or. . . decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). A state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law if it "correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case." Id. at 407-08. Finally, a state court decision involves an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings only if it is shown that the state court's presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy support in the record. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Ryan v. Clarke, 387 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2004).
In order to state a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Petitioner must demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by that performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Deficient representation means counsel's conduct fell below the conduct of a reasonably competent attorney. Id. In the context of a guilty plea, a petitioner demonstrates ineffective assistance of counsel if, first, counsel's performance was deficient under the Strickland standard and, second, a "reasonable probability" exists that but for counsel's errors petitioner would not have pleaded guilty and would have gone to trial. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 140-41 (2012) (discussing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-59 (1985)). Federal habeas review of a Strickland claim is highly deferential, because "[t]he question is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination under the Strickland standard was incorrect but whether the determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The Missouri courts reasonably applied Strickland. As the state courts indicated, plea counsel acted reasonably in not requesting a pretrial determination of mental retardation. Although the Court is concerned that an evidentiary hearing was not held before the motion court, the record reflects that counsel thoroughly investigated the issue of Petitioner's mental status. See Vogt v. United States, 88 F.3d 587, 592 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding petitioner's trial attorneys acted reasonably in not requesting a competency hearing in part because counsel conducted a reasonable investigation of petitioner's mental condition). Further, Petitioner may not have met the definition of mental retardation under Missouri law. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.030. The relevant portions of Missouri Revised Statute 565.030 at the time of Petitioner's plea and sentencing read:
However, a defense expert found Petitioner's full scale IQ to be a 72. See cf. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 309 (2002) (Atkins had a full scale IQ of 59). Further, while a person with an I.Q. between 70 and 75 may be diagnosed as mentally retarded and defense experts reported some cognitive deficits, the reports were inconclusive as to whether these deficits were "significant" in nature. State v. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d 144, 153 (Mo. banc 2008). Therefore, it is a reasonable trial strategy not to move for a pretrial determination of mental retardation considering the risk that the trial court may deny the motion, and to advise Petitioner to accept a plea deal which eliminated the possibility of a death sentence. "The court does not `second-guess' trial strategy or rely on the benefit of hindsight and the attorney's conduct must fall below an objective standard of reasonableness to be found ineffective." Williams v. United States, 452 F.3d 1009, 1013 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal citation omitted).
Regardless, as the state courts noted, Petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel's alleged error. Under Missouri law, charges of first degree murder are punishable "either by death or imprisonment for life without eligibility for probation or parole." Mo. Rev. Stat. 565.020. Therefore, even if plea counsel had moved for a pretrial determination of Petitioner's mental retardation and the trial court had granted the motion, Petition still faced a sentence of life without the eligibility of parole. Considering the substantial risk that the trial court would not have found Petitioner to be mentally retarded under the statute as well as the considerable risk that a jury could find him guilty and sentence him to death, the Court finds that Petitioner cannot show that plea counsel's alleged error prejudiced him.
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief. Furthermore, Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, which requires a demonstration "that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right." Khaimov v. Crist, 297 F.3d 783, 785 (8th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). Thus, the court will not issue a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).
Accordingly,
