RICHARD D. BENNETT, District Judge.
Pending is Brian K. Tidmore's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his 2014 judgment of conviction by way of a not guilty plea on an agreed statement of facts pursuant to which he was convicted in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County, Maryland. Specifically, he was found guilty of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute as a volume dealer, possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, and possession of cocaine. Respondents filed an Answer (ECF 5), to which Tidmore filed a Reply. (ECF 6).
The case is briefed and ready for disposition. After considering the pleadings, exhibits, and applicable law, this Court finds a hearing unnecessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2016); Rule 8, Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings in the United States District Courts; see also Fisher v. Lee, 215 F.3d 438, 455 (4th Cir. 2000) (petitioner is not entitled to a hearing under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)). The Court will DENY AND DISMISS the Petition with prejudice.
Tidmore presents interrelated and overlapping claims for relief which can be summarized as follows: (1) the trial court erred in failing to dismiss his charges due to a violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD); (2) the trial court erred by failing to dismiss his charges due to a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial; and (3) the warden of the prison in Georgia where he was incarcerated violated his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights by failing to have his IAD paperwork delivered to the Circuit Court for Wicomico County. (ECF 1 at 7, 9-11).
On March 2, 2007, Tidmore was the sole occupant of a vehicle that was stopped for a traffic violation in Salisbury, Maryland. A K-9 dog assisted in detecting a bag in the car that contained approximately 500 grams of cocaine. See Agreed Statement of Facts, Trans. (ECF 5-6 at 47, 51) On March 26, 2007, a Wicomico County grand jury returned an indictment charging Tidmore with volume possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of cocaine. (ECF 1 at 5-1 at 8).
Tidmore's trial was scheduled to begin on July 10, 2007. When Tidmore failed to appear, the trial date was continued to August 24, 2007. Tidmore again failed to appear. (ECF 1 at 5-1 at 9-10; ECF 5-2, 5-3).
Tidmore absconded to Georgia where he was arrested, convicted on narcotics charges unrelated to the ones he was facing in Maryland, and sentenced to ten years of incarceration by a Georgia state court. He was released on parole in May of 2014. (ECF 5-9 at 2-3).
On July 1, 2010, Tidmore's attorney filed a Motion for a Speedy Trial in his Maryland case. ECF 1 at 5-1 at 10; ECF 5-5 at 23. Shortly after, the State's Attorney's Office for Wicomico County lodged a detainer against Tidmore in Georgia.
On September 14, 2010, Tidmore signed a waiver of extradition and forms requesting to stand trial in Maryland. The forms were sent to the Wicomico County Sheriff's Department and the District of Attorney of Wicomico County. (ECF 5-6 at 9-16).
Tidmore was released on parole from his Georgia conviction on May 7, 2014. (ECF 5-6 at 8). He was transported to Maryland on May 11, 2014. Id.
Upon his return to Maryland, Tidmore moved to dismiss the indictments, asserting violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers ("IAD") and his right to a speedy trial. (ECF 5-5, 5-6). Tidmore testified at the two-day motions hearing conducted on August 1 and 4, 2014, that once he learned of the Maryland detainer, he informed his Georgia case manager of his desire to return to Maryland to stand trial. Tidmore testified he signed the relevant forms in Georgia on September 14, 2010, and was given documentation about three days later showing that the warden sent the forms to the Wicomico County Sheriff's Office and the county "District Attorney" in Wicomico County. (ECF 5-6 at 9-16). Tidmore's testimony was supported by a letter from the warden at the Georgia prison as well as a U.S. Postal Service "green card" that confirmed the mailing. (ECF 5-6 at 27). Tidmore could not remember whether the paperwork was sent to the Circuit Court for Wicomico County. Id. Tidmore testified that he inquired "constantly" about returning to Maryland, and his Georgia case workers called "Wicomico County" on "multiple occasions." Id. at 18.
At the end of the hearing, the trial court denied Tidmore's Motion to Dismiss, finding he had not complied with the notice requirements of Md. Correctional Services Art. 8-405(b). The trial judge stated:
(ECF 5-6 at 36) (emphasis added).
On August 4, 2014, Tidmore pleaded not guilty to an agreed statement of facts after which the Court found him guilty and sentenced him to 20 years of incarceration with all but seven years suspended. The sentence includes a mandatory minimum of five years. (ECF 5-6 at 58; ECF 1 at 1.).
Tidmore raised two questions on direct appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland:
(ECF 5-9).
On August 11, 2015, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed Tidmore's convictions in an unreported opinion. Tidmore v. Maryland, CSA No. 1451, September Term; see also ECF 5-9. Tidmore filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in the Court of Appeals of Maryland requesting further review which the Court of Appeals of Maryland denied on October 19, 2015. (ECF 5-10 at 30).
On December 23, 2015, Tidmore filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (ECF 1 at 5; ECF 5-1 at 14). On July 29, 2016, Tidmore was granted post-conviction relief in the form of permission to file a Belated Motion for Modification of Sentence. (ECF 5-1 at 15). All other claims in Tidmore's Post-Conviction Petition were withdrawn with prejudice. Id. Tidmore filed a Motion for Modification in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County on October 3, 2016, which that Court denied on July 25, 2017. See http://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/casesearch/inquiry (last viewed March 27, 2018).
The federal habeas statute at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 states that a district court "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
The statute sets forth a "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings." Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n. 7 (1997); see also Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 853 (2005). This standard is "difficult to meet," and requires federal courts to give state-court decisions the benefit of the doubt. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A state prisoner must show that a state court ruling on a claim presented in federal court was "so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).
A federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus unless the state's adjudication on the merits: (1) "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or (2) "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A state adjudication is "contrary to" clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1) where the state court "arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law" or "confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to [the Supreme Court]." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). Under the "unreasonable application analysis," a "state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as `fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). In other words, "a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because [it] concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010).
Under section 2254(d)(2), "a state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance." Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). "[E]ven if reasonable minds reviewing the record might disagree about the finding in question," a federal court may not conclude that the state court decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Id.
Further, "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct[,]" and the petitioner bears "the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Nicolas v. Attorney Gen. of Md., 820 F.3d 124, 129 (4th Cir. 2016). "Where the state court conducted an evidentiary hearing and explained its reasoning with some care, it should be particularly difficult to establish clear and convincing evidence of error on the state court's part." Sharpe v. Bell, 593 F.3d 372, 378 (4th Cir. 2010). This is especially true where the state court has "resolved issues like witness credibility, which are `factual determinations' for purposes of Section 2254(e)(1)." Id.
When undertaking an evaluation of §§ 2254(d)(1) and (2), where the Court of Appeals of Maryland has summarily denied a request for further review of the Court of Special Appeals' determination, a federal habeas court must "look through" the summary decision to the last reasoned decision. Brumfield v. Cain, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2269, 2276 (2015) (citations omitted). The last reasoned opinion on the claims Tidmore presents here was issued by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland on direct review.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial." U.S. Const. amend. VI. This guarantee is applied to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1967). To prove a Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial violation, a petitioner "must show first that the Amendment's protections have been triggered by arrest, indictment, or other official accusation." United States v. Woolfolk, 399 F.3d 590, 597 (4th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). If Sixth Amendment protections are triggered, a court must consider whether dismissal is warranted based on the totality of the circumstances, paying particular attention to the four factors identified by the Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). Those factors are: "Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." Id. at 530; accord Woolfolk, 399 F.3d at 597.
The first inquiry is also a threshold requirement, because "[s]imply to trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from presumptively prejudicial delay." Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-652 (1992). After a defendant meets this threshold requirement, he "must . . . show on balance," that the four inquiries weigh in his favor. Woolfolk, 399 F.3d 597, quoting United States v. Thomas, 55 F.3d 144, 148 (1995). Ultimately, none of the four factors is "either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant." Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. In undertaking this analysis, this Court is mindful "that the accused's interest in a speedy trial is specifically affirmed in the Constitution." Id.
Tidmore's claim that he is entitled to federal habeas relief because his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was denied and rejected by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in an opinion that states in relevant part:
(ECF 5-9 at 12-15) (bracketed alterations added).
The Court of Special Appeals' opinion next outlined the chronology of events between Tidmore's arrest and conviction in Maryland.
(ECF 5-9 at 15-16).
The Court of Special Appeals continued its analysis by examining the reasons for the delays, noting that Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, instructs:
(ECF 5-9 at 16).
Against this background, the Court of Special Appeals determined the period from March 2, to the initial trial date on July 10, 2007, as "neutral," because Maryland law permits reasonable time for normal trial preparation and the time spent in pre-trial preparation is neutral and not charged to either the State or the defendant. (ECF 5-9 at 16-17). Turning to the next time periods, the Court of Special Appeals opinion states:
Next, the Court of Special Appeals considered the third Barker factor, assertion of the right to a Speedy Trial, stating:
(ECF 5-9 at 18-19).
Lastly, the Court of Special Appeals addressed the fourth Barker factor: whether there was prejudice as a result of the delay.
(ECF 5-9 at 17-22).
Barker holds that prejudice should be weighed with respect to the three interests that the right to a speedy trial was designed to preserve: preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; minimizing the anxiety and concern of the accused; and limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 (footnote omitted). Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability to adequately mount a defense skews the fairness of the entire system. If witnesses die or become unavailable due to a delay, the prejudice is obvious. Id. With this in mind, the Court of Special Appeals next considered whether Tidmore's defense was impaired by delay. (ECF 5-9 at 22).
The Court of Special Appeals, like the Circuit Court, was unpersuaded Tidmore suffered actual prejudice. The Court of Special Appeals emphasized "there was no showing that specific witnesses were unavailable." Id. at 22. Further, "although appellant failed to appear twice for trial, his counsel presumably had been ready to proceed with a defense as of July 10, 2007, the first trial date. Given that appellant fled the area, leaving his witnesses behind, his complaint rings hollow." (ECF 5-9 at 17-22). In so finding, the Court of Special Appeals referenced Fourth, Sixth and Tenth Circuit precedent requiring more than generally stated assertions of harm to demonstrate prejudice. See United States v. Hall, 551 F.3d 257, 273 (4th Cir. 2009) (indicating Defendant argued prejudice without identifying any unavailable witnesses or exculpatory evidence lost or rendered unavailable as a result of delay); United States v. Margheim, 770 F.3d 1312, 1331 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 1514 (2015) (looking with disfavor on "hazy descriptions of prejudice" and requiring a showing of definite prejudice and the specific manner missing witnesses would have aided the defense); Norris v. Schotten, 146 F.3d 314, 328 (6th Cir. 1998) ("The only manner in which appellant has claimed his defense was impaired was his alleged inability to call witnesses. However, appellant does not explain how the alleged prolonged detention affected his ability to call these witnesses").
After examining each Barker factor, the Court of Special Appeals continued:
(ECF 5-9 at 24-25).
In light of the above, it is clear that Court of Special Appeals identified controlling Supreme Court precedent, determined the delays presumptively prejudicial to Tidmore, and proceeded to conduct a Barker analysis that considered the totality of the circumstances and applied the four Barker factors. The analysis apportioned each delay to the State, to Tidmore, or found it neutral. The period after Tidmore became a fugitive, the time between his first trial date and his execution of forms requesting transfer to Maryland under the IAD, was taxed heavily against him. This interval consisted of three years and two months. The period, amounting to nearly three years and eight months between Tidmore's assertion of his IAD rights and his return to Maryland, was taxed against the State due to its negligence, albeit "not heavily." ECF 5-9 at 17, 25. "[D]eliberate . . . delay" on the part of the state is "weighted heavily against the government," a "more neutral reason such as negligence" is "weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered," and a "valid reason" justifies the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. Other delays were determined neutral. Also weighing into this equation was the determination that Tidmore identified no witnesses, evidence, or other actual harm resulting from the delay that prejudiced his defense, and that he was responsible for the initial delay by absconding. Accounting for the presumed prejudice resulting from this lengthy cumulative delay, the Court of Special Appeals determined that there was no speedy trial violation.
The facts on which the Court of Special Appeals applied the Barker analysis are supported in the record, and are presumed correct on federal habeas review. Moreover, Tidmore presents no facts to surmount his burden of rebutting the presumption of their correctness by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The state's decision was not contrary to Supreme Court precedent.
Having reviewed the record in light of the deferential standard of review applicable to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 proceedings, this Court concludes that the State court's decision did not involve an unreasonable application of federal law or an unreasonable determination of the facts. Accordingly, federal habeas relief will be denied as to this claim.
Tidmore claims that the trial court improperly denied his Motion to Dismiss for failure to comply with the 180-day time limit in the IAD.
The IAD "is a compact entered into by 48 states, the United States, and the District of Columbia to establish procedures for resolution of one State's outstanding charges against a prisoner of another State." New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111 (2000); see also 18 U.S.C. App. 2 § 2. The Compact "is designed `to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of . . . charges'" and "prescribes procedures by which a member State may obtain for trial a prisoner incarcerated in another member jurisdiction and by which the prisoner may demand the speedy disposition of certain charges pending against him in another jurisdiction." United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 343 (1978) (citation omitted). Maryland is a party to the compact, Md. Code. Correctional Serv. Art. §§ 8-401 to 8-417, as is the State of Georgia, GA Code Ann. § 42-6-20. Interpreting the IAD presents a question of federal law. New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111 (2000).
The IAD "enables a participating State to gain custody of a prisoner incarcerated in another jurisdiction, in order to try him on criminal charges[,]" Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 341 (1994), and "gives a prisoner incarcerated in one State the right to demand the speedy disposition of any untried indictment, information or complaint that is the basis of a detainer lodged against him by another State[.]" Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 718-19 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Even assuming arguendo that Tidmore had established that Maryland had the obligation under the IAD to bring him to trial within 180 days, Tidmore does not show that he suffered prejudice during this period. His summary claim "the Maryland detainer prevented me from having specific jobs and institutional privileges, and opportunities for programs and transitional housing"
Further, even if Tidmore's claim were cognizable, the Court of Special Appeals' determination that the 180 day period did not begin until Tidmore's IAD forms were received by the trial court comports with federal law.
The state court ruling is consistent with federal law. In Fex v. Michigan, the Supreme Court held that for purposes of determining the date a prisoner initiates his IAD request, the date on which the request was actually delivered to the prosecutor and court of jurisdiction governs, not the date that the prisoner transmitted his IAD request to the court and to prison authorities. Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 52 (1993) ("[T]he 180-day time period in Article III(a) of the IAD does not commence until the prisoner's request for final disposition of the charges against him has actually been delivered to the court and prosecuting officer of the jurisdiction that lodged the detainer against him"). Because the Court of Special Appeals' conclusion is consistent with Fex, that state court ruling survives scrutiny and federal habeas relief will be denied.
Tidmore claims that his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights were violated by the Warden of the Georgia Prison for failing to ensure his IAD paperwork was filed with the Circuit Court for Wicomico County. (ECF 1). Respondents argue this claim is not cognizable under § 2254. This Court finds this claim unavailing. First, Tidmore did not demonstrate to the trial court that the Warden failed to send the IAD papers to the Circuit Court for Wicomico County, only that there was no evidence the papers had actually been received. (ECF 5-6 at 27) (Tidmore could not remember whether the paperwork was sent to the Circuit Court for Wicomico County). Further, the purported failure of the Warden in Georgia to take a particular action is peripheral to the validity his state proceedings in Maryland, does not render his current incarceration under a Maryland conviction unconstitutional, and of import here, did not cause prejudice. See Kerr, 757 F.2d at 607. Accordingly, this claim provides no grounds for federal habeas relief, and will dismissed.
A Certificate of Appealability may issue "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To meet this burden, an applicant must show that "reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues were `adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.'" Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)(quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)). Tidmore has failed to make a substantial showing that he was denied a constitutional right, and this Court finds that reasonable jurists would not find the denial of habeas relief in this case debatable. Accordingly, a Certificate of Appealability shall not issue.
For these reasons, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus will be DENIED AND DISMISSED with prejudice in a separate Order which follows.
(ECF 5-9 at 8)(emphasis added).
