GERALD E. ROSEN, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Sophia Pappas' petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner is incarcerated at the Huron Valley Women's Complex in Ypsilanti, Michigan pursuant to her convictions for arson of a dwelling house, conspiracy to commit arson of a dwelling house, sending explosives with intent to injure, and assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. She seeks habeas relief on two grounds: insufficient evidence supported one of the elements of arson of a dwelling house, and sentence was based on inaccurate information. The Court denies the petition.
Petitioner's convictions arise from the firebombing of a house in Livonia on April 24, 2012. The Michigan Court of Appeals summarized the evidence leading to Petitioner's convictions are follows:
People v. Pappas, No. 313751, 2014 WL 1234151, *1-2 (Mich. Ct. App. March 25, 2014).
Petitioner was charged in Wayne County Circuit with conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder, assault with intent to commit murder, arson, conspiracy to commit arson, and sending explosives with the intent to injure. Following a bench trial, she was acquitted of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, but convicted of arson of a dwelling house, conspiracy to commit arson of a dwelling house, sending explosives with intent to injure, and assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. On November 26, 2012, she was sentenced to 9 to 20 years' imprisonment for the arson, conspiracy to commit arson, and sending explosives with intent to injure convictions, and 5 to 10 years' imprisonment for the assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder conviction.
Petitioner filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals raising these claims:
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentences. People v. Pappas, No. 313751, 2014 WL 1234151 (Mich. Ct. App. March 25, 2014). She filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme court, raising the same claims raised in the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Pappas, 497 Mich. 856 (Mich. Sept. 5, 2014).
Petitioner then filed the pending habeas petition. She raises the same claims raised on direct review in state court.
Review of this case is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus only if he can show that the state court's adjudication of his claims —
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
"A state court's decision is `contrary to' . . . clearly established law if it `applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]' or if it `confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [this] precedent.'" Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). "[T]he `unreasonable application' prong of the statute permits a federal habeas court to `grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts' of petitioner's case." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413). However, "[i]n order for a federal court find a state court's application of [Supreme Court] precedent `unreasonable,' the state court's decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court's application must have been `objectively unreasonable.'" Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21 (citations omitted); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as `fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011), quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004). "Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal. . . . As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id. at 786-87 (internal quotation omitted).
Section 2254(d)(1) limits a federal habeas court's review to a determination of whether the state court's decision comports with clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. Section 2254(d) "does not require citation of [Supreme Court] cases — indeed, it does not even require awareness of [Supreme Court] cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them." Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). "[W]hile the principles of "clearly established law" are to be determined solely by resort to Supreme Court rulings, the decisions of lower federal courts may be instructive in assessing the reasonableness of a state court's resolution of an issue." Stewart v. Erwin, 503 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 2007), citing Williams v. Bowersox, 340 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir. 2003); Dickens v. Jones, 203 F.Supp.2d 354, 359 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
Lastly, a federal habeas court must presume the correctness of state court factual determinations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A petitioner may rebut this presumption only with clear and convincing evidence. Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998).
Petitioner argues that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to support her conviction for arson of a dwelling house. Under Michigan law, the elements of arson of a dwelling house are: (1) the defendant willfully and maliciously burned a dwelling house and (2) the defendant intended to burn the dwelling house, or intentionally committed an act that created a very high risk of burning the house, and the defendant knew of that risk and disregarded it. Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.72; People v. Barber, 255 Mich.App. 288, 294-95 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003). Petitioner was convicted as an aider and abettor. "To establish that a defendant aided and abetted a crime, a prosecutor must show that (1) the crime charged was committed by the defendant or some other person, (2) the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the commission of the crime, and (3) the defendant intended the commission of the crime or knew that the principal intended to commit the crime at the time he gave aid and encouragement." Riley v. Berghuis, 481 F.3d 315, 322 (6th Cir. 2007), citing People v. Carines, 597 N.W.2d 130, 135 (1999). Petitioner focuses her sufficiency of the evidence argument on a single element. She argues that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Faulk's house was burned.
The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner's sufficiency of the evidence claim, finding "there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable finder of fact to conclude that Faulk's home was burned to the extent necessary to support defendant's conviction." Pappas, 2014 WL 1234151 at *3. The Michigan Court of Appeals acknowledged there was no major damage to the structure of the home, but held that structural damage was not an element of the charged offense. Id. The state court noted that a police officer observed that the outside wall of the house near Faulk's bedroom and a pillar attached to the house were both charred. A fire investigator similarly testified that he observed a charred scorch mark above the shutters next to Faulk's bedroom window and that a pillar attached to the front of the house was charred. Id. The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the arson statute required only "minimal damage" to a home and that the damage described by the officer and investigator was sufficient to satisfy this threshold. Id.
"[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). On direct review, review of a sufficiency of the evidence challenge must focus on whether "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (emphasis in original). In the habeas context, "[t]he Jackson standard must be applied `with explicit reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law.'" Brown v. Palmer, 441 F.3d 347, 351 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16).
"Two layers of deference apply to habeas claims challenging evidentiary sufficiency." McGuire v. Ohio, 619 F.3d 623, 631 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Brown v. Konteh, 567 F.3d 191, 204-05 (6th Cir. 2009)). First, the Court "must determine whether, viewing the trial testimony and exhibits in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Brown, 567 F.3d at 205 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319)). Second, if the Court were "to conclude that a rational trier of fact could not have found a petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, on habeas review, [the Court] must still defer to the state appellate court's sufficiency determination as long as it is not unreasonable." Id.
On habeas review, a federal court "does not reweigh the evidence or redetermine the credibility of the witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by the trial court." Matthews v. Abramajtys, 319 F.3d 780, 788 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983)). "A reviewing court `faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume — even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record — that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.'" McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 133 (2010) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326). According the state court's findings of fact a presumption of correctness, the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision easily passes scrutiny under the deferential AEDPA standard. The state court applied the correct constitutional test, relied on facts amply supported in the record, and did not unreasonably apply clearly established constitutional law. Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief with respect to this claim.
Next, Petitioner challenges the scoring of offense variable (OV) 19. OV 19 provides that 10 points will be assessed when an offender interferes or attempts to interfere with the administration of justice. Mich. Comp. Laws § 777.49(c). It is well-established that "`federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.'" Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990)). Petitioner's argument that the state court erred in scoring her sentencing guidelines is based solely on the state court's interpretation of state law. It does not implicate any federal rights. Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) ("[A] state court's interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting on habeas review."); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975) ("[S]tate courts are the ultimate expositors of state law."). "[A] claim that the trial court mis-scored offense variables in determining the state sentencing guidelines is not cognizable on habeas corpus review." See Adams v. Burt, 471 F.Supp.2d 835, 844 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
Moreover, the Michigan Court of Appeals expressly found that sufficient evidence supported the scoring of OV 19 and detailed the facts supporting that determination. Pappas, 2014 WL 1234151 at *4. The Sixth Circuit repeatedly has recognized "`that a state court's interpretation of state law, including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.'" Stumpf v. Robinson, 722 F.3d 739, 746 n.6 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76). The state court's rejection of Petitioner's claim therefore was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts and was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of established Supreme Court precedent. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22 provides that an appeal may not proceed unless a certificate of appealability (COA) is issued under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings now requires that the Court "must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant."
A COA may be issued "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(2). A petitioner must show "that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (citation omitted). In this case, the Court concludes that reasonable jurists would not debate the conclusion that the petition fails to state a claim upon which habeas corpus relief should be granted. No certificate of appealability is warranted. Nor should Petitioner be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal as an appeal cannot be taken in good faith. See FED. R. APP. P. 24(a).
For the foregoing reasons,
It is
