ALTICE, Judge.
In a previous appeal in these proceedings, this court reversed a jury verdict in favor of Terex-Telelect, Inc. (Terex)
In advance of the third trial, Wade filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude evidence of Terex's compliance with ANSI A92.2 and the design specifications found in ANSI A92.2. The trial court granted Wade's motion, finding that this court's decision in Terex I established the law of the case with regard to relevancy and therefore required such exclusion. Terex moved to certify the matter for interlocutory appeal, which request the trial court granted. This court accepted jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal on December 18, 2015. There are two issues presented for our review:
We affirm.
The underlying facts, taken from this court's opinion following the second trial, follow:
Terex I, 966 N.E.2d at 189-90 (footnote omitted).
After the first trial ended in a hung jury, the second jury trial commenced on June 16, 2010. At trial, Terex presented evidence that it complied with Richmond Power's specifications by providing an insulating dielectric bucket liner without an interior step. Terex also presented evidence that it complied with ANSI A92.2 in designing and manufacturing the bucket. This evidence included expert testimony from three witnesses, including a board-certified safety professional, an engineer and former director of safety for Terex, and the past chairman of the subcommittee that drafted ANSI A92.2, that the bucket
Over Wade's objection, the trial court included a regulatory compliance instruction submitted by Terex. The instruction informed the jury there was a rebuttable presumption that the bucket was not defective and/or that Terex was not negligent in the manufacture and design thereof because of its compliance with applicable codes, regulations, and specifications.
Prior to the retrial,
The grant or denial of a motion in limine is within the sound discretion of the trial court and is an adjunct of the power of trial courts to admit and exclude evidence. Hopper v. Carey, 716 N.E.2d 566, 570 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied. Therefore, when reviewing a grant or denial of a motion in limine, we apply the standard of review for the admission of
The law of the case doctrine provides that an appellate court's determination of a legal issue binds both the trial court and the appellate court in any subsequent appeal involving the same case and substantially the same facts. Dutchmen Mfg., Inc. v. Reynolds, 891 N.E.2d 1074, 1082 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), trans. denied. The purpose of the doctrine is to minimize unnecessary repeated litigation of legal issues once they have been resolved by an appellate court. Id. This doctrine is based upon the sound policy that once an issue is litigated and decided, that should be the end of the matter. Godby v. Whitehead, 837 N.E.2d 146, 152 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). Accordingly, the law of the case doctrine bars relitigation of all issues decided "directly or by implication in a prior decision." Luhnow v. Horn, 760 N.E.2d 621, 625 (Ind.Ct.App.2001).
Terex first challenges the trial court's determination that Terex I establishes the law of the case with regard to the relevancy of evidence of its compliance with ANSI A92.2. Terex maintains that the sole issue addressed in Terex I was the propriety of the regulatory compliance instruction. Terex asserts that the precise holding in Terex I is that "where the safety standard is silent on a particular design element or product risk, compliance with the safety standard will not trigger the statutory presumption." Appellant's Brief at 12. Terex disagrees with any interpretation of Terex I that would make evidence of its compliance with ANSI A92.2 irrelevant across the board.
Terex further notes that Wade did not object during the second trial to the admissibility of evidence relating to Terex's compliance with ANSI A92.2 as it pertained to the assessment of the reasonableness of Terex's conduct, and thus, the general relevance of such evidence pursuant to Ind. Evidence Rule 401 was not an issue before this court in Terex I. As such, Terex asserts that the law of the case doctrine does not operate to render all evidence of its compliance with ANSI A92.2 inadmissible on grounds of relevance for purposes of retrial on Wade's product liability claim.
We agree that in Terex I, the issue addressed concerned the propriety of the rebuttable presumption instruction given to the jury. In deciding whether error resulted from the giving of a jury instruction, a reviewing court must consider (1) whether the instruction correctly states the law, (2) whether there is evidence in the record supporting the instruction, and (3) whether the substance of the instruction is covered by other instructions. Hill v. Rhinehart, 45 N.E.3d 427, 439 (Ind.Ct. App.2015), trans. denied. In Terex I, the majority's analysis focused on the second prong.
The majority concluded that although OSHA regulations require compliance with ANSI standards for lift trucks and that Terex presented evidence regarding its compliance therewith, Terex was not entitled to the rebuttable presumption instruction. In its analysis, the majority noted that "for evidence of compliance with governmental standards to be relevant, the standard itself must relate to the risk or product defect at issue." Terex I at 195 (emphasis supplied). The majority then found that "[n]owhere in either the OSHA regulations or ANSI A92.2 is there
The evidence in Terex I is the same evidence before us now. The only difference is that in the prior appeal, the argument was made at the jury instruction stage, while in the present appeal, the argument was at the motion in limine stage. Regardless of the procedural posture, the substance of both arguments is the same and they necessarily entail a determination of relevancy. We find that the majority's analysis in Terex I implicitly, if not directly, decided that evidence concerning ANSI A92.2 and Terex's compliance therewith is irrelevant to the design defect alleged by Wade. We thus agree with the trial court that the majority's decision in Terex I is the law of the case with regard to relevancy.
To the extent Terex claims that evidence of its compliance with ANSI A92.2 is relevant to a determination of whether it exercised reasonable care, such was also implicitly decided in Terex I with the majority's conclusion that Terex was not entitled to assert the rebuttable presumption found in the IPLA. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Wade's motion in limine so as to exclude evidence pertaining to ANSI A92.2 and Terex's compliance therewith from the third trial in this matter.
Even if the law of the case doctrine does not bar admission of Terex's compliance with ANSI standards, the parties dispute whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting Wade's motion in limine excluding such evidence. The parties focus their arguments on the relevance of such evidence for purposes of retrial.
Relevant evidence is defined as evidence "having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Ind. Evidence Rule 401. "Although evidence must be relevant to be admissible, see Ind. Evidence Rule 402, not all relevant evidence is admissible." Davidson v. Bailey, 826 N.E.2d 80, 85 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (citing Wohlwend v. Edwards, 796 N.E.2d 781, 785 (Ind.Ct.App.2003)). Ind. Evidence Rule 403 provides that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. See also Davidson, 826 N.E.2d at 85.
Terex argues that ANSI A92.2 and its compliance therewith is relevant and therefore admissible because the jury must consider such evidence in evaluating the reasonableness of Terex's actions in designing and manufacturing the bucket. Terex maintains that "a jury cannot adequately evaluate the reasonableness of the design without knowing what aspects of the design were mandated by the ANSI standard." Appellant's Brief at 14. In fact, Terex claims that several of the design requirements set forth in ANSI A92.2 are directly related to Wade's allegations
Wade acknowledges the design requirements contained in ANSI A92.2. Wade, asserts, however, that ANSI A92.2 is wholly irrelevant to the defect he alleged, i.e., the lack of an interior step to exit the bucket due to the placement of the dielectric liner over the existing interior recess in the bucket. Wade asserts that evidence of Terex's compliance with ANSI A92.2 provides no explanation for his alleged defect. Finally, Wade claims the compliance evidence is not relevant to rebut his alternative design evidence because Wade's alternative design is an actual product in Terex's product line.
As noted by the majority in Terex I, evidence relating to ANSI A92.2 and Terex's compliance therewith is of no consequence to the issue of safe egress from the bucket. The majority in Terex I presented an apt analogy:
Terex I, 966 N.E.2d at 193. The same holds true here. Compliance with ANSI A92.2 is not relevant in a product liability case where the standard is silent with regard to the defect alleged. Indeed, we find that evidence relating to ANSI A92.2 and Terex's compliance therewith would serve no purpose other than to mislead or confuse the fact-finder about the issue to be decided. Thus, even if there was no prior decision by this court establishing the law of the case, Terex has not established that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Wade's motion in limine.
For all of the above reasons, we affirm the trial court's grant of Wade's motion in limine as to the evidence referenced in motion in limine # 2 and motion in limine #9.
Judgment affirmed.
BAILEY, J. and BRADFORD, J., concur.
Appellant's Appendix at 46-47. Motion in Limine # 9 provides:
Id. at 48.