BERNARD A. FRIEDMAN, Senior District Judge.
Petitioner is a Michigan prisoner who has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Following a jury trial in Ingham County Circuit Court, petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.317. She was sentenced as a third-offense habitual offender, Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.11, to 300 to 480 months of imprisonment. Petitioner now challenges the conviction by asserting a sufficiency of the evidence claim. For the reasons set forth below, the Court shall deny the instant petition. The Court shall also deny a certificate of appealability and leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis.
This Court recites verbatim the relevant facts relied upon by the Michigan Court of Appeals, which are presumed correct on habeas review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1):
People v. Fundunburks, No. 327479, at *1-2 (Mich. Ct. App. July 19, 2016) (unpublished); see docket entry 6-13.
Petitioner's conviction was affirmed on appeal, id., and the Michigan Supreme Court denied the application for leave to appeal. People v. Fundunburks, 889 N.W.2d 260 (Mich. 2017).
Petitioner seeks habeas relief on the following ground:
Pet. at 5 (PageID.5).
Section 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An "unreasonable application" occurs when "a state court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not "issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 410-11.
"[A] federal court's collateral review of a state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our federal system." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The AEDPA thus
Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (footnote omitted). "[A] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as `fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Therefore, in order to obtain habeas relief in federal court, a state prisoner is required to show that the state court's rejection of his or her claim "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id. at 103. A habeas petitioner should be denied relief as long as it is within the "realm of possibility" that fairminded jurists could find the state court decision to be reasonable. Woods v. Etherton, 136 S.Ct. 1149, 1152 (2016).
As noted above, petitioner claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict her of second-degree murder. She argues that the prosecution failed to provide evidence to satisfy the element of malice and that the evidence therefore supports a finding of voluntary manslaughter. She contends that her "state of mind when she acted" is in dispute and that her "actions, while intentional, were . . . committed `under the influence of passion, in the heat of blood, produced by adequate or reasonable provocation before a reasonable time had elapsed for the blood and reason to resume.[']" Pet. at 5 (PageID.5).
The Supreme Court has held that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Habeas review of sufficiency of the evidence claims is limited to reviewing the elements of the crimes as defined by state law. See Allen v. Redman, 858 F.2d 1194, 1197 (6th Cir. 1988) (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982), and Duffy v. Foltz, 804 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1986)). Under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), the crucial question in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19 (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted). In other words, "the only question under Jackson is whether that finding was so insupportable as to fall below the threshold of bare rationality." Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 656 (2012). A state court's determination that the evidence does not fall below that threshold is entitled to "considerable deference under [the] AEDPA." Id.
A federal habeas court may not overturn a state court decision that rejects a sufficiency of the evidence claim merely because the federal court disagrees with the state court's resolution of that claim. Instead, a federal court may grant habeas relief only if the state court decision was an objectively unreasonable application of the Jackson standard. See Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 2 (2011). "Because rational people can sometimes disagree, the inevitable consequence of this settled law is that judges will sometimes encounter convictions that they believe to be mistaken, but that they must nonetheless uphold." Id.
Under Michigan law, the elements of second-degree murder are: (1) a death, (2) caused by an act of the defendant, (3) with malice, and (4) without justification or excuse. Stewart v. Wolfenbarger, 595 F.3d 647, 654 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing People v. Goecke, 579 N.W.2d 868, 878 (Mich. 1998)). "[M]alice is defined as the intent to kill, the intent to cause great bodily harm, or the intent to do an act in wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm." Id. (citing People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 326 (Mich. 1980)). Additionally, "[t]he offense of second-degree murder `does not require an actual intent to harm or kill, but only the intent to do an act that is in obvious disregard of lifeendangering consequences.'" Id. at 658 (quoting People v. Aldrich, 631 N.W.2d 67, 80 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001)).
A defendant is guilty of voluntary manslaughter in Michigan if the evidence establishes "(1) that the defendant killed in the heat of passion; (2) that the passion was caused by an adequate provocation; and (3) that there was not a lapse of time during which a reasonable person could control his passions." Richardson v. Berghuis, No. 2:07-CV-13405, 2010 WL 3290961, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 16, 2010) (internal citation omitted). Although the prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, under Michigan law "the burden of proof to show provocation . . . is on the defendant, and it must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence." Ruelas v. Wolfenbarger, 580 F.3d 403, 413 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing People v. Darden, 585 N.W.2d 27, 31 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998)).
The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's claim on the merits and held that there was sufficient evidence, including evidence of malice, to support her conviction for second-degree murder:
Fundunburks, No. 327479, at *3.
The Michigan Court of Appeals disagreed with petitioner "that the evidence as presented compelled a voluntary-manslaughter conviction." Id. The court reasoned:
Id. at *3-4.
In the present case, petitioner has not shown that the Michigan Court of Appeals' rejection of her claim "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. That court reasonably determined that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict of second-degree murder in part because a rational trier of fact could conclude that petitioner acted with malice when she stabbed the victim. The court noted that "the jury was presented with evidence that defendant killed her boyfriend out of jealousy over his relationships with other women." Fundunburks, No. 327479, at *3. It found that "the fact that defendant stabbed [him] with a five-inch knife in the chest, i.e., the area where the heart is located, also supports defendant's intent at the time of the stabbing." Id. This determination is entitled to "considerable deference" because it is a proper application of the Jackson standard and was not "so insupportable as to fall below the threshold of bare rationality." Coleman, 566 U.S. at 656. As the court noted, even if evidence was presented by petitioner that could have supported a voluntary manslaughter verdict, the jury was not required to accept petitioner's version of the facts. Fundunburks, No. 327479, at *3-4.
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22 provides that an appeal may not proceed unless a certificate of appealability issues. A certificate of appealability may issue "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To receive a certificate of appealability, "a petitioner must show that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Courts must either issue a certificate of appealability indicating which issues satisfy the required showing or provide reasons why such a certificate should not issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b); In re Certificates of Appealability, 106 F.3d 1306, 1307 (6th Cir. 1997). In this case, the Court shall deny petitioner a certificate of appealability because she has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a federal constitutional right, as discussed above. See Dell v. Straub, 194 F.Supp.2d 629, 659 (E.D. Mich. 2002). The Court shall also deny petitioner leave to appeal in forma pauperis because any appeal would be frivolous. Id.
For the reasons stated above,
IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is denied. The Court also denies permission to appeal in forma pauperis
