Filed: Feb. 06, 2019
Latest Update: Mar. 03, 2020
Summary: 17-1290 Lehman XS Trust v. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT _ August Term 2017 (Argued: April 17, 2018 Decided: February 6, 2019) Docket 17-1290 LEHMAN XS TRUST, SERIES 2006-GP2, (LXS 2006-GP2), by U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, solely in its capacity as Trustee, LEHMAN XS TRUST, SERIES 2006-GP3, (LXS 2006-GP3), by U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, solely in its capacity as Trustee, LEHMAN XS TRUST, SERIES 2006-GP4, (LXS 2006-GP4), by U.S. BA
Summary: 17-1290 Lehman XS Trust v. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT _ August Term 2017 (Argued: April 17, 2018 Decided: February 6, 2019) Docket 17-1290 LEHMAN XS TRUST, SERIES 2006-GP2, (LXS 2006-GP2), by U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, solely in its capacity as Trustee, LEHMAN XS TRUST, SERIES 2006-GP3, (LXS 2006-GP3), by U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, solely in its capacity as Trustee, LEHMAN XS TRUST, SERIES 2006-GP4, (LXS 2006-GP4), by U.S. BAN..
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17‐1290
Lehman XS Trust v. Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
______________
August Term 2017
(Argued: April 17, 2018 Decided: February 6, 2019)
Docket 17‐1290
LEHMAN XS TRUST, SERIES 2006‐GP2, (LXS 2006‐GP2), by U.S. BANK
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, solely in its capacity as Trustee, LEHMAN XS
TRUST, SERIES 2006‐GP3, (LXS 2006‐GP3), by U.S. BANK NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, solely in its capacity as Trustee, LEHMAN XS TRUST, SERIES
2006‐GP4, (LXS 2006‐GP4), by U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, solely in
its capacity as Trustee,
Plaintiffs‐Appellants,
v.
GREENPOINT MORTGAGE FUNDING, INC.,
Defendant‐Appellee.*
______________
Before:
WESLEY, CHIN, AND CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff U.S. Bank National Association (“U.S. Bank”) appeals from a
judgment entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Carter, J.) dismissing its second amended consolidated complaint as
untimely. U.S. Bank argues, among other things, that the district court erred in
The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to amend the official caption as noted
*
above.
dismissing its complaint because (1) its claim for indemnification under the
contract in dispute is independent of its claim for breach of that contract, and the
former claim therefore was timely filed in federal court; and (2) its claim for
indemnification based on separate contracts executed at a later date relates back
to the original state‐court filing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). We
disagree. AFFIRMED.
_________________
HECTOR TORRES (David J. Abrams, David J. Mark, on the brief),
Kasowitz Benson Torres LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs‐
Appellants.
THEODORE R. SNYDER (James A. Murphy, New York, NY;
Cameron S. Matheson, Glen Allen, VA, on the brief), Murphy &
McGonigle, P.C., for Defendant‐Appellee.
_________________
WESLEY, Circuit Judge:
This appeal is the most recent chapter in the ongoing saga of the last
decade’s housing finance crisis. At the core of the appeal are three trusts (the
“Trusts”) composed of residential mortgage‐backed securities that Defendant‐
Appellee GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. (“GreenPoint”) sold in 2006 to
Lehman Brothers Holding, Inc., and Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB (collectively,
“Lehman”), with Plaintiff‐Appellant U.S. Bank acting as Trustee. Six years after
the sale, in 2012, a forensic review of the Trusts revealed that nearly all of the
2
sample mortgages GreenPoint sold to Lehman were in breach of the
representations and warranties (“R & Ws”) GreenPoint made in its Flow Mortgage
Loan Purchase and Warranties Agreements (“MLPAs”) with Lehman.
GreenPoint failed to cure or repurchase the loans within the contractual time
frames. As a result, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”)—acting on
behalf of U.S. Bank as Trustee and as conservator for the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”),1 which in turn was the beneficial owner
of some of the certificates issued by the Trusts—filed summonses with notice in
New York Supreme Court.2
GreenPoint removed the actions to federal court, at which point the FHFA
dropped out of the litigation and U.S. Bank as Trustee filed an amended and
On September 6, 2008, Freddie Mac was placed into conservatorship by the FHFA
1
pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 4617.
2 In the New York courts, a plaintiff commences an action “by filing a summons and
complaint or summons with notice.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 304(a). A party may elect to file a
summons with notice if the party is not prepared to serve the complaint; in that case, the
summons must put the defendant on notice of “the nature of the action and the relief
sought,” as well as “the sum of money for which judgment may be taken in case of
default.” Id. § 305(b).
3
consolidated complaint.3 After discovery and the filing of a second amended
consolidated complaint, GreenPoint moved for summary judgment as to three
counts of this complaint, and to dismiss as to the fourth count, arguing, among
other things, that the claims were barred by New York’s statute of limitations.
The district court concluded, for various reasons discussed in this opinion,
that none of U.S. Bank’s claims was timely. The issue before this Court is whether
any of U.S Bank’s claims survive GreenPoint’s motions for summary judgment
and dismissal. We affirm the district court’s conclusion that none does.
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background
In 2006, Lehman, not a party to this appeal, purchased aggregated pools of
residential home mortgages from GreenPoint.4 The sales were governed by two
3 The FHFA ceased prosecuting its claims in this case because of a “no action” clause
contained in the Trust Agreements. A “no action” clause bars “individual certificate
holders from bringing independent law suits which are more effectively brought by the
trustee unless certain exceptions are met.” Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Quicken Loans Inc.,
810 F.3d 861, 868 n.8 (2d Cir. 2015) (cleaned up) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(“Deutsche Bank”).
4 In 2006, before Lehman began bankruptcy proceedings, U.S. Bank entered into
agreements to serve as Trustee of the Trusts at issue in this case.
4
MLPAs, each of which contained a series of R & Ws as to the quality of the
mortgage loans.5 When Lehman purchased the loans from GreenPoint in 2006,
they had an aggregate principal balance exceeding $3.39 billion.
Lehman conveyed the mortgage loans and its rights under the MLPAs to a
depositor (also not a party to this appeal), which then conveyed the mortgage
loans to three Trusts—GP2, GP3, and GP4—via another set of contracts
denominated “Trust Agreements.”6 The last dates on which Lehman purchased
mortgage loans from GreenPoint (i.e., the effective dates of the R & Ws) were May
15, 2006 (GP2), June 15, 2006 (GP3), and July 17, 2006 (GP4). The Trusts closed on
5 Although the MLPAs at issue are separate contracts, the language relevant to the issues
on appeal is identical in the two documents, and U.S. Bank treats the documents as one
in its brief to this Court. The first MLPA was signed between Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB
and GreenPoint in 2001; the second MLPA was signed between Lehman Brothers
Holdings, Inc. and GreenPoint in 2006.
6 The “depositor” here was a third‐party entity called Structured Asset Securities
Corporation (“SASC”). SASC’s role was to create the three Trusts and, “[c]oncurrently
with the execution” of the Trust Agreements, to “transfer, assign, set over, deposit with
and otherwise convey to the Trustee, without recourse . . . all the right, title and interest
of the Depositor in and to the Mortgage Loans.” J.A. 387, § 2.01(a). In other words, the
depositor’s role was to create the Trusts. In the same moment that the parties closed on
the MLPAs, SASC acquired an interest in the Trust’s assets, placed the assets in the Trusts,
and transferred the Trusts to the Trustee (U.S. Bank). The signatories to the Trust
Agreements were SASC as depositor; U.S. Bank as Trustee; Aurora Loan Services LLC as
master servicer (a role not relevant to this appeal); and Lehman as underwriter.
5
the MLPAs on May 31, 2006 (GP2), June 30, 2006 (GP3), and July 31, 2006 (GP4).
Once the mortgage loans were deposited into the Trusts, they were securitized and
certificates were issued representing rights to cash flows from the securitized loan
portfolios. Investors then purchased the certificates, thereby acquiring an
ownership interest in the Trusts. Freddie Mac was one of these investors.7
The R & Ws contained in the MLPAs and the Trust Agreements made
assertions about the quality of individual mortgage loans and the mortgage loan
pools. Specifically, Section 7 of the MLPAs represented that the mortgage loans
were “underwritten in accordance with [GreenPoint’s] Underwriting Guidelines,”
J.A. 160, 261; that the mortgage loan schedules were “complete, true and correct,”
id. 154, 255; that GreenPoint possessed complete mortgage files, id. 161, 262; and
that, except as specifically scheduled, the loan‐to‐value ratio for the mortgage
loans did not exceed 80%, id. 158, 259. The MLPAs provided that GreenPoint made
7 Freddie Mac was the beneficial owner of certificates in a single class issued by each of
the Trusts. It did not, however, own more than 25% of “each Class affected thereby” the
alleged default, a condition the contractual no action clause required for a certificate
holder to commence litigation. Although we note that GreenPoint appears to be correct
that the FHFA (acting as conservator for Freddie Mac) did not satisfy this condition, we
express no judgment on GreenPoint’s merits argument that the FHFA lacked standing to
bring suit because of the no action clause.
6
these R & Ws “as of” each closing date. Section 2.03 of the Trust Agreements
incorporated the R & Ws from the MLPAs.
In an effort to ensure compliance with the R & Ws, the MLPAs and the Trust
Agreements created a contractual remedy in the event that GreenPoint breached.
Under Section 8 of the MLPAs, upon learning of a breach, GreenPoint had sixty
days to “use its best efforts promptly to cure such [b]reach in all material respects.”
Id. 165, 268. If the breach could not be cured, Section 8 of the MLPAs provided that
GreenPoint “shall, at the Purchaser’s option, repurchase such Mortgage Loan” at
an established repurchase price. Id. The Trust Agreements included an identical
clause, except they gave GreenPoint ninety days from the discovery of the breach
to cure or repurchase. The same section of the MLPAs contained an Accrual
Provision that established how the parties would proceed in the event of a breach.8
8 The Accrual Provision states:
Any cause of action against [GreenPoint] relating to or arising out of the
Breach of any [R & Ws] . . . shall accrue as to any Mortgage Loan upon
(i) discovery of such Breach by the Purchaser or notice thereof by
[GreenPoint] to the Purchaser, (ii) failures by [GreenPoint] to cure such
Breach or repurchase such Mortgage Loan as specified above, and
7
Section 9 of the MLPAs also contained an indemnification clause, which
reads, in relevant part:
[GreenPoint] agrees to indemnify [Lehman] and hold it harmless
from and against any and all claims, losses, damages, penalties, fines,
forfeitures, legal fees and related costs, judgments, and any other
costs, fees and expenses that [Lehman] may sustain in any way
related to (i) any act or omission on the part of [GreenPoint] or any
other person or entity in the origination, receiving, processing,
funding or servicing any Mortgage Loan prior to the related Transfer
Date or otherwise arising from the transfer of servicing of the
Mortgage Loans provided for in this Agreement, [and] (ii) any
assertion based on, grounded upon [or] resulting from a Breach of any
of [GreenPoint’s R & Ws] contained herein . . . . [GreenPoint] shall
immediately notify [Lehman] if a claim is made by a third party with
respect to this Agreement or the Mortgage Loans . . .
J.A. 167, 270.
In addition to the indemnification provisions included in the MLPAs,
GreenPoint (together with Lehman and SASC) entered into separate
Indemnification Agreements for each Trust. The agreements provided that
GreenPoint would “indemnify and hold harmless” the other parties to the MLPAs
(iii) demand upon [GreenPoint] by the Purchaser for compliance with this
Agreement.
J.A. 166, 269.
8
and Trust Agreements “from and against any and all losses, claims, liabilities,
damages, penalties, fines, forfeitures, legal fees and expenses and related costs,
judgments, and any other costs, fees and expenses” that “arise out of or are based
upon any untrue statement or alleged untrue statement of any material fact” or
the omission of any such fact in the information GreenPoint provided to Lehman.
Id. 1062, 1071, 1080. The relevant “as of” dates for the Indemnification Agreements
were May 30, 2006 (GP2); June 28, 2006 (GP3); and July 28, 2006 (GP4).
In 2012, Freddie Mac conducted a forensic review of the loan files9 and
determined that an overwhelming percentage of the mortgage loans in the Trusts
breached GreenPoint’s R & Ws under the MLPAs and Trust Agreements.10 U.S.
9 The operative complaint discusses the forensic review in the passive voice, making it
impossible for us to determine from the complaint alone who initiated the review in 2012
and why. See, e.g., J.A. 1129 ¶ 41 (“Forensic reviews were undertaken . . . .“). However,
U.S. Bank’s brief to this Court explains that Freddie Mac—not U.S. Bank—conducted the
review, presumably after it and other certificate holders suffered major losses on their
investments because of high rates of default. Appellant Br. 9.
U.S. Bank alleges that this analysis showed that 93.5% of the sampled loans in the GP2
10
Trust were in breach, 99.8% of the sampled loans in the GP3 Trust were in breach, and
100% of the sampled loans in the GP4 Trust were in breach. The breaches included
misrepresentations of borrower income, leading to a higher debt‐to‐income ratio than
GreenPoint’s guidelines permitted; misrepresentations of occupancy status of homes to
which the mortgage loans related, decreasing the value of the mortgage loans; improper
calculations of debt and debt‐to‐income ratios; failure to verify borrower assets or
9
Bank submitted breach notices to GreenPoint on the following dates: March 19,
2012, and August 24, 2012, for the GP2 Trust; March 19, 2012, for the GP3 Trust;
and April 17, 2012, for the GP4 Trust. GreenPoint did not cure or repurchase within
the sixty‐ or ninety‐day periods established in the MLPAs and Trust Agreements,
respectively.
II. Procedural History
Almost immediately after the sixty‐day cure periods expired, the FHFA
commenced three actions against GreenPoint in New York Supreme Court, New
York County, “as conservator for” Freddie Mac and “on behalf of” U.S. Bank as
Trustee. The FHFA filed summonses with notice for the GP2, GP3, and GP4 Trusts,
respectively, on May 30, 2012, June 29, 2012, and July 30, 2012, exactly one day
ahead of the six‐year anniversaries of the closing dates of the three Trusts.
GreenPoint removed the actions to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York on October 24, 2012. On November 21, 2012, the
qualifying loans with insufficient credit score; and incorrect calculations of loan‐to‐value
and cumulative loan‐to‐value ratios, which, according to U.S. Bank, are allegedly “among
the most important measures of the risk of a mortgage loan.” J.A. 1130–41.
10
district court consolidated the three actions and authorized the plaintiffs to file a
single consolidated complaint, which they did on November 26, 2012.
The FHFA dropped out of the litigation in January 2013, and U.S. Bank—
now the sole plaintiff—filed an amended consolidated complaint.11 The amended
consolidated complaint included three causes of action related to breach of
contract and indemnification. GreenPoint moved to dismiss, and the district court
denied the motion. See Lehman XS Tr., Series 2006‐GP2 v. GreenPoint Mortg.
Funding, Inc., 12 Civ. 7935, 12 Civ. 7942, & 12 Civ. 7943, 2014 WL 1301944 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 31, 2014).
The parties commenced discovery. Although they completed that task by
early December 2014, U.S. Bank requested a stay of further proceedings pending
the New York Court of Appeals’ resolution of an appeal taken from ACE Securities
GreenPoint invoked federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1345, which provides that
11
“the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings
commenced by the United States, or by any agency or officer thereof expressly authorized
to sue by Act of Congress.” As the removal notices indicated, the FHFA is a federal
agency for the purposes of § 1345. See 12 U.S.C. § 4511(a) (“There is established the
Federal Housing Finance Agency, which shall be an independent agency of the Federal
Government.”). When the FHFA dropped out of the suit, however, U.S. Bank filed its
amended consolidated complaint under diversity jurisdiction as well as 28 U.S.C. § 1345.
11
Corp. v. DB Structured Products, Inc., 112 A.D.3d 522 (1st Dep’t 2013), leave to appeal
granted by 23 N.Y.3d 906 (2014). Soon after the Court of Appeals issued its opinion,
see ACE Secs. Corp. v. DB Structured Prods., Inc., 25 N.Y.3d 581 (2015) (“ACE”), U.S.
Bank moved for and was granted leave to file a second amended consolidated
complaint (“SACC”). It filed that complaint, which is the focus of the present
appeal, on March 3, 2016.
The SACC mirrored the first amended consolidated complaint with respect
to the first two causes of action: (1) breach of contract seeking specific
performance, based on GreenPoint’s failure to repurchase the noncompliant loans
or cure its breach of the R & Ws; and (2) breach of contract seeking monetary
damages, based on the same allegations. The SACC expanded the third cause of
action—indemnification based on language in the MLPAs and the Trust
Agreements—to seek not only expenses incurred in connection with the first two
causes of action, but also a monetary award of $1.1 billion. Finally, the SACC
added a fourth cause of action for indemnification arising under the separate
Indemnification Agreements. The fourth claim sought reimbursement for losses
12
based on a separate set of R & Ws that GreenPoint made when the parties executed
the Indemnification Agreements.
GreenPoint moved for summary judgment on the first three claims, arguing
they were time‐barred. It moved for dismissal of the fourth claim under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), asserting that the FHFA and U.S.
Bank lacked standing and that U.S. Bank had failed to state a claim. The district
court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the fourth claim
as time‐barred. See Lehman XS Tr., Series 2006‐GP2 v. GreenPoint Mortg. Funding,
Inc., 12 Civ. 7935, 12 Civ. 7942, & 12 Civ. 7943, 2017 WL 1293773, at *10 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 29, 2017). The court found that the contractual claims (claims one and two)
were time‐barred because the FHFA filed the summonses with notice more than
six years after the statute of limitations began to run under New York law. Id. at
*7. With respect to the third claim, seeking indemnification, the court found that
U.S. Bank’s claim was “not one for indemnification” but instead was “more
appropriately characterized as one to recover losses incurred by breach of
contract.” Id. at *8. Accordingly, the court concluded that the third claim, too, was
time‐barred. Finally, the court held that the fourth claim, also seeking
13
indemnification, was time‐barred because it involved a new set of operative facts
and therefore could not relate back to the original complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), even assuming the original complaint was timely
filed. Id. at *9. U.S. Bank appealed.
DISCUSSION
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, mindful
that summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Sousa v. Marquez, 702 F.3d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a)). We also review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss,
including its interpretation and application of statutes of limitations and
contractual terms. Deutsche Bank, 810 F.3d at 865. When we sit in diversity
jurisdiction and must decide a question of New York state law, we are bound “by
the law of New York as interpreted by the New York Court of Appeals.” Licci ex
rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 739 F.3d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
In ACE, 25 N.Y.3d at 596, the New York Court of Appeals held that a cause
of action for breach of R & Ws that guarantee particular facts as of a certain date,
14
but do not guarantee future performance, accrues on the date those R & Ws
become effective. We were called upon to apply ACE in Deutsche Bank. Deutsche
Bank involved facts similar to the case now before us: a trustee, Deutsche Bank,
sought to recover from Quicken Loans, which originated a pool of mortgage loans
that Deutsche Bank later discovered breached R & Ws made in the mortgage‐loan
agreements. 810 F.3d at 863. The issue was whether the trustee’s cause of action
for breach of the R & Ws accrued when the R & Ws became effective (making the
claims untimely) or when the trustee demanded repurchase or cure and was
rebuffed (making the claims timely). Looking to ACE, we held that the trustee’s
cause of action accrued “[i]mmediately upon effectiveness of the R & Ws,” because
at that point, “the Trustee was entitled to demand the contractual remedy—cure
or repurchase—as to any material breach.” Id. at 866. We also rejected the trustee’s
argument that the remedy clause was substantive (meaning a condition precedent
to a party’s performance) rather than procedural (seeking a remedy for a
preexisting wrong). Id. at 867. Because we deemed the demand process to be
“merely procedural,” we held that it did not “delay accrual of the cause of action,”
making the trustee’s claims untimely. Id. (citing ACE, 25 N.Y.3d at 597).
15
U.S. Bank argues that, notwithstanding Deutsche Bank, ACE, and the
numerous cases that followed,12 its causes of action for breach of contract accrued
not when the R & Ws became effective, but when GreenPoint was made aware of
the breaches and failed to cure. According to U.S. Bank, this case is distinguishable
from Deutsche Bank and ACE because here, sophisticated parties negotiated for a
contract provision establishing that a cause of action for a breach of the R & Ws
“shall accrue,” J.A. 166, 269, only when the Trustee made a demand for
compliance. U.S. Bank made no such demand until 2012.
While this appeal was pending, the New York Court of Appeals granted
review in a similar case, Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. Flagstar Capital Mkts. Corp.,
32 N.Y.3d 139 (2018). U.S. Bank pinned its hopes on Flagstar and urged us to await
the New York high court’s decision. Flagstar, U.S. Bank argued, would
“definitively determine the validity of an express accrual clause under New York
See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Dexia Real Estate Capital Mkts., 643 Fed. App’x 48 (2d
12
Cir. 2016) (summary order); Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 643 Fed.
App’x 44 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary order); Homeward Residential, Inc. v. Sand Canyon Corp.,
12 Civ. 7319, 2018 WL 557913 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2018); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Bank of Am.,
N.A., 15 Civ. 8153, 2016 WL 5118298 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2016), appeal docketed, 16‐3560 (2d
Cir. 2016); Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. WMC Mortg., LLC, 151 A.D.3d 72 (1st Dep’t 2017); U.S.
Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. GreenPoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., 147 A.D.3d 79 (1st Dep’t 2016).
16
law.” Appellant Br. 19. Flagstar did just that, but U.S. Bank’s prediction of
vindication proved wrong. Under Flagstar, an express accrual clause cannot
operate to delay the commencement of a limitations period under New York law,
regardless of the parties’ sophistication or clearly expressed intentions. See
Flagstar, 32 N.Y.3d at 139. In other words, Flagstar clarified the sole issue that U.S.
Bank asked us to resolve: namely, whether sophisticated parties could create a
substantive condition precedent by including an express accrual clause that would
delay the running of the statute of limitations. See id. The New York Court of
Appeals answered that question in the negative. The rules from ACE and Deutsche
Bank therefore govern U.S. Bank’s contractual claims here.
I. Causes of Action One and Two: Breach of Contract
The statute of limitations on a breach of contract claim in New York is six
years, and this period begins to run when a breach occurs. See N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§§ 203(a), 213(2); Deutsche Bank, 810 F.3d at 865 (citing Ely‐Cruikshank Co. v. Bank of
Montreal, 81 N.Y.2d 399, 402 (1993)). As we explained in Deutsche Bank on facts
indistinguishable from those now before us, “the statute of limitations began to
17
run on the date the R & Ws became effective and were either true or false at that
time.” 810 F.3d at 867.
The undisputed facts are that the effective dates of the R & Ws were May 15,
2006 (GP2); June 15, 2006 (GP3);13 and July 17, 2006 (GP4). The FHFA filed in state
court on May 30, 2012 (GP2); June 29, 2012 (GP3); and July 30, 2012 (GP4). As the
district court correctly concluded, “[e]ach of these actions was filed over six years
after the statute of limitations on the breach of contract actions began running.”
Lehman XS Tr., 12 Civ. 7935, 12 Civ. 7942, & 12 Civ. 7943, 2017 WL 1293773, at *7.
The first two causes of action were therefore untimely under settled New York
law. The district court properly granted summary judgment to GreenPoint.
II. Cause of Action Three: Indemnification Under Section 9 of the MLPAs
When an aggrieved party recovers not from a wrongdoer but from a third
party, the third party’s subsequent claim against the wrongdoer becomes one for
The district court’s reasoned opinion includes a scrivener’s error in its recitation of the
13
effective dates of the R & Ws. See Lehman XS Tr., 12 Civ. 7935, 12 Civ. 7942, & 12 Civ. 7943,
2017 WL 1293773, at *7 (indicating that the last sale date for the GP3 Trust was “June 15,
2008”). It is clear, however, from the rest of the opinion, the complaint, the parties’
submissions to the district court, and the parties’ papers on appeal that the final date of
sale for loans in the GP3 Trust was June 15, 2006.
18
indemnification. See Oscar Gruss & Son, Inc. v. Hollander, 337 F.3d 186, 200 (2d Cir.
2003) (applying New York law) (quoting Hooper Assocs., Ltd. v. AGS Computs., Inc.,
74 N.Y.2d 487, 492–93 (1989)); see also Mas v. Two Bridges Assocs., 75 N.Y.2d 680, 690
(1990) (indemnification arises when “a party held legally liable to plaintiff shifts
the entire loss to another”).
Thus, under New York law, absent “unmistakably clear” language in an
indemnification provision that demonstrates that the parties intended the clause
to cover first‐party claims, an agreement between two parties “to indemnify” each
other does not mean that one party’s failure to perform gives rise to a claim for
indemnification. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Recovery Credit Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 13,
21 (2d Cir. 1996); see also BNP Paribas Mortg. Corp. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 778 F. Supp.
2d 375, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Unless the indemnification clause refers exclusively
or unequivocally to claims between the indemnitor and indemnitee, the court
must find the agreement to be lacking evidence of the required intent to cover such
claims.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Consequently, absent such language,
“[w]here parties agree to ‘indemnify’ each other for losses incurred by a breach of
contract, where those lo[s]ses do not relate to liability to a third party, the
19
characterization of ‘indemnification’ is no more than an epithet for recovery for
breach of contract.” Xerox State & Local Sols., Inc. v. Xchanging Sols. (USA), Inc., 216
F. Supp. 3d 355, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). Put simply, “[a]n action does not become
[one] for indemnity merely because the pleader has so denominated it.” Peoples’
Democratic Rep. of Yemen v. Goodpasture, Inc., 782 F.2d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 1986)
(quoting Bunker v. Bunker, 80 A.D.2d 817, 817 (1st Dep’t 1981)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Here, the distinction between a claim for breach of contract and one for
indemnification is relevant in determining the timeliness of U.S. Bank’s third
claim. Under New York law, a cause of action for contractual indemnification
“does not arise until liability is incurred by way of actual payment” to a third
party. Varo, Inc. v. Alvis PLC, 261 A.D.2d 262, 265 (1st Dep’t 1999) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also McDermott v. City of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 211,
216 (1980). Therefore, if U.S. Bank is correct that it has a cause of action for
indemnification, the third claim in the SACC was timely. If, however, U.S. Bank’s
indemnification claim is merely a reformulation of its breach‐of‐contract claims,
20
the third cause of action was untimely for the same reasons as the first two causes
of action.
According to U.S. Bank, GreenPoint should pay for breaching the promises
it made in the MLPAs concerning the quality of the mortgages it sold. This claim,
U.S. Bank insists, is not the same as its breach of contract claims because “the
parties here bargained for two separate remedies contained in two separate
sections of the MLPAs.” Appellant Br. 28. U.S. Bank contends the third claim is
“independent” because the indemnification provisions found in Section 9 of the
MLPAs allow it to “pursue any and all remedies otherwise available at law or in
equity, including, but not limited to, the right to seek damages,” J.A. 168, 270, in
addition to the repurchase provision found in Section 8. As counsel explained at
oral argument, U.S. Bank is seeking “damages that relate to the
misrepresentations, so that unlike the initial claim[s], there’s an additional element
of proof that has to be established.” Oral Arg. at 2:10–3:30.
Had U.S. Bank paid a certificate holder for harms to the certificate holder
stemming from GreenPoint’s breach, its claim against Greenpoint would be for
indemnity. But the claim here seeks payment to U.S. Bank arising from
21
GreenPoint’s violations of the R & Ws that it made to U.S. Bank as Trustee. It is a
breach of contract claim, plain and simple.
We reach this conclusion for two reasons. First, Section 9 of the MLPAs does
not “unequivocally” or in “unmistakably clear” language extend to first‐party
claims. See J.A. at 167–68, 270 (“[GreenPoint] agrees to indemnify [U.S. Bank] and
hold it harmless from and against any and all claims, losses, damages, penalties,
fines, forfeitures, legal fees and related costs, judgments, and any other costs, fees
and expenses that [U.S. Bank] may sustain . . . [and GreenPoint] shall immediately
notify [U.S. Bank] if a claim is made by a third party with respect to this Agreement
or the Mortgage Loans.”). In the absence of such language, the provision must be
read to contemplate an actual indemnification scenario, in which U.S. Bank would
be entitled to repayment if it paid out costs to a third party. U.S. Bank does not
allege that to date it has paid on claims to third parties directly tied to GreenPoint’s
breaches of its R & Ws.
Second, the allegations in the SACC belie the argument that U.S. Bank is
seeking to recover something different under its indemnification claim than what
it seeks under the breach of contract claims. See J.A. at 1148–50, ¶ 99 (“To date, the
22
Trusts have sustained approximately $1.1 billion in aggregate collateral‐level
losses and damages as a result of GreenPoint’s breaches of its R & Ws and failure to
repurchase breaching Mortgage Loans.” (emphasis added)). The argument that
Section 9 provides an “independent” remedy is, therefore, meritless: the
indemnification claim cannot be “independent” if its success directly depends on
the breaches of the R & Ws in the MLPAs outlined in the contract claims. As the
New York Court of Appeals explained in ACE, even if two sections of the contract
provide alternative remedies for the same breach, “the underlying act the Trust
complains of is the same: the quality of the loans and their conformity with the
[R & Ws].” 25 N.Y.3d at 596.
Thus, U.S. Bank’s “indemnification” claim is in reality a repackaged version
of its breach of contract claims. See Goodpasture, 782 F.2d at 350. There is no
“indemnified” party who covered a loss that should have been paid by a third‐
party obligor. There is thus no “independent” claim for indemnification. U.S. Bank
cannot circumvent the statute of limitations by recasting its contract claim as one
23
for indemnification. The district court properly dismissed the third claim as
untimely.14
III. Cause of Action Four: Breach of the Indemnification Agreements
In its fourth claim, raised for the first time in the SACC filed on March 3,
2016, U.S. Bank alleges breaches of the Indemnification Agreements. These three
agreements (separate and distinct from the indemnification clauses in the MLPAs)
are documents the parties signed immediately before they closed on the MLPAs.
In them, GreenPoint independently represented that it had complied with the
R & Ws it made in the MLPAs. All three agreements contain the same statement:
“GreenPoint hereby represents and warrants, as of the date of the Prospectus
Supplement, that the GreenPoint Information is true and correct in all material
GreenPoint also argues that this claim should be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil
14
Procedure 12(b)(1) because the FHFA did not have standing to file the summonses with
notice in the first instance. U.S. Bank may not, GreenPoint argues, be substituted as the
real party in interest under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) because there was no
“honest mistake” in the initial naming of the plaintiff. In a letter brief it submitted to this
Court pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j), U.S. Bank directs our
attention to a recent opinion from this Court holding that “a plaintiff’s honest mistake is
not a precondition for granting a Rule 17(a)(3) motion.” Klein ex rel. Qlik Techs., Inc. v. Qlik
Techs., Inc., 906 F.3d 215, 227 (2d Cir. 2018). Because we agree with the district court that
U.S. Bank’s claim was untimely on a different basis, we decline to address this argument.
24
respects and includes all ‘Seller Information’ as defined in the [MLPAs].” J.A. 1063
(GP2), 1072 (GP3), 1081 (GP4).
According to U.S. Bank, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), its
claim for breach of the Indemnification Agreements relates back to the filing dates
of the state court summonses with notice, therefore rendering the claim timely, at
least as to the GP2 and GP4 Trusts.15 We disagree.
Rule 15(c) provides that an amendment to a pleading “relates back to the
date of the original pleading” where, as relevant here, “the amendment asserts a
claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—
or attempted to be set out—in the original pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B).
15 The FHFA filed its summons with notice for the GP2 Trust on May 30, 2012, exactly six
years after May 30, 2006, the date that the GP2 Indemnification Agreement was executed.
Therefore, if U.S. Bank’s claim were to relate back to this date, it would be timely.
Similarly, the GP4 Indemnification Agreement was executed on July 28, 2006, and six
years from that date was July 28, 2012, a Saturday. The time to file therefore fell on “the
next succeeding business day”—Monday, July 30, 2012. See N.Y. Gen. Constr. § 25‐a(1);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1). This is precisely the day that the FHFA filed its summons with
notice, and, consequently, if U.S. Bank’s claim were to relate back to this date, it would
be timely as well. U.S. Bank’s claim as to the GP3 Trust, however, is untimely even under
its “relation‐back” theory, because the GP3 Indemnification Agreement was executed on
June 28, 2006, and the FHFA filed its summons with notice on June 29, 2012, one day after
the statute of limitations had run.
25
The purpose of Rule 15(c)’s relation‐back provision is “to balance the interests of
the defendant protected by the statute of limitations with the preference expressed
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in general, and Rule 15 in particular, for
resolving disputes on their merits.” Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 560 U.S. 538,
550 (2010). “[T]he central inquiry is whether adequate notice of the matters raised
in the amended pleading has been given to the opposing party within the statute
of limitations by the general fact situation alleged in the original pleading.” Slayton
v. Am. Express Co., 460 F.3d 215, 228 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Thus, “even where an amended complaint tracks the legal theory of the first
complaint, claims that are based on an entirely distinct set of factual allegations
will not relate back.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This includes claims
that are based on different contracts.16
See, e.g., 6A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure
16
§ 1497 (3d ed. 2018) (“[A]mendments alleging . . . the breach of an independent
contract . . . may be subject to the defense of statute of limitations because of a failure to
meet the transaction standard.”); see also Morgan Distrib. Co. v. Unidynamic Corp., 868 F.2d
992, 994 (8th Cir. 1989); In re Rationis Enters., Inc. of Panama, 45 F. Supp. 2d 365, 367
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
26
The SACC’s allegations of breaches of the GP2 and GP4 Indemnification
Agreements do not relate back to the filing date of the FHFA’s original pleading
in New York Supreme Court. The original summonses with notice involved
actions for breach of contract and declaratory relief (GP2) and breach of contract,
declaratory relief, specific performance, and indemnification (GP3 and GP4) under
the provisions of the MLPAs. J.A. 23 (GP2), 38 (GP3), 53 (GP4). The focus of the
summonses was GreenPoint’s contractual obligation “to cure or repurchase from
the Trust[s] those mortgage loans where R & Ws have been breached.” Id. 24, 39,
54. The summonses, in other words, contained no mention of the Indemnification
Agreements, and sought recovery only for breaches of the R & Ws in the MLPAs,
which governed the initial sale of the mortgage loans from GreenPoint to Lehman.
Although the underlying R & Ws in the MLPAs and the Indemnification
Agreements employ the same terms, we cannot conclude that GreenPoint was on
notice when the FHFA filed the original complaint that the litigation would also
involve the Indemnification Agreements. Indeed, the FHFA had no reason to
include any claims related to the Indemnification Agreements, in which it had no
interest and to which it was never a signatory. Those documents were intended to
27
outline the scope of GreenPoint’s obligation to indemnify Lehman and its
successors for claims brought against Lehman by third parties—not to protect
certificate holders (like the FHFA) from the sale of unsound securitized mortgage
loans.
Simply put, the original complaint and the SACC invoke separate contracts;
the signatories to the Indemnification Agreements and the MLPAs are different;
and the nature of the claims and the remedies they seek are not the same. See
ASARCO LLC v. Goodwin, 756 F.3d 191, 202–03 (2d Cir. 2014); 6A Charles Alan
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1497 (3d ed. 2018)
(collecting cases); see also Lehman XS Tr., 12 Civ. 7935, 12 Civ. 7942, & 12 Civ. 7943,
2017 WL 1293773, at *9 (“[I]t cannot be said that based on the facts alleged in the
original pleading, GreenPoint was given adequate notice that Plaintiff would
bring claims pursuant to the Indemnification Agreements.”). The fourth cause of
action does not relate back to the original filing for claims based on any of the
Trusts, and that cause of action was therefore untimely asserted.
28
CONCLUSION
The district court properly dismissed U.S. Bank’s claims as untimely. For the
foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court granting GreenPoint’s
motions for summary judgment and to dismiss is AFFIRMED.
29
