DENNIS L. HOWELL, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment (# 16, 18). Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to obtain judicial review of the final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying her claim for disability benefits. The issues have been fully briefed, and the matter is now ripe for ruling. Following a review of the record, the parties' briefs, and the relevant legal authority, the Court grants Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denies the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment.
On August 1, 2012, plaintiff protectively-filed applications for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income. (Transcript of Administrative Record ("T.") 18.) Plaintiff alleged a disability onset date of November 13, 2010. (T. 18.) The Social Security Administration denied Plaintiff's claims initially on October 18, 2012. (T. 18.) The claims were denied upon reconsideration on August 27, 2013. (T. 18.) On October 10, 2013, Plaintiff filed a written request for a hearing. (T. 18.)
On February 4, 2015, a disability hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), in Charlotte, North Carolina. (T. 18.) The ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled from November 13, 2010, through the date of his decision, April 16, 2015. (T. 18-30.) Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ's decision. (T. 8-10.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (T. 8.) On October 17, 2016, Plaintiff filed the instant action seeking review of the Commissioner's decision. (# 1)
An individual is disabled for purposes of receiving disability payments if he or she is unable to "engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A);
At the first two steps of the sequential evaluation, the burden is on the claimant to make the requisite showing.
If the claimant fails to satisfy his or her burden at step three, however, then the ALJ must still determine the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC").
At step five, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant can perform other work.
In his April 16, 2015, decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under Sections 216(i), 233(d), and 1614(a)(3)(4) of the Social Security Act. (T. 29.) The ALJ made the following specific findings:
(T. 21-29.)
Title 42, United States Code, Section 405(g) provides that a plaintiff may file an action in federal court seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's denial of social security benefits.
When a federal district court reviews the Commissioner's decision, it does not "re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the Secretary."
In her second assignment of error, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by assigning great weight to the opinions offered by the State agency non-examining psychologists while affording much less weight to the two consultative psychologists. Pl.'s Mem. Law (# 16-1) at 9-12.
The record, as it relates to Plaintiff's mental examinations, reveals the following: On September 27, 2012, Plaintiff received a comprehensive clinical psychological evaluation from Graham A. Hunter Ph.D. (T. 459-62.) At that time, Plaintiff reported experiencing panic attacks in public places. (T. 459.) Plaintiff also reported that she participated in no social activities and has difficulty being in public or in the company of other people. (T. 460.)
Plaintiff explained that over the course of two years, she had experienced signs associated with depression, such as less interest in activities that she previously enjoyed, decreased interest in sexual activity, reduced sleep, reduced appetite, and frequent tearfulness. (T. 460.) Plaintiff also explained that she has "extreme difficulty" with leaving the house and has been unable to function in the workplace since about 2010. (T. 460.) Plaintiff noted that she had previously been involuntarily committed following an attempt to commit suicide. (T. 460.) Plaintiff further noted that she had been treated for depression and anxiety in the past. (T. 460.)
Dr. Hunter described Plaintiff's affect as tearful and noted that she was tearful throughout most of her interview. (T. 461.) Dr. Hunter diagnosed Plaintiff with major depressive disorder, moderate; panic disorder with agoraphobia; and alcohol dependence. (T. 462.) Dr. Hunter determined that Plaintiff's global assessment of functioning ("GAF")
The ALJ gave "little weight" to Dr. Hunter's opinion on the basis that it was inconsistent with Plaintiff's ability to live with a roommate and regularly communicate with friends and family over the phone. (T. 26.) "Great weight" was given to Dr. Hunter's opinion that Plaintiff could understand, retain, and follow instructions and is able to sustain attention and perform simple repetitive tasks. (T. 26.) Dr. Hunter's opinion that Plaintiff had a GAF score of 45 was given "little weight" because the ALJ noted that GAF scores only reflect mental status on the day of the score and do not give an overall picture of a claimant's longitudinal mental health. (T. 26.)
On August 22, 2013, Plaintiff was evaluated by Karen H. Crane, PsyD. (T. 490-94.) At the time of her evaluation, Plaintiff reported suffering from anxiety and depression for "a long time." (T. 490.) Plaintiff also reported suffering from panic attacks "quite a lot." (T. 490.) Plaintiff said that she felt sad and down on most days. (T. 490.) Plaintiff explained that she feels "very" anxious around people and rarely leaves the house. (T. 490.) Plaintiff admitted that she took a shot of vodka in order to get out of the house for her evaluation. (T. 490.) Plaintiff reported that her anxiety had been at the current level for two years. (T. 490.) Plaintiff also reported she had no contact with her adult children and admitted she does not really deal with others. (T. 491.) Plaintiff explained that she last worked in the beginning of 2010. (T. 491.)
Dr. Crane determined that Plaintiff's mood was depressed and anxious, even though Plaintiff denied suicidal and homicidal ideation/plan/intent. (T. 491-92.) Dr. Crane diagnosed 1613163, at 3 n.6 (W.D. Va. May 1, 2017). Plaintiff with panic disorder and agoraphobia, major depressive disorder, and rule out alcohol abuse. (T. 493.) Dr. Crane determined that Plaintiff could understand, retain, and follow simple instructions. (T. 493.) Plaintiff could also sustain attention to perform simple and repetitive tasks. (T. 493.) Dr. Crane opined Plaintiff has "[s]ignificant problems" with social interaction, which would interfere with her ability to relate to coworkers and supervisors. (T. 493.) Dr. Crane further opined Plaintiff's coping ability appears limited, and this would negatively impact her ability to handle work-related stresses. (T. 493.)
The ALJ gave "some weight" to Dr. Crane's opinion. (T. 26.) Dr. Crane's opinion that Plaintiff can understand, retain, follow simple instructions, and sustain attention to perform simple and repetitive tasks was given "great weight." (T. 26.) The ALJ gave "little weight" to Dr. Crane's opinion that Plaintiff has significant problems with social interaction that would interfere with her ability to relate to coworkers and supervisors, and Plaintiff has a limited ability to handle work-related stresses. (T. 26.) The ALJ concluded that these findings were inconsistent with Plaintiff's ability to live with a roommate and regularly communicate over the phone with friends and family. (T. 26.)
On October 9, 2012, Nancy Lloyd, Ph.D., a State agency medical professional conducted a psychological assessment by way of a record review. (T. 78-92, 93-107.) On August 27, 2013, Ben Williams, Ph.D., made a psychological assessment by way of record review. (T. 110-128, 129-146.) Both mental health professionals concluded that Plaintiff could remember simple instructions and work procedures. (T. 27, 142.) The ALJ gave the opinions offered by both professionals "great weight." (T. 27.)
The Regulations provide as follows with respect to the Social Security Administration's criteria for evaluating opinion evidence:
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2). The Regulations direct that the ALJ must analyze and weigh the evidence of record with the following factors taken into consideration: (1) length of treatment relationship and frequency of evaluation, (2) nature and extent of the treatment relationship, (3) supportability, (4) consistency, (5) specialization, and (6) various other factors. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6), 416.927(c)(2)-(6);
At the outset, the Court notes that Plaintiff has not cited and the Court is not aware of any mental health treating source opinions for consideration.
In her brief, the Commissioner argues that "[i]n appropriate circumstances, the opinions of State agency consultants may be entitled to greater weight than the opinions of treating sources." Def.'s Mem. Supp. (#19) at 15. The Court agrees with the Commissioner, but concludes that this is not one of those "appropriate circumstances." In this case, the opinions offered by the State agency record reviewing professionals were used to undercut
In sum, the rationales given for discounting the opinions offered by Drs. Crane and Hunter are legally insufficient, and the ALJ's evaluation of the medical opinion evidence fails to comply with the Regulations. Therefore, remand is warranted.
In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (# 16) is GRANTED, and this case is REMANDED for further proceedings. The Commissioner's motion for summary judgment (# 18) is DENIED.