GLEN H. DAVIDSON, Senior District Judge.
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Credit Acceptance Corporation's motion to compel arbitration [6]. Upon due consideration, the Court finds that the motion should be granted.
On March 13, 2017, Plaintiff Credit Acceptance Corporation ("Credit Acceptance") filed this suit against Defendant Robie Vansteenburgh, also known as Robbie Vansteenburgh ("Vansteenburgh"). On March 24, 2017, Vansteenburgh filed an answer [5] to the complaint [1]. Subsequently, on April 3, 2017, Vansteenburgh filed the present motion to compel arbitration [6]. Credit Acceptance filed a response in opposition [9], and Vansteenburgh filed a reply [10]. The matter is now ripe for review.
On July 28, 2015, Vansteenburgh electronically executed a Retail Installment Contract for the purchase of a 2004 GMC Sonoma (the "vehicle") from Jerry Willis Motors LLC ("Jerry Willis Motors"). It is undisputed that the Retail Installment Contract, which was assigned to Credit Acceptance, includes an arbitration agreement. Credit Acceptance avers that Vansteenburgh attempted to circumvent this arbitration agreement by filing suit against Credit Acceptance, Jerry Willis Motors, and Jerry Willis in the Circuit Court of Itawamba County in Civil Action No. CV17-038PI, wherein Vansteenburgh alleged that those parties unlawfully and wrongfully repossessed the vehicle. Credit Acceptance maintains that the alleged arbitration agreement applies to the claims asserted by Vansteenburgh in the state court action, that Vansteenburgh validly agreed to arbitrate, and that Vansteenburgh is bound by the terms of the arbitration agreement. Vansteenburgh argues in response that his state court claims do not fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement, and thus, that arbitration of his state court claims is not warranted.
As stated above, Credit Acceptance moves the Court to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (the "FAA") based on the arbitration agreement contained in the Retail Installment Contract, and specifically argues, inter alia, that the arbitration agreement is valid and enforceable with respect to Vansteenburgh's state court claims against Credit Acceptance inter alii.
In 1925, Congress enacted the FAA in response to the longstanding, widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that existed at English common law and was adopted by American courts. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1991); Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Inman, 436 F.3d 490, 492-93 (5th Cir. 2006).
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 470 U.S. at 219-20, 105 S.Ct. 1238. Because "arbitration is a matter of contract," courts must "rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms." Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 133 S.Ct. 2304, 2309, 186 L. Ed. 2d 417 (2013). Thus, arbitration may be compelled only if the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute in question. See 9 U.S.C. § 4; Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67-68, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 177 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2010); Janvey v. Alguire, 847 F.3d 231, 240 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
Against this backdrop, the Court assesses whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute in question using a two-step process: (1) whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties; and (2) whether the dispute in question falls within the scope of that arbitration agreement. See Robinson v. J & K Admin. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 817 F.3d 193, 195 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 373, 196 L. Ed. 2d 292 (2016). If the Court finds that the parties have a valid agreement to arbitrate and that the dispute is within the scope of the arbitration agreement, the Court generally examines whether any legal constraints foreclose arbitration of those claims. See Brown v. Pac. Life Ins. Co., 462 F.3d 384, 396 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628, 105 S.Ct. 3346). Courts must "apply the federal policy favoring arbitration when addressing ambiguities regarding whether a question falls within an arbitration agreement's scope, but . . . do not apply this policy when determining whether a valid agreement exists." Sherer v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 548 F.3d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 2008). See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475-76, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 103 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1989); Banc One Acceptance Corp. v. Hill, 367 F.3d 426, 429 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Will-Drill Res., Inc. v. Samson Res. Co., 352 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 2003)); Westmoreland v. Sadoux, 299 F.3d 462, 465 (5th Cir. 2002). The determination of whether a party is bound by an arbitration agreement is included within the broader issue of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate. Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov't of Turkmenistan, 345 F.3d 347, 355 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Smith/Enron Cogeneration Ltd. P'ship, Inc. v. Smith Cogeneration Int'l, Inc., 198 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 1999)). "The purpose of the FAA is to give arbitration agreements the same force and effect as other contracts — no more and no less." Washington Mut. Fin. Grp., LLC v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260, 264 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2); see Pennzoil Expl. & Prod. Co. v. Ramco Energy Ltd., 139 F.3d 1061, 1064 (5th Cir. 1998) ("[a]rbitration is a matter of contract between the parties").
With the foregoing case law in mind, the Court examines whether the parties in the case sub judice agreed to arbitrate the dispute, that is, whether a valid arbitration agreement exists, and if so, whether the dispute is within the scope of the arbitration agreement.
As stated above, Vansteenburgh purchased a used 2004 GMC Sonoma from Jerry Willis Motors, and as part of that transaction, electronically signed the subject Retail Installment Contract. Neither Vansteenburgh nor Credit Acceptance dispute that the Retail Installment Contract contains a valid arbitration provision or that there are no external constraints that preclude arbitration of the claims brought by Vansteenburgh in state court. Thus, the central question is whether the arbitration provision covers the claims alleged in Vansteenburgh's state court complaint. See Ford Motor Co. v. Ables, 207 F. App'x 443, 446 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). In addressing questions of scope, this Court is mindful that "`due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself must be resolved in favor of arbitration.'" See Webb v. Investacorp, Inc., 89 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc., 489 U.S. at 475-76, 109 S.Ct. 1248). "Arbitration should not be denied `unless it can be said with positive assurance that an arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation which would cover the dispute at issue.'" Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Ramco Energy Ltd., 139 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Neal v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., 918 F.2d 34, 37 (5th Cir. 1990)).
The Court examines the pertinent arbitration clause at issue in the case sub judice. The Retail Installment Contract [1-1] provides in pertinent part as follows:
Retail Installment Contract [1-1] at 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (emphasis added).
The entirety of Vansteenburgh's argument in opposition to Credit Acceptance's motion to compel arbitration is as follows: "[T]his dispute does not involve any dispute about the purchase agreement for a car between the parties. It involves the tort of conversion through intent or through negligence. There is no dispute about payments, contract, etc." Def.'s Resp. Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. Compel Arbitration [9] at 1. Credit Acceptance argues in its reply brief that Vansteenburgh provides no legal authority for his position and that Vansteenburgh's tort claims are arbitrable because they fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement in the Retail Installment Contract.
Credit Acceptance's arguments are well taken. Although Vansteenburgh's state court claims may "involve the tort of conversion through intent or through negligence," see Def.'s Resp. Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. Compel Arbitration [9] at 1, the claims nonetheless fall within the scope of the subject arbitration clause. The arbitration clause defines "dispute" as "any controversy or claim between [Vansteenburgh] and [Jerry Willis Motors or Credit Acceptance] arising out of or in any way related to this [Retail Installment] Contract, including, but not limited to, any default under this Contract, the collection of amounts due under this contract, . . . ." Retail Installment Contract [1-1] at 5. The arbitration clause further describes dispute as follows: "`Dispute' shall have the broadest meaning possible, and includes contract claims, and claims based on tort . . . or any other legal or equitable theories." Id. Based upon this language, Vansteenburgh's state law claims which, according to Vansteenburgh, sound in tort, fall within the scope of the clause. The limitation on the breadth of the scope of the arbitration agreement is found in the following subsequent language: "Notwithstanding the foregoing, `Dispute' does not include any individual action brought by [Vansteenburgh] in small claims court or [Vansteenburgh's] state's equivalent court, unless such action is transferred, removed[,] or appealed to a different court." Id. The state court complaint was filed by Vansteenburgh in the Circuit Court of Itawamba County, which is not a small claims court or equivalent court and has "original jurisdiction in all actions when the principal of the amount in controversy exceeds two hundred dollars [$200.00]." MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-7-81.
"[U]pon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit . . . is referable to arbitration under such an agreement," a court "shall . . . stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had." 9 U.S.C. § 3. This Court has discretion to dismiss a case in favor of arbitration, see Fedmet Corp. v. M/V Buyalyk, 194 F.3d 674, 676 (5th Cir. 1999); "[t]he weight of authority clearly supports dismissal of a case when all of the issues raised in the district court must be submitted to arbitration," in which case "retaining jurisdiction and staying the action [would] serve no purpose," Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir. 1992). The Court is of the opinion that the case sub judice should be dismissed, as its limited purpose was to seek arbitration of the claims in the state court lawsuit. See Pl.'s Compl. [1] ¶¶ 13-15.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Credit Acceptance Corporation's motion to compel arbitration [6] is GRANTED; the matter is REFERRED TO ARBITRATION; and this case is DISMISSED.
An order in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.
