RULING

SHELLY D. DICK, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to the Holloway Doctrine1 by Defendant, Ronrico Terrell, Sr. ("Defendant"). The Government has filed an Opposition2 to this motion. For the following reasons, the motion shall be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 2, 2014, Defendant was charged in a Superceding Indictment3 with Count One, conspiracy to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute 28 grams or more of cocaine base and 500 grams or more of cocaine; Counts Two, Three, and Four, distribution of cocaine; Counts Five, unlawful use of a communications facility; Count Six, possession with intent to distribute 28 grams or more of cocaine base and cocaine; and Count Seven, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. On March 19, 2015, Defendant pled guilty to Counts One and Seven pursuant to a written Plea Agreement.4 On August 6, 2015, the Defendant was sentenced to 60 months on Count One, and 60 months on Count Seven, to be served consecutively, for a total of 120 months.5

Having been incarcerated for approximately three years, Defendant now moves this Court for a sentence reduction pursuant to the so-called "Holloway doctrine."

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

The "Holloway doctrine" derives its name from the case of United States v. Holloway6 decided by the district court for the Eastern District of New York. In Holloway, a district judge encouraged the United States Attorney's Office to agree to vacate two or more of a defendant's lawfully-obtained convictions, even though "all appeals and collateral attacks ha[d] been exhausted and there [was] neither a claim of innocence nor any defect in the conviction or sentence,"7 because the judge believed that the defendant's sentence of nearly 58 years was excessive.8 Importantly, the United States agreed to vacate two of his convictions and only then did the court reduce the defendant's sentence. The Holloway court did not claim any broad inherent or residual power to reduce sentences. Indeed, to the contrary, the court "recogniz[ed] that there were . . . no legal avenues or bases for vacating" the defendant's judgment.9 The sentence reduction in Holloway depended entirely on the United States' acquiescence. As the court observed, the use of the Government's "power to walk into courtrooms and ask judges to remedy injustices" "poses no threat to the rule of finality" because "the authority exercised in this case will be used only as often as the Department of Justice itself chooses to exercise it, which will no doubt be sparingly."10 The "Holloway Doctrine" described above has no application whatsoever to this Defendant's case because the United States opposes any reduction of Defendant's term of imprisonment.11

Moreover, as the district court for the Northern District of Texas succinctly stated in Setser v. United States:

This Court agrees with the analysis of the Setser court with respect to the so-called "Holloway Doctrine." Defendant's motion is DENIED.

Defendant has likewise failed to identify any statutory authority for a sentence reduction, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to modify Defendant's sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), which provides that a final sentence may only be modified in three ways: (1) upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons; (2) pursuant to a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) motion by the Government; and (3) pursuant to a sentencing range lowered by the United States Sentencing Commission under 28 U.S.C. § 994(o). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a) also permits a court to correct a sentence resulting from an arithmetical, technical, or other clear error within 14 days of sentencing. Clearly, none of the criteria for modifying a sentence are met here; indeed, they are not even argued.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant's Motion for Reduction of Sentence Pursuant to the Holloway Doctrine13 is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.