METER, J.

In this dispute involving a fire-insurance policy, defendant, plaintiffs' insurance company, appeals as of right a partial grant of summary disposition to plaintiffs.1 Defendant argues that the trial court erred by ruling that plaintiffs' appraiser, Jeffery Moss, is "independent" under MCL 500.2833(1)(m) and that he may proceed with the appraisal process. In the alternative, defendant submits that MCL 500.2833(1)(m) is unconstitutional as a violation of defendant's due-process rights if it permits appraisers with pertinent contingency-fee contracts in effect to serve as appraisers in coverage disputes. We affirm.

In June 2008, plaintiffs' residence in Farmington Hills was severely damaged by a fire. Plaintiffs hired the public adjusting firm Associated Adjusters, Inc. (Associated), to assist them in presenting their claim to defendant. Jeffery Moss, a licensed public adjuster, was assigned to assist plaintiffs. Moss and plaintiffs signed a contract assigning to Associated 10 percent of the total payment on plaintiffs' claim.

A dispute developed during negotiations between Associated and defendant, and when the differences could not be settled, Moss sent a letter to defendant demanding appraisal pursuant to MCL 500.2833(1)(m). He stated that he would represent plaintiffs as their appraiser in the dispute. For the appraisal, he is to be paid on a time-and-expense basis.2 Defendant responded that it would not accept Moss as plaintiffs' appraiser because he is not "disinterested" under defendant's policy or "independent" under MCL 500.2833(1)(m). Plaintiffs then filed this action, seeking a declaratory judgment that Moss is "independent" under the statute and qualified to serve as an appraiser despite his contingency-fee adjusting agreement that remains in effect.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). The trial court ruled that Moss is "competent" and "independent" under MCL 500.2833(1)(m) and thus qualified to serve as an appraiser despite having a contingency-free contract with plaintiffs for the adjusting. The trial court also ruled that the statute is constitutional and does not violate defendant's due-process rights.

This Court reviews de novo both declaratory rulings and summary-disposition rulings. Toll Northville Ltd. v. Northville Twp., 480 Mich. 6, 10, 743 N.W.2d 902 (2008); Maiden v. Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 118, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999). In evaluating a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), a court considers all pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence submitted by the parties. MCR 2.116(G)(5). Evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if there is no genuine issue of material fact. Maiden, 461 Mich. at 120, 597 N.W.2d 817.

Defendant concedes in its appellate brief that this case involves interpreting the statutory term "independent" and does not analyze whether it may add the term "disinterested" to its policy as a separate, additional condition that appraisers must satisfy. Consequently, we resolve this appeal solely on the basis of the language of MCL 500.2833(1)(m). This statute indicates that a fire-insurance policy in Michigan must provide

Defendant argues that because Moss signed an agreement with plaintiffs assigning to Associated 10 percent of the overall amount paid by defendants, and this agreement was still in effect when plaintiffs nominated Moss as their appraiser and in fact remains in effect, Moss has a pecuniary interest in the appraisal's outcome and is not "independent" under the statute.

This Court's decision in Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Allied Adjusters & Appraisers, Inc., 238 Mich.App. 394, 605 N.W.2d 685 (1999), interpreted the requirement in MCL 500.2833(1)(m) that an appraiser be "independent" for the only time in a published opinion since the repeal of MCL 500.2832 by 1990 PA 305, effective January 1, 1992. Before the repeal of MCL 500.2832 and the enactment of the statute at issue here, the analogous former statute had read, in pertinent part, that "each [party] shall select a competent and disinterested appraiser," and should the two appraisers not come to an agreement, a "competent and disinterested umpire" would resolve the dispute. (Emphasis added.) See former MCL 500.2832 (repealed by 1990 PA 305, effective January 1, 1992, replaced by MCL 500.2833 added by 1990 PA 305, effective December 14, 1990). As the decision in Auto-Owners explained, MCL 500.2833 "indicates that the standards for appraisers and umpires are no longer the same." Auto-Owners, 238 Mich.App. at 400, 605 N.W.2d 685. The current version of the statute requires that appraisers be "competent [and] independent," while umpires must be "competent [and] impartial." MCL 500.2833(1)(m) (emphasis added).

Because the statute does not define the words "independent" or "impartial," it is proper to consider the dictionary definitions of these terms. See Auto-Owners, 238 Mich.App. at 398, 605 N.W.2d 685. The Auto-Owners Court indicated that "[t]he definition of `independent' is `[n]ot dependent; not subject to control, restriction, modification, or limitation from a given outside source.'" Id. at 400, 605 N.W.2d 685, quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed). On the contrary, "[t]he definition of `impartial' is `[f]avoring neither; disinterested; treating all alike; unbiased; equitable, fair, and just.'" Auto-Owners, 238 Mich.App. at 400-401, 605 N.W.2d 685, quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed). On the basis of this difference, the Court in Auto-Owners found that an "independent appraiser may be biased toward the party who hires and pays him, as long as he retains the ability to base his recommendation on his own judgment." Auto-Owners, 238 Mich.App. at 401, 605 N.W.2d 685. The Court held that appraisers "are not disqualified from their appointments on the basis of having previously served as adjusters." Id. The Auto-Owners Court did not decide any issue pertaining to a contingency-fee agreement such as the one at issue in this case.

This Court in Linford Lounge, Inc. v. Michigan Basic Prop. Ins. Ass'n, 77 Mich.App. 710, 713, 259 N.W.2d 201 (1977), interpreting the since-repealed statute that included the "disinterested" requirement, held that an appraiser may still be "disinterested" if he or she had previously served as an adjuster on a claim. That case, like the one at bar, involved a contingency-fee agreement paid to a public adjuster. Unlike in this case, the contract with the public adjuster in Linford Lounge was canceled before or at the time the adjuster was appointed as the insured's appraiser in the dispute. Id. at 712, 259 N.W.2d 201. However, contrary to defendant's contention, Linford Lounge does not require that the insured cancel its previously agreed-upon contract in order to appoint its prior adjuster as its appraiser in the event of a dispute. The Linford Lounge Court held only that an appraiser is not disqualified under the "disinterested" standard simply because he or she had represented the insured previously as an adjuster. It did not decide whether the appraiser would have been "disinterested" if the contract had not been canceled. Neither Auto-Owners nor Linford Lounge holds, as defendant implies, that an appraiser currently working under a contingency-fee agreement as an adjuster cannot be "independent."

Because no published opinion in Michigan is directly on point with regard to the present appeal, we examine decisions from other jurisdictions. In Rios v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 714 So.2d 547 (Fla.App.1998), the court interpreted a contractual provision similar to MCL 500.2833(1)(m). The appraisal provision in the contract required each party to "select `a competent, independent appraiser' (emphasis added), and the two party-designated appraisers will then select a `competent, impartial umpire.'" Id. at 548. Given that the contract in Rios, like MCL 500.2833(1)(m), contained no definition of "independent," the court quoted the same definition discussed above3 and "decline[d] to interpret the term `independent' ... to limit the type of compensation which can be paid." Rios, 714 So.2d at 549-550. While the court cautioned that the other party must be made aware of a contingency-fee agreement, it held that an appraiser may be independent while working under a contingency-fee agreement. Id. Another Florida panel held that a policy that required an appraiser to be "disinterested" did not prevent him from receiving a contingency fee for the appraisal. See Galvis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 721 So.2d 421 (Fla.App.1998).

The court in Hozlock v. Donegal Cos., 2000 Pa.Super. 25, 745 A.2d 1261 (2000), stated that "[m]ere partiality does not necessarily render an arbitrator incapable of fair judgment." Id. at ¶ 7. While the policy at issue in Hozlock required only that the appraiser be "competent," the court went on to state that

While Hozlock is not directly on point because it did not analyze the term "independent," it is instructive.4 The court specifically declined to state whether the addition of "disinterested" into the policy would have changed the result, id. at ¶ 14, but, clearly, adding the word "independent" as defined above would not.

Other state cases have criticized contingency-fee agreements in certain contexts. The Iowa Supreme Court invalidated an appraisal award in Central Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 466 N.W.2d 257, 261-262 (Iowa 1991), on the grounds that an appraisal is a quasi-judicial function and thus an appraiser must be disinterested. That court expressed the opinion that a contingency-fee agreement gives the appraiser "a direct financial interest in the dispute" and thus renders him "interested." Id. at 261. The Rhode Island Supreme Court in Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Grabbert, 590 A.2d 88, 94 (R.I.1991), an arbitration case, stated that "Grabbert's party-appointed arbitrator has violated Canon I of the Code of Ethics because his contingent fee gave him a direct financial interest in the award that would tend to destroy public confidence in the integrity of the arbitration process." The court nevertheless refused to vacate the arbitration award because of other considerations. Id. at 96-97. The court in Rios explicitly declined to follow both of these cases. Rios, 714 So.2d at 549.

We follow Rios and hold that a contingency-fee agreement does not prevent an appraiser from being "independent" under MCL 500.2833(1)(m).5 Moss is clearly "`not subject to control, restriction, modification, or limitation'" by anyone. See Auto-Owners, 238 Mich.App. at 400, 605 N.W.2d 685, quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed). He is not an employee of plaintiffs or under any other legal duty to them with the exception of the public-adjusting contract. As such, he is capable of exercising his own judgment regarding the value of the loss in this proceeding and should not be disqualified to serve as plaintiffs' appraiser in this dispute under the "competent [and] independent" standard set forth in MCL 500.2833(1)(m). Moss testified that he makes his own determinations regarding the loss and does not listen to his clients regarding a recommended settlement amount, and defendant's appraiser agreed. Moss is "independent," and we affirm the trial court's decision.6

Defendant next argues that MCL 500.2833(1)(m), if it allows Moss to serve as an appraiser under the present facts, violates defendant's due-process rights. We disagree. We review matters of constitutional interpretation de novo. Toll Northville, 480 Mich. at 10-11, 743 N.W.2d 902.

Contrary to defendant's implication, appraisers in Michigan are not considered to be quasi-judges. They are not held to the same standard of fairness as an "impartial" umpire. See MCL 500.2833(1)(m) (requiring the parties to select a "competent [and] impartial" umpire in appraisal disputes). Public adjusters and appraisers are hired to assist in presenting a claim to an insurance company and to assist in any dispute that might arise, respectively. They are more similar to attorneys than to judges and umpires. Attorneys and appraisers are hired by one party to assist in presenting that party's position, while judges and umpires must take the proposals of both parties and decide which one is to prevail.7

Auto-Owners, 238 Mich.App. at 401, 605 N.W.2d 685, allows for the likelihood of a party-appointed appraiser's being biased towards the party that retained the appraiser. This does not deprive defendant of any constitutional right. The cases cited by defendant in favor of its position assume that an appraiser is directly analogous to a judge. They are not binding in this situation because Moss is not required to be quasi-judicial or impartial. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (it was a violation of due process where the mayor of the city sat as a judge and received a salary increase for convicting a defendant), and Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 129 S.Ct. 2252, 173 L.Ed.2d 1208 (2009) (a West Virginia justice had refused to recuse himself in a situation in which he had a conflict of interest). Moss is not a quasi-judge and there has been no denial of defendant's due-process rights. The trial court did not err in its ruling.

Affirmed.

BORRELLO, P.J., concurred with METER, J.

SHAPIRO, J. (concurring).

I concur with Judge Meter's opinion in all respects. I write separately to emphasize the practical dislocations that would arise from adoption of defendant's argument. Defendant essentially asks that we require the party-appointed appraisers to possess the same level of neutrality as the umpire. Indeed, virtually all the cases cited by defendant address the requirements for judges and magistrates, which is, of course, an absolute standard of impartiality. I agree with the majority that defendant's position is inconsistent with the Legislature's decision to use statutory language that clearly distinguishes between the role of the party-selected appraisers and the umpire. The umpire, upon whom the decision ultimately rests, must be "impartial" while the appraisers need not be. Instead, they must be "independent," i.e. not under the actual control of the parties.

Appraisal is a practical mechanism to resolve disputes without the necessity for lawsuits and the appraiser acts as an expert for the party that hires the appraiser. While an appraiser brings specialized knowledge to the process, all parties also expect that each appraiser will articulate and generally support his or her client's position concerning the claim. In an appraisal, the two party-selected appraisers, through argument and compromise, attempt to reach a resolution of the claim that they both believe is reasonable. If that cannot be accomplished, then the umpire either induces them to bridge their differences or makes the decision himself with one of the two party-selected appraisers providing the second vote. Despite defendant's assertion of a due process claim, at no point does defendant assert that this method yields unfair results or that it is impracticable.

Defendant suggests that payment of an appraiser by contingent fee is corrupting, but that payment by hourly fee is not. This is a distinction without a difference. The appraiser appointed by defendant in this case makes his living acting on behalf of insurance companies and it is either naive or disingenuous to suggest that he will continue to be hired by them if they do not feel that the results he obtains are in their interest. Defendant's appraiser testified that over the past three years alone, defendant has appointed him as its appraiser on approximately 40 claims and has paid him $114,512.03 in appraiser fees. In the 14 recent claims where this appraiser and a public adjustor, presumably working under a 10 percent contingency fee agreement, served as party appraisers, his hourly fees exceeded the policyholders' appraisers' fees by 42 percent. To maintain that he does not have a pecuniary interest in seeking a favorable outcome for defendant and the other insurance companies that retain him is absurd. This is not an attack on this gentleman's probity, because he is, in fact, paid to act as an advocate with specialized knowledge, as is plaintiff's appraiser. The role that an appraiser plays, the fact that he or she is paid by one side to the dispute, and the fact that he or she exclusively (or nearly exclusively) works for either insurers or insureds, is the source of the lack of impartiality, not whether the appraiser is compensated at an hourly rate or by a contingent fee. An appraiser's livelihood depends on maintaining a reputation among insureds or insurers that their respective positions will be well-articulated and supported and that the appraiser will obtain an acceptable, if not pleasing, outcome for the side that retained the appraiser. If we were to adopt defendant's extra-statutory requirements, virtually all party-appointed appraisers would have to be disqualified and the entire appraisal mechanism, which has fairly served all sides for decades, would come to a screeching halt. The result would be more unnecessary litigation.

Lastly, the majority opinion does not address plaintiffs' argument that defendant's policy, by requiring "disinterested" rather than "independent" appraisers, is inconsistent with state law, as it has existed since 1990, and constitutes fraud. Given our conclusion in this case, I agree that it was not necessary to do so and I make no judgment regarding defendant's intent in its continued use of the outdated term. However, it must be noted that defendant's response to this argument is wholly devoid of merit. Defendant suggests that if its policy is out of compliance with the statute, indeed, even if it is purposefully so, it is of no consequence because its policy also states:

This statement, which is itself required to be included by state law, is a sword provided to insureds should they discover that the policy issued to them does not comply with state law. Contrary to defendant's suggestion, it is not intended as a shield for insurers that issue policies inconsistent with state law. Insurers have a duty to comply with state law. The provision justcited is intended to require that compliance, not to facilitate noncompliance.