PATRICK J. DUGGAN, District Judge.
On June 8, 2010, Mertik Maxitrol GMBH & Co. KG ("Mertik KG"), a German corporation, and Mertik Maxitrol, Inc. ("Mertik Inc."), a Michigan corporation affiliated with Mertik KG, filed this suit to recover damages for the unauthorized use of copyrights and trade dress in connection with the sale of gas flow control devices. Before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Honeywell Technologies SARL ("Honeywell SARL") pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b) and 12(b)(6). Defendant Honeywell International, Inc. ("Honeywell USA") has also joined in this motion in part. The matter has been fully briefed, and on February 29, 2012, the Court indicated to the parties that it was dispensing with oral argument pursuant to Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(f)(2). For the reasons stated below, the Court grants the motion in part.
Plaintiffs manufacture a gas flow control unit that is used in certain types of heating appliances. One or more Mertik entities appointed one or more Honeywell entities to distribute this product in Western Europe.
In 2001 or 2002, Honeywell's affiliate in the Ukraine and Russia proposed to distribute the product. Mertik KG entered into an contract with Honeywell's Netherlands affiliate, Honeywell B.V., under which Mertik KG would deliver the product to Honeywell Ukraine and Russia for distribution in those two nations, and Honeywell B.V. would guarantee payment. See Pls.' Resp. Br. Ex. D. The parties renewed their agreement in 2003 and 2004.
In 2010, Plaintiffs apparently learned that a Honeywell entity was producing an unauthorized version of the product in China. TAC ¶ 46; Kern-Koskela Decl. ¶ 17.
In June 2010, Plaintiffs filed this action in the Eastern District of Michigan. They subsequently amended their Complaint twice. Honeywell USA moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, and the Court granted this motion in part. Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration and leave to file a Third Amended Complaint, pointing to new facts supporting their claims. The Court granted leave to amend, and Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint on September 7, 2011.
The Third Amended Complaint asserts the following claims: "Copyright Infringement" (Counts I and II); "Unfair Competition" (Count III); "Unfair Competition (Website Marketing)" (Count IV); "Trade Dress Infringement" (Count V); "Common Law Unfair Competition" (Count VII); "Unjust Enrichment" (Count VIII); and "Injunctive Relief" (Count IX).
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." As the Supreme Court recently provided in Iqbal, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965). The plausibility standard "does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal [conduct]." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965.
In deciding whether the plaintiff has set forth a "plausible" claim, the court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true. Id.; see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007). This presumption, however, is not applicable to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Therefore, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65). Ultimately, "[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 1950. In conducting this analysis, the Court may consider the pleadings, exhibits attached thereto, and documents referred to in the complaint that are central to the plaintiff's claims. See Greenberg v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 177 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir. 1999).
Honeywell SARL argues that the Third Amended Complaint provides inadequate notice of the conduct for which Honeywell SARL is allegedly liable. Honeywell SARL takes issue with Plaintiffs' generic references to "Honeywell," rather than specific Honeywell entities. Plaintiffs contend that the Third Amended Complaint has defined this term to refer to all three Defendants, and thus, an allegation against "Honeywell" should be interpreted to apply to all three Defendants. See TAC ¶ 5. Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint at times refers to specific Honeywell entities, and at times uses the collective term "Honeywell." The Court believes that Plaintiff's use of the collective term gives sufficient notice that all three Honeywell entities are alleged to have engaged in the identified conduct. The heart of Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint appears to be the "Factual Background" section, which uses the collective term "Honeywell" as follows:
TAC ¶¶ 46-73. The Court believes that these allegations make sufficiently clear that all three Honeywell entities are accused of producing, marketing, and selling the Counterfeit Product worldwide, as well as making false representations to third parties. Although it may have been possible for Plaintiffs to be more specific in their allegations, Rule 8(a) requires only a short and plain statement of their claim. That standard is satisfied here.
Honeywell SARL cites a number of cases for the principle that collective allegations fail to satisfy Rule 8's standard. See Honeywell SARL Br. 5. This rule is too broad. Two of the cases cited by Honeywell SARL involve actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Franklin v. Federspiel, No. 11-12483, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80754 (E.D. Mich. July 25, 2011); Flentall v. Mills, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100649 (W.D. Mich. Sep. 23, 2010). The rationale for requiring allegations specific to each defendant in the context of a § 1983 suit has been explained by one court as follows:
Robbins v. Okla. ex rel. Dep't of Human Servs., 519 F.3d 1242, 1249-50 (10th Cir. 2008) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The Robbins court went on to explain that the allegedly tortious acts committed by these types of defendants were likely to be "entirely different in character." Id. The same rationale does not apply here, as Plaintiffs accuse the three Honeywell entities of nearly identical misconduct.
In their motion, Honeywell SARL and Honeywell USA argued that Count III, "Unfair Competition," must be dismissed because it is duplicative of Count V, Plaintiffs' trade dress claim brought pursuant to the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). Plaintiffs' response clarified that Count III is a claim of false designation of origin. Honeywell SARL now contends that this claim fails because Plaintiffs have not pleaded sufficient facts to support liability under the statute.
The Lanham Act imposes liability on "any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services . . . uses in commerce . . . any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which . . . is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive . . . as to the origin . . . of his goods, services, or commercial activities." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). The term "origin" refers to "the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods." Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37, 123 S.Ct. 2041, 2050 (2003). Thus, where a defendant actually produced the goods that it sold as its own, the plaintiff cannot prevail on a false designation of origin claim.
Plaintiffs have not alleged that Defendants wrongfully resold as their own products produced by Plaintiffs, or that Defendants sold their own products under the claim that they were actually Plaintiffs' products. Rather, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants produced an unauthorized version of the product substantially identical to Plaintiffs' product and identified that product as "V5475." TAC ¶¶ 46-47, 58, 63-64. While this conduct may be actionable under other statutes or legal theories, it does not give rise to a false designation of origin claim under the Lanham Act. Count III must therefore be dismissed with respect to Honeywell SARL and Honeywell USA.
Count IV alleges that "Honeywell" violated the Lanham Act by marketing and selling products with protected trade dress through Honeywell's website. Id. ¶ 116. Plaintiffs further allege that Honeywell's sales of these products over the internet are likely to deceive people as to the origin of the products or the existence of an association between Honeywell and Plaintiffs. Id. ¶ 117. Honeywell SARL argues that Plaintiffs fail to allege any connection between Honeywell SARL and the Honeywell website. Notably, Plaintiffs have alleged that "Honeywell USA controls and supervises all information contained on the Honeywell.com website." Id. ¶ 18. Yet as Plaintiffs point out, they have also alleged in Count IV that:
TAC ¶ 116. Because the collective "Honeywell" designation was used, the Court reads this paragraph to allege that all three Defendants, including Honeywell SARL, market and sell the counterfeit product through the Honeywell website. Thus, Plaintiffs' allegations are not confined to the maintenance of the website. Plaintiffs have alleged conduct on the part of Honeywell SARL in Count IV, and Honeywell SARL's motion to dismiss must be denied with respect to this claim.
Honeywell SARL and Honeywell USA assert that Count V must be dismissed because it seeks to protect the product's functionality. It is well-established that "trade dress protection may not be claimed for product features that are functional." TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29, 121 S.Ct. 1255, 1259 (2001). A product feature is functional "`if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.'" Id. at 32, 121 S. Ct. at 1261 (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165, 115 S.Ct. 1300, 1304 (1995)). A feature is not functional where it is "merely an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the device." Id. at 30, 121 S. Ct. at 1260. "[T]he person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of proving that the matter sought to be protected is not functional." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3).
It is readily apparent from the facts pleaded by Plaintiffs that the trade dress they seek to protect is functional. Plaintiffs describe this trade dress to include:
TAC ¶ 130. Each aspect of the design is stated exclusively in terms of its function. The base is described by the components it contains and the functions of those components. The mounting holes allow "attachment to gas appliances," which is essential to the product's use because the product is built into appliances. Plaintiffs describe knobs for adjusting the temperature and turning the device on and off, as well as the operation of those knobs. Such controls are plainly essential to the product's use. The metal slab is also described purely in terms of its use in fastening the top cover onto the product. The proposed trade dress includes nothing that could be considered ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary. Plaintiffs only support for their claim that this dress is non-functional is the conclusory assertion that "Plaintiffs' protected trade dress is non-functional."
Plaintiff argues that the issue of functionality cannot be resolved on the pleadings. While it is true that "[t]he functionality of trade dress is a factual finding," In re Bose Corp., 476 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2007), Plaintiffs have the burden of "proving that the matter sought to be protected is not functional." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3). Plaintiffs are therefore required to at least plead facts that would permit a finding of non-functionality. Here, Plaintiffs have failed to do so, as the trade dress they seek to protect is plainly functional. Finally, Plaintiffs have asserted that their trade dress has acquired secondary meaning in the marketplace as an identifier of the manufacturer, TAC ¶ 132, but where trade dress is found to be functional, "secondary meaning is irrelevant." TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 26, 121 S. Ct. at 1258. Count V must therefore be dismissed with respect to Honeywell SARL and Honeywell USA.
Honeywell SARL and Honeywell USA argue that the "orphan" misrepresentation allegations should be stricken from the Third Amended Complaint. These allegations are:
TAC ¶¶ 59, 72-73. Honeywell SARL and Honeywell USA argue that these statements fail to satisfy the heightened pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which they contend applies even under the Lanham Act if a misrepresentations is alleged. The parties concede that there is no controlling authority defining the appropriate standard.
Plaintiffs admit that they have not asserted a claim of fraud, Pls.' Resp. Br. 12, but seem to indicate that these allegations support their Lanham Act claims. The Court has concluded that Counts III and V must be dismissed. The only remaining Lanham Act claim is Count IV, which concerns the marketing and sale of counterfeit products through Honeywell's website. The misrepresentation allegations are unrelated to this claim, as they involve statements by Honeywell to third parties. Thus, the "orphan" allegations are irrelevant to the Lanham Act claim remaining before the Court. The Court therefore need not address the pleading standard applicable to misrepresentation allegations supporting a Lanham Act claim. Because Plaintiffs have not asserted a fraud claim, the Court finds the allegations in paragraphs 59, 72, and 73 are irrelevant, and should be stricken pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f).
Honeywell SARL and Honeywell USA argue that the common law claims in Counts VII and VIII must be dismissed because the common law does not reach conduct outside the United States. Michigan law typically does not apply to conduct that occurs outside both Michigan and the United States:
Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 413 Mich. 406, 434, 320 N.W.2d 843, 854 (Mich. 1982). Plaintiffs seem to argue that an exception to the rule of extraterritoriality should apply here, but Sexton only recognized exceptions created by the legislature. Michigan common law, of course, is judicially created. Pittman v. Taylor, 398 Mich. 41, 49 n.8, 247 N.W.2d 512, 515 n.8 (Mich. 1976). Sexton appears to preclude extraterritorial application of Michigan common law.
Plaintiffs argue that a Michigan common law unfair competition claim is governed by the same standards as the Lanham Act. They note that the Lanham Act does apply outside the United States in some instances. The Court does not believe, however, that reliance on standards of federal law allows Michigan courts to effectively exercise the powers of Congress. Thus, the common law claims against Honeywell SARL, which only allege conduct abroad, must be dismissed.
Plaintiffs have also brought common law unfair competition and unjust enrichment claims against Honeywell USA. As Plaintiffs have alleged that Honeywell USA acted in the United States, these claims cannot be dismissed on grounds of extraterritoriality. Honeywell USA contends that Plaintiffs' allegations fail to state a valid claim for relief.
Honeywell USA argues that the common law unfair competition claim must be dismissed because it is governed by the same standards as the Lanham Act. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 833 (6th Cir. 1983). Honeywell USA has not sought dismissal of Plaintiffs' Lanham Act claim relating to website marketing, Count IV; this claim therefore remains outstanding. The Court therefore cannot dismiss the common law unfair competition claim on these grounds. Honeywell USA's motion must therefore be denied with respect to Count VII, common law unfair competition.
The Court next turns to the unjust enrichment claim. "In Michigan, a claim for unjust enrichment consists of: `(1) receipt of a benefit by the defendant from the plaintiff and (2) an inequity resulting to plaintiff because of the retention of the benefit by the defendant.'" Erickson's Flooring & Supply Co. v. Tembec, Inc., 212 F. App'x 558, 564 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Barber v. SMH (US), Inc., 202 Mich.App. 366, 375, 509 N.W.2d 791, 796 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993)). Plaintiffs assert:
TAC ¶ 155. Plaintiffs have not alleged that Honeywell received a benefit from Plaintiffs; rather, they allege that Honeywell USA's unauthorized sales allowed it to unfairly profit in the marketplace. Moreover, the Court has already concluded that the trade dress that is the subject of Plaintiffs' claims is not protected under the Lanham Act because it is functional. Accordingly, the unjust enrichment claim against Honeywell USA must be dismissed.
Honeywell SARL and Honeywell USA have requested dismissal of Count IX, which seeks injunctive relief. Honeywell SARL and Honeywell USA argue that this claim must be dismissed for the same reasons as the underlying Lanham Act and unfair competition claims. The Court has determined, however, that Count IV, Plaintiffs' Lanham Act claim relating to website marketing, cannot be dismissed at this time. Not all claims underlying the request for injunctive relief have been resolved. Count IX therefore cannot be dismissed at this time.
Accordingly,
