JOHN W. deGRAVELLES, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA.
Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss ("First MTD"), (Doc. 7), filed by two
On or about September 19, 2014, Cleveland, "who had a significant history of psychiatric illness, including diagnosis of Bi-Polar Disorder," made a threat, recanted minutes later, against a local judge in front of an employee at the Clerk's office for the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Baton Rouge. (Doc. 45 at 2; Doc. 1 at 2.) On that same day, on the basis of his explicit threat, a warrant for Cleveland's arrest issued, and Cleveland was arrested at his home in Donaldsonville, Louisiana. (Doc. 45 at 2; Doc. 1 at 2.) Booked that night into the Ascension Parish Prison, Cleveland was transferred to EBRPP on September 20, 2014. (Doc. 45 at 2; Doc. 1 at 2.) Gautreaux and Grimes allegedly served as EBRPP's "official policy makers." (Doc. 45 at 2; Doc. 1 at 2.) PMS, in turn, provided medical services to EBRPP's inmates, "operat[ing] the facility... [therein] pursuant to a contract with... Gautreaux." (Doc. 45 at 3; Doc. 1 at 3.) Gautreux and Grimes, Plaintiffs claim, "were responsible for providing inmates with adequate medical treatment." (Doc. 45 at 3; Doc. 1 at 3.)
At intake, Cleveland allegedly advised prison officials of his numerous health problems, including suicidal thoughts, bipolar disorder, diabetes, high blood pressure, spinal stenosis, leg and ankle trouble, and peripheral artery disease. (Doc. 45 at 3; Doc. 1 at 3.) Later that day, LeBlanc, Cleveland's daughter, "phoned prison officials and spoke to [Ms.] Linda Ottesen [`Ottesen']," "a supervisor with the prison medical department." (Doc. 45 at 3; Doc. 1 at 3.) Allegedly, she "explained all of ... Cleveland's medical conditions, and medications to ... Ottesen and ... provided the name of Cleveland's primary care physician and pharmacy." (Doc. 45 at 4; Doc. 1 at 4.)
Two days later, Cleveland spoke to his son and complained "that he was on suicide watch, had no clothes or bedding, was
On September 26, 2014, Cleveland again spoke to his daughter. (Doc. 45 at 4; Doc. 1 at 4.) According to LeBlanc, he complained of chest pains and shortness of breath and told her "that he was shackled, on suicide watch, and being denied access to his medication because he was unable to walk far enough for pill call." (Doc. 45 at 4; Doc. 1 at 4.) LeBlanc immediately called Ottesen, requesting that her father be transported to Our Lady of the Lake Hospital. (Doc. 45 at 4-5; Doc. 1 at 4.) Thereupon, Ottesen "assured her that ... Cleveland was getting his medication and would be seen by a doctor." (Doc. 45 at 5; Doc. 1 at 4.) Despite these promises, Cleveland's family "obtained a prescription from his primary care physician for a wheelchair and provided the prescription to the prison medical department." (Doc. 45 at 5; Doc. 1 at 5.) Doctor Charles Bridges refused to honor these prescriptions, and EBRPP staff accordingly refused to accept an actual wheelchair delivered by Plaintiff's own son. (Doc. 45 at 5; Doc. 1 at 5.) In response, LeBlanc called Grimes to report her father's difficulties, but Grimes "informed... LeBlanc that he had no control over prison medical services and that there was nothing he could do about the situation." (Doc. 45 at 5; Doc. 1 at 5.) On October 1, 2014, Cleveland's brother called Ottesen, reiterating his family's concerns over his brother's care. (Doc. 45 at 5; Doc. 1 at 5.)
Meanwhile, during his incarceration, Cleveland repeatedly advised EBRPP officials of his complaints. From October 2 to October 5, 2014, he completed three medical request forms regarding his heart problems. (Doc. 45 at 6; Doc. 1 at 6.) On October 14, 2014, to no avail, he complained of headaches and his need for both surgery and a wheelchair. (Doc. 45 at 6; Doc. 1 at 6.) On October 16 and 17, 2014, Cleveland once more requested a wheelchair, as he could not otherwise "not get his medication." (Doc. 45 at 6; Doc. 1 at 6.) LeBlanc too echoed these concerns on October 17. (Doc. 45 at 6; Doc. 1 at 6.)
On October 19, 2014, Cleveland visited with an EBRPP nurse. (Doc. 45 at 7; Doc. 1 at 7.) Apparently, this nurse noted Cleveland's shortness of breath but did no more than place him on suicide watch due to his seemingly "bizarre and abnormal behavior." (Doc. 45 at 7; Doc. 1 at 7.) Seen by a nurse on October 20, 2014, for his chest pains, he again requested a wheelchair. (Doc. 45 at 7; Doc. 1 at 7.) Around that time, Cleveland's brother once more called to convey his family's increasing worries. (Doc. 45 at 7; Doc. 1 at 7.) On October 21, 2014, Grimes himself reached out to EBRPP's medical department, apparently questioning "why Cleveland was still in lockdown if he had been taken off of suicide watch." (Doc. 45 at 7; Doc. 1 at 7.) A "glitch in the paperwork" was blamed by the unnamed EBRPP official. (Doc. 45 at 7; Doc. 1 at 7.)
Subsequently, Cleveland's condition seemingly worsened, his complaints oft-conveyed to the employees of EBRPP and
Then, on November 10, 2014, Cleveland endured two separate medical emergencies. (Doc. 45 at 8; Doc. 1 at 8.) Rather than provide Cleveland with treatment, EBRPP confined him to "a single cell." (Doc. 45 at 9; Doc. 1 at 9.) Later that November day, Cleveland telephoned LeBlanc and "told her he was having a heart attack"; LeBlanc then called Grimes with this information. (Doc. 45 at 9; Doc. 1 at 9.) Thus, on November 11, 2014, LeBlanc spoke with one more employee of EBRPP's medical department. (Doc. 45 at 9; Doc. 1 at 9.) Though this official revealed that Cleveland's echocardiogram had been abnormal and though LeBlanc thereupon "begged" for her father's transfer to Our Lady of the Lake Regional Medical Center, Cleveland remained at EBRPP. (Doc. 45 at 9; Doc. 1 at 9.)
Sometime after Cleveland was allegedly tazed and slammed into the cell door by three defendants, on November 12, 2014, Cleveland "was found unresponsive in his cell." (Doc. 45 at 9; Doc. 1 at 9.) "He was not breathing, cold to the touch, and could not be revived." (Doc. 45 at 9; Doc. 1 at 9.) As his children tell it, he "died naked on the concrete floor in Cell 10 of Cellblock A1 of the EBRPP after being tazed during a heart attack," his physical and mental problems well known but disregarded. (Doc. 45 at 10; Doc. 1 at 8.)
Based on this alleged chain of conduct, Plaintiffs sued Defendants for sundry violations. Counts one, two, and three focus on Cleveland's general conditions of confinement ("Confinement Claim"); Count Four states "an episodic act or omission claim" ("Episodic Act Claim"); and all four arise under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution ("Constitution") and are alleged pursuant to Section 1983 of the United States Code's forty-second title.
Plaintiff filed the Complaint on November 6, 2015. (Doc. 1.) PMS submitted the Second MTD on December 2, 2015, (Doc. 7), and Gautreaux and Grimes tendered the First MTD on December 7, 2015, (Doc. 8). Plaintiff docketed Opposition to the Second MTD on December 22, 2015, (Doc. 11), and the Opposition to the First MTD on December 23, 2015, (Doc. 13). PMS countered with the Reply in Support of First MTD on January 6, 2016, (Doc. 21); Gautreaux and Grimes did so on January 13, 2016, (Doc. 26). On February 23, 2016, Plaintiffs sought leave to file an amended complaint, (Doc. 36), followed by a motion to substitute the latter filing, (Doc. 37), granted on March 1, 2016, (Doc. 40). Pursuant to this Court's order on March 10, 2016, (Doc. 43), the Amended Complaint
Filed by the Natural Defendants, the First MTD seeks dismissal on the basis of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
First, according to this motion, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim against either person in his individual capacity or provide sufficient facts to "negate the[se] defendants' assertions of qualified immunity". (Doc. 7-1 at 3-4.) In other words, "[t]he Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that Sheriff Gautreaux or Warden Grimes' conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights regarding the medical care of Cleveland," as they have not alleged facts "show[ing] any personal involvement by Sheriff Gautreaux or Warden Grimes[] in providing medical care to Cleveland." (Id. at 4-5.) While Grimes and Gautreaux may still be liable "under a theory of respondeat superior," Plaintiffs have not properly pled the requisite elements for such supervisory liability. (Id. at 5-6.) Neither "affirmatively participated in the treatment of Cleveland's medical needs while at the Prison," and no failure to train or adopt a policy, motivated by either person's deliberate indifference, has been pled, as the law requires. (Id. at 6-8.) In short, "[t]he Plaintiffs do not allege sufficient facts to show that Sherriff Gautreaux or Warden Grimes acted with deliberate
Second, as these Natural Defendants propose, Plaintiffs do not allege sufficient facts to show a violation of Cleveland's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, either as to his general conditions of confinement or due to any episodic act by either defendant. (Id. at 8-12.) As to the former, Gautreaux and Grimes contend that "[a] detainee challenging jail conditions must demonstrate more than an incident; he [must] demonstrate a pervasive pattern of serious deficiencies in providing for his basic human needs; any lesser showing cannot prove punishment in violation of the detainee's Due Process rights." (Id. at 9.) Crucially, as the First MTD thereupon emphasizes, "[t]he effective management of a detention facility is a valid objective that may justify imposition of conditions and restrictions on pretrial detention." (Id.) But Plaintiffs here have "fail[ed] to allege a pervasive pattern of serious deficiencies in providing adequate health care to pretrial detainees with heart problems or mental illness"; indeed, they fail to allege any specific deficiency or omission." (Id. at 10.) Other prisoners may have died as an alleged "result of inadequate medical care," but such a statement does not amount to "a specific claim of a pattern of specific similar omissions as in this case that allegedly caused these inmates['] death[s]." (Id.) To clinch this argument, Gautreaux and Grimes conclude this section: "Plaintiffs have not alleged facts to show that the `conditions' [at EBRPP] amounted to punishment and ... [were] not incident to some other legitimate governmental purpose." (Id.)
Moving on to Plaintiffs' Episodic Act Claim, these defendants first note — "[the] deliberate indifference [required for such claims] cannot be inferred from a negligent or even grossly negligent response to a substantial risk of serious harm" — and conclude: "Plaintiffs' conclusory allegation[s are] not sufficient to show that either Sheriff Gautreaux or Warden Grimes was aware that Cleveland was allegedly not receiving medication, without which he would suffer serious harm; [or] that either actually drew that inference and his response indicates he intended the harm to occur." (Id. at 11.) Accordingly the "stringent test of showing ... deliberate indifference to Cleveland's medical needs" required for an episode claim has not been met by the Complaints as filed. (Id. at 11-12.)
Third, even if Plaintiffs were suing Gautreaux and Grimes in their official capacities, the allegations made are insufficient to establish the necessary form of municipal liability. (Id. at 12-14.) In particular, Plaintiffs have failed to show that either defendant "disregarded a known or obvious consequences of his action," "to identify a single policy or custom ... that caused Cleveland's injuries," or suggest this duo's endorsement of a defective training regimen for their employees and subordinate. (Id. at 14-15.) By not having properly alleged one such defect, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against the Natural Defendants even in their official capacities.
Fourth, Grimes and Gautreaux question the viability of Plaintiffs' ADA Claim. According to these two persons, "Plaintiffs' allegations of deficient, substandard and inadequate medical treatment are insufficient to establish that the[se] defendants
As a concession, Defendants take no issue with Plaintiffs' "state law claims of negligence." (Id. at 19.) Rather, "[i]n the event this Court dismisses the federal claims against Sheriff Gautreaux and Warden Grimes, they respectfully ask that this Court decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim." (Id.) In other words, at least for now, Defendants raise no issue as to factual adequacy of the Complaints as to their sixth and final count.
After summarizing the Complaint,
As to their fourth count, "Defendants' failure to train prison personnel on ... Cleveland's constitutional right to medical care," a right "well and clearly established," "resulted in the ultimate harm: death," while Defendants "certainly knew or should have known that there were serious deficiencies in the implementation of prison policy on access to medical care." (Id. at 15.) In fact, as the Complaint alleges, Grimes had "actual knowledge," and Plaintiffs do "allege a pattern of similar denials," i.e. the death of "at least 4 other inmates" at EBRPP "due to inadequate medical care." (Id. at 15-16) In Plaintiffs' view, Defendants' "policy of failing to provide medical care can be categorized as a failure to implement a policy," this failure sufficient to establish liability for purposes of an episodic claim. (Id. at 16.) Next,
Unlike the First MTD, the Second MTD is predicated wholly upon PMS' reading of the ADA.
Centered solely on PMS' attack on Plaintiffs' ADA claim, the Opposition to Second MTD is substantively and textually identical to the relevant portion of the Opposition to the First MTD. (Compare Doc. 11 at 2-6, with Doc. 13 at 16-19.)
Rule 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). The analysis mandated by Rule 12(b)(6) analysis incorporates the pleading standard articulated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly: "To pass muster under Rule 12(b)(6), [a] complaint must have contained enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Reece v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 762 F.3d 422, 424 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929, 949 (2007)); accord Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir.2009). In the course of this determination, a court
The constitutional rights of a pretrial detainee flow from both the procedural and substantive due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
As Reed explains, "challenge to a condition of confinement is a challenge to `general conditions, practices, rules, or restrictions of pretrial confinement.'" Reed, 795 F.3d at 463 (quoting Hare v. City of Corinth, Mississippi, 74 F.3d 633, 644 (5th Cir.1996)). Though courts "routinely rejected conditions of confinement claims
Axiomatically, "[t]he medical care a prisoner receives is just as much a `condition' of his [or her] confinement as the food he [or she] is fed." Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2326, 115 L.Ed.2d 271, 282 (1991). Furthermore, as a matter of law, "[a] State's imposition of a rule or restriction during pretrial confinement manifests an avowed intent to subject a pretrial detainee to that rule or restriction," and "even where a State may not want to subject a detainee to inhumane conditions of confinement or abusive jail practices, its intent to do so is nevertheless presumed when it incarcerates the detainee in the face of such known conditions and practices." Hare, 74 F.3d at 644; accord Reed, 795 F.3d at 463. Consequently, "a true jail condition case starts with the assumption that the State intended to cause the pretrial detainee's alleged constitutional deprivation." Hare, 74 F.3d at 644-45. Though not expressly, "[t]he Fifth Circuit has at least suggested that condition-of-confinement claims are cognizable against individual actors only in their official capacities." Nagle v. Gusman, No. 12-1910 Section "R"(2), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23747, at *16-17, 2016 WL 768588, at *5 (E.D.La. Feb. 26, 2016) (collecting cases).
In contrast, "where the complained-of harm is a particular act or omission of one or more officials, the action is characterized properly as an episodic act or omission case." Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51, 53 (5th Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). The relevant question now "becomes whether that official breached his constitutional duty to tend to the basic human needs of persons in his charge, and intentionality is no longer presumed." Reed, 795 F.3d at 463 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Hare, 74 F.3d at 645). For such a violation to be found, the official must have "subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to the detainee and responded to that risk with deliberate indifference."
Named after the famed case that first recognized it, Monell v. Dep't. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed. 2d 611 (1978), Monell liability requires proof of four elements: (1) a policymaker; (2) an official policy; (3) a constitutional violation;
Monell "presupposes a conscious adoption of a course of action `from among various alternatives.'" Shadrick v. Hopkins County, Ky., 805 F.3d 724, 752 (6th Cir.2015). The practice that it and its progeny forbid, moreover, must be "so persistent and widespread and so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law,"
Under well-established precedent, a prisoner may bring claims against their jailors for disability discrimination under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ("RA").
Notably, while the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement does not apply under Title II, its "reasonable modifications" requirement — "A public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity," 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7); PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 121 S.Ct. 1879, 149 L.Ed.2d 904 (2001) — has been held to apply in the prison context. Garrett v. Thaler, 560 Fed. Appx. 375, 382 (5th Cir.2014). This distinction has two consequences. Overall, the ADA "does not require prisons to provide
Directly relevant to the Parties' instant dispute, the Fifth Circuit has held
Though "there is no rule barring a plaintiff from pleading both" an episodic act or omission claim and a condition of confinement claim, a court should "properly evaluate each separately." Reed, 795 F.3d at 464. Two related issues — the reach, if any, of the doctrine of municipal liability and the propriety of the defense of qualified immunity — must too be weighed, as each doctrine bears on the plausibility of Plaintiffs' constitutional claims. Last but not least, Plaintiffs' ADA claim must be independently analyzed. In the end, however fragile it may appear to the Natural Defendants now, a reed is still a reed for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6).
To maintain a condition-of-confinement claim, a plaintiff must show (1) a condition of a pretrial detainee's confinement that is (2) not reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest and that (3) violated that detainee's constitutional rights. See Edler v. Hockley Cty. Comm'rs Court, 589 Fed.Appx. 664, 668 (5th Cir. 2014). A "condition of confinement" can be a rule, restriction, practice, or general condition of pretrial confinement. Id.; Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51, 53 (5th Cir.1997). "If the plaintiff seeks to base his or her constitutional claim on an unstated rule or policy, however, the plaintiff must show that one or more jail officials' acts or omissions were sufficiently extended or pervasive, or otherwise typical of extended or pervasive misconduct by other officials, to prove an intended condition or practice." Nagle, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23747, at *26, 2016 WL 768588, at *9 (emphasis in original). For this claim's purposes, a plaintiff need
Here, Plaintiffs' pleading readily — and plausibly — puts forward such a claim. Throughout the Complaints, Plaintiffs allege defects in the medical care that Cleveland obtained during his time at EBRPP, a prison run by Grimes and under the jurisdiction of Gautreaux. According to these two documents, EBRPP officials were repeatedly informed of Cleveland's perilous medical state, (Doc. 13 at 5; see also Doc. 1 at 3-4; Doc. 45 at 3-4), as confirmed by Cleveland's apparently insistent complaints to EBRPP officials, (Doc. 1 at 3-6; Doc. 45 at 3-6), his doctor's own prescription, (Doc. 1 at 5; Doc. 45 at 5), his family's continual calls, (Doc. 1 at 3-8; Doc. 45 at 3-8), and EBRPP's own notes and tests, (Doc. 1 at 7-8; Doc. 45 at 7-8).
When Cleveland asked for a wheelchair, his request was denied for no apparent reason, and an appointment with a psychiatrist scheduled instead. (Doc. 1 at 6; Doc. 45 at 6). And when Cleveland suffered shortness of breath, he was instead placed on suicide watch for "bizarre and abnormal behavior." (Doc. 1 at 7; Doc. 45 at 7). At one point, one prison doctor refused to provide Cleveland with a wheelchair because "he was fat and needed to walk more." (Doc. 1 at 5; Doc. 45 at 5.)Thereafter, "prison officials" at EBRPP, the institution run by Grimes and Gautreaux, denied Cleveland such access "because it ... [had not] been approved of by [the] EBRPP medical doctor," the same man who purportedly refused on the basis of Cleveland's weight. (Doc. 1 at 5; Doc. 45 at 5.) Purportedly, on one occasion, "Grimes informed ... LeBlanc that he had no control over prison medical services and that there was nothing he could do about the situation." (Doc. 1 at 5; Doc. 45 at 5.) Yet, after Cleveland's family contacted Gautreaux, among others, Grimes suddenly "reached out to the prison medical department about ... Cleveland" and "questioned why Cleveland was still in lockdown if he had not been taken off suicide watch." (Doc. 1 at 7; Doc. 45 at 7.)
If this Court treats these and other allegations as true, as it must under Rule 12(b), a certain image comes into plausible focus: though Cleveland suffered from sundry "serious medical conditions," (Doc. 13 at 5), appropriate medical care was never given in accordance with a policy that "serves absolutely no administrative goal," (Doc. 1 at 11; Doc. 45 at 11). Whether stated or unstated, this policy, naturally and logically, had been adopted and/or enforced by Grimes and Gautreaux, both of whom had notice of Cleveland's allegedly inadequate conditions and, on at least one occasion, specifically interceded on his behalf. Not purely "conclusory," as Gautreaux and Grimes claim, (Doc. 7-1 at 10), these allegations tell a dramatic tale.
As a matter of law, "inadequate medical care ... is a condition of his [or her] confinement." Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303, 111 S.Ct. 2321. In such cases, when "[a] jail's evaluation, monitoring, and treatment of inmates with chronic illness" is "grossly inadequate due to poor or non-existent procedures and ... caused ... injury," a court can "reasonably infer a de facto jail policy of failing properly to treat inmates with chronic illness." Shepherd, 591 F.3d at 453; see also Edler v. Hockley Cntty. Comm'rs Ct., 589 Fed.Appx. 664, 668 (5th Cir.2014). True, despite this precept, many courts have nonetheless "reject[ed] a challenge-to-conditions claim where the evidence does not show a systematic policy or failure." Campos, 597 Fed.Appx. at 792. But, though Defendants contend otherwise, Plaintiffs have here pointed to the untimely death of three other pretrial detainees. (Doc. 1 at 11; Doc. 45 at 11.) As such, Plaintiffs have shown
Based on the pleadings, then, Plaintiffs have pointed to a recognizable and unconstitutional condition and alleged that it served no legitimate, non-punitive governmental objective, each pivotal allegation supported by a factual recitation regarding Defendants' knowledge of specific incidents at EBRPP. Bell, 441 U.S. at 539, 99 S.Ct. 1861; Wagner v. Bay City, Tex., 227 F.3d 316, 324 (5th Cir.2000). Regardless of the eventual sufficiency of the evidence to support this claim, this Court is now tasked "only with determining whether there are sufficient factual allegations to put ... [Defendants] on notice of a viable claim." Cheek, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110039, at *41, 2013 WL 4017132, at *15. Based on the existing law, Plaintiffs have done so as to their every conditions claim (Counts One, Two, and Three), the defective conditions alleged so widespread and known that Grimes and Gautreaux cannot now evade responsibility for purposes of Rule 12(b) by claiming their undisturbed ignorance.
In response to this particular claim, Defendants first fault Plaintiffs for failing to allege the prerequisites for supervisory liability. Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d 134, 137, 138 (8th Cir.1989). "[W]hen supervisory liability is imposed, it is imposed against the supervisory official in his individual capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates." Clay v. Conlee, 815 F.2d 1164, 1170 (8th Cir.1987); see also McGrath v. Scott, 250 F.Supp.2d 1218, 1222, 1223 (D.Ariz.2003) (distinguishing between municipal and supervisory liability). In this circuit, "[t]o succeed on a failure to train claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) the supervisor either failed to supervise or train the subordinate official; (2) a causal link exists between the failure to train or supervise and the violation of ... [a] plaintiff's rights; and (3) the failure to train or supervise amounts to deliberate indifference." Gates v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 435 (5th Cir.2008).
For purposes of Rule 12, so long as a plaintiff alleges the existence of certain training deficiencies and how and why the relevant defendants should have known of these particular problems, the necessary indifference will be found. See, e.g., Atteberry v. Nocona Gen. Hosp., 430 F.3d 245, 254, 256 (5th Cir.2005); Whitfield v. Melendez-Rivera, 431 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir.2005). In other words, at the pleading stage, allegations of "tacit approval of, acquiescence in, or purposeful disregard of, rights-violating conduct" will defeat a motion to dismiss predicated on Rule 12(b)(6). Camilo-Robles v. Hoyos, 151 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.1998). For this reason, "[s]upervisory liability can be established without direct participation in the alleged events if supervisory officials implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation
Based on this jurisprudence, Plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient to support constitutional claims against Grimes and Gautreaux in their individual capacities because, considered in toto, they state a factual basis for determining that both men knew or should have known of that EBRPP's system was so deficient as to expose prisoners with ailments similar to Cleveland's own to substantial risk of significantly unmet serious medical needs — i.e., was unconstitutional — and failed to properly attempt to correct it, and that their actions or inactions in this respect caused Cleveland's fatality.
As an additional defense, Defendants blandly assert that "[t]he effective management of a detention facility is a valid objective." (Doc. 7-1 at 9.) Yet, having already attacked Plaintiffs for use of such conclusory assertions, Defendants do so without explaining why the denial of the medical treatment that Cleveland sought but did not receive, the actual and particular conditions to which Cleveland was subjected, was crucial for this end's attainment, see Bell, 441 U.S. at 540, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (noting that "the effective management of the detention facility once the individual is confined is a valid objective that may justify imposition of conditions and restrictions of pretrial confinement" (emphasis added)). Indeed, at face value, Defendants' assertion would immunize any and all conditions from review upon the invocation of such an apparent interest.
Nonetheless, while "[a]mong the legitimate objectives recognized by the Supreme Court are ensuring a detainee's presence at trial and maintaining safety, internal order, and security within the institution," Collazo-Leon v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 51 F.3d 315, 318 (1st Cir.1995), not one of these recognizable aims can said to justify EBRPP's persistent failure to provide Cleveland with a wheelchair or offer treatment of his numerous — and exceedingly well-documented and widely-aired — physical ailments, (Doc. 45 at 5-10; Doc. 1 at 5-10.) Repeatedly, Cleveland allegedly complained of chest, leg, and neck pain, concerns evidenced by his own medical files, and though he was shackled and placed on suicide watch, his physical deterioration was seemingly ignored and left
With an episodic-act-or-omission claim, "the complained-of harm is a particular act or omission of one or more officials." Scott, 114 F.3d at 53. In such cases, a plaintiff "complains first of a particular act of, or omission by, the actor and then points derivatively to a policy, custom, or rule (or lack thereof) of the municipality that permitted or caused the act or omission." Id. For purposes of imposing liability on a defendant in his or her individual capacity in such a case, a pretrial detainee must establish that the defendant acted with subjective deliberate indifference. Id. A person acts with subjective indifference if (1) "he [or she] knows that an inmate faces a substantial risk of serious bodily harm," and (2) "he [or she] disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." Anderson v. Dallas Cty., Tex., 286 Fed.Appx. 850, 860 (5th Cir.2008) (citing Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir.2006)).
To establish liability on a defendant in his or her official capacity, thereby holding a municipality accountable for the constitutional violation, the detainee "must show that the municipal employee's act resulted from a municipal policy or custom adopted or maintained with objective deliberate indifference to the detainee's constitutional rights." Scott, 114 F.3d at 54. The test for this form of indifference "considers not only what the policy maker actually knew, but what he should have known, given the facts and circumstances surrounding the official policy and its impact on the plaintiff's rights." Corley v. Prator, 290 Fed. Appx. 749, 750 (5th Cir.2008) (relying on Lawson v. Dallas Cnty., 286 F.3d 257, 264 (5th Cir.2002)).
Here, Plaintiffs have put forth factual allegations that, if accorded the presumption of truth and considered cumulatively, plausibly establish Grimes' and Gautreaux's knowledge and deliberate indifference for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6). First, while PMS may have been managing EBRPP's medical services, Cleveland's psychological and physical conditions were amply documented in his own files and other sources. Allegedly, therefore, the cabinets and papers maintained by EBRPP, an entity headed and managed by Grimes and Gautreaux, contained explicit and mounting evidence of the precarious state of Cleveland's health and his overlooked medical needs. Furthermore, Grimes was twice informed of Cleveland's dire medical state and at least once spoke to officials about EBRPP's and PMS' treatment of Cleveland. (Doc. 1 at 5, 7; Doc. 45 at 5, 7; Doc. 21 at 3.) Gautreaux, charged with the prison's overall management, had been informed, at least once, of EBRPP's allegedly deficient care of Cleveland; as Plaintiffs allege, "[t]hey wrote a letter to Senator Mary Landrieu, and contacted Sheriff Sid Guatreux [sic], III's office and the District Attorney's office to try to get ... Cleveland medical assistance." (Doc. 1 at 7; Doc. 45 at 7.) Like Plaintiffs' conditions-of-confinement allegations, these assertions, if believed, would leave a reasonable juror with a distinct impression: as Cleveland declined, the
Had Cleveland given no indication of his seemingly perilous condition, had symptoms of his decline not been so pervasively recorded by multiple EBRPP and PMS employees, and had neither official been remotely implicated by the indifferent actions of the sundry individuals working in the very facility that they ran, neither Grimes nor Gautreux could be found liable as a matter of law. Here, however, based on Plaintiffs' papers, see supra Part II.A, a reasonable factfinder could still find that "the[se] official[s] were both "aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed], ... dr[e]w the inference," and, by ultimately choosing to leave the relevant policies undisturbed, effectively assented to the episodic harms, from chills to heart murmurs to a tazer-induced death, inflicted by others working within EBRPP. Krajca, 440 Fed.Appx. at 343; see also, e.g., Reed, 795 F.3d at 464. "[A]n episodic event perpetrated by an actor interposed between ... [Cleveland] and the... [City/Parish], but [it was] allegedly caused or permitted by the ... general conditions" knowingly allowed by Grimes and Gautreux. Scott, 114 F.3d at 53. Having propounded as much in the Complaints, Plaintiffs have done enough to establish their liability at this time.
As the Fifth Circuit has explained, such subjective recklessness suffices for an episodic claim, as this standard "does not require the plaintiff to show that a prison official acted or failed to act believing that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm." Butler v. Hood Cnty. (Estate of Pollard), 579 Fed. Appx. 260, 265 (5th Cir.2014) (citing Farmer v. Brennan,
Put differently, with both repeated failures to take better care of Cleveland and Grimes' and Gautreaux' knowledge of and connection to these discrete omissions' repetition over a two week period having been alleged, an episodic claim against EBRPP's sheriff and warden has been
In conclusion, because the facts alleged by Plaintiffs in support of their claims are not "fantastic or delusional" and their legal theories of liability are not "indisputably meritless," their Episodic Claim must stand for now. Eason v. Thaler, 14 F.3d 8, 9 n. 5 (5th Cir.1994) (citing to Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1833, 104 L.Ed.2d 338, 348 (1989)).
Municipal liability under § 1983 "requires proof of three elements: a policymaker; an official policy; and a violation of constitutional rights whose moving force is the policy or custom." Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018). In the First MTD, Gautreaux and Grimes fault Plaintiffs for "fail[ing] to allege sufficient facts to make such a claim," as the pleadings do not establish these men's deliberate indifference, one of this claim's "essential element[s]." (Doc. 7-1 at 12-13.) In so arguing, however, Defendants have ignored this element's nuanced construction. Generally, a de facto policy that remains in place despite high risks of constitutional violations is sufficient to demonstrate the "deliberate indifference" aspect of municipal liability. Cheek, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110039, at *42, 2013 WL 4017132, at *15. Thus, "[i]f a program does not prevent constitutional violations, municipal decisionmakers may eventually be put on notice that a new program is called for." Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1390, 137 L.Ed.2d 626, 641 (1997). In such cases, "[t]heir continued adherence to an approach that they know or should know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees may establish the conscious disregard for the consequences of their action — the deliberate indifference — necessary to trigger municipal liability." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Effectively, therefore, the applicable indifference standard looks at "not only what the policymaker actually knew, but what he should have known, given the facts and circumstances surrounding the official policy and its impact on the [pretrial detainee's] rights." Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 331 (5th Cir.2008) (quoting Lawson v. Dallas Cnty., 286 F.3d 257, 264 (5th Cir.2002)).
Here, the allegations include at least two key propositions. First, Plaintiffs allege that EBRPP's existing level of medical care inadequately addressed its detainees'
The Natural Defendants' reliance on the defense of qualified immunity is equally flawed, albeit for different reasons. In general, the defense of qualified immunity shields government agents, sued in their individual capacities, "from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305, 116 S.Ct. 834, 838, 133 L.Ed.2d 773, 783 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, "[t]he doctrine of qualified immunity serves to shield a government official from civil liability for damages based upon the performance of discretionary functions if the official's acts were objectively reasonable in light of then clearly established law."
Despite the Natural Defendants' insistence to the contrary, (See, e.g., Doc. 7-1 at 3-4), Plaintiffs have readily met this threshold for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6). Unquestionably, "pretrial detainees have a [clearly established] constitutional right, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not to have their serious medical needs met with deliberate indifference on the part of the confining official."
Precisely because this determination is considered "a fact-intensive inquiry," courts have been reluctant to find the defense of qualified immunity proved on papers alone. Dorsett-Felicelli v. Cnty. of Clinton, 371 F.Supp.2d 183, 193 (N.D.N.Y. 2005); see also, e.g., Sales v. Barizone, No. 03 Civ. 6691RJH, 2004 WL 2781752, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2004); Sims v. Artuz, 230 F.3d 14, 23 (2d Cir.2000). Here, as in most cases, enough facts have been alleged to allow another to infer that Grimes and Gautreaux endorsed and adhered to a policy, whether written or not, or a course of conduct which traversed a well-established right with manifest indifference. At least for now, this conclusion forecloses the Natural Defendants' victory as to this defense.
Plaintiffs' ADA Claim, pled against Defendants
Of course, as Defendants rightly stress, "[t]he ADA prohibits discrimination because of disability, not inadequate treatment for disability." Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir.2010). So construed, the ADA is violated by a prison's or jail's failure to attend to the medical needs of its disabled inmates. Grzan v. Charter Hosp. of Nw. Ind., 104 F.3d 116, 121, 123 (7th Cir.1997) (as to Section 504); Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir.1996) (as to the ADA); see also, e.g., Kiman v. N.H. Dep't of Corr., 451 F.3d 274, 284 (1st Cir.2006) (emphasizing that "courts have differentiated ADA claims based on negligent medical care from those based on discriminatory medical care"); Lesley v. Chie, 250 F.3d 47, 55 (1st Cir.2001) ("[A] plaintiff's showing of medical unreasonableness ... must be framed within some larger theory of disability discrimination."). As in the medical indifference cases, the ADA "does not create a remedy for medical malpractice," Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir.1996), and "purely medical decisions... do not ordinarily fall within the scope of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act," Fitzgerald v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 403 F.3d 1134, 1144 (10th Cir.2005).
Despite this body of law, however, a contrary principle controls in accommodations cases: in case after case, "the Fifth Circuit has held that a defendant's failure to make the reasonable modifications necessary to adjust for the unique needs of disabled persons can constitute intentional discrimination under the ADA." Hacker, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73014, at *40, 2016 WL 3167176, at *13 (citing Melton v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d 669, 672 (5th Cir.2004), and Garrett v. Thaler, 560 Fed.Appx. 375, 382 (5th Cir.2014)). As one court explained, "failure to make reasonable accommodations to the needs of a disabled prisoner may have the effect of discriminating against that prisoner because the lack of an accommodation may cause the disabled prisoner to suffer more pain and punishment than non-disabled prisoner." McCoy v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Justice, No. C-05-370, 2006 WL 2331055, at *7 (S.D.Tex. Aug. 9, 2006); see also United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 157, 126 S.Ct. 877, 880-81, 163 L.Ed.2d 650, 658 (2006). In fact, "where the defendant otherwise had knowledge of the individual's disability and needs but took no action," not even the failure to expressly request a specific accommodation (or modification) fatally undermines an ADA claim. Greer v. Richardson Indep. Sch. Dist., 472 Fed.Appx. 287, 296 (5th Cir.2012);
Here, in their Complaints' first ten pages, Plaintiffs allege that a request for a modification, i.e. wheelchair, was made but ignored, Cleveland thereby finding himself
For similar reasons, Plaintiffs' other ADA claim — that Cleveland "was discriminated against on the basis of his mental illness disability," (Doc. 13 at 18) — survives. To establish a cause of action for discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must show that he is a qualified individual with a disability, that he was excluded from participation in, or denied the benefits of, an available service, program, or activity, and that such exclusion or denial was by reason of his disability. Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir.2000); Pena v. Bexar Cnty., 726 F.Supp.2d 675, 683 (W.D.Tex.2010). Here, based on the Complaints' allegations, every element of this cause of action can be found. On multiple occasions, Cleveland and his family explained his mental disabilities to EBRPP and PMS; their existence was, in turn, documented in these entities' files — and those maintained by Cleveland's own doctor. (Doc. 1 at 3-9; Doc. 45 at 3-9.) Despite this purported knowledge, Defendants did not provide Cleveland with treatment appropriate for the bipolarity and schizophrenia documented in these documents, not to mention his own doctor's written prescription. Doc. 1 at 3-9; Doc. 45 at 3-9.) Even so, he was allegedly placed in lockdown for his "bizarre and abnormal behavior" and "shackled and handcuffed all day" more than once. (Doc. 1 at 4-5; Doc. 45 at 4-5.)
If he or she finds these allegations satisfactorily proved, a reasonable factfinder could readily attribute knowledge of Cleveland's mental disabilities to Defendants and find that PMS, Grimes, and Gautreaux failed to properly treat Cleveland's longstanding problems. Having precluded him from participating in other programs by virtue of his disability as a matter of a policy that they adopted (or did not change), Defendants would thereupon be liable for disability discrimination. In short, based on their allegations, Plaintiffs have put forward a case sufficiently plausible to withstand Rule 12(b)(6)'s challenge.
With Plaintiffs' pleadings containing allegations sufficient to support their constitutional and statutory counts, Rule 12, holistically construed, forbids this matter's dismissal. A plausible case, in other words, has been set forth with more than the minimal particularity required by rule and precedent. Accordingly, this Court DENIES the Motions to Dismiss, (Docs. 7-8).
