DONOVAN W. FRANK, District Judge.
This Memorandum Opinion and Order is amended only to correct an error on page 15 at paragraph 3 with respect to the date of the ALJ's Decision that is to be vacated. Specifically, paragraph 3 of the Order should read: "The ALJ's July 27, 2018 Decision is hereby
In this action, Independent School District No. 283 (the "District") moves for judgment on the administrative record seeking reversal of a July 27, 2018 decision issued by an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). (Doc. No. 20.) The July Decision ordered that the IEP of a high-school student whose parents previously lodged a due process complaint under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. ("IDEA"), be revised to include additional features and services. (See Doc. No. 1 ("Compl.") ¶ 2; Doc. No. 2 (the "July Decision").) In addition, Defendants E.M.D.H. (the "Student"), a minor, by and through her parents and next friends, L.H and S.D. (the "Parents"), move for judgment as a matter of law and to strike the Declaration of Peter Martin (Doc. No. 23). (Doc. No. 37.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the District's motion on jurisdictional grounds, denies the Defendants' motions, and vacates the July Decision.
Defendants assert that the Student has been denied her right to a free and appropriate education under the IDEA. In a March 16, 2018 hearing decision (the "March Decision"), the ALJ found the Student eligible for special education and ordered, among other things, that the District implement an IEP with certain substantive features. Specifically, the March Decision required the District to immediately change the Student's educational placement by providing her a free, appropriate public education ("FAPE") consisting of special education and related services, at public expense, until her high-school graduation. (See Civ. No. 18-935 ("E.M.D.H. I"), Doc. No. 2 (the "March Decision").) As part of the March Decision, the ALJ reached the following conclusions:
(Id. at 4-5.) The ALJ further ordered that:
7. The School District must, within 30 days of the date of this Order, reimburse Parents $2,430 for the assessment conducted by Dr. Reese in May, 2017.
8. Parents are the prevailing party in this matter.
(Id. at 28-29.)
On April 4, 2018, the District brought an action in this Court, E.M.D.H. I, challenging the March Decision.
(E.M.D.H. I, Doc. No. 21 at 12.) While Defendants argued for these additional components in their opposition to the District's motion for a stay, Defendants, notably, did not cross-appeal the March Decision to add these services.
On April 10, 2018, the District convened the IEP team. (Doc. No. 19 (Administrative Record ("AR")) at 41.) Defendants, their attorney, and four private providers (including Lindstrom and Selnes) attended the meeting. (Id.) Proposals were put forward by both the District and the Parents. For example, the District proposed three two-hour academic sessions per week, while Defendants proposed five three-hour sessions per week, plus private in-home behavioral therapy services, private mental health therapy, a private "community navigator," letter grades for PLATO credits, and goals related to Student spending less time in her bedroom, maintaining consistent sleep, and completing chores at home. (AR 44, 681-87.) The record shows that the IEP team considered Defendants' proposals. For example, the IEP team specifically discussed the five-day schedule versus the three-day schedule for academic sessions and decided that the five-day schedule might be "too fast" and that the three-day schedule was preferable to begin with and build up from. (AR 42.)
On April 13, 2018, the District sent a proposed IEP to Defendants (the "IEP"). (AR 66, 351.) Among other things, the IEP provided for the following:
(AR 1792-1795.) On April 16, 2018, the Parents gave their written consent to implement the IEP "as proposed." (AR 748-749.) On that same day, Defendants' attorney sent a letter to the District's attorney, acknowledging the Parents' consent, but also noted "insufficiency" of the IEP in the following areas: provision of behavior support services proposed by Selnes; letter grades; psychological services and counseling supports; and consistent and increasing ESY services. (AR 762-63.)
On April 24, 2018, the parties began to implement the IEP. For example, on that day, Carey Hermanson, a licensed EBD teacher, began meeting with the Student at the public library for three two-hour sessions per week. (AR 328.) The record demonstrates that the Student earned high scores on PLATO assessments (AR 329), was motivated (AR 329-331), and, at least through June 26, 2018, spent more time working on PLATO than in the preceding several months, earning two academic credits (AR 350).
On May 15, 2018, the Parents initiated a second due process hearing, seeking to add features to the IEP, including:
(AR 1645-1648.) Defendants requested the same ALJ from E.M.D.H. I, Hearing Officer James Mortenson, because of his familiarity with the "closely related" issues. (AR 1648.) The Minnesota Department of Education ("MDE") granted the request.
The District's attorney requested that the Chief Administrative Law Judge ("Chief ALJ") of the Minnesota Office of Administrative Hearings disqualify ALJ Mortenson, arguing that he had treated the District unfairly in E.M.D.H. I. (AR 1617-1629.) On May 2, 2018, while the request was pending, ALJ Mortenson held a pre-hearing conference, during which the ALJ proposed to hold the due process hearing on July 10-12, 2018. (AR 1524, 1552.) The District's counsel told the ALJ that he was not available on those days because of a previously scheduled vacation abroad and, instead, proposed a hearing beginning on July 19, 2018. The ALJ denied the request. And when the District requested that the hearing time line be extended for good cause, the Parents objected, and the ALJ declined to find good cause, reasoning that another attorney could represent the District. Facing the prospect of being represented by an attorney lacking familiarity with E.M.D.H. I, the District sent the Chief ALJ a supplemental declaration in support of its disqualification request outlining the ALJ's adoption of an "onerous, prejudicial and fundamentally unfair" hearing schedule. (AR 1499-1504.) The Chief ALJ denied the disqualification request.
Also during the May 22, 2018 prehearing conference, the ALJ summarized the issues raised by Defendants as:
(AR 1530.) When asked if this adequately framed the issues, counsel for the Parents answered "Yes." (Id.)
The District filed a motion for summary disposition, arguing that: (1) the appeal of E.M.D.H. I to this Court divested the ALJ of jurisdiction; (2) res judicata barred consideration of the claims; (3) the IEP proposed and implemented by the District was reasonably calculated to provide the Student a FAPE; and (4) changing the District's grading methods is beyond the scope of the ALJ's authority. (AR 1440-1454.) On May 30, 2018, the District and the Parents and their attorney participated in a conference, during which the District agreed to provide ESY services during the summer of 2018 three days per week. On June 26, 2018, the ALJ denied the District's pending motion for summary judgment, explaining, in part, that he had jurisdiction over the second hearing because E.M.D.H. I concerned the March Decision, and the second hearing request was centered on the IEP, which did not yet exist in March 2018. In addition, the ALJ concluded that res judicata did not apply because the IEP "was not fully and completely dictated by the March 16 Order" and the parents were presenting a new claim about the IEP. (AR 1342-1343.)
On July 27, 2018, the ALJ issued the July Decision, holding that the District had denied the Student a FAPE. (Doc. No. 2 at 26.) The ALJ ordered that the IEP be immediately revised to include the following provisions for the Student:
(July Decision at 18-19.)
The District then brought the present appeal, seeking reversal of the July Decision. Both parties seek judgment in their favor as a matter of law.
A motion for judgment on the record in an IDEA case is a request that a final judgment be issued in what is essentially a bench trial on a stipulated record. Slama v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2580, 259 F.Supp.2d 880, 882 (D. Minn. 2003). The reviewing Court makes its decision independently, based on a preponderance of the evidence, as to whether the IDEA was violated. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C); Sneitzer v. Iowa Dep't of Educ., 796 F.3d 942, 948 (8th Cir. 2015). The Eighth Circuit has emphasized that this review is "not necessarily de novo," and the reviewing court must give "due weight" to the ALJ's decision, not substituting its judgment for that of the school officials. See Sneitzer, 796 F.3d at 948.
As an initial matter, the Court addresses whether the ALJ lacked jurisdiction over the second hearing. The District argues that the Parents' appeal of the March Decision in E.M.D.H. I vested this Court with jurisdiction over the March Decision's conclusions on both eligibility and the proper provisions of the initial IEP, and therefore that the ALJ was divested of jurisdiction over those matters and could not revise the IEP. The Court agrees.
A special education due process hearing decision is "final" subject to the right to appeal the decision in federal district court. 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.514, 300.516. The district courts have jurisdiction over the appeals. 24 C.F.R. § 300.516(d). "The filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance — it confers jurisdiction in the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal." Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982).
The Court has carefully reviewed the issues presented in the second due-process hearing and compared them to those considered in the first due-process hearing and the resulting March Decision in E.M.D.H. I. The Court finds that requests in the second hearing were encompassed by the first due process hearing that resulted in the March Decision. Indeed, the request for letter grades, ESY, extracurricular and community activities, and private in-home behavioral services were all part of the testimony by Defendants' witnesses in the first due process hearing. In addition, during the first hearing, the ALJ explicitly asked the parties to include recommendations on the appropriate contents of the IEP in their closing briefs.
The District appealed, and asked the Court to stay portions of the March Decision.
The appeal of the March Decision in E.M.D.H. I vested the Court with jurisdiction over the March Decision, and the March Decision, in turn, encompassed the required contents of the Student's IEP. The issues presented in the second hearing relate directly to what Defendants perceive as the required contents of the IEP. Indeed, in the second hearing and this action, Defendants represent that the IEP proposed in April 2018 "could not possibly meet [Student's] needs." (Doc. No. 38 at 3.) Even so, Defendants consented to the IEP and soon after initiated a second due process hearing. Yet, Defendants acknowledge that the second due process hearing addressed services and components that should have been included in the IEP. Defendants submit that these additional services are separate and distinct from those at issue in E.M.D.H. I, namely because they were not asserted until after the IEP was created and because the March Decision only decided issues of eligibility and the basic contours of an initial IEP. However, as discussed above, the services that Defendants now request were addressed in the first hearing, and had Defendants wanted the IEP to specifically provide these services, the proper procedure would have been to file their own appeal of the March Decision to take issue with its conclusions and the scope of the order. Defendants did not do so.
Defendants' second hearing request is a request to supplement the IEP. However, the District's appeal of E.M.D.H. I to this Court divested the ALJ of jurisdiction over the March Decision and the provisions of the IEP. Therefore, the ALJ was not permitted to reexamine, supplement, or change the IEP. For this reason, the Court concludes that the July Decision is properly vacated. See, e.g., Dep't of Educ. of Hawaii v. Leo W., 226 F.Supp.3d 1081, 1096-98 (D. Hawaii 2016) (vacating a hearing officer's decision on an issue over which he lacked jurisdiction).
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein,
1. The District's Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record (Doc. No. [20]) is
2. Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Record and to Strike (Doc. No. [37]) is
3. The ALJ's July 27, 2018 Decision is hereby
4. The Court directs the Clerk of Court to amend paragraph 3 of the Judgment (Doc. No. [53]) accordingly.
