ELIZABETH A. STAFFORD, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Terri Moten's complaint against Defendant Michael Monicatti and other defendants
After Moten filed her complaint in November 2017, she requested and was granted entry of a default against Monicatti in January 2018. [ECF Nos. 1, 5, 8]. But the parties stipulated in February 2018 to set aside the default, and Monicatti filed an answer to the complaint later that month. [ECF Nos. 16, 17]. An attorney for Monicatti signed the parties' joint status report under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f), but the report stated that the attorney would be withdrawing and that Monicatti would be representing himself in pro per. [ECF No. 23]. A March 2018 order allowed Monicatti's attorney to withdraw. [ECF No. 25].
The parties agreed in the joint report that Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosures would be due on April 18, 2018, and Chief Judge Hood incorporated that deadline into the scheduling order. [ECF Nos. 23, 24]. The scheduling order also required initial witness lists to be exchanged by June 25, 2018, and discovery to be completed by August 13, 2018. [ECF No. 24]. Moten filed her initial witness list on June 25, 2018, [ECF No. 28]; Monicatti did not file one. Moten also filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint in June 2018. [ECF No. 29]. Monicatti filed neither a response to that motion nor an answer to the amended complaint, which was filed on July 24, 2018. [ECF No. 38].
On June 29, 2018, Moten filed a motion to compel Monicatti to produce initial disclosures, and to answer requests for production of documents and interrogatories under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 33 and 34. [ECF No. 30]. An exhibit to the motion shows that Moten's attorney, Adam Taub, sent an email to Monicatti asking for concurrence in the motion to amend the complaint and a motion to compel initial disclosures. [ECF No. 30-2, PageID.250]. Monicatti responded on May 2, 2018 asking for clarification, which Taub provided. [Id., PageID.248-49]. Taub sent Monicatti another email asking for concurrence before filing the motion to compel. [Id., PageID.248]. There is no indication that Monicatti ever responded to Taub after his May 2nd email.
The local rule required Monicatti to file a response to the motion to compel within 14 days after he was served with it. E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(e)(2). Monicatti failed to timely respond to the motion to compel, so this Court ordered him to respond to the motion to compel no later than July 27, 2018, and warned him that failure to respond could lead to sanctions, including a default judgment against him. [ECF No. 36]. Monicatti did not file a response by July 27, so the Court issued an order for him to show cause by August 16, 2018 why he should not be sanctioned or a default judgment should not be entered against him. [ECF No. 41]. Again, Monicatti failed to respond. He has deserted this litigation, and a default judgment should be entered against him.
In Dell, Inc. v. Advicon Computer Servs., Inc., the court noted that, although no rule or statute authorizes entry of default judgment for failure to obey court orders in general, it is well established that a court has the inherent authority to do so. No. 06-11224, 2007 WL 2021842, at *5 (E.D. Mich. July 12, 2007) (Lawson, J.). The Dell court cited several examples:
Id. In the absence of Sixth Circuit authority establishing the appropriate circumstances for entering a default judgment for failure to abide by court orders, the Dell court relied on the established Sixth Circuit test for entering a default judgment as a discovery sanction:
Id., (citing Bank One of Cleveland, N.A. v. Abbe, 916 F.2d 1067, 1073 (6th Cir.1990).
In United States v. Griffin, the court relied on Dell to recommend a default judgment against the defendant. No. 12-13927, 2013 WL 1843779 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 20, 2013), adopted, 2013 WL 1831323 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 30, 2013). The defendant in Griffin had failed to respond to a motion for summary judgment despite being warned that such a failure may result in sanctions, including a grant of summary judgment in the plaintiff's favor. Id. at *1. After the defendant failed to respond to the motion for summary judgment, the court issued an order for the defendant to show cause why summary judgment or a default should not be entered in the plaintiff's favor. Id. The defendant still did not respond to the motion for summary judgment, and did not respond to the show cause order. Id.
Applying the four factors, the Griffin court found that the defendant's failures were her fault, and emphasized that "the Court does not expect plaintiff to either wait indefinitely or continue to incur litigation expenses when it is clear that defendant has abandoned all defense of this matter." Id. at *2. The Griffin court also saw "no utility in considering or imposing lesser sanctions" since the defendant had not filed responses as ordered, including her failure to respond to the show cause order. Id. The court thus recommended that a default judgment be entered in an amount to be determined by the district court, and that all pending motions be terminated as moot. Id.
Application of the four factors outlined in Dell to this case renders the same recommendation as in Griffin. Monicatti failed to respond to Moten's motion to compel, despite being ordered to do so, and failed to respond to this Court's show cause order. As in Griffin, he failed to respond to those orders despite being warned that his failure to do so could result in a default judgment. Monicatti's failure to respond to this Court's orders is the result of willfulness, bad faith or, at the very least, his fault. Monicatti's desertion of this case has also prejudiced Moten, in that the discovery cutoff has passed without Monicatti providing initial disclosures, a witness list or responses to Moten's discovery requests. Moten should not be expected to wait indefinitely or to incur any more expenses in an attempt to compel Monicatti to participate in this litigation. Finally, like the court in Griffin, this Court sees no utility in considering or imposing lesser sanctions given Monicatti complete failure to respond to respond as directed to previous orders. Thus, all of the factors outlined in Dell weigh in favor of entering a default judgment against Monicatti.
The Court
Either party to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and Recommendation, but must act within fourteen days of service of a copy hereof as provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). Filing objections which raise some issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all objections that party might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Secretary of HHS, 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). A copy of any objection must be served upon this Magistrate Judge. E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2).
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